On the almost inconceivable misunderstandings concerning the subject of value‐free social science

A value judgment says what is good or bad, and value‐free social science simply means social science free of value judgments. Yet many sociologists regard value‐free social science as undesirable or impossible and readily make value judgments in the name of sociology. Often they display confusion about such matters as the meaning of value‐free social science, value judgments internal and external to social science, value judgments as a subject of social science, the relevance of objectivity for value‐free social science, and the difference between the human significance of social science and value‐free social science. But why so many sociologists are so value‐involved – and generally so unscientific – is sociologically understandable: The closest and most distant subjects attract the least scientific ideas. And during the past century sociologists have become increasingly close to their human subject. The debate about value‐free social science is also part of an epistemological counterrevolution of humanists (including many sociologists) against the more scientific social scientists who invaded and threatened to expropriate the human subject during the past century.     

Sociology and value neutrality: Limiting sociology to the empirical level

The scientific objectivity of sociology depends upon adherence to value neutrality, an adherence that strengthens the social power of sociologists. Yet all disciplines, including science, are motivated by values. This article argues that value neutrality is both possible and desirable for sociology, even though a number of values appear to be necessary to the sociological project. Among those values, some are necessary to the project of science as such, while others guide research interests. I argue that value consensus among sociologists regarding any extrascientific (research guiding) value raises questions of scientific integrity: Critical rationalism and humanitarianism are considered in this context. The scientific status of sociology is also compromised by nonempirical pronouncements, including the advocacy of certain values (such as egalitarianism) and of positions regarding the status of values (e.g., cultural relativism). I propose that the role of social scientist be kept distinct from the roles of moral philosopher and of theologian, and that this division of labor be accomplished by a scientific adherence to value neutrality. An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.     

Facts, values, and evaluative explanation: Contributions of Leo Strauss to contemporary debates

As the 20th century comes to a close, sociologists remain mired in the long-standing debate surrounding facts and values. The tensions between value-neutral and value-relevant sociologists have raged for decades and no resolution appears likely; at least no resolution is likely within the parameters of the existing debate. This essay is an introduction to the work of social thinker Leo Strauss, whose orientation provides a different perspective on the issue. It was Strauss's conviction that sociologists were fiddling Neros, oblivious to the crisis of value they helped engender, but excused on grounds that they did not know they fiddled and that they did not know Rome burned. A value-free social science that denied the possibility of reasoned discourse on value, while surreptitiously advancing a vision of the good, created little but confusion while undermining the basis on which any vision of the good could be defended. A value-driven social science, animated by what Strauss called the “historical sense,” likewise undermined the legitimacy of the value this social science was designed to serve while casting suspicion on all subsequent value claims. Works by Bellah, Wallerstein and Alexander, Seidman, Collins and Denzin, among others, are used for illustrative purposes. Following Strauss, it is suggested that evaluation and explanation cannot be divorced; theirs was a natural relationship that modern philosophy, beginning with Machiavelli, had unwittingly denied. Strauss advocated a social science that understood value as something to quest for, rather than something to be assumed, and he judged theory to be a guide for action, rather than its substitute. It is suggested that Strauss's reading of the classics could be of benefit to sociologists seeking resolution to the crisis of facts and values.     

Economics as a Multi-Paradigmatic Science: the ‘Best Kept Secret’ of Irrational Choice

The article reexamines the prevailing perception of traditional economics as the science of rational choice among contemporary economists and sociologists, especially rational choice theorists. It proposes that conventional economics is not exclusively the theory of rational choice but also one of irrational choices in the economy. The article aims to contribute toward a fuller understanding and appreciation of classical and neoclassical economics, especially among sociologists, as composite rational choice-irrational choice theory and in that sense a multi- rather than single-paradigm science, thus no different from sociology and other social (and physical) sciences. This may be relevant or interesting to sociologists given that their rational choice colleagues, like economists, extol the “virtues" of conventional and modern economics as a single-paradigm, theoretically unified science around “rational choice” and criticize the “vices” of sociology as plagued by competing paradigms and theoretical disunity. The article supports many economic sociologists’ view or intuition of conventional economics as complex rational-irrational choice theory and multi-paradigm science, and disconfirms rational choice theorists’ interpretation and generalization of it as “rational choice theory” only and single-paradigm unified science.     

The turn to biology

This article firstly discusses social science reference to animal studies. The latter remain important in engagement with life science because of their frequent deployment and because of increased calls to re-examine animal research among sociologists and other social scientists. Extending from this discussion, it is argued that social scientists still tend to exhibit a questionable selectivity in their treatment of life-science research. In addition, it is suggested that insufficient attention is paid to epistemological differences between life and social science. The article concludes by outlining an approach to interdisciplinary endeavour that combines ‘parallelism’ with mutually reflexive scrutiny of social and life science assumption.     

Partial Paradigm Shifts in the Social Sciences: Twenty Years of Research in Rural Sociology3

Abstract Falk and Zhao (1989) have recently suggested that increased theoretical diversity characterizes the last decade of published research in Rural Sociology. We suggest that this claim is premature, given paradigmatic trends in the larger discipline of sociology. From a reanalysis of data sources and the use of an analytical framework based on the partial paradigm concept, we conclude that rural sociology is attempting to further integrate theory, methodology, and image of the subject matter within a positivistic partial paradigm framework. We further suggest that rural sociologists continue their pursuit of a reflexive understanding of the practice of social science as an integral part of their research agenda.     

The Sociology of Neuroethics: Expectational Discourses and the Rise of a New Discipline

The sudden emergence of the discipline ‘neuroethics’ is an intriguing event from the perspective of the sociologies of medicine, science and bioethics. Despite calls for greater social science engagement with neuroethics, it has so far received little attention. So that sociologists might consider how to engage with the field, and in order to simultaneously contribute towards a sociology of neuroethics, this paper explores neuroethics’ disciplinary identity via a critical analysis of literature defining neuroethics’ scope and role. Drawing on the sociologies of bioethics and expectations, I argue that in setting the neuroethical agenda, neuroethicists construct expectations about the future of neuroscience. In doing so, they align themselves with neuroscience, rather than maintaining a critical distance. Similar critiques have been made of bioethics, but in its efforts to distinguish itself from bioethics, neuroethics appears to exacerbate many of the attributes which sociologists have found problematic. This reinforces the need for critical social science perspectives to inform neuroethics, and also shows how neuroethics is potentially an interesting area of empirical study for sociology. However, the paper concludes by calling for critical reflexivity in sociology’s engagement with neuroethics, in light of recent debates surrounding the relationship between social science, bioethics, bioscience and expectations.     

Science against modernism: the relevance of the social theory of Michael Polanyi

Science, as an institution, is widely taken by sociologists to exemplify the modern tendency towards vesting trust and authority in impersonal offices and procedures, rather than in embodied human individuals. Such views of science face an important challenge in the social philosophy of Michael Polanyi. His work provides important insights into the continuing role of embodied personal authority and tradition in science and, hence, in late modernity. I explicate Polanyi's relevance for social theory, through a comparison with Weber's essay 'Science as a Vocation'. An understanding of the personal dimensions of trust and authority in science suggests practical limits to the position of Giddens on the disembedding of social relations and on the scepticism and reflexivity of modernity.     

The sociology of social problems in Japan

The sociology of social problems in Japan has different characteristics from its counterpart in the United States. These differences are the circumstances surrounding an individual’s knowledge of social science prior to World War II, and the two main streams of social science after the rush of American sociology into Japan following that war. A few legends in some of the main fields of study are reviewed. Additionally, one of the most urgent social problems facing sociologists in Japan, the decline and survival of departments of sociology, is described and discussed.     

Sociology and Human Rights in the Post‐Development Era

This article explores the dilemmas of the sociology of human rights – a growing field of academic research. Sociologists are increasingly conceptualizing poverty, global economic inequality, and social inequalities of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation not as social problems, but rather as human rights abuses. The shift of emphasis from the social problems perspective to the human rights perspective demands a different set of remedies from IGOs, national governments, and local authorities. Whereas in the past sociologists tended either to recommend modifications to social policies or to propose large‐scale social transformation, they now find themselves advocating the implementation of human rights on the global, national, and local levels. This has brought sociologists into the area of global governance. The process of delineating an explicitly sociological perspective on human rights is impeded by two overlapping dilemmas: (1) the tension between an approach that emphasizes the analysis of ‘rights effects’ on the global, national, and local levels and an approach that stresses the advocacy of rights as a palliative for social inequalities; and (2) the tension between an interdisciplinary vision, in which sociology would join other disciplines in illuminating human rights and a unidisciplinary vision, in which sociologists and their allies would push for a unified social science founded on human rights.     

The attitudes of American sociologists toward causal theories of male homosexuality

The origin of homosexuality has been the subject of systematic study in many disciplines during the previous century. In the social science literature, two general models concerning the etiology of homosexuality have emerged, the essentialist model and the constructionist model. This article reviews these two models and provides empirical data on their relative support. Support for each model has been gauged by assessing the opinions of sociologists. Data was obtained from a random sample of sociologists teaching in colleges and universities throughout the United States. The major finding is that the majority of sociologists now endorse the essentialist position.     

Can sociology be a science?: The issue of gender and sex-dimorphic characteristics

In spite of the fact that much of the work done by sociologists is of high quality, there appears to be a pervasive sense among sociologists that as a field sociology is not developing an accumulating base of knowledge that involves a combination of theory and empirical “facts.” Social constructs are a basic component of most human behavior, and such behaviors cannot be understood without attention to the nature of those social constructs. However, humans are also biological beings, their biological attributes are relatively stable, and variations in these attributes often have a strong effect on behavior. It is also the case that what persons experience and how they behave has an effect on their biological attributes. We suggest that if sociologists were attentive to the interactions of biological attributes and social constructs, sociologists would be in a position to develop a constantly expanding base of scientific social knowledge. As an illustrative example, we have focused on the issue of how gender and sex-dimorphic characteristics are intrinsically interrelated.     

Elements of a Sociological Contribution to Happiness Studies

A significant body of social‐science research on happiness has accrued in recent decades, produced mainly by economists and psychologists. Sociologists, however, have made more limited contributions to “happiness studies”. This paper provides an overview of concepts, methods and findings and suggests some questions about happiness that ought to be of substantial interest to sociology. Many sociologists are clearly interested in the well‐being of the people they study (sometimes suggesting “policy implications” emerging from their empirical findings); happiness is a presumptively important form of well‐being, and an engagement with happiness studies might constitute a way to develop more systematic connections between well‐being and academic research. Building on existing findings, sociologists would be well‐placed to consider the social context of happiness (as against an individualist orientation more common in other disciplines) as well as the unintended consequences of policy initiatives and happiness discourses.     

Reading Ibn Khaldun in the Formative Period of Sociology

‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the founder of the science of society, became known to modern sociologists during the formative period of sociology, that is, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. There was something of a reception of Ibn Khaldun in Europe at that time by sociologists and other scholars who were not necessarily involved with Islamic or West Asian studies. In fact, the reception of Ibn Khaldun by modern scholars in the West can be differentiated into Eurocentric or Orientalist as opposed to more disciplinary attitudes. While much has been said about the Eurocentric reception of Ibn Khaldun, less is discussed about the disciplinary approach to Ibn Khaldun among thinkers who wrote when the modern science of sociology was emerging in Europe. This special issue on Ibn Khaldun in the Formative Period of Sociology provides English translations of six articles originally written in Italian, French, German, Polish, Spanish and Turkish between 1896 and 1934. Not all of these articles were written by sociologists. Together, they provide some background as to how Ibn Khaldun was conceived of in non-area studies circles, in the social sciences and humanities.     

Sociological contributions to the study of social innovation: A critical review

Sociology has long been interested in innovating solutions to social problems. However, this desire has also been a source of controversy as it can conflict with the discipline's ambition also to be recognized as a hard science. This paper critically reviews sociological contributions to the study of social innovation. It first contextualizes these contributions by discussing the origins of sociology's interest in transforming society, the growing tension between that interest and sociology's other aspiration to create objective knowledge about the social world, and how more sociologists have relocated to business schools where most research on social innovation is now being conducted. Next, it summarizes sociologists' contributions, which emphasize how social innovation is organized by institutions, networks, social movements, and organizations themselves. It then discusses criticisms of this work and responses to these critiques. It concludes by asking whether sociologists' research on social innovation has advanced their discipline's dual mission of reforming and explaining society and what additional studies are needed.     

Sur le langage et l’écriture en sociologie Brèves considérations théoriques et pratiques à partir de Bourdieu

After showing that language and writing are used as basic resources in sociology, this article seeks to identify issues raised by writing in sociology to produce the knowledge expected of this discipline as other social sciences. After considering the status of sociological knowledge and use of language that this knowledge requires, the article seeks to define the rules to be followed by sociologists in order to explain what it means in science. The arguments presented here differ from those developed in some post-modern theories, according to which sociology is after all only a matter of language, and sociologists are authors like novelists. The article is based on considerations developed in particular by Pierre Bourdieu.     

Assessing the impact of planned social change

It is a special characteristic of all modern societies that we consciously decide on and plan projects designed to improve our social systems. It is our universal predicament that our projects do not always have their intended effects. Very probably we all share in the experience that often we cannot tell whether the project had any impact at all, so complex is the flux of historical changes that would have been going on anyway, and so many are the other projects that might be expected to modify the same indicators.It seems inevitable that in most countries this common set of problems, combined with the obvious relevance of social science research procedures, will have generated a methodology and methodological specialists focused on the problem of assessing the impact of planned social change. It is an assumption if this paper that, in spite of differences in the forms of government and approaches to social planning and problem-solving, much of this methodology can be usefully shared — that social project evaluation methodology is one of the fields of science that has enough universality to make scientific sharing mutually beneficial. As a part of this sharing, this paper reports on program impact assessment methodology as it is developing in the United States today.     

Cautionary Notes on Navigating the Neurocognitive Turn

The approach sociologists should take toward the biological sciences, particularly in light of the neurocognitive turn that is taking place in many other disciplines, is not as straightforward as some have suggested. Advocates of bridging neurocognitive and sociological frameworks have argued that we should learn and utilize neurocognitive science in order to refresh sociological concepts, as well as to contribute positively to the development of bio/psycho/social knowledge. However, I argue that the onto‐epistemological question of how we should approach neuroscientific knowledge, which has yet to be resolved, should be foregrounded rather than forgotten in these efforts. Without a willingness to criticize as well as learn from neurocognitive science, and wade into its internal debates, sociologists risk reifying neurocognitive knowledge and diminishing awareness and appreciation of its complexities and contradictions.