Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead*

George Herbert Mead argues that human society is comprised of six basic institutions—language, family, economics, religion, polity, and science. I do not believe that he can be criticized for making institutions the cornerstones of a society, but he can definitely be criticized for his explanation of how our basic institutions originate, how these institutions operate in society after their inception, and how they later change, modifying society in the process. The problem with Mead's explanation of these three critical matters is that he based them on his principle of “sociality” rather than on the principle of “domination.” If Mead's principle of sociality is replaced by the principle of domination and his notion of the “generalized other” is replaced by the notion of the “phantom community,” then most of these problems can be largely solved. Thus, in this paper, I will not only point out the key problems in Mead's theory of society, but I will also offer solutions to them based on the notions of domination and the “phantom community.” The end product is a “radical interactionism” that surpasses Mead's original interactionism in identifying the part that both domination and the composite “other” play in every known human society—big and small, and past and present.     

The Roots of “Radical Interactionism”

A plea has been made for replacing the perspective of “symbolic interactionism” with a new interactionist's perspective—“radical interactionism.” Unlike in symbolic interactionism, where Mead's and Blumer's ideas play the most prominent roles, in radical interactionism's, Park's ideas play a more prominent role than either Mead's or Blumer's ideas. On the one hand, according to Mead, the general principle behind the organization of human group life was once dominance, but it is now “sociality.” On the other hand, according to Park, this general principle is now and has always been dominance. Blumer takes a position much closer to Mead's than Park's arguing that the general principle underlying the organization of human group life is sociality. Under certain special conditions, however, it can become dominance. Although like radical interactionism, symbolic interactionism is rooted in pragmatism, unlike in radical interactionism, symbolic interactionism is still plagued with strains of utopian thought, among which the notion of sociality is the most virulent. Sociality may be the principle on which human group life is organized in heaven, but, down here on earth, it remains organized on the basis of domination. Thus, radical interactionism provides a much‐needed antidote to the idealistic overtones still found in symbolic interactionism.     

The self as the locus of morality: A comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead's theories of the moral constitution of the self

This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor's phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead's pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor's framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity.     

Experience,Subjectivity, Selfhood: Beyond a Meadian Sociology of the Self

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post-Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience.     

The Generality of Theory and the Specificity of Social Behavior: Contrasting Experimental and Hermeneutic Social Science

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the “nomological‐deductive” approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the “hypothetico‐deducive” approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: (1) the problem of situational specificity, and (2) the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition.     

Part II: Death in Literature. Poetry as Epitaph

Anyone tolerably versed in American literature will realize that we could have devoted our entire collection to attitudes toward death in American literature. Such a collection could be tightly organized and valuable, but it might also be redundant for an audience which consists primarily of loosened-up literary folk to begin with. So we offer, instead of standard selections, a group of essays which, though they are about death in literature, use literature as a vehicle for discussing either theoretical or practical interpretations of death in American society and letters. Karen Campbell's essay, “Poetry as Epitaph,” uses Emily Dickinson's poetry to illustrate and embody current international theories about death and language. We place this contribution first in this section because it serves as a transition between Gravestones and Epitaphs and Death in Literature: Dickinson was writing at the same historical moment discussed by Kenneth Ames in “Ideologies in Stone,” a fact the reader may wish to remember while reading “Poetry as Epitaph;” and Karen Campbell treats Dickinson's poetry as epitaphic in style and genre. Sonia Gernes' “Life After Life: Katherine Anne Porter's Version” uses Porter's “Pale Horse, Pale Rider” to illustrate and make provocative suggestions about Raymond Moody's theses in Life After Life. Leslier Fiedler's contribution is an extract from a speech given under the auspices of an organization studying the humanist's response to child abuse, and is part of a series of lectures on that subject. He discusses infanticide through literature and then through popular culture. Marvin Kohl takes issue with some of Professor Fiedler's conclusions.     

VII. Foster children: The Jewish home finding society and the institute for Juvenile research 1

Although there is a body of literature that applies Gestalt therapy techniques to clinical practice, little has been written about the use of Gestalt therapy theory as a comprehensive framework for social work practice as a whole. Gestalt therapy theory unifies social work's ecological and strength perspectives and is highly consonant with the core values of the profession. Four major theoretical aspects of Gestalt therapy that are highly applicable to social work practice are described: field theory, “I-Thou” relationship, creative adjustment, and the phenomenological perspective. Case examples are provided to demonstrate a Gestalt approach to social work practice.     

Addiction science and the perception of freewill

Do people think individuals with Substance Use Disorder (SUD) have freewill? How does addiction science inform views on the issue? We distinguish between two senses of freewill: 1) libertarian freewill , in which freedom turns on a particular metaphysical conception of action (sometimes operationalized as “could have done otherwise”), and 2) compatibilist freewill , in which freedom depends on the relation between the actor's psychology and her actions (e.g., “was the act what she wanted to do?”). We argue that, in different ways, scientific accounts can impact conceived freewill by linking addictive behavior to mechanisms that observers view as peripheral to the actor ( motivation modularity) . While a variety of impacts on conceived compatibilist freewill are plausible, we argue that contemporary addiction science has no direct bearing on conceived libertarian freewill. Addiction science may, however, indirectly impact conceived libertarian freewill by priming an explanatory framework in which intention is superfluous (especially materialism).     

Police and Psychiatrists: A Case of Professional Dominance?

Drawing on data from a recent study and Freidson's theory of professional dominance, this article considers the contemporary nature of relationships between police officers and psychiatrists. The different strategies used by the two occupational groups in attempting to control the management of a group of patients considered by both to be “dirty work” is explored, as is the “political” agenda of police/psychiatric relations in the context of current mental health policy.     

Social workers' reflexive understandings of their “everyday” communications with children

Over the past two decades, the use of ethnographic research methods, in combination with a range of discursive, conversational, and multimodal analytical approaches, have provided vivid accounts of the complex nature of social workers' everyday communication. This paper discusses the potential and the problems of combining a video‐stimulated recall methodology with an explicit theoretical framework, in order to generate critical reflexive “insider” accounts of social workers' direct encounters with children. The framework employed was based on an adaptation of Goffman's concepts of “framing” and “footing,” which were integrated into an analytical process designed to theorize social workers' critiques regarding the nature of their communication with children. Three detailed case exemplars are used to demonstrate the potential of this methodology to explore the “delicate” agency required by social workers in the practice of authentic communication in complex professional inquiries with children. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the theoretical and practical issues associated with utilizing reflexive methodologies in professional contexts.     

Social psychology as a stable interpretative framework irrefutably committed to the scientific study of persons and society

Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we “live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin.” Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief-stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self-conception in the latter half of the 20^th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework.     

Social Representations and Repression: Examining the First Formulations of Freud and Moscovici

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”.     

Xun Zi Holds That Human Nature Is Simple and Uncarved,Not Evil

For more than two thousand years, the chapter of the Xunzi titled “Man’s Nature Is Evil” has labeled Xun Zi as a representative of the doctrine that human nature is originally evil. In fact, Xun Zi holds to a belief in human nature as originally simple and “uncarved.” The ideas of human nature in that chapter conflict with those in the other chapters including “Discourse on Ritual Principles,” “An Exhortation to Learning,” “Discourse on Nature,” “On the Correct Use of Names” and “Of Honor and Disgrace.” According to these chapters, human nature is not evil, but simple and uncarved; its good or evil is undetermined, it may become either good or evil, etc. Furthermore, we can find other evidence, such as the sayings of Xun Zi’s disciples, the Records of the Grand Historian, the doctrines of human nature in the Western Han dynasty, and so on, for the statement that Xun Zi holds that human nature is simple and uncarved.     

"Mirror Neurons," Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's Critique of Practice Theory

In this paper, I critically examine Stephen Turner's (1994) critique of practice theory in light of recent neurophysiological discoveries regarding the “mirror neuron system” in the pre‐frontal mo‐tor cortex of humans and other primates. I argue that two of Turner's strongest objections against the sociological version of the practice‐theoretical account, the problem of transmission and the problem of sameness, are substantially undermined when examined from the perspective of re‐cently systematized accounts of embodied learning and intersubjective action understanding in‐spired by these developments. In addition, I show that the practice‐theoretical framework out‐lined by Pierre Bourdieu in the Logic of Practice and other works is, in contrast to Turner's por‐trayal of a confused hodgepodge of logical errors and empirical impossibilities, largely consistent with the latest neurophysiological evidence and as such fundamentally foreshadowed more recent understandings of the neurocognitive foundations of the perception, understanding and structure of the motor schemes productive of action in the world. Also in line with these newer neurosci‐entific developments, the practice‐theoretical focus on the body as the central matrix generative of tacit understandings and analogical operations responsible for “higher order” systems of classi‐fication emerges as the key to solving some of the thorniest problems in the theory of action: eliminating to need to resort to unwarranted “collective object” explanations for the origins of shared presuppositional frameworks.     

The “Exceptional”United States: First New Nation or Last Welfare State?

The author discusses the American welfare state in the context of Lash and Urry's thesis on ‘disorganized capitalism’. Attention is directed to the claim that the US welfare state has been the laggard of organized capitalism but is becoming the pathbreaker in defining patterns of public welfare provision under an increasingly disorganized capitalism. In this context the US may be “showing the way” to the welfare states of Western Europe. A number of claims about the “exceptional” nature of US development are reviewed and a number of reservations are entered against the “disorganization” thesis as applied to the welfare state. It is suggested that attention should be focussed upon contemporary patterns of welfare state re-organization rather than dis-organization.     

The child's entry into the symbolic order: a developmental-societal interpretation of Jacques Lacan

Lacan's psychoanalytic insights, as found primarily in his 1964 seminar “The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis” are interpreted within a social-developmental framework. Using Piaget's theory of a structural transition from action logic to object logic I recast (1) Lacan's signifying function as a new competence emerging around age two and (2) the “Other” as the general content/context of this newness, namely the child's grasp of a societal-symbolic order. The child's entry into that order is described as inherently linked to sexuality, desire and the unconscious and as accompanied by feelings of alienation and separation. Insofar as the desire of the unconscious is toward the “Other” Lacan seems to support my claim of an endogenous origin of the societal order.     

Sensuous (Re)Collections: The Sight and Taste of Socialism at Grūtas Statue Park,Lithuania

ABSTRACT

The present paper is about Grūtas, a Lithuanian park—museum featuring recuperated Soviet-era artifacts. This museum is examined as a locus of public memory where the nation's socialist history is invoked through visual representations (recovered statuary) and by implicating the sense of taste (“Soviet” drinks and dishes served at the museum's café). The paper suggests that seeing the Socialist past at Grūtas activates memories of trauma and loss, while tasting that past summons up more nostalgic reminiscences. It is further argued that this museum constitutes a visual and gustatory critique of Lithuania's increasingly commodified and “modernized” present. It is also proposed that collective memory in today's Eastern Europe affords a productive ethnographic site in which to investigate the ongoing systemic transformations in the aftermath of communist rule.     

城里的“飘飘”：成都本地同性恋身份的形成和变迁

中国当代社会和经济的变迁，促进了同性恋身份及其身份社区的出现。本文根据在成都市所进行的田野调查，从建构主义的视角，考察了本地语境下三种男同性恋身份——“飘飘”、“同志”和gay的形成和变迁。尽管今天成都的男同性恋者在日常生活中交替使用上述三个身份称谓，但是三个称谓隐含了不同的文化参照和政治内涵。笔者认为“飘飘”身份在本地的同性恋历史传统和现代同性恋身份之间起到了一个承上启下的作用，而“同志”身份则极大地推动了中国当代同性恋者的表现形式从行为向身份的转变，促进了同性恋社区的形成和壮大。     

本轮经济全球化的后果及其成因探索

由于本轮经济全球化主导观念的重大偏误，导致当今世界人与自然、人与人、人与自身的对立后果愈演愈烈。本轮经济全球化以“经济人”假定为逻辑起点，以发达国家的最大利润和经济效益为目标，实质是大资本在全球范围内对利润的持续性、体制化的疯狂劫掠，巧立名目地将人类共同资源与财富转化为利润装进了资本家私人口袋的同时，却把资本主义基本矛盾必然引发的人与自然的割裂、人与人的纷争和人相对于自身的异化等诸多脱序状况丢给了普罗大众。认清本轮经济全球化主导观念的偏误，有利于我们在实现“中国梦”的进程中，重树“道德人”的规范，积极化解这三大对立，而不是被“经济全球化”等中性概念所蒙蔽，受制于资本逻辑羁绊，苟安于日益危脆的世界之中。