渠道投机行为的相互性以及交易专有资产的影响

以营销渠道中投机行为的相互性为研究对象,基于相互性理论和营销渠道行为理论提出4个假设,以制造企业的营销渠道负责人为调查对象,通过问卷调查共获得139份有效问卷,采用多元调节回归模型对数据进行分析,探讨营销渠道中企业之间投机行为的相互性以及企业交易专有资产在其中发挥的影响作用.结果显示,投机行为在渠道合作伙伴之间具有相互性;企业针对合作伙伴在交易专有资产上的投入不但会降低其渠道投机行为,而且会正向调节渠道合作伙伴之间投机行为的相互性;企业针对合作伙伴在交易专有资产上的投入与合作伙伴的渠道投机行为之间无显著的相关关系.     

基于委托代理理论的泥沙资源化政府激励与监督机制设计

构建政府和企业间有效的合作激励机制成为保证泥沙资源利用效率和实现泥沙资源市场化、产业化发展的重要途径。目前关于泥沙资源化中政府的激励机制研究非常有限,且未建立与约束企业投机行为相关的监督机制。本文基于委托代理理论,对不对称信息下泥沙资源化的政府激励与监督机制设计进行研究。首先构建了泥沙资源化的激励机制设计模型,然后考虑引入监督机制对激励契约进行改进,分别得到单一激励机制以及激励与监督相结合机制下的政府固定补贴、激励系数、企业最优努力水平和政企期望效用,对比分析了监督努力水平等相关参数对政企最优决策的影响。最后,结合算例对模型进行分析验证。结果表明,引入监督机制可以提高企业泥沙资源利用的努力水平以及政府对企业道德风险的防范。而政府的激励机制与监督机制具有一定替代关系,通过比较监督成本与监督收益的变化,设计的最优契约结构可使政府的激励与监督机制发挥最大效益。     

经销商“抱团”如何影响制造商的信息支持和合同监督？

基于社会网络理论和渠道行为相关文献,研究了经销商“抱团”(网络密度)对制造商渠道行为及其后果的影响,并探讨了行业环境不确定性的调节作用。研究结果显示：第一,经销商网络密度对制造商的信息支持和合同监督均有正向影响;第二,行业环境不确定性弱化了经销商网络密度对信息支持的正向影响,但对经销商网络密度与合同监督之间的关系没有显著影响;第三,信息支持有助于降低渠道冲突水平、抑制经销商投机行为,合同监督有助于抑制经销商投机行为,但对渠道冲突没有显著影响。     

博弈论视角的我国股市投机行为分析

长期以来,我国股市一直存在着严重的过度投机行为,不利于股市的健康发展。本文从博弈论的视角,构造上市公司、政府、投资者之间相互博弈的模型,以此来探讨我国股市过度投机行为的形成原因,并提出了抑制过度投机的一些政策建议。     

项目经理任职资格体系的构建与应用——以A建筑施工企业为例

建设工程项目经理作为建筑施工企业的核心人才,对工程项目管理的成败起着关键作用。本文以A公司为例,基于项目经理能力素质模型,通过开辟项目经理职业发展通道、开发项目经理任职资格等级标准、建立项目经理任职资格评价认证机制三个方面构建了项目经理任职资格体系,提出了建设工程项目经理任职资格体系应用于项目经理选拔任用、培养开发、建立激励体系的基本思路和措施,以期为相关企业提供参考。     

企业边界人员的私人关系与企业间机会主义行为——双刃剑效应的作用机制及其边界条件

企业边界人员的私人关系对企业间关系的影响如同一柄双刃剑,既可能抑制也可能促进企业间机会主义行为。本文运用案例研究方法,检验了产生这一双刃剑效应的内在机制。基于委托代理理论、权力依赖理论和制度理论,分别从企业内部、企业间关系以及企业所处的制度环境3个层面识别了双刃剑效应的边界条件。分析结果表明:当企业内部激励较为公平或企业所处制度环境较好时,私人关系会通过促进企业间的信任和承诺来抑制企业间机会主义行为;反之,则可能通过放松企业层面的监督和控制促进交易对象的投机行为。本文还发现了一项颇具本土特色的结论:在非均衡的依赖关系中,因私人关系的存在,弱势企业的投机倾向表现的较为明显,强势企业反而有更少的机会主义行为。     

市场非有效与公司投机及过度融资

构建了一个模型,讨论非有效的股票市场对上市公司控股股东或管理层过度融资与短期实业投机行为的影响.并针对具体因素采用比较静态的方法,分析非有效市场对管理层投机程度的影响及其经济意义.发现:公司管理层会在真实内在价值的实业投资和短期投机之间权衡.1)当实业投资回报比较高时,即使市场非有效程度比较高,公司管理层也不会采取投机活动;当实业竞争激烈,收益相对于投机过低时,会选择短期投机.2)当多余的融资大到某种程度时,会影响公司管理者投资行为,他们会花一部分功夫去迎合外部投资者,而且在迎合上所下的功夫随着多余的融资的增大而增大.     

浅议施工企业对项目部的和谐管理

本文在和谐管理理论的视角下，提出了施工企业对项目部和谐管理的模式与方法，分析了施工企业培育项目部管理人员的激励需求和最优激励组合比例，并对施工企业职能服务部门提出了简要的服务要求，并通过对了两次分配的经济激励方案。同时，利用基于声誉的非经济激励模型，分析了建立企业内部项目经理人才市场的重要性和必要性。     

关系型治理何时能够抑制渠道投机行为?——企业间关系质量调节作用的实证检验

以营销渠道行为与组织理论为基础,实证探讨了企业间关系质量对制造商使用关系型治理与经销商投机行为之间关系的调节影响。通过对来自制造业的152份数据分析发现:在低企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会抑制经销商的投机行为,采用共同解决问题的方式则会增多经销商的投机行为;在高企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会增多经销商的投机行为,而采用共同解决问题的方式则会抑制经销商的投机行为。本文的研究结论对于制造商合理选择关系型治理方式制定决策,抑制经销商的投机行为具有重要的理论与实践意义。     

内在动机与外在激励

本文结合管理实践系统论述了内在动机对于个体行为的激励作用,探讨了个体的内在动机与外在激励之间的关系,明确了内在动机与外在激励在激励机制设计中的地位。通过模型分析发现,内在动机对于个体的行为具有显著的激励作用,它能够提高个体的努力水平。内在动机对于外在激励具有替代作用,内在动机是个体努力的根源,应该成为激励机制的核心,而外在激励则是对内在动机的补充。     

Firm-bank trusting relationship and discouraged borrowers

Firms can be credit constrained both because banks deny credit when they apply for it and because they refrain from filing for the loan in the first place, anticipating rejection. Interestingly the latter aspect has been only marginally investigated, so far and, no previous research pays attention to firm manager’s trust in the loan manager as a factor that can affect firm’s decision to file for a loan. Present research investigates the role of the trust of firm’s managers in the loan managers as a determinant of not being discouraged from applying for a loan by looking at a strictly randomly selected sample of firms in China. By relying on a structural equation model that investigates both the direct and the mediating role of trust we find that the firm manager’s trust in the loan manager affects the firm’s decision to file for a loan by reducing the firm’s risk of being a discouraged borrower. We also discover that trust mediates the role of the firm manager’s experience and the monitoring activity pursued by the bank.     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.     

管理者关系特性对海外子公司知识获取及公司绩效的影响研究

基于组织学习理论和社会资本理论,考察了管理者关系特性对海外子公司内外部网络知识获取和企业绩效的影响。研究结果显示,母子公司管理者之间的信任和沟通频率对获取母公司知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地重要企业管理者之间的信任对获取本地商务知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地政府主要负责人之间的私人关系对获取本地制度知识有显著影响。此外,本地制度知识在母公司知识对海外子公司绩效的影响中起正向调节作用,本地商务知识起负向调节作用。     

经理行为偏差与企业绩效激励指标的确定

股东在面对具有行为偏差的经理时,如何设计剩余收益作为激励指标,以促使双方的目标一致,一直是学界和实务界关注的一个问题。如果股东继续沿用传统的基于公司资本成本率计算得到的剩余收益,将使得损失厌恶的经理投资不足,过度自信的经理投资过度。为了改进投资决策,股东需要针对不同行为特征类型的经理设计较公司资本成本率更低或更高的激励相容资本成本率,以有效激励经理做出符合股东利益的投资决策。     

Acquisition and Disclosure of Operational Information*

We study a firm's strategy for acquisition and disclosure of operational information by establishing linkages among information quality, managerial self‐interest, and production planning. We develop a multistage model in which a manager of a publicly traded firm first receives private information about the product demand and then uses it to make production and disclosure decisions. We consider two prevalent disclosure models employed in the accounting literature: all‐or‐nothing and cheap‐talk models. In the all‐or‐nothing model, it is assumed that any disclosure must be truthful, but the manager can strategically withhold information. We show that the manager commits to acquire the value‐added operational information if (i) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is low or (ii) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is high, but the fixed disclosure cost is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. We demonstrate that the firm is better off if the production level is observable to the financial market because multidimensional signaling reduces costs. In the cheap‐talk model, we assume that the manager's disclosure may not be truthful. We show that the manager's incentive to acquire value‐added operational information increases along with the penalty cost for misleading investors. Therefore, a high penalty cost for misleading investors can encourage the manager to obtain more precise information, which in turn improves the firm's cash flow.     

The relationship between supply chain manager capabilities and performance: empirical evidence

This study seeks to answer the question how supply chain managers’ capabilities impact individual and firm performance. Organisations have begun to recognise the importance of their supply chain and the necessity for qualified supply chain managers. Therefore, there is a need for further research on the impact of these capabilities on individual and firm performance. Sustained performance of a firm depends on dynamic capabilities and it allows firms to align and adapt strategies according to the volatile external environment. Using dynamic capabilities theory, the supply chain manager capabilities model was developed as a way for supply chain managers to effectively use their skills and past experiences to improve their own and firm’s performance. Primary data was collected through a survey distributed to supply chain management professionals. The results strongly support the relationship between technology and soft skills with supply chain manager capabilities. Interestingly, our study identifies sequential relationship amongst the three constructs such as capabilities, individual and firm performance. Capabilities are related with individual performance whereas individual performance is related with the firm performance. However, our findings revealed that there is no direct relationship between supply chain manager capabilities and firm performance.     

信息非对称程度与企业家效用、资本结构、企业市场价值

本文分析了市场信息非对称程度对企业家投资效用、企业债务水平及企业市场价值的影响。分析表明,若企业项目是高质量的,信息非对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平提高;反之,若企业项目是低质量的,信息非对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平减少;外部知情投资者比例的变化与企业家效用的变化之间的关系与企业质量有关。     

MANAGERIAL HEDGING AND PORTFOLIO MONITORING

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his compensation using financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is costly. We find that the optimal incentive compensation and governance provisions have the following properties: (i) the manager's portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the manager's compensation is more sensitive to firm performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm's performance, the manager's compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. Moreover, the model suggests that the optimal level of portfolio monitoring is higher for managers of firms whose performance canbehedged more easily, such as larger firms and firms in more developed financial markets. (JEL: G30, D82)     

Disentangling the effects of organizational controls on innovation

The strategy and innovation literatures argue that organizational competitiveness is contingent upon firms simultaneously pursuing both process and product innovations. A firm’s control system plays a fundamental role in this regard by managing, motivating, and coordinating employees’ behaviors for the development of its innovative capabilities. Research suggests that in order to develop successful innovation, management must use controls that align employees’ interests with those of the organization while simultaneously allowing employee autonomy to encourage creativity. These disparate functions lead to the control–autonomy dilemma. We argue that managers can address this dilemma by recognizing that the effect of controls on innovation outcomes depends, in part, on the controls’ enabling features and the type of commitment they inspire. Our findings show that employee development, which is the focus of input controls, has a direct effect on process innovation-related behaviors while specified goals, the emphasis of output controls, have a direct effect on product innovation-related behaviors. It is only through employees’ perceptions of managerial support that input controls increase product innovation-related behaviors and output controls increase process innovation-related behaviors.     

Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior

The main purpose of this study is to investigate how organizational slack is created and how it affects a firm’s performance. To address these questions, we construct three equations: managerial incentive function, organizational slack formation function and performance function, and we apply 3SLS simultaneously to these functions by using the data sets of 2,791 Japanese firms from the years 2001 and 2006. From the empirical analysis of these Japanese firms, we obtain the following results: a firm’s performance declines as organizational slack increases; organizational slack is affected by annual change rate of revenues but not by managerial incentive; managerial incentive decreases as a firm’s performance improves while it increases as the structure of corporate governance is strengthened.