The Purchasing Performance of Organizations Using e-Marketplaces

We apply transaction cost economic theory and perspectives in an empirical test regarding purchasing performance using electronic marketplaces. Basically, buyers can purchase products either by hopping across multiple electronic marketplaces or maintaining close relationships with a particular electronic marketplace. We investigate which is more beneficial for a buyer organization's purchasing performance in terms of price reduction and purchasing efficiency. We undertake this task by developing hypotheses and a research model and subjecting them to testing and analysis using the purchase of maintenance, repair and operations products in a large and important market, South Korea.     

Multiproduct,Multicriteria Model for Supplier Selection with Product Life‐Cycle Considerations

In industrial purchasing contexts firms often procure a set of products from the same suppliers to benefit from economies of scale and scope. These products are often at different stages of their respective product life cycles (PLCs). Firms consider multiple criteria in purchasing such products, and the relative importance of these criteria varies depending on the PLC stage of a given product. Therefore, a firm should select suppliers and choose sourcing arrangements such that product requirements across multiple criteria are satisfied over time. The extant models in sourcing literature for evaluating and selecting suppliers for a portfolio of products have not considered this important and practical issue faced by firms. This article proposes a mathematical model that effectively addresses this issue and contributes to the sourcing literature by demonstrating an approach for optimally selecting suppliers and supplier bids given the relative importance of multiple criteria across multiple products over their PLC. The application of the model on a hypothetical data set illustrates the strategic and tactical significance of such considerations.     

P2P Marketplaces and Retailing in the Presence of Consumers' Valuation Uncertainty

Can peer‐to‐peer (P2P) marketplaces benefit traditional supply chains when consumers may experience valuation risk? P2P marketplaces can mitigate consumers' risk by allowing them to trade mismatched goods; yet, they also impose a threat to retailers and their suppliers as they compete over consumers. Further, do profit‐maximizing marketplaces always extract the entire consumer surplus from the online trades? Our two‐period model highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces while accounting for the platform's pricing decisions. We prove that with low product unit cost, the P2P marketplace sets its transaction fee to the market clearing price, thereby extracting all of the seller surplus. In this range of product unit cost, the supply chain partners are worse off due to the emergence of a P2P marketplace. However, when the unit cost is high, the platform sets its transaction fee to be less than the market clearing price, intentionally leaving money on the table, as a mechanism to stimulate first period demand for new goods in expectation for some of them to be traded later, in the second period, via the marketplace. It is not until the surplus left with the sellers is sufficiently high that the supply chain partners manage to extract some of this surplus, ultimately making them better off due to a P2P marketplace. We further analyze the impact of a P2P marketplace on consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, we consider model variants accounting for a frictionless platform and consumer strategic waiting.     

The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing

Retailers are increasingly adopting a dual‐format model. In addition to acting as traditional merchants (buying and reselling goods), these retailers provide a platform for third‐party (3P) sellers to access and compete for the same customers. We investigate the strategic rationale for a retailer to introduce a 3P marketplace. Our analysis provides insights into the growing prevalence of 3P marketplaces. We show that by committing to having an active 3P marketplace, the retailer creates an “outside option” that improves its bargaining position in negotiations with the manufacturer. This can explain the increasing prevalence of such marketplaces. On the other hand, the manufacturer would prefer to eliminate the retailer's outside option and should seek to limit or prevent sales through 3P marketplaces. This is consistent with actions that several manufacturers have taken to limit such sales. Interestingly, if the manufacturer fails to eliminate sales of competing products through the 3P marketplace, then the best strategy for the manufacturer is to allow the retailer to dictate the terms of their contract. This is because a powerful retailer will rely less on its outside option in generating profit, and therefore it will increase the fees charged to 3P sellers and soften the competition between 3P sellers and the manufacturer. The decrease in competition will lead to an increase in the value of outside option of the manufacturer and improve its profit. Additionally, we find that the presence of a 3P marketplace benefits consumers, but this benefit diminishes as the retailer becomes more powerful.     

Capacity Allocation among Multiple Suppliers in an Electronic Market

An electronic marketplace typically provides industrial suppliers an alternative option for selling their capacity in addition to the traditional open market. However, suppliers face different sets of costs and risks in open market and in electronic market. Consequently, suppliers participating in an electronic market are likely to offer their capacity at a different price compared with traditional open market. We analyze this problem and derive the price‐capacity function for the supplier. We also derive a basis for allocating buyer's requirements among multiple suppliers so as to minimize his cost. Our model shows that suppliers with large capacities would quote a lower price in the electronic market. It also predicts that the unit bid price increases with bid quantity in the electronic market. Based on the price‐capacity curve, we model a scenario where the buyer announces, a priori, the number of suppliers to be selected for award of a contract that will minimize its costs.     

Understanding platform business models: A mixed methods study of marketplaces

Recent technological advances have enabled the emergence of novel business models based on digital platforms. Marketplace like Airbnb or Uber offer such digital platforms to connect previously unmatched demand-side and supply-side participants through innovative forms of value creation, delivery and capture. While countless firms claim to offer the next ‘Airbnb for X’ or ‘Uber for Y’, we lack knowledge about the defining business model characteristics of these marketplaces. To close the gap, this paper provides a conceptually and empirically grounded taxonomy of their business models. Applying a mixed methods approach, it first develops an integrative framework of marketplace business models. Guided by the framework, the research systematically analyzes 100 randomly selected marketplaces with content analysis and binary coding. The gathered data is analyzed with cluster analysis techniques to develop a taxonomy for marketplace business models. The clustering process reveals six clearly distinguishable types of marketplace business models and thus shows that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to creating, delivering, and capturing value with marketplaces and platforms in general. We characterize these distinctive types on basis of the qualitative and quantitative findings. Among others, we find that two of these types are highly aligned with business model characteristics associated with the so-called sharing economy. The findings are discussed against platform, marketplace, and sharing economy literature to contribute to a higher integration of different literature streams that are concerned with similar organizational types and phenomena.     

Japanese Supply Chain Relationships in Recession

The remarkable nature of Japan’s supply chain relationships has been identified as a significant factor in its industrial success, especially in the automotive and electronics sectors. Yet, Japanese companies do not recognise the term ‘supply chain management’. For four decades Japan’s industrial giants developed sourcing strategies based on highly-pressured, customer-dominated supply relationships in which sub-contractors enjoyed the benefits of the success of their customers at the expense of yielding their autonomy. In 1991, the Japanese economy plunged into deep recession and has yet to recover. Large corporations now appear vulnerable and almost all Japan’s banks are technically insolvent. This article explains the ways in which recession has affected the supply chain relationships in Japan and the domestic and international sourcing strategies that shape them. Japanese industrial customers are now putting increased pressure on their suppliers to provide technical solutions and to develop links with other customers for the first time. The sub-structures of the keiretsu appear to be giving way to open competition with ‘parent’ firms selling equity in subsidiaries. Profound changes appear to be underway in Japanese industrial sourcing strategies—suppliers can no longer rely on retaining business simply by obedience and hard work. Instead, they face an open, fiercely competitive environment—at home and abroad. In this new order, Japanese suppliers are developing new competitive technical and commercial capabilities, enabling their Japanese industrial customers to concentrate on real-time, market-driven configuration of products, without needing to hold stocks in their supply chains and distribution channels. Meanwhile, Japan is seeking to re-establish its position of leading player in East Asia.     

Skill Management in Large‐Scale Service Marketplaces

Large‐scale, web‐based service marketplaces have recently emerged as a new resource for customers who need quick resolutions for their short‐term problems. Due to the temporary nature of the relations between customers and service providers (agents) in these marketplaces, customers may not have an opportunity to assess the ability of an agent before their service completion. On the other hand, the moderating firm has a more sustained relationship with agents, and thus it can provide customers with more information about the abilities of agents through skill screening mechanisms. In this study, we consider a marketplace where the moderating firm can run two skills tests on agents to assess if their skills are above certain thresholds. Our main objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of skill screening as a revenue maximization tool. We, specifically, analyze how much benefit the firm obtains after each additional skill test. We find that skill screening leads to negligible revenue improvements in marketplaces where agent skills are highly compatible and the average service times are similar for all customers. As the compatibility of agent skills weakens or the customers start to vary in their processing time needs, we show that the firm starts to experience sizable improvements in revenue from skill screening. Apparently, the firm can reap the most of these substantial benefits when it runs only one test. For instance, in marketplaces where agents posses uncorrelated skills, the second skill test only brings an additional 2% improvement in revenue. Accounting for possible skill screening costs, we then show the optimality of offering only one test when the compatibility between agent skills is sufficiently low. The results of this study also have important implications in terms of the right level of intervention in the marketplaces we study.     

Failure Risk and Quality Cost Management in Single versus Multiple Sourcing Decision

The advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against supplier failures arising from undependable products due to latent defects is examined using a model with nonlinear external failure costs. Prior research has focused only on supplier failures arising from unreliable supply, such as late, insufficient, or no delivery. I derive a closed‐form characterization of the optimal production quota allocation for the LUX (Latent defect‐Undependable product‐eXternal failure) setting. The allocation determines the optimal supply base, with intuitive properties that hold under a mild requirement. The requirement includes the special case of equal procurement costs charged by suppliers but also allows unequal costs without any particular order. The key result of the article is a necessary and sufficient condition determining whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal. Another condition is obtained to determine the exact size of the optimal supply base, provided the mild requirement holds. With minor modifications, the results also hold when a buyer‐initiated procurement contract can be used to elicit private information on the suppliers’ unit variable production costs.     

A Multi‐Supplier Sourcing Problem with a Preference Ordering of Suppliers

We study a sourcing problem faced by a firm that seeks to procure a product or a component from a pool of alternative suppliers. The firm has a preference ordering of the suppliers based on factors such as their past performance, quality, service, geographical location, and financial strength, which are commonly included in a supplier scorecard system. Thus, the firm first uses available inventory from supplier 1, if any, then supplier 2, if any, and so on. The suppliers differ in costs and prices. The buyer firm seeks to determine which suppliers to purchase from and in what quantities to maximize its total expected profit subject to the preference ordering constraint. We present the optimal solution to this problem, and show that it has a portfolio structure. It consists of a sub‐set of suppliers that are ordered by their underage and overage costs. This portfolio achieves a substantial profit gain compared to sourcing from a unique supplier. We present an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal solution. Our model applies to component sourcing problems in manufacturing, merchandizing problems in retailing, and capacity reservation problems in services.     

Supplier competition and its impact on firm׳s sourcing strategy

Most research on firms׳ sourcing strategies assumes that wholesale prices and reliability of suppliers are exogenous. It is of our interest to study suppliers׳ competition on both wholesale price and reliability and firms׳ corresponding optimal sourcing strategy under complete information. In particular, we study a problem in which a firm procures a single product from two suppliers, taking into account suppliers׳ price and reliability differences. This motivates the suppliers to compete on these two factors. We investigate the equilibria of this supplier game and the firm׳s corresponding sourcing decisions. Our study shows that suppliers׳ reliability often plays a more important role than wholesale price in supplier competition and that maintaining high reliability and a high wholesale price is the ideal strategy for suppliers if multiple options exist. The conventional wisdom implies that low supply reliability and high demand uncertainty motivate dual-sourcing. We notice that when the suppliers׳ shared market/transportation network is often disrupted and demand uncertainty is high, suppliers׳ competition on both price and reliability may render the sole-sourcing strategy to be optimal in some cases that depend on the format of suppliers׳ cost functions. Moreover, numerical study shows that when the cost or vulnerability (to market disruptions) of one supplier increases, its profit and that of the firm may not necessarily decrease under supplier competition.     

Supplier selection with multiple criteria in volume discount environments

Supplier selection is a multi-criteria decision making problem which includes both qualitative and quantitative factors. In order to select the best suppliers it is necessary to make a trade-off between these tangible and intangible factors some of which may conflict. When business volume discounts exist, this problem becomes more complicated as, in these circumstances, buyer should decide about two problems: which suppliers are the best and how much should be purchased from each selected supplier. In this article an integrated approach of analytical hierarchy process improved by rough sets theory and multi-objective mixed integer programming is proposed to simultaneously determine the number of suppliers to employ and the order quantity allocated to these suppliers in the case of multiple sourcing, multiple products, with multiple criteria and with supplier's capacity constraints. In this context, suppliers offer price discounts on total business volume, not on the quantity or variety of products purchased from them. A solution methodology is presented to solve the multi-objective model, and the model is illustrated using two numerical examples.     

基于B2B电子交易市场的零售商最优订购策略

B2B电子交易市场能够为企业提供现货交易、远期合约交易以及产能期权合约交易等交易服务.B2B电子交易市场中交易的期权合约在签订后至到期日之前可再次交易.以此为背景研究了零售商最优采购策略.研究结果表明,期权合约可再次交易为供应链中的零售商提供新的投机渠道,显著地提高了零售商对期仅合约的采购数量,而对与固定供应商签订的长...     

Price and Service Competition in an Outsourced Supply Chain

We consider a buyer who outsources the manufacturing of a product to multiple symmetric make‐to‐stock suppliers who compete on price and service (fill rate). The buyer allocates demand to the suppliers using a score function with an exponential form, which specifies the relative importance of price vs. service, in order to minimize his costs, while the suppliers choose their prices and fill rates to maximize their profits. For the case of dual‐sourcing, we characterize the optimal parameter of the exponential score function, considering the impact of the buyer's decisions on the suppliers, and considering how the suppliers compete against each other to earn a portion of the buyer's demand. We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium behavior of the system. We then consider a general number of suppliers and show that the equilibrium prices and fill rates, and the buyer's cost, are increasing in the number of suppliers. We compare these results to a model of single‐sourcing, in which the buyer is the Stackelberg leader and extracts all profits from the supplier. We find that the buyer always prefers single‐sourcing to multisourcing. Finally, we study a centralized system and use the results to develop a coordinating contract for the decentralized system.     

Competition and Coordination in Online Marketplaces

Online marketplaces, such as those operated by Amazon, have seen rapid growth in recent years. These marketplaces serve as an intermediary, matching buyers with sellers, whereas control of the good is left to the seller. In some cases, e.g., the Amazon marketplace system, the firm that owns and manages the marketplace system will also sell competing products through the marketplace system. This creates a new form of channel conflict, which is a focus of this article. We consider a setting in which a marketplace firm operates an online marketplace through which retailers can sell their products directly to consumers. We consider a single retailer, who currently sells its product only through its own website, but who may choose to contract with Amazon to sell its product through the marketplace system. Selling the product through the marketplace expands the available market for the retailer, but comes at some expense, e.g., a fixed participation fee or a revenue sharing requirement. Thus, a key question for the retailer is whether she should choose to sell through the marketplace system, and if so, at what price. We analyze the optimal decisions for both the retailer and the marketplace firm and characterize the system equilibrium.     

The Severity of Supply Chain Disruptions: Design Characteristics and Mitigation Capabilities

Supply chain disruptions and the associated operational and financial risks represent the most pressing concern facing firms that compete in today's global marketplace. Extant research has not only confirmed the costly nature of supply chain disruptions but has also contributed relevant insights on such related issues as supply chain risks, vulnerability, resilience, and continuity. In this conceptual note, we focus on a relatively unexplored issue, asking and answering the question of how and why one supply chain disruption would be more severe than another. In doing so, we argue, de facto, that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable and, as a consequence, that all supply chains are inherently risky. Employing a multiple‐method, multiple‐source empirical research design, we derive novel insights, presented as six propositions that relate the severity of supply chain disruptions (i) to the three supply chain design characteristics of density, complexity, and node criticality and (ii) to the two supply chain mitigation capabilities of recovery and warning. These findings not only augment existing knowledge related to supply chain risk, vulnerability, resilience, and business continuity planning but also call into question the wisdom of pursuing such practices as supply base reduction, global sourcing, and sourcing from supply clusters.     

Incentive issues in performance-based outsourcing contracts in the UK defence industry: a simulation study

Traditional outsourcing literature has claimed gains for the customer in terms of quality and costs. However, such gains are illusory in outsourcing of high-risk, complex tasks. The use of contracts and governance mechanisms for handling complex procurements is essential in obtaining rewards from outsourcing. Powerful incentives and risks are normally used in industrial service contracts to transfer risks to measure compliance with performance measures. The availability contracts for complex engineering services provision are forms of outsourcing contracts that transfer resources from government to external service providers on a substantial scale. The change moves the contractor role from creating resources to managing resources. Such role change mandates collaboration with customers and suppliers in supply/value chains. The management task is then perceived in terms of linking and optimising alignments rather than increasing service levels. Incentive design is one mechanism for linking the coordination of resources required in availability contracting to the business model. This article studies the impacts of agreed contract type and incentive mechanism on the customer and service provider profits using agent-based discrete event simulation model under multiple risk sharing scenarios.     

Fit between sourcing capabilities and organisational structure on IT outsourcing performance

Thus far, relatively few studies on the supplier side of Information Technology (IT) outsourcing arrangements have been based on empirical quantitative research. Previous research identified a recurring supplier problem, a lack of sustainability in IT performance. The literature revealed that a supplier's capabilities and organisational structure affect the supplier performance. We hypothesise that realising a fit between the necessary sourcing capabilities and organisational structure on the IT supplier side will result in a sustainable sourcing performance. We executed a survey research among employees involved in sourcing activities of three different IT outsourcing suppliers (N?=?135). The results from our analysis provide evidence that these constructs can be used to analyse differences between the three types of service suppliers. Results indicate that suppliers who focus on establishing a fit are more willing or able to monitor if they achieve a sustainable performance.     

Sourcing Decisions with Stochastic Supplier Reliability and Stochastic Demand

Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier.     

Impact of competitive conditions on supplier evaluation: a construction supply chain case study

This research proposes a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) framework and demonstrates the impact of competitive conditions on supplier evaluation process for construction supply chains. The paper focuses on the supply chain of a large-scale housing project in order to illustrate the role of competitive capability and suppliers’ profile and its influence on supplier evaluation based on prevailing supply/market conditions. Various scenarios are investigated to demonstrate the impact of competition on supplier evaluation. The contribution of the study lies in highlighting the impact of supply/market conditions on MCDM decisions causing supplier evaluation ‘imbalance’ and MCDM usage. It is expected that the study will be useful for project management, construction, supply chain management, sourcing professionals. The findings of the study are generalisable to projects-based situations such as petroleum refinery and ship building where bill of materials typically consists of thousands of items and a large number of suppliers are involved.