A Note on Dual Internal Labor Markets and Wages of Temporary Workers: Evidence from Linked-Employer-Employee Data

I use linked employer-employee data from the German Federal Statistical Office to estimate within-firm wage differentials between temporary workers with fixed-term contracts and workers with permanent contracts in the context of dual internal labor markets. Wage-tenure profiles of permanent workers are estimated separately for each firm to obtain a proxy for the prevalence of internal labor markets. Temporary workers earn significantly lower wages in firms with steeper wage-tenure profiles. This finding is consistent with the segmentation in a primary permanent workforce with high wages and a secondary temporary workforce with low wages, if internal labor markets are more prevalent.     

Befristete Beschäftigung: Chance oder Risiko?

The paper investigates whether increased labor market flexibility leads to a reinforcement of the existing segmentation of the labor market or whether it is dismantling the barriers in the labor market. Using spell data (employment and unemployment periods) from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, time period: 1984–1999) both determinants of fixed-term contracts and their consequences (renewed temporary employment, unemployment) are investigated with the help of random-effects logit-models. The results show that respondents’ characteristics (amount and type of human capital, formerly experienced periods of unemployment), structural variables (branch, firm size), and occupational characteristics (position, marginal employment) are influencing the risk of getting a temporary job. Furthermore it becomes evident that fixed-term contracts are increasing the risk of getting a temporary job again or of becoming unemployed after termination of the temporary job. These results show that fixed-term contracts above all are part of the secondary labor market, and that they especially have negative consequences for the employees in this segment. On the other hand fixed-term contracts can be seen as a chance in the way that they offer at least an alternative to unemployment. Hence, a too narrow evaluation of temporary employment would be too simplistic.     

WAGE SECRECY AS A SOCIAL CONVENTION

Despite the general belie that a free flow of information enhances efficiency, social convention appears to call for secrecy regarding individuals' wages. This paper provides an explanation for this convention. We suggest that the role of wage secrecy is to reduce effective labor mobility, and thereby enhance the feasibility of risk-shifting contracts. Wage secrecy may yield a mix of mobility and risk shifting that is superior both to a spot market for labor and to a social convention that binds workers to their employers.     

THE RELATIVE STICKINESS OF WAGES AND PRICES

While many modern business cycle theories posit the existence of nominal wage and/or output price stickiness, their relative importance remains an unsettled issue. Using a structural VAR model, this paper exploits evidence on the behavior of real wages to assess the relative importance of these two sources of stickiness. The empirical results suggest that a positive shock to aggregate demand causes a significant temporary fall in real wages. This is taken as evidence that sticky wages have played a more important role than sticky prices in transmitting aggregate demand shocks to real economic activity in the post-war U.S. (JEL E32)     

The return of international labour migrants in the ESCAP Region

The social phenomenon of massive temporary international labor migration from the ESCAP region has emerged extremely rapidly. Within 10 years, the number of persons from ESCAP countries grew from a negligible one to 3.5 million. Related research and government policies have lagged behind this latest surge in migration. Most research conducted has been small-scale and lacks an analytical or theoretical framework. Policy formulation for temporary labor migration is difficult because most of the rapid growth in the industry has occurred as a result of private efforts, with a minimum of government intervention. It is now difficult, for the government to provide effective regulations or measures to stimulate and assist the process. Regulations on compulsory remittances or overseas minimum wages have proved to be unrealistic and, if not rescinded, are routinely circumvented. The most effective policies to assist return migrants may not be those which are intended to do so, but those which control the earlier stages of the migration process, such as recruitment, working conditions, and banking arrangements. The most valuable policies may also include those affecting education, training, employment, and general socioeconomic growth. Governments are recommended to provide social services for migrants and their families who are experiencing problems, and to institute community programs in areas with a large number of labor migrants. Governmental efforts to promote forms of labor migration beneficial to the workers would be valuable and should include measures to identify overseas labor markets for employing its nationals, government ot government labor contracts, and government participation in joint-venture projects. International migration should be analyzed in the context of theories and social change in order for governments to formulate effective measures for the reintegration of returning workers. Labor migration on the current scale has many social implications for the sending countries; relationships between employers and employees, the government and private sectors, and white and blue collar workers are affected. Social change and technological innovation will become more rapid, women's status and family roles will change markedly, and behavior is likely to become less conformist and more individualistic.     

A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JEL E32, J41)     

How temporary is temporary employment in Spain?

I use a multinomial logit model and the Spanish Active Population Survey (EPA) for the period 1987–1996 to study labor force transitions of temporary workers. These workers hold fixed-term employment contracts, which Spanish labor law distinguishes from indefinite contracts. Since the EPA questionnaire allows the identification of workers with either type of contract, I use matched EPA files to analyze transitions from temporary to permanent employment and explore the extent to which workers holding fixed-term employment contracts tend to be trapped in temporary employment relationships. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Pedro Albarrán-Pérez provided excellent research assistance.     

THE CHANGING RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGES TO PRICE-LEVEL SHOCKS: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INDEXATION

The article provides evidence for the U.S over the period 1961-84 that the responsiveness of nonunion wages to price-level shocks changes through time much as the degree of indexation in union contracts does, suggesting that there exists implicit as well as explicit indexation. When coupled with the result from previous research that indexation responds positively to inflation uncertainty, the findings indicate that greater inflation uncertainty may lead to reduced overall wage rigidity. In the context of a rational expectations model with long-term wage contracts, a decline in the effectiveness of an activist monetary policy could result.     

Contract curve or implicit contract: Which will a union choose?

While much has been written about implicit and efficient (contract curve) contracts, little has been written about which contract a union will choose. This study examines how a democratic union chooses between these contracts. Under most conditions, unions reject an efficient contract and are more likely to choose an implicit contract, but a type of contract new to the economic literature could predominate over either.     

PRICE LEVEL UNCERTAINTY, SAVING, AND LABOR SUPPLY

This paper derives the implications, for individual saving and labor supply, of increased uncertainty about the future price level. The framework for the analysis is a two-period model in which saving and labor supply are alternative sources of both present disutility and future income. The individual is assumed to make simultaneously his saving and labor supply decisions prior to the resolution of the uncertainty about the future price level. We find that, under theoretically plausible and empirically relevant assumptions about attitudes toward risk, an increase in future price level uncertainty increases individual saving and labor supply. These results imply that, for the economy as a whole, increased uncertainty about the future price level increases output and employment, while decreasing the real rate of interest, the present price level, and economic welfare.     

EFFICIENCY WAGES AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE PAY

This paper studies optimal relational contracts in motivating workers in a market setting. We find that labor markets with higher turnover costs will use more subjective performance pay and less efficiency wages and that in those markets, the total wage payment is lower and the equilibrium employment level is higher. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, an increase in turnover costs leads to higher social welfare. Incorporating workers' search costs, we show that wages are procyclical in booms and are either rigid or countercyclical during recessions. The predictions of the model are consistent with some empirical evidence. ( JEL D82, J33, J41, J63)     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR CONTRACTS: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

The conventional Keynesian model suggests that frictions created by nominal wage contracts generate a positive relationship between inflation and output. On the other hand, the New Classical/Real Business Cycle theory claims that firms and workers base their employment behavior, and hence output, on the marginal product of labor ignoring the efficiencies of fixed nominal wage contracts. Using Brazilian data, where nominal wages were indexed by law, tests show that fixed nominal wage contracts insignificantly affected output. Thus, the data support the view that fixed nominal wages play an insignificant role in determining the evolution of output. ( JEL E31)     

Women’s employment and the decline of home cooking: Evidence from France, 1985–2010

We here investigate the extent to which labour-market changes explain the decline in the time spent home cooking by married women in France between 1985 and 2010. Using time use data and Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, we find that rising women’s employment and observed wages together account for about 60% of the fall in the time married women spent cooking. We then use a semi-parametric matching technique to construct an implicit wage rate, which better reflects the change in labour-market incentives that individuals face. The rise in women’s implicit wages explains no more than 20% of the decline in their cooking time, while the wage of their partner has no effect. Changing labour-market incentives are thus far from being the main driver of the decline in home-cooking. We also find evidence that home cooking continues to be structured by the gendered social norm of the “proper family meal”.     

THE QUANTITY-ADJUSTED VALUE OF LIFE

The traditional compensating differential analysis is extended to reflect the effects on wages of the duration of life at risk and of insurance benefits to the surviving spouse and dependents. The implicit discount rate that workers use in making their life-cycle employment decisions is also estimated. The revealed discount rate ranges from 10 to 12 percent, and the implicit value per year of life is 175,000. There is also evidence of significant wage reductions resulting from higher workers' compensation benefits for fatal and nonfatal injuries, suggesting an important tradeoff between ex ante and ex post compensation for risk.     

UNDERPAID and OVERWORKED: MEASURING THE EFFECT OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION ON WAGES

This paper investigates the degree of shortfall between the wages workers earn and what they could earn assuming perfect or costless information in the labor market. We use the stochastic frontier regression technique to estimate the degree of shortfall found in wages on an individual basis. The paper tests, in addition, a number of hypotheses supplied by search theory in this context. The results generally confirm the propositions from search theory and indicate that, on the average, worker wages fall short of worker potential wages by approximately 10 percent.     

A note on altruism and caregiving in the family: do prices matter?

Exchanges of work for money and altruism are two alternative explanations for bequests, transfers from children to older parents, and in-family caregiving. Such exchanges may also occur in couples living together and are therefore a major theme in economic analyses of marriage. This note emphasizes two ways that the literature on altruism and inter-generational monetary transfers and the economic literature on marriage can enrich each other: the concept of price for in-family caregiving can be expanded along the lines of the analysis of Work-In-Household and market analyses of marriage can pay more attention to altruism as an alternative explanation for observed behaviors such as labor supply or consumption.     

Policing Mechanisms in Agricultural Contracts*

Abstract In this paper we focus on mechanisms of coordination in agricultural contracts. Our approach is intended to advance understanding of social relations of production and distribution of power in agrofood systems. Through an analysis of contracts between farmers and intermediaries (e.g., processors, shippers, consignment agents) for California fruits and vegetables, we identify three functions of contracts: they help to coordinate production, they provide incentives (and penalties) to induce particular behaviors, and they allow farmers and intermediaries to share risk. These functions are implemented via four policing instruments: input control, monitoring, quality measurement, and revenue sharing. The instruments are employed by intermediaries to mitigate “blind spots” in contracts and to control farmers' actions and the quality of their output. This mechanism design approach is complemented by a sociologically oriented analysis emphasizing the embeddedness of economic institutions. We problematize the stylized fashion in which the concept of authority has been treated in the contract farming literature, and propose an alternative approach to studying new organizational forms and divisions of labor among farmers and intermediaries.     

INVOLUNTARY, EMPLOYMENT IN CONTRACTS WITH RISKY JOB SEARCH

The implication of partially insurable job search risk for incentive compatibility in a standard contracting framework are explored. When unemployment spells provoke job search, workers face risk in spell duration and reemployment wages. When search effort is not variable, contracts including unemployment insurance will yield involuntary employment. When search effort is diminished by UI benefits, firms shift some compensation back to wages, increasing the relative attractiveness of employment. The analysis begins with a theorem on incomplete insurance by Imai, Geanakoplos and Ito [1981] for which a simple proof and economic intuition are provided.     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

Does labor contract completeness drive unionization? Experimental evidence

Flynn (2005) proposes that the degree to which labor contracts are complete may be a major driving force behind the propensity of employees to unionize. We find behavior consistent with this hypothesis in an experimental production game in which subjects are assigned to playing either employers or employees. The rate at which employees opt for a proxy for unionization more than triples when the labor-contracting regime under which they are working shifts from incomplete to complete labor contracts. Complete labor contracts drive out positive reciprocity, anger workers, and increase their desire to unionize.