Incentive Contracts in Projects with Unforeseeable Uncertainty

Designing incentive contracts that constructively guide employee efforts is a particularly difficult challenge in novel innovation initiatives, where unforeseen events may occur. Empirical studies have observed a variety of incentive structures in innovation settings: “time and material contracts” (compensation for executing orders), “downside protection” (target‐driven incentives with protection from unexpected risks), and “upside rewards” (additional remuneration for pursuing opportunities). This paper develops a model of incentives in presence of unforeseen events and offers a theoretical prediction of which of the empirically observed incentive structures should be used under which circumstances. The combination of three key influences drives the shape of the best incentive contract. First, the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty, or the occurrence of events that cannot possibly be foreseen at the outset. These may force a change in the project's plan, making pure target setting insufficient. Second, fairness concerns dictate that the employee's expected compensation cannot be shifted downward by unforeseen events, because it would cause demotivation, hostility, and defection. Third, management may not be able to observe the detailed actions of the employee (moral hazard) nor whether a positive or negative unforeseen event has occurred (asymmetric information).     

Employment with Alternative Incentive Schemes when Effort is Not Verifiable

Abstract. This paper compares macroeconomic results related to efficiency wages, contracts with bonus and tournaments in a framework with unverifiable effort. When effort is fully observable, both contracts with bonus and tournaments, unlike efficiency wages, solve the incentive problem without generating involuntary unemployment. Only tournaments, however, allow attainment of the Pareto optimal employment level. If effort is not fully observable, previous results must, to some extent, be reconsidered. Contracts with bonus also produce involuntary unemployment, while tournaments, in addition to continuing to produce a higher level of employment, generate involuntary unemployment only if a shirker who is not caught has some probability of winning.     

双边道德风险下供应链质量协调契约研究

契约的公平性是契约有效性的前提,也是提高供应链协调效率的基本保证。本文基于外部市场变化对契约公平性影响,运用委托代理理论,同时考虑供应商和制造商质量失误的基础上,构建双边道德风险下二级供应链质量控制博弈模型,分析外部损失分担与内部惩罚质量契约协调下双方产品质量控制水平,研究外部市场及质量成本变化对两种契约的公平性和有效性的影响,并对模型分析结果进行仿真验证。结果显示：外部认证系统直接影响外部损失分担契约的公平性与有效性,而对内部惩罚契约无效;当供应商不必为制造商质量失误负责时,外部损失契约将实现对供应链的质量协调;随着供应商质量控制成本的提高,内部惩罚契约质量控制效果将高于外部损失分担契约,而当制造商质量控制成本下降时,外部损失分担契约较内部损失分担契更有效。因此,保证契约的公平性是实现供应链产品质量协调的根本前提。     

基于公平心理的报酬契约设计及代理成本分析

针对标准契约理论在设计报酬契约时忽略了公平心理因素这一问题,本研究以行为契约理论为工具.设计了引入公平心理之后的最优报酬契约,并进一步分析了公平心理对激励效率的影响.理论分析表明:公平心理较弱时,最优报酬契约是团队相对主义契约,其中公平心理会导致公平租金和公平风险补偿两种激励效率损失;公平心理较弱时,最优报酬契约是团队平均主义契约,其中公平心理只会导致公平风险补偿一种激励效率损失.这些研究结论对企业设计报酬契约具有重要参考意义,比如企业应该对公平心理强弱不同的员工设计和提供不同结构形式的报酬契约.     

Threshold Incentives and Sales Variance

In this paper, we analyze the impact of two forms of commonly used threshold‐based incentive schemes on the observed sales variability. The first form of the incentive comprises an additional marginal payment on crossing a specified sales threshold and the second form of the incentive scheme comprises a lumpsum bonus payment on crossing the predetermined sales threshold. We model the effect of such incentives under two specific scenarios: an exclusive dealership selling a single product and a non‐exclusive dealer selling two competing products. For an exclusive dealer, we show that a bonus contract not only increases the expected sales, but, more importantly, decreases the sales (order) variance. Consequently, the bonus‐based scheme allows the manufacturer to regulate sales variance better. With a non‐exclusive dealer, the sales variance increases substantially with an additional marginal payment contract. However, our analysis suggests that the bonus contract continues to perform better in this case, too, if the threshold level is set appropriately using the underlying demand distribution.     

盟员行为偏好下生鲜农产品供应链生鲜努力激励机制与协调研究

本文建立了"合作社+核心企业"模式下两阶段折扣定价的二级生鲜农产品供应链，基于消费者生鲜偏好、价格敏感度对市场需求的影响，选取Nash谈判解作为公平参考点，引入合作社公平偏好理论，研究供应链盟员保鲜投入决策。针对合作社保鲜努力激励，探讨供应链盟员偏好对保鲜努力水平以及收益共享契约激励协调效果的影响。研究发现，消费者生鲜偏好的提高能够促进收益共享契约的激励效果，并且提高合作社公平效用。同时，收益共享契约在第一阶段对保鲜努力水平的激励效果优于第二阶段，而在第二阶段联合使用收益共享和成本分摊能够显著提高该阶段的保鲜投入。     

公平关切及低碳视角下供应链两部定价契约问题研究

低碳环境下,碳排放权作为一种有价值、可交易的稀缺性资源,已彻底颠覆了传统企业的竞争法则、成本构成及盈利模式,被视为低碳时代供应链契约优化与协调的主要对象。文章利用博弈论等相关知识,考虑公平关切及低碳视角下,由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,分别讨论了当零售商不具有公平偏好及具有公平偏好时,面对有利和不利不公平分配的制造商向零售商提供两部定价契约能否达成协调？以及达成协调时的供应链契约协调参数设置等问题。研究结果表明,只有在制造商和零售商都具有公平偏好,且在竞争型供应链渠道下,当制造商面对不利不公平分配的单位负效用大于某一临界值时,供应链两部定价契约不能达成协调。     

Efficient Labour Contracts: Impediments and How to Circumvent Them

Efficient labour contracts on wages and employment could contribute to a reduction in unemployment in Europe. Their implementation is hindered by institutional settings and asymmetric incentives at different levels of the bargaining process. Employed workers have no incentives to forego wage increases at the firm level for potential employment gains, while employers’ federations possess no means to guarantee an employment increase for the sector covered by a wage agreement. Decentralization of wage bargaining does not solve this incentive problem. It is demonstrated that the introduction of marketable certificates may reduce the asymmetric incentive effects enabling contracts with higher employment.     

R&D成果转让合同履约的定量分析:激励对策与优效设计

R&D(研究与开发)成果向生产力转化难的问题因研发方利益无保障而普遍存在。本文运用经济对策理论和数量分析方法,对R＆D成果转让合同给出定量描述,并在此基础上对实际中常见的三种成果转让情形分别给出了激励受让方履约的合同设计。对三种合同的履约激励相容性给出了证明。对其中两种情形还讨论了使受让方履约与研发方利润最大化或审计成本最小化的双目标优效合同设计,建立了各情形下的双目标激励优效条件。最后通过一个具体例子说明所设计的多期双目标优效合同的可行性及应用。     

基于不公平厌恶或地位追求的创新顾客最优合同类型研究

本文首先从创新顾客的公平偏好程度、薪酬合同类型（最优激励系数）与激励机制效果的关系入手,引入公平偏好理论（不公平厌恶和地位追求）、相对绩效评估（RPE）和参与成本要素,构建顾客参与企业新产品开发的激励模型;其次,通过模型求解和分析,探讨分析各类薪酬合同中风险成本、不公平预期损失和激励效果之间的关系;最后,通过仿真实验验证并确定企业采用的创新顾客最优薪酬合同类型。研究发现：在同一薪酬合同下,创新顾客愈不在意其参与成本的投入,该合同的激励效果愈积极;关于创新顾客最优合同类型的选择,意味着求解一个三方面权衡,包括风险成本、不公平预期损失和公平偏好的激励效果;对于公平偏好程度较低的创新顾客,企业可采用相对绩效合同,例如锦标竞争合同;对于公平偏好程度较高的创新顾客,当其风险规避程度较高时,可采用团队报酬合同,当其风险规避程度较低时,可采用完美团队合同。     

工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过单价合同与收益共享合同所组成的菜单合同模式对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量。本文构建了单阶段群体激励模型以及考虑承包商个体存在公平感知的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨不同报酬结构下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:业主实行同一报酬结构在多阶段工程建设中难以维持高效率;单阶段激励中较好的报酬结构并不适用于多阶段激励过程;个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;报酬结构中针对不同质量标准的激励力度均会对激励效率产生影响,仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果。     

基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究

传统委托-代理模型都是建立在代理人纯粹自利假设基础上的,本文将公平偏好理论融入传统委托-代理模型进行研究,分析委托人雇佣公平偏好代理人情况下的最优激励机制.研究表明公平偏好因素改变了传统委托-代理模型的许多结论,传统委托.代理模型仅是本文所建立模型的一种特殊形式.     

激励合约线性结构的行为合约理论解释

合约理论继承了经济学传统自利偏好假设,却忽略了公平偏好等行为心理因素。为此,在借鉴行为经济学描述公平偏好的FS模型基础上,把公平偏好引入最优激励合约设计的标准框架,以行为合约理论为工具,通过建立离散产出和离散努力模型,研究设计公平偏好下的最优激励合约。分析结果发现,引入公平偏好之后的一级最优和二级最优激励合约都是线性结构的,并且其斜率会随着公平偏好增强而增大,但不会超过0.5。这不但得到了线性结构的激励合约,而且得到了与实证研究结论相一致的关于激励合约斜率性质的理论分析结果,从而为激励合约线性结构提供了一种较合理的理论解释。     

内在激励对企业外在激励供给策略的影响研究

在员工拥有内在激励的情形下,探讨企业对于外在激励的最优供给策略。研究表明:随着员工内在激励水平的提高,企业对于外在激励的最优供给水平并不一定因此而降低;在员工内在激励发生变化的情形下,企业是否增加、减少或维持其外在激励的供给水平,实际上取决于收益函数对员工努力水平的二阶导数;随着员工内在激励的提高,无论企业所提供的最优外在激励是增加、减少或不变,员工的总激励总会提高;且企业利润是员工内在激励的增函数。     

企业盈余管理行为的探讨

盈余管理是管理人员运用判断改变财务报告以使自己获益的行为,它的存在有其内在的和外在的原因,会计信息不对称、应计制本身的内在特点是盈余管理得以存在的内在原因,而对会计信息监管不力、有关契约的不完善则是其存在的外在条件,盈余管理的动机反映了分红假设、债务契约和政治成本假设以及资本市场的需求压力。盈余管理尽管有一定的正面作用,但其负面作用也是不容忽视的,它损害了会计信息使用者的利益,对资本市场的发展存在不利影响,因而必须采取有效措施防止其滥用。简要论述了盈余管理的涵义、原因和动机、手法、后果之后,对如何防范盈余管理、提高盈余信息含量提出了若干建议。     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进

本文认为经营业绩对经理有隐性激励作用是完全有可能的,将业绩的隐性激励作用引入经理的效用函数后建立了对经理的最优报酬激励模型,并通过对模型进行求解得到改进的最优报酬契约。通过分析给出了主要结论。     

Optimal pricing strategy of an on-demand platform with cross-regional passengers

Recent years have witnessed the emergence and prosperity of online ride-hailing, which empowers the traditional taxi industry with information technology. However, the ride-hailing platform has no direct control over drivers, one of the biggest challenges for the platform is how to balance the supply and the demand. Considering the cross-regional demand and the surge demand, this paper focuses on the pricing strategy of the ride-hailing platform, and further introduces strategies such as bonus incentive and information sharing. We find that when facing demand surging and supply shortage in one region, the platform can adopt surge pricing or bonus incentive in the adjacent region before the demand surges to balance the supply and the demand. Specially, the surge pricing strategy benefits the platform when the surge demand is high or the cross-regional demand is low, but the bonus incentive strategy has the opposite effect. The existence of cross-regional demand improves the performance of the bonus incentive strategy but reduces that of the surge pricing strategy. We further show that the platform prefers bonus incentive to surge pricing when only a small number of drivers are required to move. But bonus incentive always improves social welfare better than surge pricing. Extending to information asymmetry, information sharing can also encourage more drivers to move. However, the effect is limited such that the proportion of drivers who move will not exceed a threshold. The platform also has the incentive to share false information, which makes drivers question the credibility of the shared information. In this case, the surge pricing strategy can be used as a costly signal to verify the credibility of the information.     

裁员视角下人力资源的有效激励与代理成本分析

在假定产出可以观测的条件下,构造含裁员概率的企业与员工之间的委托-代理激励模型,把企业的裁员概率与员工的实际业绩结合起来,针对员工素质类型是对称信息和非对称信息,分别探讨含产出-工资合同的企业激励机制设计,比较两种不同信息结构下不同激励效应,分析非对称信息下实施合同的代理成本.     

董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性

董事会治理是影响高管薪酬契约有效性的关键,已有研究主要从董事会结构层面展开,缺乏对董事会内部运作机制与高管薪酬契约有效性关系的具体分析。基于董事权威不平衡性的治理效应视角,系统考察了董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的逻辑关系及其作用机理,得出了一些具有重要价值的结论,主要包括:1.董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节作用,且主要体现在业绩下滑的样本公司中,表明董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约的影响主要体现在公平性和风险匹配性方面。2.只有当最高层级董事身份为独立董事时,董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节效应。3.董事会非正式层级增强了高管薪酬的行业和地区薪酬敏感性,进一步验证了董事会非正式层级的社会公平效应。论文的研究为从微观运作层面理解董事会治理和高管薪酬契约有效性提供一种新的视角和结论,对于优化董事会治理和提高高管薪酬契约有效性等均具有重要借鉴意义。