PRIVATE INTEREST SUPPORT FOR EFFICIENCY ENHANCING ANTITRUST POLICIES

Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. We argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face.     

ANTITRUST POLICY AND MERGERS: THE WEALTH EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Many believe that antitrust policy has had a dramatic impact on merger strategies in the United States. For this to be true, enforcement of antitrust laws must affect a wide range of firms, not just those firms whose mergers are contested. This study tests whether or not firms engaged in uncontested mergers are affected by antitrust enforcement, as signalled by Supreme Court decisions. Using event study methodology, we find that antitrust policy against mergers was binding during the 1960s and 1970s as it ulowered the value of targets in ucontested ongoing mergers.     

TOWARD A POSITIVE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTITRUST

Most economists associate antitrust policy with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nonetheless, there is in England and America a much older body of antitrust law, namely, the common law of restraint of trade. This regulation, like language and markets, evolved over a long period of time. This article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be. The last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution.     

Codetermination: Union style

Many European countries have instigated a form of “industrial democracy” by legislating codetermination schemes. However, codetermination may also be accomplished without legislation. We show that unionizing an industry’s labor supply will also achieve much the same results as mandatory codetermination as long as unions are exempt from antitrust legislation. The value of “union codetermination” will yield returns beyond what economists have previously predicted.     

Institutional Conditions of Economic Globalization: Effects of Antitrust and Merger Laws on the Global Integration of the Acquisition Market1

A central insight from institutional theory about markets is that they cannot operate without governing rules to guide interactions among actors. Because most of these rules are made and enforced within national borders, international economic transactions are said to suffer from an “institutional abyss,” the lack of institutional arrangements for economic exchanges. Scholars have found that the abyss can be filled by two factors: network connectedness, such as inter-governmental organizations, and intercountry economic agreements, such as the World Trade Organization or free trade. This article proposes a third factor: the global diffusion of governmental regulations. When countries adopt highly standardized regulations on a particular transaction, it provides legal familiarity for foreigners and reduces procedural uncertainty surrounding how the transaction should be executed. Using fixed-effects models on longitudinal data, I show that the adoption of antitrust and merger laws increases the volume of cross-border mergers—the transaction the laws are meant to regulate. This result stands in direct opposition to financial scholars’ predictions that antitrust and merger laws will reduce cross-border mergers because the laws are meant to restrain, not liberate, the transaction. This article theorizes how the diffusion of regulations, not the elimination of regulations, can facilitate global market integration.     

HOW MANY CHEERS FOR ANTITRUST'S 100 YEARS?

This article describes the ambiguity inherent is U.S. antitrust policy, arguing that it is a necessary consequence of the true, but not commonly understood, task of antitrust policy. Competition is multidimensional in form, and its different dimensions cannot be maximized together. Therefore, antitrust policy cannot maximize competition per se, but aims to achieve an efficient mix of competitive forms. Inadequate knowledge of the technical and preference tradeoffs involved guarantees that questions about the appropriate competitive mix will remain open to debate. The resulting policies, in the author's opinion, merit one cheer out of a possible three.     

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS AND FREE RIDING

Many economists argue that state right-to-work laws, by disallowing union shops, encourage free riding and thus diminish union viability. Others counter that right-to-work laws are not enforced and that they represent local attitudes and employee characteristics which would encourage free riding in any me. We find that when other factors which affect free riding are taken into account, the marginal impact of right-to-work laws remains significant, although of a smaller magnitude than that found in previous bivariate studies.     

Marriage contracts and the law-and-economics of marriage: an Austrian perspective

Marriages and firms share many characteristics in common. Both institutions deal with a set of promises between two parties and therefore need contracts to encourage individual parties to stand by their promises and commitments. Despite these similarities, in most countries marriage laws are statutory laws that have little in common with commercial contract laws. We present the Chicago and neoclassical perspectives on law-and-economics, with a special emphasis on marriage laws. According to this framework, it is possible to explain the way traditional marriage laws have regulated exchanges between spouses and spouses in Western countries such as France, when these countries were patriarchal societies. We also consider the case of egalitarian marriage and show some of the limitations of any statutory marriage laws. We then present a critical perspective on the law-and-economics literature on marriage. Our critique is based on the economic literature by Austrian economists and by public choice theorists. We emphasize the knowledge problem, the problem of interest, and the problems associated with government monopoly in coercion. Our concluding section presents some suggestions regarding a legal system inspired from international commercial contract law. By not giving any particular government a monopoly on the power to enforce marriage contracts such system would avoid some of the problems found in the systems of statutory laws currently regulating marriage and divorce in the Western world.     

Is there consensus among American labor economists? Survey results on forty propositions

I examine whether consensus exists among American labor economists on forty propositions by analyzing responses to a questionnaire mailed to 193 randomly selected labor economists who are members of the American Economic Association. The questions address many of the important debates in labor economics. The answers show consensus on a number of issues, including the belief that minimum wage laws decrease employment, and a rejection of comparable worth’s merits. However, there is substantial disagreement about the impact of unions, the amount of discrimination in the labor market, the trend of average real wages, and several other topics. For comments and advice I thank Charles Brown, Lee Craig, Price Fshback, Donald Frey, Robert Margo, Joshua Rosenbloom, and Andrew Yates. Special thanks go to those who generously gave their time to complete the questionnaire.     

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS IN POLICY AND LITIGATION: WHY THE DISPARITY?

The lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation—as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust/competition policy and litigation—has at least three causes: a considerably shorter period of intellectual development; the specific historical origins and culture of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where this disparity is especially noticeable; and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies. This paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications—including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics. (JEL B12, B13, B21, D18, L41)     

ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF NONPROFITS: SHOULD HOSPITALS RECEIVE SPECIAL CARE?

Nonprofit hospitals receive favorable tax treatment in exchange for providing socially beneficial activities. Extending this rationale suggests that nonprofit hospital mergers should be evaluated differently than mergers of for-profit hospitals because suppression of competition may also allow nonprofits to cross-subsidize care for the poor. Using detailed California data, we find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profit hospitals to provide more charity care or offer unprofitable services in response to an increase in market power. Therefore, we find no empirical justification for applying, as some courts have suggested, different antitrust standards for nonprofit hospitals. (JEL I11, L1, L44)     

Independent Service Organizations and Economic Efficiency

Following the Supreme Court's Kodak decision, numerous antitrust cases have revolved around practices of manufacturers which deter independent service organizations (ISOs) from servicing the manufacturer's equipment. Such practices include tying equipment sales to service, tying service sales to other "aftermarket" products, and refusing to sell replacement parts to ISOs. We show that interbrand systems competition without ISOs curbs service and equipment price distortions and, under plausible conditions, confers greater benefits to users of durable equipment than intrabrand service competition with ISOs. Hence, the effect of manufacturers' practices that foreclose ISOs from service aftermarkets can be efficiency promoting rather than anticompetitive.     

Declining Share of Small Firms in U.S. Output: Causes and Consequences

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model, with large and small firms, to examine possible causes and welfare implications of a declining trend in small firms' share of U.S. output since 1958. Numerical experiments indicate that recent technological advances and government tiering policies that have reduced fixed setup costs of production benefit the emergence of small firms, but lower their output share due to competition for resources among firms. However, this outcome is welfare improving. Therefore, if the policy objective is to raise small firms' output share and economic welfare simultaneously, it is desirable to concentrate on increasing antitrust and deregulatory efforts.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON ANTITRUST LAW

Economists today play prominent roles in formulating antitrust policy and litigating antitrust cases. This paper explains why economics influences antitrust law and describes how economic theories enter and shape the antitrust system. Antitrust policy and doctrine change over time in response to developments in economic theory, and the decentralization of the antitrust adjudication system and the wide latitude accorded judges in interpreting antitrust statutes ensure that legal rules will reflect advances in the economic literature concerning the appropriate content of standards governing business conduct.     

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ON VERTICAL FORECLOSURE

Recent papers have shown conditions under which vertical mergers can result in anticompetitive foreclosure of unintegrated rivals. One implication of these models is that a necessary condition for anticompetitive foreclosure is that unintegrated rival firms are less profitable after a vertical merger. We test this hypothesis by examining the stock prices of unintegrated rivals at the time of a vertical merger announcement and at the time of a government antitrust complaint. We find no evidence to support the foreclosure hypothesis.     

Recent minimum wage increases and the minimum wage labor force

Coclusion  Recently Whaples (1996) reported that most labor economists believe that minimum wage laws decrease employment. Despite this, policy makers have continued to periodically raise the minimum, with the most recent increases occurring in October 1996 and September 1997. The various analyses done by Card, Katz, and Krueger, that showed little to no employment effect of past minimum wage increases, have provided additional ammunition for those who would seek further increases. However, using the estimates of Williams and Mills (1998), we demonstrate that the latest minimum wage increases substantially decreased employment for both sexes. We believe that future increases will do likewise.     

Residence laws and unionization in municipal labor markets: The case of firefighters

An estimate is made of the impact of residence laws and unionization on compensation (wages plus major fringe benefits) as well as on employment of municipal firefighters. In addition, hypotheses about the manner in which residence laws exert these effects are econometrically tested using data obtained by surveying the mayors of 560 municipalities. The standard view — that is, that residence laws restrict labor supply — is not supported by the empirical evidence. Rather, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that residence laws affect compensation by altering the bargaining environment; for example, effects of unions are weaker when there are residence laws. The authors would like to express their appreciation to David Lewin and Ronald Ehrenberg for their helpful advice and thoughtful comments, and to two anonymous referees for suggestions which indubitably improved the paper. Significant research assistance was provided by Glen Elder. Financial support by the Institute of Industrial Relations is gratefully acknowledged.     

ECONOMIC WELFARE, PRICE AND PROFIT: THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST REGIMES

This paper critically examines the deterrent effect of price-fixing statutes under alternative antitrust regimes. A regime is defined by the litigation strategy which the antitrust agency employs in detecting cartels and in determining whether prosecution is warranted and by the basis upon which courts estimate damages. The results of the analysis suggest that antitrust policy may actually induce cartels to further restrict output, increasing welfare loss above the level imposed by an unthreatened, perfect monopoly. Litigation strategy and damages should be founded upon consideration of welfare loss measures to avoid this possibility.