平台服务和物流服务对网络商家信心的影响——商家信誉的调节作用

在电子商务平台中,商家日常经营所需的服务与传统零售业有所不同,主要包括平台服务和物流服务两种。商家信心决定着平台的生存发展,但尚未有文献从信心视角对平台服务和物流服务展开研究。本文使用3995位淘宝店铺经营者的调查数据,建立次序回归模型分析发现:平台服务和物流服务都对商家信心有正向影响;商家信誉具有调节作用,随着信誉等级的提高,平台服务对商家信心的影响逐渐增强;而信誉等级较低的商家信心更容易受物流服务影响。     

电子商务产品定价与返利策略优化及协调研究

在电子商务背景下,网络零售商以两种模式向消费者提供产品,一种是常规的网络直销模式,另一种是通过有第三方返利平台参与的返利模式.当两种模式同时存在时,利用消费者效用理论,分别研究了网络零售商的最优定价策略与第三方返利平台的最优返利策略.结果表明,网络零售商是否引入返利模式,与返利产品的满足率、消费者购买返利产品花费的额外成本及返利兑现率密切相关.相对于集中式决策,分散式决策下网络零售商的最优零售价格会降低,同时第三方返利平台返还给消费者的返利会减少,这会加剧两种模式之间的冲突而导致系统低效率.为此,设计了一种改进的收益共享合同来协调两种销售模式,不仅使系统效率达到最优,并且使渠道成员实现"共赢".最后结合数值算例验证了该合同的有效性.     

A free gift card alternative to price discounts in the newsvendor problem

In this paper, we develop a newsvendor model in which the retailer gives “free” gift cards to consumers who purchase a regularly priced product at the end of the selling season instead of discounting the product. The model is developed for a market with patient consumers. We derive the sufficient optimality condition for the retailer's stocking level in the first period and the optimal gift card value in the second period. We also investigate the conditions under which giving gift cards results in higher expected profits than discounting the product. We find that five factors determine the effectiveness of gift cards. The first three factors are consumers' valuation per $1 of gift card, gift card redemption rates, and the average gross margin of the retailer. The last two factors are the degree to which consumers use gift cards to pay for products which they would have purchased from the retailer in the future with cash, and the additional spending above the gift card value consumers make when they redeem the card. The last two factors have a strong interaction. We also find that gift cards can be profitable when patient consumers consistently value each $1 by their redemption probability, even with 100% redemption. Numerical analysis shows that in the presence of patient consumers, increases in the redemption rate may lead to an increase in the expected profit. Similar counter-intuitive behavior of the expected profit occurs with changes in other problem parameters. The analysis also shows that gift cards' profit advantage over discounting increases with the variability of demand. The analysis also indicates that gift cards are most effective for low to medium priced products sold by high margin retailers.     

以旧换新收购方式下的逆向物流网络优化设计

为提高企业回收积极性,构建了一个以以旧换新为收购方式的新的逆向物流网络优化设计的混合整数非线性规划(mixed-integer nonlinear programming,MINLP)模型,以确定最优选址(位置和数量)和折扣价格,使回收中心净利润最大。提出了启发式算法来解决大规模选址问题,并利用算例验证了模型和算法的有效性和可行性。最后分别算例分析了企业的品牌差异和采用两种策略(单一折扣价格策略和质量依赖折扣价格策略)对回收中心净利润的影响。     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

网络商店与社区便利店的商品虚拟展示合作研究

基于消费者效用理论，考虑网络商店在社区便利店内虚拟展示商品，实施商品种类合作的策略，分析了虚拟展示合作对双方决策以及市场均衡和利润的影响。研究结果表明，虚拟展示增加了社区便利店的商品多样性，促进了零售价格的增长，但虚拟展示商品和社区便利店内实物商品的竞争导致社区便利店利润降低，使得社区便利店缺乏主动参与合作的动机。基于纳什讨价还价模型，构建了基于平均主义的利润分成协调机制，实现了社区便利店和网络商店的商品虚拟展示合作，改善了参与双方的利润。     

基于收益共享契约的网络零售联合促销策略研究

网络零售业造节促销已成常态,优化网络零售平台(简称平台商)和销售商联合促销策略是一项值得深入研究的课题。本文基于收益共享契约,利用不同的博弈模型刻画入驻销售商和平台商之间三种不同的促销模式,包括由其中一方率先发起促销的模式和二者同时发起促销的模式,研究不同模式下销售商和平台商的最优促销策略。研究结论表明,在三种促销模式下,二者的最优促销策略均随着商品佣金费率的增长依次呈现三种不同的形式:从仅由销售商提供促销到联合促销再到仅由平台商提供促销。当且仅当佣金费率和商品的日常售价高于一定阈值时,销售商和平台商才会有动机开展联合促销。研究还发现,销售商和平台商在各自率先发起的联合促销模式下具备先动优势。销售商(平台商)率先发起的联合促销将更有利于对佣金费率较低(高)的商品实施。当销售商和平台商同时独立发起促销时,供应链整体促销力度最大,供应链的整体利润也最高。     

基于“硬件/软件”平台产品性能改进的定价策略与激励合同研究

构建了一个“硬件/软件”平台，平台一边是互补内容或服务的提供商，一边是购买平台产品和内容的最终消费者。在刻画平台产品和内容之间互补网络效应的基础上，考虑平台产品性能改进，运用博弈论方法，揭示了平台产品定价、内容定价、平台收费及平台产品性能水平决策的内在机理，并进一步探索了优化平台产品性能的激励合同设计。研究结果表明：(1)在一定条件下平台产品可以亏本销售，但内容必须具有盈利性。(2)互补性网络效应越强、平台产品性能改进效率越高或敏感系数越小将促使平台提高产品性能并制定更高的平台接入费，同时内容价格也会提高。但平台产品性能水平与其价格的变化并不总是保持一致。(3)数量折扣和固定转移支付合同的组合合同可以实现双边市场系统的协调并进一步优化平台产品性能水平，且当固定转移费用在一定范围内时，实现平台和内容提供商利润的帕累托改进。     

The Retail Space‐Exchange Problem with Pricing and Space Allocation Decisions

We consider retail space‐exchange problems where two retailers exchange shelf space to increase accessibility to more of their consumers in more locations without opening new stores. Using the Hotelling model, we find two retailers’ optimal prices, given their host and guest space in two stores under the space‐exchange strategy. Next, using the optimal space‐dependent prices, we analyze a non‐cooperative game, where each retailer makes a space allocation decision for the retailer's own store. We show that the two retailers will implement such a strategy in the game, if and only if their stores are large enough to serve more than one‐half of their consumers. Nash equilibrium for the game exists, and its value depends on consumers’ utilities and trip costs as well as the total available space in each retailer's store. Moreover, as a result of the space‐exchange strategy, each retailer's prices in two stores are both higher than the retailer's price before the space exchange, but they may or may not be identical.     

The comparison between trade-in and leasing of a product with technology innovations

Companies can adopt trade-in and/or leasing to shorten consumers׳ upgrade cycle and gain control over secondary markets. In this paper, we consider a monopolistic manufacturer who offers a technology product to a market consisting of heterogeneous consumers. We focus on an exogenous, stochastic innovation process that determines the availability of new technology and consequently, residual value of the current product. We derive the optimal pricing strategy of trade-in and leasing, respectively, examine its impact on the manufacturer׳s expected profit, and compare the performance of the two strategies. Trade-in protects the manufacturer against residual value risk and allows the flexibility of offering the option at different innovation states separately. Leasing, on the other hand, provides the manufacturer an opportunity to circumvent low new product prices and thus increases expected profit when product reuse profitability is high. The interplay between the two forces, product reuse profitability and new product price, determines the preference between trade-in and leasing. Our findings provide monopolistic manufacturers guidance on how to optimally employ the trade-in and leasing strategies.     

数据可携权能否治理“大数据杀熟”？

电商平台利用大数据对消费者“杀熟”的现象屡见不鲜,但因其隐蔽性我国政府一直难以监管,那么欧盟提出的消费者数据可携权能否治理“大数据杀熟”现象？对此本文从平台用户的视角出发,通过构建由电商平台和消费者组成的演化博弈模型,研究引入数据可携权后双方的演化稳定策略,并分析影响双方行为策略的因素。研究表明：当老顾客在平台用户中占比较高,并且老顾客行使数据可携权转移至新平台获得的额外效用大于某阈值时,赋予消费者数据可携权能够遏制 “大数据杀熟”现象,但当老顾客中不满意顾客的占比较高时,消费者具有数据可携权会阻碍电商平台产品或服务的提升;消费者行使数据可携权的概率与个人数据价值成正相关,与观测数据价值成负相关;电商平台采取“大数据杀熟”策略的概率与个人数据价值成正相关,与衍生数据价值成负相关。     

GIFT EXCHANGE AND WORKERS' FAIRNESS CONCERNS: WHEN EQUALITY IS UNFAIR5

We study how different payment modes influence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment and can set individual wages in the other. We find that the use of equal wages elicits substantially lower efforts. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se because under both wage schemes it is profit‐maximizing for agents to exert high efforts. The treatment difference instead seems to be driven by the fact that the norm of equity is violated far more frequently in the equal wage treatment. After having suffered from violations of the equity principle, agents withdraw effort. These findings hold even after controlling for the role of intentions, as we show in a third treatment. Our results suggest that adherence to the norm of equity is a necessary prerequisite for successful establishment of gift‐exchange relations. (JEL: J33, D63, M52, C92, J41)     

The superstore format in Australia: Opportunities and limitations

This article outlines the development of both food superstores and non-food superstores (referred to as category killers) in Australia. Ten retail categories have been identified where there is a moderate to high rate of adoption of the superstore format (more than 20 outlets). These ten categories have been analyzed to identify the success factors in superstore development, which include accurate assessment of consumer one-stop shopping needs, sufficient finance, good store design skills and a balanced program of store expansion. The article explores the managerial implications for traditional retailers, for existing superstore retailers (especially the issue of optimal store size), for existing convenience store operators, department stores and for manufacturers and wholesalers. There are limitations of the superstore format in categories which are fashion orientated or where consumers require close distance convenience. These limitations actually provide opportunities to a myriad of retailers in fast food, dry-cleaning, banking, florists and the like, to reassess their locational and service delivery strategies. The superstore concept is clearly a revolution in itself, but its shock waves are provoking and stimulating second order mini-revolutions in traditional specialist stores, department stores, convenience stores, warehousing and manufacturing.     

独立定价还是共同定价:新支付工具的定价策略

基于新支付工具发展初期市场特征构建双边市场定价模型，分析共同定价和独立定价策略下企业利润和社会福利最大化新支付工具定价。研究显示：政府较企业对新支付工具制定更低价格水平促使用户支付选择转移，特别是在共同定价策略下会有效提升市场效率，达到社会福利最大；但若政府无法做到共同定价，特别在新支付工具成本优势不明显时，会使支付工具间存在过度补贴而降低社会福利，这时企业利润最大化定价为次优选择。     

需求不确定下双渠道供应链产品质量控制研究

考虑到电商平台与实体门店两种渠道参与主体的质量决策对不同渠道产品质量水平的影响,进而引致两种渠道下供应链产品质量与价格的市场竞争。本文运用stackblerg博弈分析模型,研究由制造商、实体门店、电商平台与消费者组成的双渠道供应链产品质量控制问题。在考虑需求不确定性的基础上,构建双渠道下制造商、实体门店和电商平台收益分析模型,分析双渠道下制造商与实体门店的批发价格契约、制造商与电商平台之间收益共享契约两种策略对供应链产品质量控制水平的影响,通过运用最优化原理求解制造商、实体门店和电商平台物流配送的最优质量控制水平,并对结果进行仿真模拟。结果显示：制造商、实体门店和电商平台之间的契约对三方产品质量控制具有交互影响,电商平台物流配送质量水平与实体门店仓储质量水平呈同方向变化,而实体门店产品市场售格的提高则不利于电商平台加强物流配送质量水平,消费者对产品售格敏感性越高,制造商越注重产品质量提升。反之,消费者对仓储和物流配送质量水平敏感性提高,并不利于制造商加强产品质量控制。因此,通过大力发展物流配送服务业,提升产品物流配送质量控制水平,不仅有助于生产环节质量控制,同时也将促使实体门店加强产品仓储质量控制水平。     

Vehicle scrappage incentives to accelerate the replacement decision of heterogeneous consumers

Vehicle scrappage subsidy programs have been widely applied by governments to replace old cars by newer, more fuel-efficient ones. While these programs have been implemented to provide motivation for replacing vehicles earlier, they may not be as effective as expected. From a cost-benefit perspective, the consumers who would have replaced anyway, even without the program, must be considered when evaluating the net benefits of the program. This requires accounting for variations in consumers’ willingness to replace. Considering consumer heterogeneity in net trade-in valuation, this study investigates a dynamic vehicle-replacement problem based on a life cycle optimization (LCO) approach. We theoretically demonstrate that although increasing the subsidy level does motivate low-value consumers to replace earlier, it also induces consumers with a high net trade-in valuation to replace later in order to become eligible for the subsidy program. We have also developed a simulation program based on real data, to demonstrate the application of our general model. According to the simulation results, ignoring consumer heterogeneity could result in an overestimation of the net benefits of the scrappage program.     

不同市场能力下的“电商—平台—物流”在线销售系统的决策研究

近年来,随着互联网的快速发展,市场上衍生出了一些在线销售网站。考虑了一个包含电商卖家、电商平台和物流公司的在线销售系统模型,其中需求依赖于产品价格、平台和物流服务水平。研究了当物流、平台同时决策时,在线销售系统中电商卖家和平台、物流之间的不同市场能力结构问题。考虑了3种不同市场能力的分散决策模型:(1)物流-平台Stackelberg模型;(2)电商Stackelberg模型;(3)Nash模型。相关的均衡解和最优利润被得到。研究结果表明,在不同的市场能力结构下,当物流公司和平台同时决策时,即使他们的服务投入不相同,但最优收费相同。市场能力结构对在线销售成员和消费者有重要的影响。对电商而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定较低的零售价格,并获得最多的利润,同时能够提升消费者购买的积极性;当市场能力较低时,电商会制定较高的零售价格,并获得最少的利润。对平台和物流公司而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定比较高的收费,同时付出较少的努力,但并不能获得最高利润,同时会打击消费者的积极性;但是,当市场能力较低时,他们一定获得最少的利润。在Nash模型中,平台和物流公司会付出最大的努力,同时获得最大的利润,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也是最多。在物流-平台Stackelberg模型中,平台和物流公司付出的努力最少,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也最少。     

焕新计划下考虑消费者细分的产品定价策略

焕新计划是生产商为提升自身竞争优势而推出的一种促销手段，加入焕新计划的消费者在第一阶段可以享受全方位服务，在第二阶段可以享受以旧换新抵扣优惠。消费者将权衡加入焕新计划的费用、服务水平以及抵扣力度等因素决策是否在第一阶段加入焕新计划。本文假设时尚型消费者每阶段都会购买最新产品，而节俭型消费者第一阶段购买产品后在第二阶段继续使用，针对这两类消费者在实施焕新计划和不实施焕新计划两种情况下，构建两阶段模型以决策产品的最优定价；运用解析方法分析了产品的生产成本等参数对最优定价的影响；运用解析方法和数值算例方法对两模型进行对比。     

闭环供应链中互联网回收平台合作推广研究

考虑单个制造商，单个网络零售商和单个第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链系统，网络零售商在销售产品、推广零售平台的同时,利用自身知名度向消费者宣传推广第三方回收商的互联网回收平台，制造商选择是否分摊零售商和回收商的推广成本，文中分三种情形研究供应链成员的最优决策，并进行了对比分析。研究表明：制造商分摊推广费用比不分摊推广费用的效果好；制造商分摊网络零售商的推广费用比分摊第三方回收商的推广费用的推广效果好。     

非授权分享、定价分歧与知识付费平台运营策略

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