Left behind: intergenerational transmission of human capital in the midst of HIV/AIDS

This paper provides evidence on how adverse health conditions affect the transfer of human capital from one generation to the next. We explore the differential exposure to HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa as a substantial health shock to both household and community environment. We utilize the recent rounds of the Demographic and Health Surveys for 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. First, we find that an additional year of maternal education leads to a 0.37-year increase in children’s years of schooling in the developing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, our results show that mother’s HIV status has substantial detrimental effects on inheritability of human capital. We find that the association between infected mothers’ and their children’s human capital is 30 % less than the general population. Finally, focusing only on noninfected mothers and their children, we show that HIV prevalence in the community also impairs the intergenerational human capital transfers even if mother is HIV negative. The findings of this paper are particularly distressing for these already poor, HIV-torn countries as in the future they will have even lower overall level of human capital due to the epidemic.     

Population distribution and economic development in Africa: The need for urbanization policies

Many countries in Africa are facing severe development problems because of high rates of population growth, stagnant or declining agricultural productivity, and increasing migration of the rural poor to large cities. Most demographic studies of Africa ignore problems arising from the spatial distribution of population and public allocation of investment. Strategic planning of the location of development investments in ways that will prevent or reduce excessive concentration of population and productive activities in large primary cities is becoming increasingly important for many African governments. In this article it is argued that the excessive growth of primary cities in predominantly rural countries can be detrimental to their economic recovery. Policies encouraging more widespread distribution of population in secondary cities and towns and policies promoting investment in physical infrastructure, marketing, small-scale manufacturing, and agroprocessing in secondary cities and towns can provide a stronger base for both rural and urban development in many African countries in the future.     

Sub-Saharan Africa: population pressures on development

The population of sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 434 million in 1984, is expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2025. The birth rate, currently 48/1000 population, continues to increase, and the death rate, 17/1000, is declining. Rapid population growth has curtailed government efforts to provide adequate nutrition, preserve the land base essential for future development, meet the demand for jobs, education, and health services, and address overcrowding in urban areas. Low education, rural residence, and low incomes are key contributors to the area's high fertility. Other factors include women's restricted roles, early age at marriage, a need for children as a source of security and support in old age, and limited knowledge of and access to modern methods of contraception. Average desired family size, which is higher than actual family size in most countries, is 6-9 children. Although government leaders have expressed ambivalence toward development of population policies and family planning programs as a result of the identification of such programs with Western aid donors, the policy climat is gradually changing. By mid-1984, at least 13 of the 42 countries in the region had indicated that they consider current fertility rates too high and support government and/or private family planning programs to reduce fertility. In addition, 26 countries in the region provide some government family planning services, usually integrated with maternal and child health programs. However, 10 countries in the region do not support family planning services for any reason. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet produced a family planning program with a measurable effect on fertility that could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Social and economic change is central to any hope of fertility reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Lower infant and child mortality rates, rising incomes, higher education, greater economic and social opportunities for women, and increased security would provide a climate more conducive to fertility decline. Given the limited demand, great sensitivity must be shown in implementing family planning programs.     

Parental Divorce and Children’s Schooling in Rural Malawi

A growing body of literature has examined the impact of different types of family structures on children’s schooling in sub-Saharan Africa. These studies have investigated how living arrangements, gender of the household head, parental death, and paternal migration are related to schooling. Although many sub-Saharan African countries have high divorce rates, very few studies have explored the impact of parental divorce on children’s schooling. The present study uses three waves of data from the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health (MLSFH) to investigate the effect of parental divorce on children’s schooling and the possible mechanisms driving this relationship. Unlike prior studies, this study uses child-level fixed-effects models to control for selection into divorce. Results show that parental divorce is associated with lower grade attainment and a larger schooling gap, defined as the number of years a child is behind in school (among children currently attending school). Although no association exists between parental divorce and current school attendance, girls affected by divorce are significantly less likely to be attending school. Differences in economic resources, maternal coresidence, or maternal psychological well-being do not explain the relationship between parental divorce and children’s schooling.     

How the World Survived the Population Bomb: Lessons From 50 Years of Extraordinary Demographic History

The world population will reach 7 billion in late 2011, a demographic milestone that is causing renewed attention to the challenges caused by population growth. This article looks at the last 50 years of demographic change, one of the most extraordinary periods in demographic history. During this period, world population grew at rates that have never been seen before and will almost surely never be seen again. There were many concerns about the potential impact of rapid population growth in the 1960s, including mass starvation in countries such as India, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and increased poverty in low-income countries. The actual experience was very different. World food production increased faster than world population in every decade since the 1960s, resource prices fell during most of the period, and poverty declined significantly in much of the developing world. The article considers the economic and demographic explanations for the surprising successes of this important period in demographic history. It also looks at regions that have been less successful, especially Africa, and at the lessons for dealing with the important challenges that still remain.     

Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.     

Single Motherhood and Child Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Life Course Perspective

Single motherhood in sub-Saharan Africa has received surprisingly little attention, although it is widespread and has critical implications for children’s well-being. Using survival analysis techniques, we estimate the probability of becoming a single mother over women’s life course and investigate the relationship between single motherhood and child mortality in 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Although a mere 5 % of women in Ethiopia have a premarital birth, one in three women in Liberia will become mothers before first marriage. Compared with children whose parents were married, children born to never-married single mothers were significantly more likely to die before age 5 in six countries (odds ratios range from 1.36 in Nigeria to 2.61 in Zimbabwe). In addition, up to 50 % of women will become single mothers as a consequence of divorce or widowhood. In nine countries, having a formerly married mother was associated with a significantly higher risk of dying (odds ratios range from 1.29 in Zambia to 1.75 in Kenya) relative to having married parents. Children of divorced women typically had the poorest outcomes. These results highlight the vulnerability of children with single mothers and suggest that policies aimed at supporting single mothers could help to further reduce child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa.     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Whatever Happened to Social Indicators in Africa? Whatever Happened Indeed! A Developing World Perspective on the Kenneth C. Land and Alex C. Michalos Report on ‘Fifty Years After the Social Indicators Movement’

Africa is a latecomer to the Social Indicators Movement. The first social indicators for Third World countries were developed by outsiders and covered almost exclusively topics related to basic needs and development. In response to Kenneth Land’s and Alex Michalos’ historical assessment and their agenda for future ‘social indicators/quality of life/well-being’ research, the commentary traces how South Africa and sub-Saharan countries—with a little help from many friends who are pioneers in the movement—have succeeded in developing their own home-grown social indicators movement. Addressing some of the themes outlined in the agenda that Land and Michalos set for future research, the commentary discusses the importance of monitoring social change occurring in African society in a ‘post-industrialized and much more globalized, and digitized-computerized-roboticized’ era: How will new values and norms impact on the quality of life of future generations of African people?     

Quality of life declines in big and growing cities. Poverty in cities

The quality of life in developing countries during the first couple of decades after the Second World War was higher in cities than in small towns and villages. However, the relative advantage of city dwellers in developing countries has declined since the 1970s, with high-growth rate cities experiencing a more severe decline. Infant mortality levels in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s are as high in large cities as in the smallest towns and villages. In most developing regions, big city residents are increasingly disadvantaged, such that researchers and policymakers can no longer assume that the quality of life in urban areas is better than in rural areas. The urban transformation of the developing world is similar to the 19th century urbanization of now-developed countries, but today many more people are crowding into far bigger cities. Using survey information from 43 countries representing 63% of the developing world's urban population outside of China and India, Martin Brockerhoff of the Population Council and Ellen Brennan of the UN Population Division found that rapid population growth and big size have overwhelmed the capacity of cities to provide essential goods and services.     

Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty‐First Century

Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.     

非洲的人口动态与分布

非洲的人口动态长期以来具有高出生率、高死亡率的特点,20世纪90年代以后,非洲的人口动态由高出生高死亡模式向高出生中死亡模式转变．死亡率的持续下降在很大程度上是由于数种过去危害最严重的急性传染病基本上得到有效控制的结果。正是死亡率的下降和持续的高出生率导致非洲人口迅速增长。在非洲人口增长的过程中．人口分布是极不平衡的。非洲人口分布的变化与经济因素的人口定期迁移是密切相关的,大致可分为三种情况．这种独特的迁移模式均与经济活动和生产方式直接相关。     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

Aids and population growth in sub-Saharan Africa: Assessing the sensitivity of projections

Despite different models to project the course of the AIDS pandemic and a scarcity of data to provide standard input parameters for those models, a limited consensus emerges from distinct sets of population projections. In sub-Saharan Africa, population growth rates are projected to remain positive in spite of the pandemic over the next few decades. To investigate this conclusion, alternative projections of an HIV/AIDS epidemic and its related mortality are first produced from different sets of input parameters and assumptions. Their incorporation into the population projections of a fast-growing country illustrates the robustness of projected population growth rates under very different scenarios of the future epidemic but with the common assumption that it will not affect the mortality of the uninfected population, fertility nor migration. This paper then shows that the projected growth rates are much less robust when interactions between the epidemic and the demographic regime are allowed and identifies several potential mechanisms for such interactions. In particular, it suggests that improving our confidence in the medium-term projections of the demographic impact of AIDS in the region requires less a refinement of the projections of the epidemic than a better understanding of its impact on the timing of the postulated fertility decline.     

Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child's Perspective: Family Size,Cohort Size,and Children's Resources

This article provides a new characterization of stages of the demographic transition from the perspective of children competing for resources within families and cohorts. In Stage 1 falling mortality increases the size of both families and birth cohorts. In Stage 2 falling fertility overtakes falling mortality to reduce family size, but population momentum causes continued growth in cohort size. In Stage 3 falling fertility overtakes population momentum to produce declining cohort size. We apply our framework to census microdata for eight countries and to United Nations population projections for a larger set of countries. The results suggest that most countries spend two to three decades in Stage 2, with declining family size offset by increasing cohort size. From the perspective of children aged 9–11, many countries enter Stage 3 between 2000 and 2010. Other countries, especially in Africa, will continue to experience increasing cohort size for several more decades.     

The World Fertility Survey: charting global childbearing

Interviewing some 350,000 women in 42 developing countries and 20 developed countries representing nearly 40% of the world's population, the World Fertility Survey (WFS) is in a unique position to document the historic 1970s slowdown in global population growth. This Bulletin describes efforts begun in 1972 to ensure high quality, internationally comparable, accessible data, the data's importance for policymakers, planners and researchers, and major findings available by early 1982 from directly assisted WFS surveys in 29 developing countries and contraceptive use data from WFS-type surveys in 16 developed countries. Marital fertility has declined in all developing regions except Africa but still averages from 4.6 children/woman in Latin America to 6.7 in Africa, while preferred family size ranges from 3.0 children in Turkey to 8.9 in Senegal--far above the average 2.2-2.5 children/woman needed to end developing countries' population growth in the long run. However, women ages 15-19 prefer nearly 2 children fewer than the oldest women ages 45-49; 3.8 vs. 5.7 on the average. Nearly 1/2 (48%) of married women surveyed in 27 countreis said they wanted no more children. Preventing all unwanted births would reduce birth rates up to 15 births/1000 population in these countries. Overall, 32% of married, fecund women in developing countries are using contraception compared to an average 72% in 16 developed countries. Education, literacy, and more available family planning services increase contraceptive use. Age at marriage is rising in Asia, but this factor alone has little effect on fertility. Infant mortality is higher in many developing countries than previously thought. Breastfeeding is an important restraint on fertility in most developing countries but is declining among more educated, employed, and urban women which could raise fertility if not compensated for by gains in contraceptive use.     

How a trend towards a stationary population affects consumer demand

Abstract During the great depression of the 1930seconomists in both the United States and Europe tried to analyse the economic consequences of declining rates of population growth. Not only were birth rates in many industrial countries at the lowest levels ever, but they coincided with high rates of unemployment. Of the many economists who held that demographic trends were partly responsible for the adverse economic conditions, a prominent example was John Maynard Keynes. According to his so-called stagnation thesis, population growth stimulates investment demand in two ways: more people need more goods and services and, hence, more investment in factories and machinery; and with population growing, businessmen are more likely to regard their investment misallocations as less serious than when the growth is slow or nil.(1)A minority of writers were more optimistic about the economic consequences of slower rates of population growth. For example, Thompson argued that with a lower ratio of consumers to producers the population would enjoy a higher standard of living and the education of children should improve.(2).     

Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.