Trust, repute and the role of non-profit enterprise

This article examines the trust hypothesis: the claim that asymmetric information can explain the existence of non-profit enterprise in certain markets. We argue that this hypothesis, in order to be viable, has to meet three challenges: ‘reputational ubiquity’, ‘incentive compatibility’ and ‘adulteration’. Drawing on modern agency theory, we conclude that the trust hypothesis stands on shaky ground. It can be sustained only under particular conditions that have been neither carefully described in theory nor subject to empirical assessment. The available evidence, patchy and inadequate as it is, seems to suggests that there are some ownership-related differences in aspects of organisational performance connected with asymmetric information. However, there is little evidence that this relates to trustper se or provides a rationale for the existence of non-profit ownership in these industries. We conclude with a plea for substantial research on consumer expectations and provider motivations. Visiting Associate Professor at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking

There are many situations wherein a group of individuals (e.g., voters, experts, sports writers) must produce an ordered list of ‘best’ alternatives selected from a given group of alternatives (e.g., candidates, proposals, sports teams). Two long established mechanisms that have been used for this task are ‘Zermelo’s Ranking Method’ (1929) and ‘Borda’s Voting Scheme’ (1781). The main purpose of this paper is to point out that they are, under certain common circumstances, identical. We then show that Zermelo’s Method can be used in situations that Borda’s Method is not designed to handle.     

An Examination of ‘Irregular Competition’ between Corporations and NGOs

The purpose of this article is to develop a theory which frames the demands of civil society in such a way as to better enable corporate subjects to manage and navigate ‘irregular’ engagement from activist organizations. Activist NGOs engage in advocacy at times by mounting, facilitating or encouraging popular social campaigns and actions against targeted corporations. In many cases, radical ‘direct action’ tactics are adopted, taking such approaches, NGOs may capitalise on the broader, more ethically diverse strategic possibilities open to them than are available to their corporate adversaries. We employ institutional theory to map out this asymmetric distribution of strategic possibility. We theorise NGOs and corporate subjects as effectively ‘competing’ with one another to maximise their own strategic possibilities and to minimise those of their opponents, in the perennial battle for hearts and minds that plays out between NGOs, corporate subjects, and broader civil society actors who ultimately determine boundary rules for NGO-corporate conflict. Within this context we explore the normative challenge arising from the possibility that corporate subjects might seek to tip the competitive balance by learning from how the military has adapted to successfully engage with ‘irregular’ adversaries through what is often termed ‘asymmetric’ or ‘irregular’ warfare. Should corporations follow a similar adaptive process, by mirroring the ‘irregular’ strategies of activist groups? Drawing evidence from the military experience, we suggest—perhaps counter intuitively—that such adaptations can create new opportunities for conflict resolution and for building sustainable cooperation between former adversaries.     

Social and Psychological Challenges of Poker

Poker is a competitive, social game of skill and luck, which presents players with numerous challenging strategic and interpersonal decisions. The adaptation of poker into a game played over the internet provides the unprecedented opportunity to quantitatively analyze extremely large numbers of hands and players. This paper analyzes roughly twenty-seven million hands played online in small-stakes, medium-stakes and high-stakes games. Using PokerTracker software, statistics are generated to (a) gauge the types of strategies utilized by players (i.e. the ‘strategic demography’) at each level and (b) examine the various payoffs associated with different strategies at varying levels of play. The results show that competitive edges attenuate as one moves up levels, and tight-aggressive strategies––which tend to be the most remunerative––become more prevalent. Further, payoffs for different combinations of cards, varies between levels, showing how strategic payoffs are derived from competitive interactions. Smaller-stakes players also have more difficulty appropriately weighting incentive structures with frequent small gains and occasional large losses. Consequently, the relationship between winning a large proportion of hands and profitability is negative, and is strongest in small-stakes games. These variations reveal a meta-game of rationality and psychology which underlies the card game. Adopting risk-neutrality to maximize expected value, aggression and appropriate mental accounting, are cognitive burdens on players, and underpin the rationality work––reconfiguring of personal preferences and goals––players engage into be competitive, and maximize their winning and profit chances.     

A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems

A simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K < S firms is considered. Since markets are incomplete, at a (financial) equilibrium shareholders typically disagree on whether to keep or not the status quo production plans. Hence each firm faces a genuine problem of social choice. The setup proposed in the present paper allows to study these problems within a classical (Downsian) spatial voting model. Given the multidimensional nature of the latter, super majority rules with rate are needed to guarantee existence of politically stable production plans. A simple geometric argument is proposed showing why a 50%-majority stable production equilibrium exists when K=S−1. When the degree of incompleteness is more severe, under more restrictive assumptions on agents’ preferences and the distribution of agents’ types, equilibria are shown to exist for rates ρ smaller than Caplin and Nalebuff (Econometrica 59: 1–23, 1991) bound of 0.64: they obtain for production plans whose span contains the ‘ideal securities’ of all K mean shareholders.Hervé Crès is a member of the GREGHEC, unité CNRS, UMR 2959.     

Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation

Given a set of propositions with unknown truth values, a ‘judgement aggregation function’ is a way to aggregate the personal truth-valuations of a group of voters into some ‘collective’ truth valuation. We introduce the class of ‘quasimajoritarian’ judgement aggregation functions, which includes majority vote, but also includes some functions which use different voting schemes to decide the truth of different propositions. We show that if the profile of individual beliefs satisfies a condition called ‘value restriction’, then the output of any quasimajoritarian function is logically consistent; this directly generalizes the recent work of Dietrich and List (Majority voting on restricted domains. Presented at SCW08; see , 2007b). We then provide two sufficient conditions for value-restriction, defined geometrically in terms of a lattice ordering or a metric structure on the set of individuals and propositions. Finally, we introduce another sufficient condition for consistent majoritarian judgement aggregation, called ‘convexity’. We show that convexity is not logically related to value-restriction.     

Internet Gamblers: A Latent Class Analysis of Their Behaviours and Health Experiences

In order to learn about the behaviours and health experiences of people who gamble on the Internet, we conducted an international online survey with respondents recruited via gambling and gambling-related websites. The mean (SD) age of the 4,125 respondents completing the survey was 35.5 (11.8) years, with 79.1% being male and 68.8% UK residents. Respondents provided demographic details and completed validated psychometric screening instruments for problem gambling, mood disturbances, as well as alcohol and substance misuse, and history of deliberate self harm. We applied latent class analysis to respondents’ patterns of regular online gambling activities, and identified subgroups of individuals who used the Internet to gamble in different ways (L ² = 44.27, bootstrap P = 0.07). We termed the characteristic profiles as ‘non-to-minimal gamblers’; ‘sports bettors’; ‘casino & sports gamblers’; ‘lottery players’; and ‘multi-activity gamblers’. Furthermore, these subgroups of respondents differed on other demographic and psychological dimensions, with significant inter-cluster differences in proportion of individuals scoring above threshold for problem gambling, mood disorders and substance misuse, and history of deliberate self harm (all Χ ²s > 23.4, all P-values <0.001). The ‘casino & sports’ and ‘multi-activity-gamblers’ clusters had the highest prevalence of mental disorder. Internet gamblers appear to be heterogeneous but composed of several subgroups, differing markedly on both demographic and clinical characteristics.     

‘One and a Half Dimensional’ Preferences and Majority Rule

I examine a model of majority rule in which alternatives are described by two characteristics: (1) their position in a standard, left-right dimension, and (2) their position in a good-bad dimension, over which voters have identical preferences. I show that when voters’ preferences are single-peaked and concave over the first dimension, majority rule is transitive, and the majority’s preferences are identical to the median voter’s. Thus, Black’s (The theory of committees and elections, 1958) theorem extends to such a “one and a half” dimensional framework. Meanwhile, another well-known result of majority rule, Downs’ (An economic theory of democracy, 1957) electoral competition model, does not extend to the framework. The condition that preferences can be represented in a one-and-a-half-dimensional framework is strictly weaker than the condition that preferences be single-peaked and symmetric. The condition is strictly stronger than the condition that preferences be order-restricted, as defined by Rothstein (Soc Choice Welf 7:331–342;1990).     

Utilities,preferences, and substantive goods

 People’s utility levels are meant to be measures of their well-being. Early utilitarians defined them in terms of people’s happiness. Modern economics defines them in terms of people’s actual preferences. But in ethics they have to be defined in terms of people’s informed preferences. I shall discuss the relationship between people’s desires and preferences, and that between their reasoned and unreasoned preferences. I shall argue that people’s basic desires are much the same, whereas their preferences are often very different. Finally, I shall argue, contrary to Scanlon’s theory, that the things that are good for us are beneficial to us ultimately because they satisfy our biological and psychological needs and our personal interests. Received: 8 July 1996     

The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited

This paper re-examines the so-called ‘chairman’s paradox‘ that was first noticed by Farquharson in his path breaking tract on sophisticated voting, Theory of Voting (1969). The Chairman’s paradox is concerned with the case of a three member committee in which a particular player who has a regular and a tie-breaking vote – the ‘chairman’ – not only will do worse in specific instances under the plurality procedure for three alternatives than if he did not have such a vote, but will also do worse overall. That is, the chairman’s a priori probability of success (‘getting what one wants’) for all possible games with linear (strict) preference orders is lower than that of the two regular members. It is demonstrated that this result, which comes about if voters act strategically rather than sincerely, is not as robust as it has been thought to be. By merely replacing the standard assumption of linear preference orders with weak preference orders, which allow for indifference, we can escape from the paradox for the canonical case of three players and three alternatives. With weak preference orders, the a priori success of the chairman is now greater than that of the other two players. We also point to a new paradox of sophisticated voting.     

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks

This article considers the provision of two public goods on tree networks where each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if there are at least four agents, then no social choice rule exists that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, these properties are incompatible, even if agents’ preferences are restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. However, for rules on an interval, we prove that Miyagawa’s (Soc Choice Welf 18:527–541, 2001) characterization that only the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy both of these properties also holds on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Moreover, if agents’ peak locations are restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules exist on a subclass of trees. We provide a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.     

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies

 Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s. Received: 9 June 1995/Accepted: 8 January 1996     

Marriage matching and gender satisfaction

The performance of the Gale–Shapley marriage matching algorithm (Am Math Mon 16:217–222, 1962) has been studied extensively in the special case of men’s and women’s preferences random. We drop the assumption that women’s preferences are random and show that , where R _n is the men’s expected level of satisfaction, that is, the expected sum of men’s rankings of their assigned mates, when the men-propose Gale–Shapley algorithm is used to match n men with n women. This is a step towards establishing a conjecture of Knuth (Mariages Stables et leurs relations avec d’ autres problémes combinatoires, 1976, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, Vol 10, 1997) of 30 years standing. Under the same assumptions, we also establish bounds on the expected rankings by women of their assigned mates.     

Monopsony power in the market for teachers: Why teachers should support market-based education reform

Employers can exploit individuals with high moving costs when local labor markets are not competitive. Along with nurses and university faculty, teachers are sometimes in such a disadvantageous situation. Teachers’ price elasticity of supply may be quite low in many regions, and their geographic mobility may be low when they are their household's second wage earner. Their occupational mobility is often low because of the scarcity of alternate employers within commuting distance. Nearly 96 percent of Texas' teachers work in tax-financed school districts, and many regions have only one district. An econometric model developed from school district data from 48 South Texas and 48 North Texas counties supports the hypothesis that teachers are paid less in less competitive labor markets. In Texas, teachers’ salaries are not determined by collective bargaining between district officials and teacher unions. That relatively unique feature of Texas makes it especially well-suited to the task of disentangling monopsony effects from other labor market forces.     

Explaining the motivational forces of (<Emphasis Type="Italic">dis</Emphasis>)Respect: How self-focused and group-focused concerns can result in the display of group-serving efforts

The current article explains the motives underlying respect-and disrespect induced group-serving efforts. Research showed that intra-group respect increases individuals’ engagement with their group and subsequent intentions to show group-serving efforts. We refer to this process as ‘the group-focused motive’. Based on a recent program of research on actual effort and performance evaluations, we conclude that respect-induced group-serving efforts are not only due to enhanced engagement with the group. In addition, we posit that behavioral motivations can also stem from self-focused concerns — we refer to these as ‘self-focused motives’. We argue that the perception of being respected boosts the self-evaluation of individual group members. Maintenance of this positive self-evaluation, together with respect-induced enhanced self-confidence, can cause individuals to show more contextual performance. Finally, when individuals are disrespected, this impacts negatively on their self-perception. As a result, these individuals show group-serving efforts in an attempt to re-establish their self-worth, and this occurs relatively independently of improvement concerns for the group. Dick de Gilder (TC.de.Gilder@fsw.vu.nl) currently is associate professor of organizational behavior at the VU University in Amsterdam. He studied at the University of Amsterdam and received his Ph.D. from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. His research interests include organizational commitment, error management, and research management.     

Education Assistance to Africa: We Can Do More and Better

Based on the problems of Global Education Assistance to Africa (GEAA), and combined with China’s rationale and practice of Education Assistance to Africa, this paper proposes a vision and assumption to improve the GEAA, that is, using the assistance rationale of ‘Africa-based’, ‘equal-relationship’, and ‘mutual-benefits’, through ‘multi-stakeholders cooperation’, ‘multi-modes operation’, and ‘multi-goals achievement’ to build one ‘harmonious world’.     

Garfinkel before ethnomethodology

A short story titled “‘Color Trouble’” by Harold Garfinkel was published inOpportunity in 1940,The Best Short Stories 1941, andPrimer for White Folks in 1945. Garfinkel wrote this short story before World War II while a research fellow at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill under Howard W. Odum, the founder ofSocial Forces “‘Color Trouble’” narrates poignantly the racial victimization of a young black woman traveling on a public bus through the State of Virginia. The short story provides sociologists with a different medium through which to examine the seminal interests of ethnomethodology’s founder. In a literary form, the short story depicts such ethnomethodological concepts as the breaching experiment, the “et cetera clause,” “ad hocing,” and the status degradation ceremony. Garfinkel’s “‘Color Trouble’” also suggests the way in which ethnomethodology overlaps with, as well as diverges from, Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective. He received his doctoral degree from the graduate program in sociology at York University, Toronto, Ontario. His article “Autonomy and Responsibility in Social Theory” will appear inCurrent Perspectives in Social Theory, Volume 10.     

Media depth influences Sedum green roof establishment

Species selection and initial establishment of plants is critical for long term survival and health of green roofs. Plants that can withstand harsh environmental conditions and provide rapid coverage on extensive green roofs can reduce erosion, limit weed invasion, and provide a more aesthetically pleasing roof to satisfy customers. This study evaluated the effect of green roof substrate depth on initial establishment of 12 Sedum species in a Midwestern US climate. Plugs of 12 Sedum species were planted on 8 June 2005 and evaluated bi-weekly until first frost for absolute cover (AC) using a stainless steel point-frame transect. Most species exhibited greater growth and coverage at a depth of 7.0 and 10.0 cm relative to 4.0 cm. AC was highest for Sedum sarmentosum at all depths, but this species may be too aggressive. Other suitable species include Sedum floriferum, Sedum stefco, and Sedum spurium ‘John Creech’. In general, species that are less suitable are Sedum ‘Angelina’, Sedum cauticola ‘Lidakense’, Sedum ewersii, Sedum ochroleucum, and Sedum reflexum ‘Blue Spruce’. For the species tested, a minimum of 7.0 cm is highly recommended. With shallower substrates, S. sarmentosum and S. stefco will provide the fastest coverage. This paper is a portion of a M.S. Thesis submitted by K.L. Getter.     

W. H. Hutt and The economics of the colour bar

Conclusion Long before the international climate of opinion made South Africa’s system of legalized racial discrimination untenable, it was under attack from within. A tiny part of that struggle was waged on moral grounds by decent South Africans both white and nonwhite. The much larger part of the war was waged not on moral grounds but on the economic battlefield where the stakes were profit and losses. As W. H. Hutt so aptly points out, the major disadvantages of apartheid were borne by South Africa’s nonwhite population, but the disadvantage was shared by whites as well. As such it produced widespread tensions leading to resistance, evasion, contravention, and modi-fication of apartheid law. Often evasion and contravention of apartheid law was led by the very people who shared the ideology of white supremacy. The final abolition of apartheid law may indeed reflect a change in heart by South African whites but the coup de grace was, as Hutt put it, the liberating forces “released by what is variously called the ‘free market system,’ the ‘capitalist system,’ or the ‘profit system.’”