Internalities and paternalism: applying the compensation criterion to multiple selves across time

One reason to call an activity a vice and suppress it is that it reduces a person’s future happiness more than it increases his present happiness. Gruber and Koszegi (Q J Econ 116(4):1261–1303, 2001) show how a vice tax can increase a person’s welfare in a model of multiple selves with hyperbolic preferences across time. The present paper shows that an interself analogy of the compensation criterion can justify a vice ban whether preferences are hyperbolic or exponential, but subject to the caveat that the person has a binding constraint on borrowing.     

Why do larger families reduce parental investments in child quality, but not child quality per se?

Becker’s Quantity–Quality model (Becker in Demographic and economic change in developed countries, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 209–240, 1960; Becker and Lewis in J Polit Econ 81(2): S279–S288, 1973; Becker and Tomes in J Polit Econ 84(4): S143–S162, 1976) suggests a trade-off between family size and parental investments in children. To date, only Cáceras-Delpiano (J Hum Resour 41(4): 738–754, 2006) tests this theory by considering private school enrolment. This study extends this work by using a unique data set containing a broader range of parental investments that are arguably linked to parental intentions for producing higher quality children, such as overall and non-sectarian private school enrolment, the number of computers in the home per child, and saving for the child’s education. Both studies find that fertility reduces parental investments. However, the literature generally finds that fertility has no impact on child outcomes. The study offers three potential explanations for this ‘puzzle’.     

Sociology’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Suicide</Emphasis>: A Forensic Autopsy?

For decades Durkheim’s theory of suicide has been tested and found wanting. Yet, rather than being consigned to the dust-bin of history, it lives on and is pointed to as an exemplar of the powers of sociological theory and research. If this rationalizing and/or dismissal of so many falsifications of the theory were an isolated phenomenon, it might be evidence of some lemming-like propensity for suicide or a disciplinary death-wish, among a few sociologists. But it appears to be a much more widespread and common occurrence. In this paper we explore some possible explanations of this ‘falsification denial’—‘The Social Misconstruction of Reality’ (Hamilton 1996), ‘When Prophecy Fails’ (Festinger et al. 1956), ‘Underdetermination’ (Duhem 1954; Quine Journal of Philosophy 67:178–183, 1970, Erkenntnis 9:313–328, 1975; Lakatos 1970), and ‘Boundary Maintenance’ (Erikson 1966), and we outline some of the more important and pernicious consequences of this falsification denial for the discipline and future of sociology.     

The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences

Niemi (Am Polit Sci Rev 63:488–497, 1969) proposed a simple measure of the cohesiveness of a group of n voters’ preferences that reflects the proximity of their preferences to single-peakedness. For three-candidate elections, this measure, k, reduces to the minimum number of voters who rank one of the candidates as being least preferred. The current study develops closed form representations for the conditional probability, PASW(n,IAC|k), that all weighted scoring rules will elect the Condorcet winner in an election, given a specified value of k. Results show a very strong relationship between PASW(n,IAC|k) and k, such that the determination of the voting rule to be used in an election becomes significantly less critical relative to the likelihood of electing the Condorcet winner as voters in a society have more structured preferences. As voters’ preferences become more unstructured as measured by their distance from single-peakedness, it becomes much more likely that different voting rules will select different winners.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the European Public Choice Society Conference in Berlin, Germany, April 15–18, 2004.     

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks

This article considers the provision of two public goods on tree networks where each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if there are at least four agents, then no social choice rule exists that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, these properties are incompatible, even if agents’ preferences are restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. However, for rules on an interval, we prove that Miyagawa’s (Soc Choice Welf 18:527–541, 2001) characterization that only the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy both of these properties also holds on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Moreover, if agents’ peak locations are restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules exist on a subclass of trees. We provide a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.     

Utility, informed preference, or happiness: Following Harsanyi's argument to its logical conclusion

Harsanyi (1997) argues that, for normative issues, informed preferences should be used, instead of actual preferences or happiness (or welfare). Following his argument allowing him to move from actual to informed preferences to its logical conclusion forces us to use happiness instead. Where informed preferences differ from happiness due to a pure concern for the welfare of others, using the former involves multiple counting. This “concerning effect” (non-affective altruism) differs from and could be on top of the “minding effect” (affective altruism) of being happy seeing or helping others to be happy. The concerning/minding effect should be excluded/included in social decision. Non-affective altruism is shown to exist in a compelling hypothetical example. Just as actual preferences should be discounted due to the effects of ignorance and spurious preferences, informed preferences should also be discounted due to some inborn or acquired tendencies to be irrational, such as placing insufficient weights on the welfare of the future, maximizing our biological fitness instead of our welfare. Harsanyi's old result on utilitarianism is however defended against criticisms in the last decade. Harsanyi (1997) argues, among other things, that in welfare economics and ethics, what are important are people's informed preferences, rather than either their actual preferences (as emphasized by modern economists) or their happiness (as emphasized by early utilitarians). The main purpose of this paper is to argue that, pursuing Harsanyi's argument that allows him to move from actual to informed preferences to its logical conclusion forces us to happiness as the ultimately important thing. The early utilitarians were right after all! Since I personally approve of Harsanyi's basic argument, I regard myself as his follower who becomes more Catholic than the Pope. (It is not denied that, in practice, the practical difficulties and undesirable side-effects of the procedure of using happiness instead of preferences have to be taken into account. Thus, even if we ultimately wish to maximize the aggregate happiness of people, it may be best in practice to maximize their aggregate preferences in most instances. This important consideration will be largely ignored in this paper.) The secondary objective is to give a brief defence of Harsanyi's (1953, 1955) much earlier argument for utilitarianism (social welfare as a sum of individual utilities) that has received some criticisms in the last decade. The argument (e.g. Roemer 1996) that Harsanyi's result is irrelevant to utilitarianism is based on the point that the VNM (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility is unrelated to the subjective and interpersonally comparable cardinal utility needed for a social welfare function. Harsanyi's position is defended by showing that the two types of utility are the same (apart from an indeterminate zero point for the former that is irrelevant for utilitarianism concerning the same set of people). Received: 29 May 1997 / Accepted: 3 November 1997     

Measuring opportunity inequality with monetary transfers

In this paper I consider the problem of measuring opportunity inequality when monetary transfers are possible. First, I consider the case in which agents have common evaluations (or identical preferences), as in the previous literature. I then propose an extension to the heterogeneous case. In both cases I identify an appropriate egalitarian benchmark relative to which inequality can be measured, and I establish that this yields a theory of measurement analogous to that of income inequality. Consequently, the introduction of money (or an infinitely divisible commodity) avoids the difficulty reported in Ok (J Econ Theory 77:300–329, 1997). The results of the paper are immediately applicable to the measurement of multidimensional economic inequality including economies with indivisible goods.     

Development and Psychometric Evaluation of a 10-Item Short Form Inventory of Gambling Situations

The Inventory of Gambling Situations (IGS-63; Turner and Littman-Sharp, Inventory of gambling situations users guide, 2006) is a 63-item measure of high-risk gambling situations. It assesses gambling across 10 situational subscales that load onto two higher-order factors: negative and positive situations (Stewart et al. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 22:257–268, 2008). While the IGS-63 has excellent psychometric properties (Littman-Sharp et al., The Inventory of Gambling Situations: Reliability, factor structure, and validity (IGS Technical Manual), in press) its length may preclude its use in time-limited contexts. The purpose of this study was to develop and validate a 10-item short-form of the IGS (IGS-10). Each IGS-10 item reflects one of the ten subscale categories from the IGS-63, with two items from the original subscales included as examples for each IGS-10 item. The IGS-10 was administered to 180 undergraduate gamblers along with the IGS-63 and the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris and Wynne, Canadian Problem Gambling Index: Final report, 2001). IGS-10 items showed convergent validity with the corresponding IGS-63 subscales (r’s = .60–.73). Principal components analysis of the IGS-10 revealed two factors: negative (α = .84) and positive (α = .85). PGSI scores correlated significantly with all IGS-10 items (r’s = .33–.58) and with both IGS-10 higher-order subscales (r’s = .66 [negative] and .49 [positive]), supporting the criterion validity of the IGS-10. Since minimal information is lost when using the IGS-10, the short form may prove particularly useful when respondent burden prevents using the full IGS-63.     

Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence

We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with (possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, ‘contraction consistency’, subsumes earlier notions such as Chernoff’s Condition, Sen’s α and β, and regularity. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice correspondence (SCC), under which contraction consistency is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preference in its most general form. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for such equivalence. Analogous domain restrictions are also identified for the special case where choice is deterministic but possibly multi-valued. Results due to Sen (Rev Econ Stud 38:307–317, 1971) and Dasgupta and Pattanaik (Econ Theory 31:35–50, 2007) fall out as corollaries. Thus, conditions are established, under which our notion of consistency, articulated only in reference to contractions of the feasible set, suffices as the axiomatic foundation for a general revealed preference theory of choice behaviour.     

Reconciling normative and behavioural economics: the problems to be solved

We review the problem of reconciling normative and behavioural economics. In conventional welfare economics, individuals’ preferences are assumed to be coherent, and the satisfaction of those preferences is the normative criterion; but this approach breaks down if preferences are incoherent. Traditionally, the preference-satisfaction criterion has been interpreted in three conceptually different ways, emphasising respectively the normative value of happiness, self-assessed well-being, and freedom. If individuals’ preferences are incoherent, these interpretations diverge, leading to fundamentally different strategies for dealing with the reconciliation problem, and new questions are raised about whether normative economics should be addressed to governments or individuals.     

A generalization of Campbell and Kelly’s trade-off theorem

This article considers social choice theory without the Pareto principle. We revisit the trade-off theorem developed by Campbell and Kelly (Econometrica 61:1355–1365, 1993) and generalize their result. By introducing an alternative measure of decisive structure, a dominance relation, we show that if a social welfare function dominates another social welfare function, then the number of pairs of alternatives which social ranking is independently of individual preferences under the former is not more than that under the latter. Moreover, we offer two applications of our main result.     

Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow’s dictators?)

The article is based on three findings. The first one is the interrelation between Arrow’s (Social choice and individual values, Wiley, New York, 1951) social choice model and the mathematical theory of democracy discussed by Tangian (Aggregation and representation of preferences, Springer, Berlin, 1991; Soc Choice Welf 11(1):1–82, 1994), with the conclusion that Arrow’s dictators are less harmful than commonly supposed. The second finding is Quesada’s (Public Choice 130:395–400, 2007) estimate of their power as that of two voters, implying that Arrow’s dictators are not more powerful than a chairperson with an additional vote. The third is the model of Athenian democracy (Tangian, Soc Choice Welf 31:537–572, 2008), where indicators of popularity and universality are applied to representatives and representative bodies. In this article, these indicators are used to computationally evaluate the representativeness/non-representativeness of Arrow’s dictators. In particular, it is shown that there always exist Arrow’s dictators who on the average share opinions of a majority, being rather representatives. The same holds for dictators selected by lot, which conforms to the practice of selecting magistrates and presidents by lot in ancient democracies and medieval Italian republics. Computational formulas are derived for finding the optimal “dictator–representatives”.     

Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is Approval Voting and interpret this result as an extension of May’s theorem (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that Approval Voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of Baigent and Xu (Math Soc Sci 21:21–29, 1991).     

‘One and a Half Dimensional’ Preferences and Majority Rule

I examine a model of majority rule in which alternatives are described by two characteristics: (1) their position in a standard, left-right dimension, and (2) their position in a good-bad dimension, over which voters have identical preferences. I show that when voters’ preferences are single-peaked and concave over the first dimension, majority rule is transitive, and the majority’s preferences are identical to the median voter’s. Thus, Black’s (The theory of committees and elections, 1958) theorem extends to such a “one and a half” dimensional framework. Meanwhile, another well-known result of majority rule, Downs’ (An economic theory of democracy, 1957) electoral competition model, does not extend to the framework. The condition that preferences can be represented in a one-and-a-half-dimensional framework is strictly weaker than the condition that preferences be single-peaked and symmetric. The condition is strictly stronger than the condition that preferences be order-restricted, as defined by Rothstein (Soc Choice Welf 7:331–342;1990).     

Examining Community Life “in the Making”: Emile Durkheim’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Moral Education</Emphasis>

Although often overlooked in sociological circles, Emile Durkheim’s (1902–1903) Moral Education provides an important cornerstone in the quest to understand community life. Not only does Moral Education give a vibrant realism to the sociological venture in ways that Durkheim’s earlier works (1893, 1895, 1897) fail to achieve, but in addressing discipline, devotion, and informed reasoning as humanly engaged, collectively accomplished fields of activity Emile Durkheim also provides an exceptionally consequential baseline analysis of human knowing and acting. Notably as well, focusing on the organizational, intersubjectively achieved features of elementary education, Durkheim’s Moral Education lays bare the interactional nature of the moral order of community life. Indeed, as a sustained analysis of the way of life of a group of people collectively participating in the educational process, this text addresses the most basic features of people’s relations to one another and the broader society in which they find themselves. Much more than an account of childhood socialization, Durkheim’s Moral Education also presages the more thoroughly humanist sociology that Durkheim develops in The Evolution of Educational Thought (1904–1905), The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) and Pragmatism and Sociology (1913–1914).     

Psychometric Evaluation of the Problem Gambling Severity Index-Chinese Version (PGSI-C)

The purpose of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of the Chinese 9-item Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) derived from the 31-item Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI) originally developed by Ferris and Wynne (2001). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA; n = 386; Group A data) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; n = 387; Group B data) on the Chinese student and community data (Mean age = 25.36 years) showed that a unifactorial model fitted the data with good reliability score (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77). The concurrent validity of the PGSI-C was good in terms of the Chinese data matching the expected correlation between PGSI-C and other variables or scales such as SOGS, gambling frequency, gambling urge, gambling cognitions, depression, anxiety, and stress. The scale also reported good discriminant and predictive validity. In sum, the PGSI-C has good psychometric properties and can be used among Chinese communities to identify at-risk problem gamblers. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Measuring inequality of opportunity through between-group inequality components

Opportunity egalitarians support rich-to-poor redistribution whenever this allows for the compensation of income disparities due to non-responsible choices (circumstances). In this paper we focus on the measurement of opportunity inequality within Roemer’s (Philos Public Aff 22:146–166, 1993) pragmatic theory where a disjoint and exhaustive partition rule is assumed such that individuals within the same population can be grouped depending on the sole circumstances. Given entropy-based, deprivation-based and welfaristic inequality decomposition procedures, we show that the between-group Gini component from Dagum’s decomposition is the only well known between-group inequality index satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer as reformulated for opportunity egalitarianism.     

The Development of a Multi-dimensional Gambling Accessibility Scale

The aim of the current study was to develop a scale of gambling accessibility that would have theoretical significance to exposure theory and also serve to highlight the accessibility risk factors for problem gambling. Scale items were generated from the Productivity Commission’s (Australia’s Gambling Industries: Report No. 10. AusInfo, Canberra, 1999) recommendations and tested on a group with high exposure to the gambling environment. In total, 533 gaming venue employees (aged 18–70 years; 67% women) completed a questionnaire that included six 13-item scales measuring accessibility across a range of gambling forms (gaming machines, keno, casino table games, lotteries, horse and dog racing, sports betting). Also included in the questionnaire was the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) along with measures of gambling frequency and expenditure. Principal components analysis indicated that a common three factor structure existed across all forms of gambling and these were labelled social accessibility, physical accessibility and cognitive accessibility. However, convergent validity was not demonstrated with inconsistent correlations between each subscale and measures of gambling behaviour. These results are discussed in light of exposure theory and the further development of a multi-dimensional measure of gambling accessibility.     

Assessing the Reliability of the Gambling Functional Assessment

Dixon and Johnson (Analysis of Gambling Behavior 2007, 1:44–49) introduced the Gambling Functional Assessment (GFA), which attempts to identify the consequences that may be maintaining a person’s gambling behavior. The present study had 949 introductory psychology students complete the GFA, with 124 of them completing the measure a second time 12 weeks later. Measures of internal consistency were quite good regardless of whether “non-gamblers” were included or excluded. Test–retest reliability was somewhat mixed, with Escape scores yielding substandard coefficients, especially among females. Both internal and test–retest reliability were typically poorer for female respondents. In general, the GFA performed within the limits of acceptable reliability, and coefficients compared favorably with similar measures. Future investigations will need to determine the reliability and validity of the instrument, especially as it pertains to its intended population, pathological gamblers.