Studying one's own in the Middle East: Negotiating gender and self-other dynamics in the field

This article uses examples of the experience I had in the field as an indigenous researcher in Turkey in order to problematize claims to knowledge. I contend that for researchers who are positioned as relative “insiders,” whether indigenous or bicultural, such aspects of the researcher identity as gender, class, professional and relationship status are made especially salient, perhaps even more so in Middle Eastern contexts. I also argue that while indigenous status can be both empowering and restricting, the insider/outsider position can be employed as a useful vantage point for “rethinking the familiar.” I discuss with examples how this position informed my researcher role and my perspective on what is traditional.     

To the Dark Side and Back: The Administrative Odyssey of an Academic Sociologist with Lessons Learned

My first semester as a tenure-track faculty member at a mid-size university began ignominiously and suggested that my academic career might be short-lived. It began with a blistering memo that was stridently critical of the academic dean’s policy which led to being taken to the proverbial woodshed. Other less serious episodes followed which put me at odds with the “administration.” Yet I have spent more than a third of my career in administrative positions, including a stint in the provost’s office (as an assistant vice chancellor), and only recently returned to faculty status. Over the course of my academic career I have noticed that a large number of academic sociologists have taken administrative positions in academia beyond that of the department chair. This paper will explore this phenomenon and discuss the reasons members of the ‘debunking’ discipline assume administrative roles. I will address this issue within the context of my personal odyssey in administration and how the sociological perspective and imagination has contributed to working in the ‘dark side’ of academia. Finally, I will discuss lessons learned and recommendations for the aspirant administrators among the ranks of academic sociologists.     

Contested memory: Notes on Robert K. Merton’s“the Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect”

Conclusion Merton’s 1995 article shows the sociological complexity of a question that appears on the surface to be a simple one: Who wrote,“ If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”? Yet, simple things can be stated simply: the evidence for W. I. Thomas’s authorship of this sentence is far from conclusive; therefore I believe it should be attributed to both authors of the book in which it appears. It is ironic that Merton, having spent much of his professional career studying the role of citations in science, bears some responsibility for the lack of credit Dorothy Swaine Thomas has received regarding these words. This incident should therefore act as a cautionary tale about what happens when we stray too far from the scholarly practice of documenting our sources, even though we may believe we have good reasons for doing so. I am averse, however, to conclude my response to Merton’s article on a strident note. My hope is that this episode will help us move toward a“new era” of not the politically but the scholarly correct citation. It would be a pity if this issue leads to citation wars where old scores are settled and political correctness wins out over scholarly civility. On this point, I am sure Merton and I can both agree.     

Beyond the antinomies of structure: Levi-Strauss,Giddens, Bourdieu,and Sewell

In this article, I attempt to address some enduring problems in formulation and practical use of the notion of structure in contemporary social science. I begin by revisiting the question of the fidelity of Anthony Giddens’ appropriation of the idea of structure with respect to Levi-Strauss. This requires a reconsideration of Levi-Strauss’ original conceptualization of “social structure” which I argue is a sort of “methodological structuralism” that stands sharply opposed to Giddens’ ontological reconceptualization of the notion. I go on to show that Bourdieu’s contemporaneous critique of Levi-Strauss is best understood as an attempt to recover rather than reject the central implication of Levi-Strauss’ methodological structuralism, which puts Bourdieu and Giddens on clearly distinct camps in terms of their approach toward the idea of structure. To demonstrate the—insurmountable—conceptual difficulties inherent in the ontological approach, I proceed by critically examining what I consider to be the most influential attempt to resolve the ambiguities in Giddens structuration theory: Sewell’s argument for the “duality of structure.” I show that by retaining Giddens’ ontological focus, Sewell ends up with a notion of structure that is at its very core “anti-structuralist” or only structuralist in a weak sense. I close by considering the implications of the analysis for the possibility of developing the rather neglected “methodological structuralist” legacy in contemporary social analysis.     

Toward a reflexive sociology

Gouldner’s call for a “reflexive sociology” in 1970 remains a largely unexamined idea, yet with the breakdown of functionalism’s begemony and the present ferment in theory its time may finally have come. In attempting to clarify and reconstruct Gouldner’s idea, I begin with his concepts “background assumptions” and “domain assumptions,” linking them with Kubn’s ideas. Employing levels of abstraction to approach Gouldner’s material systematically, I proceed to develop and illustrate two contrasting background assumptions or world hypotheses: “stratification” and “interaction.” Finally, I examine some methodological implications of these world views, centering on defining problems, ratio scales and images of measurement, sampling and multivariate-analysis procedures. Introduced to sociology by C. Wright Mills, Bernard Phillips studied with Robin N. Williams, Jr. and taught at the University of North Carolina and the University of Illinois (where he overlapped with Alvin W. Gouldner for a year) before coming to Boston University. A cofounder of the ASA section, Sociological Practice, Phillips’ interests are in Societal Change, Theory and Methods.     

Mindful Ethics: Comments on Informant-Centered Practices in Sociological Research

In this article, I introduce the concept of “mindful ethics” to describe my experiences as a feminist qualitative researcher who has confronted ethical dilemmas in my sexuality research. Mindful ethics is informed theoretically by mindful inquiry, grounded theory, ethics in practice, and ethically important moments. Mindful ethics has been useful in dealing with ethical considerations throughout all stages of my sexuality research. Shifting my attention to the takenfor-granted social contexts and circumstances surrounding informants’ life experiences has helped me deal with ethical concerns that otherwise may have resulted in harm to informants.     

Communication problems in the intensive care unit

Hospitalization in an intensive care unit is often physically uncomfortable and socially disorganizing. The ordinary forms of conversational participation that generate and sustain a sense of agency are breached when the patient cannot communicate in socially consensual “real time.” Using my own experience in an intensive care unit, I describe how delayed speech, through the use of an alphabet board, frequently leads to a host of interactional problems and mutual accusations about character. I attempt to show that the fabric of self and the perception of quality of care are achieved through “real time” communication. I also describe the differential communicative structure of those who will not and those who will use my alphabet board. Those using the board exhibit, through board employment and through the “local” topics discussed, a depth of common culture between them and me.     

A mexican American woman encounters sociology: An autobiographical perspective

I attempt to show how my ideas about bureaucracy and Mexican American culture are a product of my life history and how I worked out key features of these ideas in teaching sociology at a small university. This was made possible because strategic sponsors helped me as an “outsider” to become a kind of “insider” within that social milieu. Her fields of interest are bureaucracy, family, social psychology and race and ethnic relations. She is currently writing a monograph on Mexican American family life.     

Assessing the Regional Economic Impact of Higher Education Institutions: An Application to the University of Cardiff

I evaluate the regional and local economic impact of the University of Cardiff, dividing its effects into two major sides: expenditure impacts and knowledge impacts. I review the major tools and methodologies available in the literature to assess the two sides. The expenditure impact in the financial year 2000–2001 is measured through a Keynesian multiplier model developed by the Centre for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Cardiff University, in order to compare that same impact in the 1994–1995 financial year. The university’s knowledge impact is assessed through two main variables: (1) employment and destination of graduates, or people impact, and (2) kind of knowledge produced. Cardiff University’s graduates enjoy full-employment, and according to our conceptual framework, Cardiff’s higher education system is classified as “nonactive” positional competition and “social” knowledge production.      

Old wine in new casks: libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles

Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is “liberty-preserving” and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people’s liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people’s values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles—and thus, there is no categorical difference between “libertarian” and other forms of paternalism.     

Charles Tilly,German Historicism,and the Critical Realist Philosophy of Science

This paper examines Charles Tilly’s relationship to the schools of thought known as historicism and critical realism. Tilly was committed to a social epistemology that was inherently historicist, and he increasingly called himself a “historicist.” The “search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the laws of Newtonian mechanics,” he argued, was a “waste of time” and had “utterly failed.” Tilly’s approach was strongly reminiscent of the arguments developed in the first half of the 20th century by Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and Meinecke for a synthesis of particularization and generalization and for a focus on “historical individuals” rather than abstract universals. Nonetheless, Tilly never openly engaged with this earlier wave of historicist sociology, despite its fruitfulness for and similarity to his own project. The paper explores some of the possible reasons for this missed encounter. The paper argues further that Tilly’s program of “relational realism” resembled critical realism, but with main two differences: Tilly did not fully embrace critical realism’s argument that social mechanisms are always co-constituted by social meaning or its normative program of explanatory critique. In order to continue developing Tilly’s ideas it is crucial to connect them to the epistemological ideas that governed the first wave of historicist sociology in Weimar Germany and to a version of philosophical realism that is interpretivist and critical.     

Rethinking Kink: Sadomasochism as Serious Leisure

Based on extensive ethnographic research in a public SM (sadomasochism) community, this paper frames SM as recreation. Drawing on Robert Stebbins’ work on “serious leisure” (1982), I posit that in order to more adequately understand SM as it occurs in this community, we need to shift from mainstream assumptions of SM as (simply) “kinky sex” to a more nuanced perspective. I explore the unique skills required in order to engage in SM, as well as the benefits and rewards that participants derive from it, in order to illustrate that SM can be more usefully understood as serious leisure.     

Home is Another Country: Ethnic Identification in Philippine Homeland Tours

Using data based mainly on 29 in-depth interviews with participants from three Philippine homeland tours, I conceptualize the process of ethnic identification through homeland tourism more precisely as the adoption of strategies aimed at symbolically demarcating grounds for informants’ belonging in the Philippines as Americans. This conceptualization highlights ethnic identification as a problem, one that must be “worked on” insofar as claims to ethnic identity must be substantiated. It is also a problem insofar as this work of belonging is displaced and misrecognized. In working to establish a connection with the homeland, I argue that my informants are working out their belonging in America within the terms of distinction set by multiculturalism.     

What is a problem?

Among others, the term “problem” plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity (ID) is regarded as “problem solving among science, technology and society” and as “problem orientation beyond disciplinary constraints” (cf. Frodeman et al.: The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). The point of departure of this paper is that the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the “problem”. The objective here is to shed some light on the vague notion of “problem” in order to advocate a specific type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the umbrella term “problem-oriented ID”: object-oriented ID (“ontology”), theory-oriented ID (epistemology), and method-oriented ID (methodology). Different philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I will then clarify the notion of “problem” by looking at three systematic elements: an undesired (initial) state, a desired (goal) state, and the barriers in getting from the one to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems, target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID.     

The Therapist as Psychobiological Regulator: Dissociation,Affect Attunement and Clinical Process

Dissociation is defined as a protective coping mechanism employed on a broad spectrum: from day-to-day “spacing out” to psychic numbing to multiplicity. A convergence of recent insights in traumatology, neuroscience, and developmental theory is reviewed. These findings all point to the importance of affect regulation in infant and child development and in the therapeutic relationship, where attunement to implicit communication is crucial. Using such relational and intersubjective organizing principles as the concept of enactment and Beebe and Lachmann’s (Infant research and adult treatment: Co-constructing interactions 2002) “three principles of salience,” I discuss an analytic case in which dissociation is a central dynamic.     

“It’s not rocket science!“: High school sociology teachers’ conceptions of sociology

Since academic sociology’s birth in this country, sociologists have not been shy about publicly praising and ridiculing the discipline. Though sociologists have been the primary participants in the seemingly endless debates about sociology’s proper subject matter, methods, and purpose, there is another group that has also struggled over the past 95 years to formulate a conception of the discipline—high school sociology teachers. At this point, we know virtually nothing about what the thousands of high school teachers who offer sociology each year, actually think about the discipline. This paper uses questionnaire and interview data collected from high school sociology teachers to examine their thoughts on four topics: (1) sociology’s strengths, (2) its weaknesses, (3) whether high school students are capable of understanding the discipline, and (4) appropriate course objectives. The results indicate that high school teachers view sociology quite differently from academic sociologists, and that their conceptions are based primarily on “textbook sociology.” I conclude by discussing the far-reaching implications of teachers’ current thinking about the discipline. I wish to thank Larry nichols for offering helpful comments on an earliar draft of this paper.     

The cultural apparatus: C. Wright Mitts’ unfinished work

Conclusion Mills wrote to his Oxford publisher in 1955. “One book grows out of another; the trouble is not only is there no end to it, but after the second is pressing upon you before you can finish the first, for planning is more fun than working.” 78 Indeed, this mode of working was common to all of Mills’ projects. He worked fast and furiously and always juggled a number of different ideas in various stages of formation. This certainly was the case with The Cultural Apparatus. In a 1955 letter to his publisher Mills enthusiastically said of the book “I'm into it.” He predicted, optimistically, that unlike his other books, this book would be easy, a natural for him that “writing it will not involve the anguish that White Collar and Elites have provided.” By 1959, however, Mills had to admit that this optimism was premature. In “The Personal Note to the Reader” he confessed that “I've never had so much trouble writing a book as I have with this one, and I’ve never taken so much pain with the writing of it as I’ve taken to heart the criticism of being repetitious, verbose and prone to jargon.” 79 Mills never completed the project. By the late 1950's he became preoccupied with the political issues of “war and peace” and American foreign policy in Cuba, the latter in particular. His health was poor as a result of a heart attack he suffered in December of 1959 on the eve of a televised debate with an American advisor in Latin America, A.A. Berle. He became embroiled in what he understood as necessary public work from within the media and he remained adamant about the personal significance of The Cultural Apparatus in 1959.     

“The Littlest Science” Revisited

I revisit Allan Mazur’s 1968 claim that sociology is “The Littlest Science.” In doing so, I review four decades of disciplinary battles on how sociology might raise its scientific profile. I examine data on public attitudes toward sociology as a science and how sociology is perceived by the larger scientific community. I conclude that taking a more interdisciplinary perspective will improve the scientific status of sociology.     

Is the U.S. unique in the decline of private sector unionism?

The U.S. is not unique in the decline of private sector unionism. Contrary to assertions of the “unique school,” unionism in the private sectors of Canada and Western Europe has also declined and for the same reason, structural changes in the labor market. “It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.” Sherlock Holmes. I acknowledge in particular the critique of my colleague, Neil Sheflin. I thank, too, for their useful comments, Larry Adams of the U.S. Department of Labor, Noah Meltz, of the University of Toronto, Alexander Troy, and my colleagues Jack Cullity, Stanley Kaish, and Peter Loeb. I appreciate the research support received from the Research Council, the International Program, and the Dean of the Graduate School — Newark of Rutgers University.     

Risk perceptions and ethical public health policy: MMR vaccination in the UK

This paper is concerned with how public health policy makers should respond to the public’s perception of risks. I suggest that we can think of this issue in terms of two different models of responding to the public’s view of such perceived risks. The first model I will call the “public perception” view (PP view) and the second the “public good” view (PG view). The PP view suggests that the public’s perception of any risks is so important that public health policies should be formulated in direct response to knowledge about them. I will consider two possible ethical arguments that might be offered in support of such a view: the first argument is an “autonomy” argument and the second a “consequences” argument. I suggest there are serious problems with both arguments. I then outline an alternative model of public health policy formation that I call the “public good” or PG model. This model focuses on drawing distinctions between the clinical and the public health context, and argues that most of public health policy is primarily concerned with the creation and maintenance of various public goods. This latter fact means that the PP model is inappropriate for public health policy formation.

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Zusammenfassung  Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich damit, wie Entscheidungsträger in der Gesundheitspolitik der Wahrnehmung von Risiken in der Öffentlichkeit begegnen sollten. Mein Vorschlag ist hier, diese Frage im Rahmen zweier verschiedener Modelle der Reaktion auf die öffentliche Sichtweise solcher wahrgenommender Risiken zu betrachten. Das erste Modell bezeichne ich als die Perspektive der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (“PP (Public Perception)-Modell”), das zweite als die Perspektive des öffentlichen Nutzens (“PG (Public Good)-Modell”). Nach dem PP-Modell sind allgemeine Risikowahrnehmungen von solcher Wichtigkeit, dass Gesundheitspolitiken als direkte Reaktion auf das Wissen über solche Wahrnehmungen zu formulieren wären. Ich betrachte zwei mögliche ethische Argumente, die zur Stützung dieses Standpunkts angeführt werden könnten, das erste ein “Autonomieargument”, das zweite ein “Folgenargument”. Ich zeige auf, dass beide Argumente mit ernsten Schwierigkeiten behaftet sind. Dann skizziere ich ein Alternativmodell zur Gestaltung öffentlicher Gesundheitspolitik, das so genannte PG-Modell, in dem der öffentliche Nutzen im Vordergrund steht. Dieses Modell konzentriert sich auf die Unterschiede zwischen Fragen des klinischen Gesundheitswesens einerseits und solchen der öffentlichen oder Volksgesundheit. Das Argument lautet dann, dass es in der Politik zur öffentlichen Gesundheit weitgehend und in erster Linie um die Schaffung und Erhaltung verschiedener öffentlicher Güter geht, was allerdings bedeutet, dass das PP-Modell für die Politikformulierung zur öffentlichen Gesundheit ungeeignet ist.

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Résumé  Le présent article s’interroge sur la manière dont les décideurs dans le domaine de la politique de santé publique devraient répondre à la perception des risques par l’opinion publique. Je suggère que nous réfléchissions sur ce thème dans le cadre de deux modèles différents de réaction à la vision de l’opinion publique des risques ainsi perçus. J’appelle le premier modèle le point de vue de la perception publique (point de vue PP (Public Perception)), et le deuxième le point de vue de l’intérêt public (point de vue PG (Public Good)). Le modèle PP suggère que la perception publique des risques revêt une telle importance que les politiques de santé publique devraient être formulées en réponse directe à ce qu’on en sait. Prenons deux arguments éthiques possibles pour étayer ce point de vue : le premier argument est un argument ≪ d’autonomie ≫ et le second un argument ≪ de conséquences ≫. Je montre que ces deux arguments posent de sérieuses difficultés. J’esquisse ensuite un modèle alternatif pour l’élaboration de politiques de santé publique, le modèle PG ou ≪ d‘intérêt public ≫. Ce modèle se concentre sur les différences entre l’aspect hospitalier de la santé et son aspect public, et argue que la politique de santé publique porte essentiellement sur la création et la préservation de biens publics. Ceci signifie que le modèle PP ne convient pas à l’élaboration d‘une politique de santé publique.

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