Social signals as design interventions for enhancing citizen science contributions*

Despite the scientific potential and increasing popularity of web-based citizen science, low contribution from volunteers is often a major hurdle. Studies have shown that individual behavior could be altered through targeted design interventions, but little is known about the specific factors that modulate volunteers’ contributions. A particularly elusive question entails the role of social feedback, in the form of targeted notifications about the contribution of other volunteers. Based on social comparison theory, we hypothesized that (1) volunteers increase contribution when presented with information about a high-performing peer or group, and (2) volunteers conform more strongly to a group rather than to a single peer. To test whether volunteers’ contributions change due to the exposure to the contribution of a peer or group norm, we systematically varied the information presented to participants in an environmental monitoring citizen science project. Volunteers increased their contributions when they were presented with the contribution of a high-performing peer and norm, but they were not influenced by a low-performing peer or norm. Further, we found that volunteers were more likely to match the contributions of a group than that of a peer. However, when volunteers were simultaneously exposed to information about a peer and a group, the effect depended on the respective performance of the peer and group. A theoretical model was developed to explain volunteers’ response and dissect the specific role of social comparison. Our findings offer the possibility of increasing volunteers’ contributions through design interventions.     

Cooperation between newcomers and incumbents: The role of normative disagreements

Cooperation in groups often requires individual members to make costly contributions that benefit the group as a whole. Prior research suggests that shared norms can help to support ingroup cooperation by prescribing common standards of how much to contribute. These common standards may be disrupted when groups undergo membership change, i.e., when members from outgroups enter the ingroup. When newcomers and incumbents have different notions about how much to contribute, a normative disagreement ensues that could undermine cooperation and the extent to which individuals identify with the group. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate whether newcomers and incumbents disagree about how much to contribute in a public goods game with peer punishment. We examine whether normative disagreement between newcomers and incumbents affects newcomer-incumbent relations in terms of group identification, the emergence of a social norm, and costly punishment. The main goal is to test whether normative disagreement and the resulting newcomer-incumbent relations harm cooperation in terms of contributions to the common good. We find that normative disagreement between newcomers and incumbents negatively affects the emergence of a shared social norm and lowers feelings of group identification. Contrary to expectations, normative disagreement does not affect cooperation negatively. Instead, participants adjust their behavior to each other’s standards, using punishment for norm enforcement. This punishment is especially directed at low-contributing newcomers, leading them to conform to the incumbents’ higher contribution standards.     

Communication, equity and the voluntary provision of a public good by heterogeneous groups

Twenty-four laboratory sessions were conducted to evaluate the roles of communication and group heterogeneity when voluntary contributions determine the level of public good provision by small groups of individuals. Simple heterogeneity has one individual in a group having either greater endowment of resources or a greater preference for the public good than the others. Complex heterogeneity has one individual in a group having both higher endowment and greater preference for the public good. Without communication, members of heterogeneous groups tend to coordinate more on equal contribution shares than predicted by the conventional public goods model but consistent with a model incorporating a preference for equity. The distribution of relative contributions and total payoffs within groups exhibit strong interactions between communication and heterogeneity, leading to less equitable distributions of payoffs as heterogeneity becomes more complex. A model of equity theory helps to organize the results. Results suggest that communication may refocus the objective of group members.     

Reporting Volunteer Labour at the Organizational Level: A Study of Canadian Nonprofits

Volunteer contributions in the production of services are an important resource internationally. However, few countries include volunteer contributions in their national accounts, even though many encourage their populations to engage in volunteering. At the organizational level, many nonprofit organizations using volunteers often limit their input to a footnote in annual reports acknowledging their contribution; few estimate their value in financial terms. As a result, their financial accounts lack information upon which to base decisions affecting the organizations and the communities they serve. Additional information is required to assess the impact of volunteers in individual nonprofits as well as the sector as a whole. This study focuses on Canada, one of the few countries that include volunteers in the national accounts, to examine to what extent nonprofit organizations estimate a financial value for these contributions and include this in their financial statements. This paper reports the results of an online survey of 661 nonprofits from across Canada. In order to understand why some organizations keep records for volunteer contributions and quantify them, two sets of explanatory factors are explored: organizational characteristics and the attitude of the executive director. We find larger organizations were more likely to engage in record keeping and estimating volunteer value, as were organizations with a relatively large group of volunteers and volunteer programs. The attitude of the executive director is important in determining which organizations engage in these practices.     

VANISHING LEADERSHIP AND DECLINING RECIPROCITY IN A SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT

We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round (“sequential treatment with information”) to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds, but cannot observe earlier contributions (“sequential treatment without information”). We also investigate whether average contributions are affected by the length of the sequence by varying group size. Our results show that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions, but that the level of contributions increases when subjects are informed about the contributions of lower‐ranked subjects. We provide evidence that the so‐called “leadership effect” vanishes within rounds, and that group size has no significant impact on the average level of contributions in our sequential contribution games. (JEL C92, H41, D63)     

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)     

Inequality and public good provision: An experimental analysis

Recent studies report that economic inequality is associated with reduced government expenditures on social programs. Several prominent social scientists, including Putman (Putnam, R., 2000. Bowling Alone. Simon and Schuster, New York), attribute this to the detrimental “psychosocial effects” of group heterogeneity on cooperation. We test the hypothesis that inequality within a group reduces individual contributions in a public goods experiment. Unlike previous examinations of inequality and public good provision, we introduce inequality by manipulating the levels and distributions of fixed payments given to subjects. When made salient through public information about each individual's standing within the group, inequality reduces contributions to the public good for all group members.     

Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers

Reducing the social distance between taxpayers and tax authorities boosts taxpayers’ acceptance of tax load and tax compliance. In the present experiment participants had the opportunity to pay their tax due either as one single compliance decision or as separate compliance decisions for each type of requested contribution (coined voice on contributions). In addition, contributions were either distributed according to a fixed scheme exogenously chosen, or participants had the possibility to change the distribution pattern (coined voice on distribution). Furthermore information about participants’ contributions was either clearly related to the tax context or related to government public expenditures (coined context). Besides analyzing the effect of voice and context on compliance, order of tax payments was controlled for in the analyses. Results show that having voice on tax contributions and on tax distribution leads to higher compliance. Moreover, compliance was higher in the context avoiding tax framing.     

Information flow through strong and weak ties in intraorganizational social networks

Strong and weak ties are compared in terms of their contributions to information flow about the work activity of persons in intraorganizational social networks. Strong ties are more important than weak ties in promoting information flow about activities within an organizational subsystem. Weak ties are more important than strong ties in promoting information flow about activities outside an organizational subsystem. The strength of weak ties in promoting boundary-spanning information flows lies not in their individual efficiency but in their numbers. In general, production of the highest probabilities of information flow is associated with a combination of both weak and strong ties.     

COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT

We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings. (JEL D72, H41, C93)     

What causes more mistrust: profile owners deleting user-generated content or website contributors masking their identities?

People regularly rely on user-generated contributions to websites to inform their opinions about people, companies, organizations, and products. This study examines how two website affordances uniquely affect the evaluation of user-generated content. Specifically, an experiment was conducted that varied whether a website (a) affords profile owners the ability to delete user-generated contributions or (b) verifies the identity of users who post evaluations of profile owners. The results suggest that although deleting user-generated content is viewed as more problematic, both forms of information control independently affect how viewers evaluate a website and the content it hosts. The findings help establish the conditions under which certain forms of information control differentially produce uncertainty and mistrust and thus have direct implications for warranting theory.     

Using focus groups to explore the nature of prayer in late life

The purpose of this article is to present results from a series of focus groups that were designed to explore the nature and personal meaning of prayer in late life. Eight focus groups were conducted consisting of 63 adults age 65 and older. Three major themes associated with prayer emerged from the group discussions. First, study participants identified a number of beliefs about how prayer operates, including beliefs about the timing and nature of answers to prayers. Second, some participants felt it was important to distinguish between group and individual prayers. In the process, they discussed several ways in which the nature and impact of group and individual prayers may differ. Third, participants in our focus groups helped clarify what initially appeared to be a rather passive approach to the use of prayer during difficult times.     

“It’s Give and Take”: Australian Families’ Experiences of Negotiating Financial and Domestic Contributions When Young Adults Return Home

Young adults are increasingly reliant on parental support, with co-residence as a result of a return home increasingly common. Despite this, little is known about how family members negotiate financial and domestic contributions post-return. This qualitative study used a phenomenological methodology to explore the experiences of Australian parents and young adults who returned to co-residence in terms of the younger family members’ contributions to their household. Findings revealed that the young adults acknowledged the need to contribute but often varied in how much assistance they offered. For the most part, the extent of this contribution reflected their parents’ actions; the tendency not to ask for assistance and undertake tasks themselves meant offspring were not given incentives to contribute. While this at times resulted in unmet expectations and frustration among parents, they continued to act in ways that favourably accommodated their offspring. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the negotiation between parents and young adults in regards to household contributions, and the need for further qualitative investigation in this area.     

Unpacking Within‐Household Gender Differences in Partners' Subjective Benefits From Household Income

The authors examine how contributions to household resources, indicated by employment status, influence satisfaction with household income (SWHI) for members of male/female couples. They take changes in SWHI, which may differ within couples, to indicate changes in perceived benefits from their common household income, benefits that can go beyond individual consumption. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey for 2,396 couples from 1996 to 2007, three gender effects are identified. First, men predominate in making the type of contribution that most positively influences SWHI, namely, full‐time employment. Second, the effect of contributions depends on the gender of the contributor, with men's employment being more influential than women's. Third, within couples, making the more influential contribution, as men tend to do, leads to relatively greater SWHI. The authors conclude that gender asymmetry in contributions made to household resources is one way in which gender inequalities invade and inhabit households.     

Imaginative Erkundung der Organisationskultur einer psychiatrischen Tagesklinik

In this contribution a representation of the organizational culture of a psychiatric day-time hospital is developed by analyzing the symbolic meanings of action taken by professionals during their daily work and their relations to other patients.After a short summary of concepts of symbolic action theory as developed by E. E. Boesch in the framework of cultural psychology, these are applied to data from two meetings of professional supervision. The data reports about imaginations and phantasms of individual team members (from individual interviews) as well as findings from a group discussion. The analysis results in hypothetic constructions of the individual phantasms and of the organizational myths, directing their actions.This finally results in ‘value orientations’ expressing the organizational culture which are especially valuable for the purpose of respectful supervision. The author regards the careful consideration of the dynamics between individual phantasms and group myths as being a central task of good practices of supervision, with the aim to develop the action potential of professionals and their patients in such a way that it is well-adapted to both autonomy and cultural frame.     

A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data

Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good in the role of “leader” or “follower”. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level as well as three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the only adjusting player, learns that the other’s independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger than the own one. To approximate the border cases of simultaneous contributing as well as sequential contributions we systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels. Surprisingly, the framing effect becomes stronger with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward adaptation.     

A literature review of overnight work travel within individual,family and social contexts

ABSTRACT

This paper presents results of a comprehensive literature review of empirical studies investigating travel for work and how it relates to individual lives. The paper presents information on how work travel has been operationalized in the literature. The paper describes findings concerning how feelings about travel, individual well-being, the work/family interface, family relationships and social connections have been found to be affected by work travel. The empirical articles on workers who travel have been conducted in multiple countries and via diverse methodologies, which provides richness to the findings. The lack of uniformity in how work travel has been operationalized presents challenges for drawing conclusions about the effects of work travel. Recommendations concerning how to move the field forward are presented, including uniting the employment-related literature with the family literature to provide more holistic and useful implications for the study of work travel.     

LIMITS OF THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFORMATION ON THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: EVIDENCE FROM FIELD EXPERIMENTS

Previous work has demonstrated the effect of social information in the voluntary provision of public goods in the field. In this article, we demonstrate the boundary conditions of the effect. We show that when social information is too extreme, it ceases to influence individual contributions. The results highlight a natural limitation of the social information effect, and provide a characterization of the most effective levels for an organization to use. (JEL M31, H41, D64)