数字在领导讲话中的妙用

领导干部讲话、作报告常常离不开数字。在讲话中善于运用数字,不仅可以增强讲话的说服力和可靠性,如果再讲究点技巧,还可以收到意想不到的效果。探讨领导讲话对数字的妙用,不是提倡玩弄数字游戏,用以文过饰非,哗众取宠,而是借以提高领导干部讲话的说服力、吸引力和感染力。夹“数”夹议趣味浓。领导讲话不是做统计报告,也不是发布新闻公报,运用数字最忌连篇累牍,平铺直“数”。如果一味地堆砌数字,俨然账房先生报流水账,就会使人听而生厌。最好的方法是用“数”说话,夹“数”夹议。2004年5月,商务部部长薄熙来陪同温家宝总理访问欧盟总部,此…     

领导讲话中的不宜多讲

无论在什么时间、什么地点、向什么对象、作什么种类的讲话,领导者都要以履行工作职责和实现工作目标为中心.在这一意义上,我们必须强调,若非有利于履行自身的工作职责和实现工作目标,领导者就不宜多讲,甚至干脆不讲.     

领导讲话不要落入俗套

不知从何时起,各级领导的讲话相继落入了＂一、二、三……＂的俗套。一讲认识意义,二讲明确重点,三讲加强领导……几乎成了通用模式。最近,重温毛主席的光辉著作,看看老人家讲话的结构和话风,再对比当前的各级领导讲话,笔者忽发奇想：讲话能否不要＂一、二、三……＂     

讲话体现领导水平

<正>讲话体现领导水平。话讲得好,不仅三言两语就能切中要害、打动人心、引起共鸣,而且可以展现领导干部的自信与能力、思想与智慧,表达自己的真情实感、心路历程、雄才伟略;话讲得不好,越是滔滔不绝,听起来越是让人云里雾里,不仅起不到引导作用,反而容易招致他人反感。我国古代思想家荀子说过:"口能言之,身能行之,国宝也。"因此,领导干部必须深谙讲话技巧,提高讲话能力。说短话邓小平同志曾经指出:开会要开小会,开短会,     

领导讲话三议

讲求讲话技巧、提高讲话水平,是领导干部增强自身素质的重要环节。但是,提高执政能力、实施科学领导,更需要领导干部讲实话、讲短话、讲有用的话。讲实话,是对领导干部的起码要求。讲实话,需要领导干部形成带头讲实话的氛围,坚持有一说一、有二说二。只有这样,领导才能有权威、有魅力,也才能实实在在地解决基层存在的问题。同时,领导干部还需要坚持听实话不听假话,不为说假话者提供市场;需要切实转变作风,深入实际体察民情,使自己不受蒙蔽,能够识别实话和假话;需要有度量,在听实话时不怕丢面子,不认为自己永远正确,不因为要维护自己的政声、…     

领导讲话如何面对热点问题

在实际领导工作中,总会出现一些人们普遍关注的热点问题。它同人们的切身利害息息相关,人们也热切地关注着领导者处理这些热点问题的态度和思路、方法。而且人们的耐心都是有限度的,如果领导者不能及……     

强化领导讲话的吸引力

开会时,听众渴望听到领导生动有趣的讲话,一旦身临会场就会情不自禁地被领导者的谈笑风生所感染。台上讲得津津有味,台下听得聚精会神,这样的讲话才令人心驰神往。撇开领导讲话的演讲技巧不谈,其讲稿固有的趣味性应该是决定其讲话吸引力的关键因素。下面,笔者就如何增强领导讲稿的趣味性,提高领导讲话的吸引力,谈几点粗浅的看法。闪亮登场,先声夺人。“良好的开端等于成功的一半”。因此,领导讲话精心设计开场白十分重要,设计得好,就能马上抓住人心,收到先声夺人之效。有时,独辟蹊径的开场白往往能产生意想不到的效果。如一位纪委领导到一个…     

领导讲话的气势美

领导讲话是领导活动的重要组成部分，它包括领导者在各种会议上的讲话、报告，在一些重要场合的演讲、致词，在某些重大活动中的谈话、发言等等。不仅讲话种类多，而且涉及内容广：有的重在分析形势，提出任务；有的重在总结工作，表彰先进；有的重在阐述理论，报告情况；有的重在表示礼仪、纪念、祝贺，等等。     

Rational and non-rational planning

People's views on planning differ widely, as this article demonstrates. Within the broad field of planning, strategic policy-making is becoming ever more important. The authors aim to discuss a number of well known concepts, methods and theoretical approaches as they appear in the business and management literature of planning. In Part 1 they indicate the variety of planning attitudes and discuss why planning is necessary and what it entails. In Part 2, with the aid of conceptual frameworks, they discuss various planning approaches and new developments and end with an examination of rational planning and strategic policy making.     

企业实施CRM的经济理性分析

本文通过建立经济理论模型,对企业实施客户关系管理(CRM)前后的收益进行分析.其中在企业实施CRM后的收益分析考虑了CRM的实施成本,重复和交叉购买及口碑推荐.通过对企业实施CRM经济理性分析,指出生产率悖论的结症所在,让大家在理性的轨道上去认识CRM、正视CRM风险,并采取措施规避风险.     

管理非合作博弈机制式表述

根据管理激励与约束机制具有多因素、多目标、多阶段特征,本文作者提出了管理博弈机制式表述方法。本文建立了单阶段和多阶段管理激励与约束非合作博弈机制式表述的基本模型及方法,这些基本模型及方法大大扩展了管理博弈问题的研究深度及研究范围,从而为人们研究复杂管理博弈问题提供了新的理论工具。     

基于有限理性消费者的竞争性退款保证策略

考虑有限理性消费者的前提下研究了低质和高质零售商关于退款保证的策略竞争。进一步将模型扩展到存在产品质量差异的情形,研究产品质量对双方策略的影响。研究表明:只有当有限理性消费者数量高于一定临界值时,提供退款保证才是有利可图的。在产品质量对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面为同时提供退款保证,且此时退款保证对低质企业更有利;而在产品质量非对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面可能为低质企业不提供,高质企业提供或双方同时提供。此时退款保证更倾向于对高质企业有利。     

Modeling Sequential Information Acquisition Behavior in Rational Decision Making

Most real‐life decisions are made with less than perfect information and there is often some opportunity to acquire additional information to increase the quality of the decision. In this article, we define and study the sequential information acquisition process of a rational decision maker (DM) when allowed to acquire any finite amount of information from a set of products defined by vectors of characteristics. The information acquisition process of the DM depends both on the values of the characteristics observed previously and the number and potential realizations of the remaining characteristics. Each time an observation is acquired, the DM modifies the probability of improving upon the products already observed with the number of observations available. We construct two real‐valued functions whose crossing points determine the decision of how to allocate each available piece of information. We provide several numerical simulations to illustrate the information acquisition incentives defining the behavior of the DM. Applications to knowledge management and decision support systems follow immediately from our results, particularly when considering the introduction and acceptance of new technological products and when formalizing online search environments.     

A Rational Decision Rule with Extreme Events

Risks induced by extreme events are characterized by small or ambiguous probabilities, catastrophic losses, or windfall gains. Through a new functional, that mimics the restricted Bayes-Hurwicz criterion within the Choquet expected utility approach, it is possible to represent the decisionmaker behavior facing both risky (large and reliable probability) and extreme (small or ambiguous probability) events. A new formalization of the precautionary principle (PP) is shown and a new functional, which encompasses both extreme outcomes and expectation of all the possible results for every act, is claimed.     

Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World

We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk‐dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The payoff matrix changes according to a random walk. Players observe these payoffs and the population distribution of actions as they evolve. The game has frictions: opportunities to change strategies arrive from independent random processes, so that the players are locked into their actions for some time. As the frictions disappear, each player ignores what the others are doing and switches at her first opportunity to the risk‐dominant action. History dependence emerges in some cases when frictions remain positive.     

A Rational Theory of Mutual Funds' Attention Allocation

The question of whether and how mutual fund managers provide valuable services for their clients motivates one of the largest literatures in finance. One candidate explanation is that funds process information about future asset values and use that information to invest in high‐valued assets. But formal theories are scarce because information choice models with many assets are difficult to solve as well as difficult to test. This paper tackles both problems by developing a new attention allocation model that uses the state of the business cycle to predict information choices, which in turn, predict observable patterns of portfolio investments and returns. The predictions about fund portfolios' covariance with payoff shocks, cross‐fund portfolio and return dispersion, and their excess returns are all supported by the data. These findings offer new evidence that some investment managers have skill and that attention is allocated rationally.