Mixed contracts for the newsvendor problem with real options and discrete demand

In this paper we consider the newsvendor model with real options under discrete demand. We consider a mixed contract where the retailer can order a combination of q units subject to the conditions in a classical newsvendor contract and Q real options on the same items. We provide a closed form solution to this mixed contract when the demand is discrete and study some of its properties. In particular we demonstrate that a mixed contract may be superior to a real option contract when a manufacturer has a bound on how much variance she is willing to accept.     

考虑资金收益情况下的供应链回购契约

在制造商的资金收益率大于零售商资金收益率的情况下,以报童模型为基础,研究了资金收益对回购契约的影响.系统预期利润变为与批发价相关,利用拉格朗日方程求解了满足零售商参与约束、同时使系统和制造商预期利润取得最大值的契约参数.与不考虑资金收益情况下的供应链协调不同的是:订货批量大于相应批发价下不考虑零售商参与约束的最优订货批量;若零售商的保留利润一定,则回购价增大;回购价可以大于批发价,批发价可以小于制造商的边际生产成本.     

不确定需求情境下的供应链预测契约设计

以报童模型为基础,研究了在由单一生厂商和零售商组成的供应链系统中,生产商如何通过契约设计来影响零售商的需求预测行为,使其收益最大化的问题。文章基于静态博弈模型对此问题进行了分析,发现在整合供应链情境下,当需求预测成本较小时选择预测能够获得更高的期望收益;在分散式供应链情境下,当生产商选择预测契约时,预测成本最终由生产商承担,且其期望收益为预测成本的减函数,而选择无预测契约时则为预测成本的非减函数;最后通过生产商期望收益对比,给出了最优策略。     

基于需求信息更新和短缺量延期供给的易逝品供应链期权契约研究

为了降低供给与需求的不匹配,引入期权契约讨论三阶段生产和订购策略:零售商在第1阶段发出固定订单;然后在第1阶段和第2阶段之间更新需求预测,并在第2阶段调整固定订购量同时购买期权;第3阶段满足市场需求,对销售季末短缺量以执行期权和紧急订购相结合的方式实行延期供给。契约参数包含期权购买价格、执行价格和延期供给对应的批发价,三者线性相关;期权契约下,制造商不存在投机动力。根据易逝品的特征,对生产和订购模型进行仿真计算和分析,结果表明:供应链及其成员的利润都得到帕累托改进,系统利润增量的分配随期权购买价格发生变化。     

在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下的供应链协调机制分析

根据报童模型和信息揭示原理建立了在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下生产商、销售商和系统的利润模型。通过对模型的优化得到两种电子佣金制度下的最优期权订购量。比较最优期权订购量和系统最优生产容量,分析了不同电子佣金制度及期权和单方支付契约类型下供应链协调特征。得到以下结论:对于具有单季节随机市场需求特征产品的期权和单方支付契约拍卖中,若生产商执行单方支付,系统不能被协调。若销售商执行单方支付,系统的协凋与电子佣金的制度有关;在赢得契约生产商支付电子佣金的制度下,最利于系统的协调和利润的分配。     

Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk‐Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss‐Averse Retailer*

This articles considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal–agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL‐sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL‐sharing provision for mitigating the loss‐aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL‐sharing‐and‐buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution‐free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.     

Enhancing corporate social responsibility: Contract design under information asymmetry

We consider a two-stage supply chain in which a contract manufacturer (CM) sells products through a brand name retailer. The contract manufacturer can invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to improve customer perception about the firm and increase demand, while the retailer can influence the demand by exerting marketing efforts. We design optimal contracts for such a supply chain, which faces information asymmetry. The wholesale price contract was developed as the base model to derive insight into the value of information sharing. We examine the impact of CSR cost on CSR commitment and profits. We find that CM׳s CSR cost impacts the CM׳s and the retailer׳s profits differently. Under certain conditions, the CM׳s profit will increase with cost, while that of the retailer is uncertain. We also propose two-part tariff contracts for both the symmetric and asymmetric cases with the aim of maximizing the retailer׳s profit and improving CM׳s commitment to CSR. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.     

Optimal procurement of long-term contracts in the presence of imperfect spot market

B2B spot market has grown rapidly and become an effective trading channel for commodity products. Besides long-term contract procurement from conventional suppliers (forward and option), a buyer can procure or sell commodities at any time in B2B spot market to adjust her inventory level. However, spot prices are generally volatile and the market is imperfect in the sense that spot trading may be realized with uncertainty in a given period of time and often comes with extra transaction cost. This paper considers a commodity buyer who can order forward and option contracts in advance and trade in a B2B spot market when spot price and demand are observed stochastically. Based on a single-period newsvendor model, we discuss three optimal order strategies and derive respective expected profits when the buyer is risk-neutral. The sensitivity of purchase costs, market liquidity and transaction cost is investigated. We also compare the optimal expected profits for different strategies to illustrate the effects of the two long-term contracts in the presence of the B2B spot market. We then extend our model to a multi-period setting and derive the optimal strategy. Finally, we numerically compute the optimal order strategy for a risk-averse buyer and analyze the impact of spot market, risk aversion, as well as the correlation between customer demand and spot price.     

延迟支付下短生命周期产品批发价契约研究

在需求随机且允许延迟支付的情况下,如果零售商的销售款不足以清偿应支付给制造商的货款,制造商将承担一定的回款风险。对此,以报童模型为基础,针对短生命周期产品建立了延迟支付下的批发价契约模型。分析表明,如果需求分布是IGFR,那么对于一定的批发价,零售商有确定的最优订货批量。制造商的预期利润是批发价的递增函数。制造商根据零售商至少应获得的预期利润来确定批发价。当满足一定条件时供应链能够实现协调,但这是一种系统利润分配缺乏柔性的协调。     

需求预测更新情形下的供应链Stackelberg博弈与协调研究

在贝叶斯需求预测更新的情形下,从供需博弈角度探讨了易逝品供应链库存管理的基本问题:什么时间订、订多少以及订货价格如何决定。建立了制造商为主方、零售商为从方的供需Stackelberg博弈模型,其中制造商在低价多量与高价少量之间权衡,零售商在低成本低预测精度与高成本高预测精度之间进行权衡。分析了模型最优解的存在性,设计了两层规划的分段迭代算法,并通过数值例子说明了模型与算法的有效性。进一步,针对Stackelberg博弈中出现的双重边际效应,提出了实现供应链协调的契约形式,论证了实现供应链协调的条件。     

不对称信息下考虑产能约束的供应链合同设计

本文针对由产能约束品牌制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑市场上消费者对产品的异质性偏好,以及品牌制造商和零售商之间存在信息不对称,研究品牌制造商最优合同设计与零售商定价策略,考察产能约束与不对称信息对产品定价和供应双方合作的影响。研究发现：受到产能约束的品牌制造商有三种合同策略,即低价合同、固定价格合同以及高价合同等三种合同,在低价合同下品牌制造商可以充分利用其产能约束,而在后两种合同下产品有可能滞销;不对称信息会导致"批发价格+一次性转移支付"合同不能完美协调供应链。当品牌制造商和零售商进行信息共享谈判时,若二者在高价合同下进行合作,则品牌制造商与零售商在一定条件下可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。     

政府奖惩下闭环供应链中需求预测信息分享研究

考虑政府奖惩机制,在制造商直接回收的闭环供应链中,当市场不确定且制造商和零售商都能预测需求时,为研究零售商的需求预测信息分享问题,本文构建一个Stackelberg博弈模型,分别求得零售商信息分享和不分享情形下的均衡结果,探讨了需求预测信息精度对供应链成员利润及信息分享价值的影响,并研究了供应链均衡的信息分享策略。研究发现,需求预测精度的提高在大多数情形下会使供应链成员都受益。当制造商回收效率较高时,自愿分享需求信息是一个均衡;当制造商回收效率较低时,信息不分享是一个均衡;当制造商回收效率处于中等水平时,通过设计一个讨价还价机制,可以促使信息分享是一个均衡。此外,政府奖惩力度也会影响均衡的信息分享策略。     

供应链金融视角下利率市场化的鲁棒分析模型

本文从供应链金融的视角出发,在需求信息缺失的情况下研究了银行贷款利率的制定对供应链及其节点企业运营状况的影响。在利率市场化的背景下,构建了银行参与的由供应商和零售商组成的供应链三方博弈模型。运用鲁棒的报童方法和极小极大后悔方法刻画了银行决定利率、供应商决定批发价格和零售商决定订货量的三方博弈情景,并获得其博弈均衡。研究表明:在部分信息下银行的参与能有效提高供应链绩效;供应商自有资金量的多少是判断利率政策(政府调控与利率市场化)对供应链效益影响的重要指标;利率市场化并不能完全解决银行业占取实体经济利益的现状,适度的政府调控是不可或缺的。     

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win.     

网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响

研究了网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响。分别建立了存在网络外部性和不存在网络外部性下的双渠道供应链模型,通过比较零售商信息分享和不分享下其与制造商的期望利润。研究发现：当未考虑产品的网络外部性时,零售商不与制造商分享其市场需求信息,与已有研究一致。当考虑了产品网络外部性且网络外部性较小时,零售商仍不与制造商分享市场需求信息;然而,当网络外部性较大时,零售商与制造商分享其市场需求信息。此外,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息有助于增加制造商和供应链利润。     

含特许权的季节性商品二次定购机制

季节性商品短生命周期的特性引发了销售商降低需求信息不确定性的意愿,同时对制造商的生产能力和柔性操作提出了较高要求.文章建立了含特许权的季节性商品二次定购模型,有效地解决了销售商为获取更多需求信息而推迟定货和制造商进行柔性生产之间的矛盾.并通过和传统的一次定购模型的比较,得出了在商品需求不确定下,二次定购机制发生并获得整条供应链收益Pareto改进的条件,以及相应的特许权费用f的制定范围.     

CSR投入对闭环供应链定价与协调决策的影响

研究了供应链成员的社会责任（CSR）投入行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了闭环供应链中以下四种不同的CSR投入方式：（1）无CSR投入;（2）制造商投入CSR;（3）零售商投入CSR;（4）制造商和零售商同时投入CSR。通过对比不同模型的均衡决策和利润,发现制造商和零售商同时进行CSR投入的方式对闭环供应链决策成员和系统均最有利,而零售商投入CSR的方式优于制造商投入CSR方式。其次,以集中化决策模型的最优结果为基准,探讨了不同CSR投入方式下分散化闭环供应链系统的协调机制设计问题。结果表明：两部定价契约能有效实现CSR约束的闭环供应链的协调;且在制造商与零售商同时投入CSR决策情形,契约中制造商的议价能力最弱,零售商的议价能力最强。最后,通过算例分析了模型中关键参数对闭环供应链均衡决策与利润的影响,并进一步对闭环供应链协调的性能进行了分析。     

政府奖惩下闭环供应链中信息不对称时的最优合同设计

考虑政府奖惩机制,在制造商依赖零售商回收的闭环供应链中,当零售商的回收成本信息是不对称时,为探究制造商最优激励合同设计问题,本文构建制造商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过运用委托代理理论和显示原理求得实现对零售商信息甄别的最优两部定价合同菜单,并分析该合同菜单性质以及信息不对称的影响,最后探讨政府奖惩机制对均衡结果的影响。研究发现,随着零售商回收效率降低,制造商会提高批发价、减少转移支付。回收成本信息不对称会使制造商和供应链利润减少,零售商利润增加。政府奖惩机制的出台会使制造商降低批发价、提高转移支付。当政府的回收标准较高而奖惩力度较小时,奖惩机制的出台会使供应链利润减少,否则,会使供应链利润增加。     

A Newsvendor Problem with Revenue Sharing and Channel Coordination*

Increasingly manufacturers and retailers are implementing revenue‐sharing policies to coordinate distribution channels more effectively. This article considers a standard newsvendor problem in a single manufacturer–retailer channel and compares the expected profits that each party receives in a traditional ordering environment with those that can be achieved under a revenue‐sharing policy designed to completely eliminate double marginalization. It is shown that the retailer always benefits from the transition to revenue sharing by capturing a portion of the incremental channel profit generated by the complete elimination of double marginalization. A necessary demand‐distribution‐dependent condition is derived under which the transition to revenue sharing benefits the manufacturer as well. The findings of this research are illustrated in a numerical example for the uniform demand distribution.     

两种分成契约下供应链企业合作减排决策机制研究

本文考虑由一个受政府碳排放规制且处于供应链上游的产品供应商和处于下游的零售商所组成的低碳供应链系统。由于低碳消费需求增加所引起的零售商利润的提高,下游零售商可采取不同的契约形式促进上游供应商扩大减排投资。为此,本文考虑了分享减排所增收益与分担减排投资成本两种契约。通过建立零供两主体的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了在两种契约下主体的最优减排水平及最优分成比例,以及两主体在不同契约形式下的最优利润值。结果表明:分担减排投资成本契约能够使减排更加彻底,得到的减排水平较高;在分担减排投资成本契约下,两主体的利润值均会有所提高;在分享减排所增利润契约下,两主体的利润变化要依据参数来确定。最后,文章依据合理数据对上述结论进行了验证,并对碳交易价格等相关参数的敏感性进行了分析。