BUYERS' STRATEGIES, ENTRY BARRIERS, and COMPETITION

In markets where sellers have customer-specific investments, and buyers can make credible, but costly, commitments to switch suppliers, buyers' strategies attenuate the market power of sellers. Furthermore, since current prices and a buyer's decision to switch suppliers are related, limit pricing becomes an equilibrium. Limit prices increase with the time it takes a buyer to switch suppliers, and with buyers' switching costs, but fall with the level of sunk investments. Thus, sunk investments may restrain the sellers' ability to exert market power. The paper questions, then, the standard inverse relationship between market performance and sunk investments.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON ANTITRUST LAW

Economists today play prominent roles in formulating antitrust policy and litigating antitrust cases. This paper explains why economics influences antitrust law and describes how economic theories enter and shape the antitrust system. Antitrust policy and doctrine change over time in response to developments in economic theory, and the decentralization of the antitrust adjudication system and the wide latitude accorded judges in interpreting antitrust statutes ensure that legal rules will reflect advances in the economic literature concerning the appropriate content of standards governing business conduct.     

ENTRY BARRIERS,COMPETITION, AND TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION

I build a model of technology adoption to study the quantitative effect of entry barriers on total factor productivity (TFP). In my model, incumbent firms choose technologies that are sufficiently productive to deter entry from a potential competitor. I show that higher entry barriers help to deter entry and lead to the choice of less productive technologies. A novelty of my work is that I use a direct measure of entry barriers. I find that reducing entry barriers from their average level in the poorest 30% of countries to their U.S. level leads to a sizeable increase in aggregate TFP of 12%. (JEL O11, O43)     

TOWARD A POSITIVE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTITRUST

Most economists associate antitrust policy with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nonetheless, there is in England and America a much older body of antitrust law, namely, the common law of restraint of trade. This regulation, like language and markets, evolved over a long period of time. This article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be. The last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution.     

ECONOMICS AND 100 YEARS OF ANTITRUST: INTRODUCTION

Editor's Note: I wish to thank the symposium editors, George Bittlingmayer, Associate Professor, and Gary Walton, Professor, Graduate School of Management, University of California Davis, Davis, CA., for their special efforts and valuable input as they shepherded these papers through the refereeing and editorial process. I also wish to thank Rodney T. Smith, Professor of Economics, Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School and Coeditor of Economic Inquiry, who served as coordinator of the symposium efforts, and Carolyn Williams, assistant to the editor, who served as liaison between Economic Inquiry, the symposium editors and the authors. These combined efforts have resulted in the exciting collection of papers that follow.     

UNIVERSITY COMPETITION,GRADING STANDARDS,AND GRADE INFLATION

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between “good” and “bad”“A’'s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)     

PRIVATE INTEREST SUPPORT FOR EFFICIENCY ENHANCING ANTITRUST POLICIES

Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. We argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face.     

HETEROGENEITY UNDER COMPETITION

A standard prediction of neoclassical microeconomics is that with perfect competition, free entry, and atomistic firms producing a homogeneous product, equilibrium finds all firms employing that technology which has minimum average cost. That competition drives out inefficient producers and reduces heterogeneity within industries is, consequently, a commonplace rule of thumb in economic thinking. This paper demonstrates that demand uncertainty is sufficient to produce heterogeneity in the equilibrium employment of production technologies and to permit the coexistence of producers exhibiting different minimum average costs. This heterogeneity is ubiquitous because the conditions for its presence are not stringent.     

ECONOMIC WELFARE, PRICE AND PROFIT: THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST REGIMES

This paper critically examines the deterrent effect of price-fixing statutes under alternative antitrust regimes. A regime is defined by the litigation strategy which the antitrust agency employs in detecting cartels and in determining whether prosecution is warranted and by the basis upon which courts estimate damages. The results of the analysis suggest that antitrust policy may actually induce cartels to further restrict output, increasing welfare loss above the level imposed by an unthreatened, perfect monopoly. Litigation strategy and damages should be founded upon consideration of welfare loss measures to avoid this possibility.     

COMPETITION AND TEACHER PAY

Competition‐based school reform could have a significant impact on teacher earnings. If school districts behave as typical oligopsonists, then increased competition could lead to higher salaries. However, if teachers receive a share of the economic rents generated by the monopoly power of school districts, then increased competition could lower teacher salaries. This study uses panel data from 670 Texas school districts and more than 335,000 teachers to examine the relationship between school competition and teacher pay. The analysis suggests that an increase in competition results in higher wages for most teachers but lower wages for teachers in relatively concentrated markets. (JEL I2, J3)     

THE RISE OF THE CHICAGO PACKERS and THE ORIGINS OF MEAT INSPECTION and ANTITRUST

The Meat Inspection Act of 1891 and the Sherman Act of 1890 are closely tied. This link makes clearer Congress' intent in enacting the legislation. Both laws were products of economic conditions after 1880 and reflected, in part, widespread concern about the market power of Chicago meat packers. The concerns of local slaughterhouses, which were being displaced by new, low-cost refrigerated beef, and of farmers, who sold livestock to the large Chicago packers, were echoed elsewhere by other small businesses and farmers, who feared for their livelihood during a time of structural change in the economy.     

ANTITRUST POLICY AND MERGERS: THE WEALTH EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Many believe that antitrust policy has had a dramatic impact on merger strategies in the United States. For this to be true, enforcement of antitrust laws must affect a wide range of firms, not just those firms whose mergers are contested. This study tests whether or not firms engaged in uncontested mergers are affected by antitrust enforcement, as signalled by Supreme Court decisions. Using event study methodology, we find that antitrust policy against mergers was binding during the 1960s and 1970s as it ulowered the value of targets in ucontested ongoing mergers.     

PERFECT COMPETITION, URBANIZATION, AND TAX INCIDENCE IN THE RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET

We use monthly gasoline price data for all 50 U.S. states over the period 1984–1999 to examine the incidence of state gasoline excise taxes. Our estimation results indicate full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer. In addition, although we find that gasoline retail prices demonstrate asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale prices , we find only limited evidence of such behavior for retail prices with respect to gasoline excise taxes. Finally, we find that gasoline markets in urban states exhibit full shifting, but those in rural states (with less competition) demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting . ( JEL H22)