Bayesian decision theory,rule utilitarianism,and Arrow's impossibility theorem

The first part of this paper reexamines the logical foundations of Bayesian decision theory and argues that the Bayesian criterion of expected-utility maximization is the only decision criterion consistent with rationality. On the other hand, the Bayesian criterion, together with the Pareto optimality requirement, inescapably entails a utilitarian theory of morality. The next sections discuss the role both of cardinal utility and of cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility in ethics. It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework. Finally, rule utilitarianism is contrasted with act utilitarianism and judged to be preferable for the purposes of ethical theory.     

From separability to unweighted sum: A case for utilitarianism

After reviewing the compelling case for separability (`social welfare is a separable function of individual utilities'), an argument is advanced for utilitarianism (defined as `social welfare is the unweighted sum of individual utilities'). Basically, a compelling individualism-type axiom leads us to (social welfare as an) unweighted sum (of individual utilities), given separability.     

The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?

The article shows that a Paretian social welfare function can be history independent and time consistent only if a stringent set of conditions is verified. Individual utilities must be additive. The social welfare function must be a linear combination of these utilities. Social preferences are stationary only if, in addition, all individuals have the same constant discount rate. The results are implemented in two frameworks: deterministic dynamic choice and dynamic choice under uncertainty. The applications highlight that the conditions are unlikely to be met by individual preferences, and that they severely restrict social preferences.     

Public Opinion On Taxes And Government Spending

This article analyses egalitarian attitudes as well as opinions concerning taxation and government spending. Australians would prefer to have their taxes reduced than to increase government spending on social services, if faced with such an alternative. Typical welfare programs have a low priority, but the public would like to see increased spending on education and science, health services, roads improvements, military defence, and fighting against drug addiction. An individual's opinions about government spending are influenced by his or her socio-economic characteristics, with unemployed people and urban dwellers being more supportive of government spending on social programs.     

From Enlightened Self‐interest to Welfare Coalitions: Overcoming Identity‐based Tensions in the Israeli Welfare State

A common argument in the social policy literature is that ethnic and identity‐based heterogeneity undermines the welfare state. In part, this happens because of difficulties in the generation of broad social solidarity in diverse societies: solidarity which is allegedly necessary for sustaining public support for the welfare state. This study explores this argument's logic in the context of welfare state politics in Israel. Israel would appear to be a near‐perfect example of how heterogeneity strains social solidarity and, in turn, undermines the welfare state. Quite differently from most studies, however, this work's emphasis is not on public attitudes or voting, but on the political interaction between economically disadvantaged identity‐based minorities – specifically Arabs on the one hand and religious Jews on the other – in the welfare field. It is argued that shared interests enable extensive co‐operation among political elites in the welfare field despite religiously‐ and nationally‐based antagonism.     

Sen and Aristotle on Wellbeing

A significant body of research and analysis concerning wellbeing has emerged across a number of social research disciplines, yet the concept of wellbeing does not admit of any unified meaning. Philosophical accounts of wellbeing are traditionally divided into three categories: hedonistic, desire‐satisfaction and objective list theories, reflecting longstanding doctrinal divisions in normative ethics. Rejecting the foundational monism associated with these approaches, Amartya Sen has proposed a pluralist ‘capabilities’ approach to personal wellbeing based on freedom of choice and the Aristotelian notion of a ‘function’. Recent Australian wellbeing research also shows promising signs of moving beyond reductive income‐based metrics towards plural indicators of poverty and social disadvantage. This paper reprises Aristotle's distinctive account of perfect wellbeing (eudaimonia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and investigates Sen's approach in its light, suggesting that future Australian research in the spirit of Sen's pluralism may benefit from Aristotelian insights into the ‘thickness’ of freedom implicated in personal wellbeing.     

Three stories about mother: narratives by women who have lived in care

Families and social work interventions in their lives are at the core of child welfare. Child welfare practices can shape children's and parents' family memories and narratives of different family relations. However, there is little social work research so far based on the personal narratives of people who have lived in care. The study data consist of the written life stories and biographical interviews of three women who have lived part of their childhood in children's homes. In their narratives, the most central family relation was their relationship to the mother. They used different narrative strategies in their stories while trying to manage both living their childhood in care and presenting their mother morally in the same story. The central moral and emotional stance in the narratives of the mother–daughter relationship was love. Through the analysis, three moral characters of the mother were constructed. The first told about an absent mother, the second a loved and loving mother and in the third, the mother's moral character was continuously negotiated and contested. Constructing a personal story and moral character of oneself and of one's mother can be truly risky in the context of a childhood in care.     

Leading Article: Welfare Development in the Midst of Political Uncertainty

On 1st July 1997 Hong Kong will be transformed from a British colony into a Special Administration Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. Although the Basic Law, a mini-constitution for the future SAR government, states that “Hong Kong's capitalist system and lifestyle will remain unchanged for 50 years after the establishment of the SAR”, changes are perceived to be inevitable, not least in respect of the welfare policies to be implemented by the future SAR government. Indeed, since the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 between the British and Chinese Governments on the future of Hong Kong, the existing Colonial Government has been enlarging its role in the social services and making relevant policies more responsive to the needs of the people. These reforms have largely been carried out in line with the democratization process which Hong Kong has been undergoing in recent years. To what extent will these changes in welfare policies continue after 1997? It is argued here that with the enlargement of democracy, and especially the establishment of political parties claiming to represent the interests of the people, it would no longer be possible for Hong Kong to return to residual-type welfare programmes. While it would be unlikely for Hong Kong to develop into a “welfare state”, the future development of social services in Hong Kong would probably command widest acceptance if policies keep in line with the prevalent welfare ideology which stresses, on the one hand, the self-reliance of the people and, on the other, the responsibility of government to look after weaker members.     

On arguments from self-interest for the Nash solution and the Kalai egalitarian solution to the bargaining problem

I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations respectively provide for a justification of the Nash solution and the Kalai egalitarian solution. However, none of these solutions taken by themselves can provide for a full story of bargaining, since, if within a context of bargaining one such consideration is overriding, the solution which does not match this consideration will yield unreasonable results. I systematically present arguments to the effect that each justification from self-interest for respectively the Nash and the Kalai egalitarian solution is vulnerable to this kind of objection. I suggest that the search for an integrative model may be a promising line of research.I am grateful to Jon Elster, A. Hylland, F. Spinnewijn, J. Verhoeven and the members of the research group for theoretical sociology in the K.U.L. for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Norway) for its financial support and the members of the department of sociology in the University of Oslo for their hospitality and interest in my work.     

The self as the locus of morality: A comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead's theories of the moral constitution of the self

This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor's phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead's pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor's framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity.     

Psychosocial and relationship-based theories for child and family social work: political philosophy, psychology and welfare practice

Psychosocial perspectives on children’s development are allied to theories that recognize the ‘self’ as essentially a social entity. The quality of relationships that children experience in their social environment have a profound effect on their socio-emotional development, personality formation and social competence. To this extent, psychosocial theories of children’s development and wellbeing can provide child and family social workers with a powerful framework within which to analyse, assess and practise. However, it is also recognized that the character of child welfare practices and policies are influenced by prevailing political climates. A simple dichotomy is described between political philosophies of the right and left; libertarianism and communitarianism; individual freedom and collective action. It is argued that the present swing to libertarian individualism has brought about major changes in the policy and practice of much child and family social work, including a preference for theories that emphasize people’s psychological independence, rationality and personal responsibility. In such a climate, child and family social work becomes more legalistic, orientated towards principles of justice rather than welfare, and towards rights and responsibilities rather than personal relationships and social competence. Psychosocial developmental theories, with their emphasis on the importance of social relationships and the emotional interconnectedness of people in community, fare less well under the rigours of psychological individualism and free-market economics. The paper concludes that if children’s psychosocial development and competence are a product of their social history, practices that psychologically ‘disembed’ people from their relationship environment are unable to consider children’s needs within a coherent, well-grounded theoretical framework. If child and family social work is premised on helping children develop social understanding and emotional wellbeing, theory and practice are best served by taking a psychosocial perspective.     

Individual rationality and the concept of social welfare

This paper, written in October 1974, deals with some game aspects of the social choice problem. The question asked is whether there exists a social decision rule satisfying the conditions imposed by Arrow over all the preference profiles that may logically arise under it (in the sense of being compatible with individual rationality). This question is answered in the affirmative. The meaning of this result is that if Arrow's condition of unrestricted domain is modified so as to exclude any profile which contradicts individual rationality, then an Arrovian social welfare function can be shown to exist (subject to the assumption that whenever the social outcome is in doubt, individuals use the maximin criterion in order to choose their voting strategy).This research was written up in October 1974 at Northwestern University and was partially supported by the National Science Foundation.     

Australian Welfare Reform: From Citizenship to Supervision

This paper examines the implications of welfare reform for the meaning of social citizenship in Australia. Australian welfare reform has been under way since the late 1980s, and reflects the themes of activity and participation that are shaping social policy in many advanced industrial nations. The paper suggests that Australian welfare reform is following a liberal trajectory of change which places a continuing emphasis on market and family as the preferred institutions for social support with a newly salient appeal to moral ideas about the responsibility of citizens to be self-sustaining. The paper argues that welfare is being transformed from a limited social right to support provided on condition, and from treating the claimant as a sovereign individual to a subject of paternalistic supervision. Together, these changes are redefining the meaning of equality in Australian social citizenship.     

Rule utilitarianism,rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility.The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior.     

The hidden welfare state, tax expenditure and social policy A comparative overview

This article describes, discusses and presents information about tax expenditure and its relation to social policy. It stresses that the hidden welfare state strongly influences social policy and that only looking at the direct provision of welfare goods may be misleading when making comparisons between countries. The article presents new figures on tax expenditure in relation to social policy and does so in a comparative perspective. It is argued that tax expenditure seems to have an upside down effect, but further research is needed to substantiate this. It concludes that tax expenditure strongly influences the provision, financing and delivery of social policy, and tax expenditure therefore has to be more fully integrated into the analysis of the welfare state.     

Alternative libertarian claims and Sen's paradox

One of the ways of escaping from Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal is to weaken Sen's libertarian condition imposed on the collective choice rule. This paper compares three different versions of a revised libertarian claim: (1) Gibbard's theory of alienable rights (1974), (2) Gaertner's and Krüger's approach of self-supporting preferences (1981), and (3) a modification of Gibbard's theory which combines a weakened condition for alienating rights with the requirement of unconditional preferences. A new possibility theorem is obtained for version (3). It is shown that all three approaches are logically independent. Furthermore, it turns out that, under the original as well as the modified version of Gibbard's theory, the alienation of rights can be achieved through strategic misrepresentation of preferences by other members of society, whereas the concept of self-supporting preferences does not admit this kind of manipulation of rights. Approach (2) appears, therefore, to agree more closely with our intuitions concerning the nature of individual rights.     

Informal Welfare, Social Work and the Sociology of Welfare

Summary This article seeks to inject some important but neglected considerationsinto discussions about the nature of informal welfare and thenotice social workers should take of it. Following a sketchof how both sociology and social policy have regarded informalwelfare, it is argued that a sociology of welfare which is sensitiveto the definitions held by participants indicates that socialworkers would be wise to seek to ‘tap’ informalwelfare very cautiously. It is also argued that such sociologyneeds to be accorded a more prominent place in social work trainingcourses.     

The "Europeanization" of Spanish Social Policy

The principal features of Spanish social policy are examined since the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s. The period has been dominated by the four governments of the Socialists under Felipe Gonzalez. It will be argued that in terms of the reform of welfare goals and institutional arrangements, as well as welfare inputs and outputs, a significant degree of “Europeanization” has been achieved. This is especially true of the later period of Gonzalez's premiership in which this process, initiated during the Transition, was accelerated.     

Metrizing social preference

In his Introduction to Value Theory N. Rescher suggests a procedure by which individual valuations can be combined to yield meaningful and accurate social valuation measures. A social valuation is the effective average m ^* of individual valuations, such that: $$m^ * = m - \tfrac{1}{2}\sigma $$ , where m is the mean of individual valuations and σ the standard deviation of individual valuations from m. Rescher's employment of this concept of effective average has the following unacceptable features: (1) the effective average is undefined for the situation by which Rescher chooses to introduce the concept; (2) negative effective averages, which are calculable for many situations, are given no interpretation by Rescher; (3) some effective averages are lower than each individual valuation which figures in their computation, and as a consequence use of the concept of effective average to pinpoint social valuations favors conformity of individual valuations to an unjustifiable extent. Rescher doubts whether a conception of social welfare (or value) can be distilled from individual preferences (or valuations). His doubts are justified, for such a move would require a prior weighting of individual preferences in such a manner that social welfare measures could be arrived at solely by attending to the preferences of qualified individuals, making computation of a welfare measure from the set of individuals' preferences gratuitous.     

Power inequalities

This paper aims to give determinate sense to the claim that there are inequalities of power by outlining a procedure in terms of which individual acts of power can be measured. Noting that problems in the definition and measurement of power are closely related, the paper criticizes one analysis of power which defines the notion in purely causal terms. It argues that such a definition inevitably leads to difficulties in quantifying power, and is in any case deficient. Power is instead defined by reference to the notion of coercion, where this idea is itself explicated in terms of threats. A measure of power is developed from this definition, so that power is quantified by the degree of deprivation that one person can impose upon another. The paper concludes by noting that an adequate measure of power at the social level depends upon inter-personal welfare comparisons, but that this does not mean that the idea of power inequalities cannot be given determinate sense.