Historiography and transformation of ethnic identity in the Mongol Empire: the Öng’üt case

Throughout their history, Inner Asian empires used familiar imperial institutions to rapidly impose new ethnic designations and their attendant languages, such as ‘Türk’ or ‘Mongol’, on their subjects. The swiftness of this integration into new ethnic designations should not be taken to mean that this integration was painless, however. In the well-documented Mongol empire, for example, this incorporation was extremely traumatic for many Inner Asian ethnic groups, even where the subordinate local elites achieved high status in the new regime. This may be seen in the case of the Öng’üt, a Christian Turkic-speaking people of Inner Mongolia whose rulers then became key marriage partners of the Mongol aristocracy. Successive iterations of the origin story of the Öng’üt rulers show how these histories went through vast changes as they were forcibly incorporated into the new empire, and dealt with the internal conflicts sparked by that incorporation. Previously central parts of their historic past, such as Christianity and service as border guards to the previous Jin dynasty, had to be marginalized and a new historical past had to be created. Historiography thus reflected and shaped changes in ethnic identity in a traumatic dynastic transition.     

VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long-surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs.     

OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF WILDLIFE

The use of wildlife resources is governed by a combination of private contracts and public regulations. Most often, private landowners control access rights, and government agencies regulate hunting and other uses. This paper shows that these institutions depend on wildlife values and the ability of private landowners to control access to species that inhabit their land. Logit regressions and literary sources are used to test implications about private hunting rights and state regulations. The data support the view that private, legal, and political forces have led to institutions that vary in ways consistent with wealth maximization.     

Impartiality,friendship-networks and voting behavior: Evidence from voting patterns in the Eurovision Song Contest

What is the extent to which a country's political institutions impact aggregate voting behavior in a comparative perspective? More specifically, are citizens in some countries more inclined vote on the basis of ‘quality’ or ‘merit’ over ‘friendship’ or ‘loyalty’, and if so, why? This paper seeks to address how the extent to which a country's political institutions are impartial (treats all citizens equally, free from corruption, strong rule of law) impact aggregate citizen behavior. When political institutions are more (less) impartial, success in society is more often on the basis of merit (patrimonial ties). This test cases is voting in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) from 1975 to 2012 among pairs and blocs of ‘voting friends’. The theory elucidates that given that certain pairs or blocs exhibit systematic voting bias for one another over time, the bias will be considerably less among impartial states than those with highly partial institutions. Using several measures of ‘friendship’, I find strong empirical evidence for this claim, even when controlling for myriad alternative factors and taking into account various voting regimes. The analysis gives us new insights on how political institutions condition aggregate citizen behavior in general and that although there is much bias in ESC voting, not all bias is equal among friend-countries.     

Klasseneinflüsse auf das Wahlverhalten und die Wahlbeteiligung

The thesis of a declining impact of social class is widely accepted in the social sciences. A central tenet of this thesis is that in particular the impact of social class on voting has declined. Despite a plethora of empirical studies concerning this issue the mechanisms leading to this postulated decline have been relatively less explored. The current paper investigates the thesis of a substitution between class effects on voting and class effects on turnout. Under study are the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Using multinomial logit and logistic regression models for both countries a decline in class voting could be observed, but class effects on turnout increased in both countries. More specifically, the propensity to vote relatively to the non-manual classes has declined among the manual classes. In conjunction with the observation that class voting is higher among the manual classes this result supports the theory that the decline of class voting is due to an increasing political frustration within the manual classes. This reasoning suggests a substitution between class effects on voting and turnout.     

A NONEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF UNANIMITY RULE, MAJORITY RULE, AND PARETO

It is widely held that in the absence of transaction costs unanimity rule is more effective at producing Pareto improvements and Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. We compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their ability to adhere to the Pareto criterion and to select Pareto-optimal alternatives using a single-dimensional spatial voting model without rational proposals. This produces two interesting results. First, if proposals are random, then majority rule is almost always more adept at selecting Pareto-optimal alternatives than unanimity rule. Second, if individuals propose their ideal points, then majority rule selects Pareto-optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule. These results contrast with equilibrium analyses, which typically show that unanimity rule is the best voting procedure for maintaining Pareto optimality. (JEL D7 , C61 )     

HOW THE LEGACY OF FRENCH COLONIZATION HAS SHAPED DIVERGENT LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA: A Time‐Series Cross‐National Analysis

Although many countries in East Asia have achieved high growth rates since the middle of the 20th century, former French colonies in the region have struggled to attain comparable levels of economic development. This article is an attempt to explain this variation in development through a cross‐national analysis of economic growth in East Asia for the period from 1970 to 2007. Results suggest that the underperformance of former French colonies is attributable to their inheritance of colonial institutions that have been unfavorable for domestic investment, international trade, and educational attainment. Overall, conclusions lend support for the idea that long‐term economic development should be understood in terms of path dependence, and that sustained economic growth requires a concerted effort to restructure growth‐adverse institutional arrangements.     

THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment . ( JEL C92)     

IMMIGRATION AND ASIAN AND HISPANIC MINORITIES IN THE NEW SOUTH: AN EXPLORATION OF HISTORY,ATTITUDES, AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Recent analyses of the cultural dimension of protest have started to move away from the structuralist and instrumentalist biases of early resource mobilization and political process models. However, these analyses are limited by a static conception of culture that inhibits their ability to explore how cultural content (i.e., meanings, beliefs, values, symbols, norms) and interpretive processes within organizations influence movement mobilization. Drawing on ethnographic, archival, and secondary historical data, this study establishes how African-American women through their interactions with others in institutions construct identities and meanings about their social situation that incline them to identify with and/or be willing to participate in sociopolitical action.     

Labor Schweiz: Vergleichende Wahlbeteiligungsforschung bei Kantonalen Parlamentswahlen

How to explain different levels in voting turnout among the Swiss sub-national units? To answer this question, this study presents the first comparative and macro-quantitative investigation of the voting participation in parliamentary elections of the Swiss Cantons between 1982 und 2004. The paper evaluates political institutions, socio-economic factors, and cultural foundations. According to our statistical inquiry we present four main determinants of cross-cantonal variance in voting turnout: mandatory voting laws, electoral thresholds, the coverage of partisan membership, and a culture of Catholicism. Moreover, the estimations reveal that there is no systematic influence of patterns of direct democracy on the voting participation in parliamentary cantonal elections.     

WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PREFERENCES? SELF‐INTEREST,IDEOLOGY, AND FAIRNESS IN A LABORATORY DEMOCRACY

Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacrifice their own well being to make financial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games, but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general finding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self‐interest: above‐average earners vote for low tax rates and below‐average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self‐reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self‐interest in this context. We do, however, find evidence for a possible indirect effect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self‐interest than the more liberal subjects. (JEL C90, D63)     

LA REPUBLIQUE METISSEE: CITIZENSHIP,COLONIALISM, AND THE BORDERS OF FRENCH HISTORY

During the past decades, debates about immigration and racism have raged in France, most recently through the sans-papiers movement through which undocumented immigrants have demanded documentation and the rights that flow from it. The important successes of the sans-papiers movement, I argue, are the result of the way they combined demands phrased through universalist discourse with expressions of cultural identity, bringing together approaches often considered incommensurable in French political culture. Taking as its contemporary point of departure the sans-papiers movement, this paper proposes that in order to better understand these debates we need to place them in the context of French colonial history. In particular, I focus on the ways the history of the French Caribbean have shaped the way race and citizenship are imagined in Republican political culture. I draw on my historical work to highlight the important ways French ‘universalism’ was in fact in many ways produced through the actions of slaves in the Caribbean. The struggles around slave emancipation and political equality in the Caribbean that developed during the French Revolution, I suggest, both produced a Republican tradition of anti-racist egalitarianism, and gave birth to a ‘Republican racism’ through which new practices of exclusion were articulated. To understand the contested meaning of citizenship in France at the end of the twentieth century, I suggest, requires such forays into the history of empire through which the possibilities of citizenship were formed.     

Beyond Ethnic Relations: Racial Politics and the Origins of the Welfare State in Republican France

To explain racial fissures in France today, one must revisit the structural and ideological failings in the origin of key Republican institutions. This article analyzes how the symbolic and material significance of labor structures imposed on black French citizens in the Third Republic produced differentiation in the value of labor to the nation. The production of social patterns and belief systems based on racial inequality were integrated into the structure of the French welfare state. The experience of black political actors, Hégésippe Légitimus, Blaise Diange, Lamine Senghor, and the state illustrates how the welfare state, as an engine of assimilation, defined a differential and racialized status for blacks during the process of crucial institution building. Although the majority of blacks in the French Empire were subjects during the Third Republic, the experience of those who were citizens indicates contradictions related to incorporation and race.     

The moral economy of contemporary working‐class adolescence: managing symbolic capital in a French public ‘Adolescent Centre’

Working‐class adolescents of French urban peripheries are key figures in a new social debate that reactivates the nineteenth century spectre of ‘dangerous’ classes to be controlled. Since the 1990s, French social counselling has privileged two modalities of response: taking account of suffering and government by listening and speech. We hypothesize that the contemporary moral economy allows for social interactions that go beyond social control and institutional domination. This is partly because professionals engaged in this moral undertaking may keep a critical distance, and partly because the concerned populations aren't necessarily devoid of resources to advance their interests or incapable of resistance. The concept of moral economy, coupled with the ethnographic method, is heuristic for fully comprehending the complexity of these issues and their stakes. Our fieldwork was centred on a French Adolescent Centre in an impoverished commune in Paris's periphery, from January 2010 through March 2011. These institutions were established in the early 2000s to respond to adolescent ‘suffering’ by crossing social work and psychiatry. Adolescents, parents, and other institutions (especially schools) solicit the professionally diverse staff for assistance, which in turn may take on cases and/or make referrals to other support institutions. By paying attention to all the scenes upon which the story of a counselled adolescent evolves, and bearing more general social evolutions in mind by applying the concept of moral economy, we can consider the multiplicity of seemingly contradictory processes as a whole. We see the destabilization of parents and their loss of symbolic capital, partly due to the norms of contemporary parenthood and partly due to the stigmatization of working‐class adolescence. But we also discern possibilities for expressing sentiments of injustice and humiliation, for increasing symbolic capital, and in some cases a reappropriation of the system, particularly in trajectories marked by a will for social ascension.     

MARKODEMOCRACY?

Robert Dahl identifies a "democratic paradox" in which citizens have low faith in democratic institutions but high esteem for democratic principles and ideals. Dahl asserts that the paradox is resolved if citizens principally perceive democracy in terms of political rights (i.e., freedom of speech and assembly) and not political responsibilities (i.e., regular voting). Such an argument, however, excludes the economic realm from conceptions of democracy. Alternatively, we argue that some citizens may actively include market principles in their perceptions of democracy. These citizens may perceive market participation as a form of democratic participation, thus providing an additional explanation of why widespread distrust of political institutions does not detract from support for democratic values. In this article we provide some preliminary evidence from a targeted survey of college undergraduates, union workers, and churchgoers that illuminates these possibilities.     

DOMESTIC CONTENT LEGISLATION: HOUSE VOTING AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION

House voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach. The results indicate that a representative's vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator's preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative's district, an increasing unemployment rate, campaign contributions from labor groups, affiliation with Democratic Party, and a liberal ideology. Despite ideology's statistical significance, the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion. The estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE EFFICIENCY OF INSTITUTIONS

This paper explores the efect on economic efficiency of the distribution of wealth and systems for enforcing property rights. We construct a two-person, two-period economy in which each person can consume, plant, transfer or steal corn. We find circumstances in which redistribution of wealth is Pareto optimal and in which increasing sanctions against theft to their maximum level is not. These results suggest that it is not only important to consider distribution in the design of property institutions, but also that redistribution itself may serve to increase the efficiency of systems of property rights.     

THE VALUE OF THE VOTE: A MODEL AND TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF TURNOUT ON DISTRIBUTIVE POLICY

This article demonstrates important effects of voter participation. A model shows why, for some types of distributive policy, incumbents are more likely to be reelected if high-turnout regions receive more funds than do low-turnout regions. The model predicts, therefore, greater allocations to high-turnout regions. This prediction is tested with county-level data from the New Deal's Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). The estimates suggest that by voting rather than not voting, an individual increased by about $30 the expected FERA allocation for the individual's county. The size of the estimated effect differs across states. ( JEL D72, N42)     

THEORIES OF COMMITMENT, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE FROM LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

Theories of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity have been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment has been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Altruism has been applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Reciprocity has been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments, which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. ( JEL C9, D64, H41, C72)     

GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION

We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties (used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant (as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes. (JEL C92, D72, D02)