U.S. immigration policy: the guestworker option revisited

In guestworker programs foreign nationals are admitted into another country on a nonmigrant status with severely curtailed social and limited labor market rights. The duration of stay is always finite and compliance with the terms of the contract are entered through a network of legal arrangements which allow officials in the receiving country a substantial amount of administrative discretion. Pro-guestworker arguments say that the borders cannot be closed, that guestworkers can be substituted for illegal aliens, that guestworkers are better than illegal aliens, and that additional labor benefits the US economy. Those against guestworker programs stress longterm socioeconomic issues rather than short-term economic advantages, saying that guestworker programs are no quick answer for illegal immigration, for domestic labor shortages, or for the US poor population. Guestworker programs, its opponents say, provide short-run economic benefits to a few employers and individuals at the expense of more widespread and longterm socioeconomic costs. They oppose: 1) the concept of admitting foreign workers with restricted rights, 2) the concentration of any negative labor market impacts on already disadvantaged domestic groups, 3) the proliferation of "jobs which Americans won't take," 4) many temporary guests ending up permanent residents, and 5) that exporting workers is as likely to impede as accelerate job-creating economic development in immigration countries. Most economists believe that diminishing marginal productivity produces downward-sloping short-run demand for labor schedules. The European experience with these programs has been different than those in the US since foreign workers in Europe were initially recruited in response to actual labor shortages and have always had legal status, but both Europe and the US have experienced large contingents of workers who remain in the countries and are at a pronounced power disadvantage regarding the society's institutions. Studies of guestworker programs have shown that worker flows eventually become impervious to the receiver's actual labor needs as employers disaggregate jobs into components which match the low skills of migrants and create additional foreign worker jobs which are then shunned by native labor, thus perpetuating a need for such labor. If the US opts for a large-scale guestworker program this will only replace 1 set of problems with another and it is not at all certain that large-scale guestworker admissions will proportionately reduce illegal migration inflows.     

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: America amends its immigration law

This disucssion of the Immigration and Control act of 1986 covers legalization, employer sanctions, and foreign agricultural worker reforms. It also identifies other changes in immigration law. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 recognizes 4 types of aliens who are eligible to receive legalization benefits: those who have resided "continuously" in the US since January 1, 1982; those who have worked in US perishable crop agriculture for 90 "man-days" each year ending on May 1, 1984, May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986 (special agricultural workers) or who have performed such labor for 90 man-days between only May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986; those who have been in the US since before January 1, 1972; and those classified as "Cuban-Haitian entrants" and who have been in the US since January 1, 1982. Each legalization category has specific eligibility requirements, its own application procedures, and its own process for obtaining legal permanent resident status. The IRCA forbids employers from knowingly employing unauthorized aliens. For the 1st time in US immigration history, an employer would be punished for employing aliens without work authorization. An employer would be able to establish an "affirmative defense" in his or her behalf if the employer examined certain documents which appear to be genuine or the applicant was referred to him by a State employment agency which previously has verified the applicant's employment eligibility. If the employer is found to have violated the provisions, a cease and desist order will be issued with a civil penalty of between $250-2000 for each unauthorized alien for the 1st time the violation occurs, between $2000-5000 for each alien for the 2nd violation, and between $3000-10,000 for each alien for subsequent violations. The Act provides for criminal penalties for employers who engage in a "pattern or practice of violations." Employer sanctions will not be effective for 18 months following passage of the Act. The changes which the IRCA introduced in terms of foreign agricultural workers fall into 2 broad categories: a formula for recruiting foreign agricultural workers for permanent residence in the US beginning with 1990 (replenishment workers); and changes in the existing system of temporary foreign workers for agricultural work. Among other things, the Act also increases colonial quotas to 5000 from 600, offers special immigrant status to certain officers and employers of international organizations and their immediate family members; and offers nonimmigrant status for parents and children of aliens given spcial immigrant status.     

The political and socioeconomic context of legal and illegal Mexican migration to the United States (1942-1984)

The US manpower shortage in industry and agriculture during World War II, combined with Mexico's burden of an excess number of unemployed laborers, provided the basis for serious labor negotiations between the US and Mexico. The result was the Bracero Agreement of 1942, a bilateral agreement involving annual quotas for the temporary hiring of Mexican braceros. On the surface the program worked well. However, there were points of contention between the 2 countries: 1) in opposition to Mexico's policy of placing recruitment centers in the interior of the country, US policy called for placing the centers near the border, to reduce transportation costs; 2) Texas, which received no braceros because of racial discrimination, relied upon illegal aliens for manual labor; 3) Texas flagrantly violated a 1948 agreement when the Border Patrol welcomed aliens across the river despite Mexican officials' threats to close the border; 4) legal braceros were confronted with competition from illegals who were willing to work for a lower wage; 5) in 1954, the Border patrol physically helped aliens across the border, while Mexican policy were physically restraining them; 6) with the conclusion of a new Bracero agreement in March 1954, illegal aliens were no longer needed, so more than 1 million were apprehended and deported to Mexico's interior. The termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 gave new impetus to illegal trafficking and the number of illegals apprehended began to increase steadily in 1965. The migration flow after 1964 was influenced by the following socioeconomic conditions in Mexico: 1) unemployment, 2) very large disparities in income distribution, 3) a discrimination of the rural sector in favor of the urban in the allocation of government funds, and 4) a dependency on foreign capital and technology. Also, it was cheap labor for the US. Neither the US nor Mexico has adopted policies related to either economic development or immigration that would systematically curtail or regulate the flow of Mexican migrants to the US. However, conflicting pressures limit the policy-making process. President Carter was limited in his policy options by the needs of large-scale commercial agriculture. President Reagan's idea of a guest-worker program did not develop into legislation. Mexico's Lopez Portillo administration counted on migration to the US as a substitute for redistributive land reform in its handling of rural political pressures; the migratory flow functioned as an "escape valve" helping to dilute the effects of rapid demographic increase and preserving the status quo.     

An Auction Model of Canadian Temporary Immigration for the 21st Century

Temporary Canadian immigration has grown beyond traditional programs for students, caregivers and agricultural workers to include trade-related temporary visas under NAFTA and the GATS. Current Canadian debates envision supplanting Canada's permanent immigration programme with a temporary visa programme to remove skill shortages. Several questions emerge under these temporary schemes including who should choose the number of temporary immigrants and under what employment conditions. This paper offers an alternative policy to the current government-determined quota on temporary visas to answer these two questions. Under the proposed scheme offered in this paper, a Canadian worker can place a job voucher up for auction on the Internet. If the Canadian worker finds an acceptable offer for his one-year (or less) voucher, then the temporary immigrant is permitted to seek a job in Canada. Thus, under this auction scheme Canadian workers are compensated for the presence of temporary immigrants, and the actual number of temporary immigrants admitted depends on the total number of Canadian workers who sell their vouchers, not on a government fat.     

Immigration: an international economic perspective

The creation of an effective US immigration policy has been complicated by the diversity of political interests and the absence of reliable statistics to determine the magnitude of the impact on the American economy. Estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the US range from 1 to 12 million. While political biases and complexities and data inadequacies complicate this analysis, some generalizations seem to be confirmed by worldwide experience. There are 2 mutually-supportive, short-run ways to reduce the flow of undocumented workers: 1) to better police US borders and shorelines and 2) to remove the motive for entry by making it illegal for employers to hire workers who are not authorized to work in the US. To give employers an easy defense and to facilitate their compliance with immigration laws, an effective worker identification system should be developed. To avoid the civil liberties, international relations, and human problems associated with mass deportations, illegal immigrants who entered the US before January 1, 1981 and who have been in continuous residence for at least 1 year, should be permitted to remain in the US as permanent resident aliens. The US should not adopt a new guest worker program. The proper sequence of changes in immigration policy is very important. Dealing with illegal immigration is essential; all these measures should be in place before an amnesty is granted. Because it is important to have friendly relations with neighboring countries and because the ultimate solution to illegal immigration is to reduce the wide disparities in employment opportunities between countries, the US should work with other countries to control illegal immigration, but should not link control to energy, trade, or other policies. It is particularly important to discuss immigration control plans with other countries, especially Mexico, and to do everything consistent with US interests to minimize the adverse impact of our immigration policies on our neighbors.     

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: an overview

"On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. After an intense lobbying effort by the business community, most provisions relating to legal immigration were omitted from the final bill. Instead, the 1996 Act focuses on illegal immigration reform and includes some of the toughest measures ever taken against illegal immigration." Aspects considered include border enforcement, penalities against alien smuggling and document fraud, deportation and exclusion proceedings, employer sanctions, welfare provisions, and changes to existing refugee and asylum procedures.     

Dancing Across Borders: ‘Exotic Dancers,’ Trafficking,and Canadian Immigration Policy

This article analyzes a Canadian immigration program that authorizes issuance of temporary work visas to ‘exotic dancers.’ In response to public criticism that the government was thereby implicated in the transnational trafficking of women into sexual exploitation, Citizenship and Immigration Canada retained the visa program de jure but eliminated it de facto. Using a legal and discursive analysis that focuses on the production of female labor migrants variously as workers, as criminals and as bearers of human rights, the article argues that the incoherence of Canadian policy can only be rendered intelligible when refracted through these different lenses. The article concludes by considering policy options available to the state in addressing the issue.     

Attitudes of Mexican Americans toward irregular immigration

This inquiry focuses on the attitudes of 314 Mexican Americans toward issues relating to current US immigration policy. Telephone and personal interviews were conducted in Hidalgo and Travis counties, Texas, with Mexican-Americans. Virtually all respondent groups oppose an increased rate of immigration, consider illegal immigration to be an important problem, support stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and believe that undocumented workers take jobs no one else wants. Half of the respondents identify illegal immigration as a regional rather than a personal problem. At the same time, the data suggest significant differences in both direction and intensity of attitudes between Mexican Americans of different generations, income, occupational levels, and region. There is general opposition to the requirement of a national identity card, but widespread support for penalizing employers of undocumented workers and for granting amnesty to undocumented workers. These findings allow an examination of the extent to which the Mexican American leadership, which has been overwhelmingly opposed to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, accurately reflects the views of the Mexican American people. The leadership and the population at large agree on 2 of the 3 issues, amnesty and the national identity card, but disagree on employer sanctions. 1st, it may be that the leadership holds the kinds of jobs for which undocumented workers are unlikely to compete, so they may not feel threatened. 2nd, they may feel that instituting employer sanctions will create incentives for employers to discriminate in their hiring practices against all Latino-looking job applicants. Non-elite Mexican Americans who support employer sanctions may believe that the only way they can compete for jobs is to make it impossible for elites to be hired. Both groups appear to fear that, regardless of the specifics of immigration reform, Mexican Americans are likely to encounter increased discrimination in the job market.     

The evolution of French immigration policy after May 1981

Changes and continuities in French immigration policies, following the assumption of power by the socialist government in 1981, are described. Attention is focused on the political implications of immigration and on the role of immigrants in French politics. Efforts to restrict immigration to France were initiated in 1931, but clandestine immigration, especially from Portugal, remained largely unchecked for 4 decades. In the early 1970s, stricter enforcement measures were adopted, but these measures met with considerable international and national opposition. In 1977, the government altered its approach to immigration by offering financial aid to help illegal migrants return to their countries of origin. These efforts met with little success, and in 1980 the government initiated measures to promote the integration of immigrants into French society. The socialistic government basically adhered to the immigration policies of the preceding government. The current government seeks: 1) to stop further illegal immigration through the intensification of border controls, 2) to grant amnesty to illegal aliens who currently reside in the country and who meet certain employment requirements, 3) to penalize employers who hire illegal aliens or who contract to bring illegal aliens into the country, and 4) to improve living conditions for legal immigrants. The politicalization of immigration has increased in recent years. Current issues center on the human and political rights of migrants and on arbitary administrative efforts to control immigration. It was expected that migrants would acquire political rights after the 1981 election; however, this expectation was not realized, and the political status of immigrants remains an unsettled issue. Consequently migrants have become pawns in the political struggle between different groups in the population both at the national and the local level. Immigration threatens to become an explosive issue. At the same time, migrants themselves are playing an increasingly prominent role in political activities, such as rent strikes and protest movements.     

Irregular Immigration,Labour Market and Enforcement at the US‐Mexico Border. Evidence from a Time‐Series Analysis (1963–2014)

This article provides evidence on irregular immigration to the US from Mexico in the years 1963–2014. It aims to answer to two questions. The first is: how much is irregular immigration responsive to changes in the US labour market? Compared with legal immigration, irregular immigration seems to be more sensitive to short‐run economic cycles as it is not directly regulated by the policies of the destination country. Second, what effect does border enforcement have on irregular immigration? One of the proposals of the recent bill is the construction of a double layer fence on the Southern border. We do not know, however, to what extent a further increase in border security will prevent irregular immigration and at which economic cost. The contribution of this article is dual: first, it provides empirical evidence on irregular immigration to the US Second, it provides evidence about the effect of US border policies on irregular immigration.     

International migration policies: conceptual problems

Kritz reviews national concepts and policies of migration. She examines how nation-states approach migration and how they define who is a migrant. Policies for permanent, temporary, and illegal migrants are examined for selected countries. While the traditional permanent immigration countries--Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US--continue to admit large numbers of permanent migrants, they are also admitting growing numbers of temporary migrants. Other countries, in Europe and the developing world, have different migration histories and use other approaches to admit foreigners--migrants are generally admitted on a temporary basis for work or other purposes. Growing numbers of these temporary migrants, however, do become long-term or permanent settlers, and the distinction between permanent and temporary migration policies becomes a short-term legal one rather than a long-term sociological one. Governments have been seeking those policy instruments that would allow them to improve control over who enters and settles in their territories, and temporary migration policies are the measures to which they are turning. While increasing restriction characterizes the policy stance of most countries toward international migration, this does not necessarily mean that the number of migrants entering is declining. Kritz argues that the concepts employed by countries in their immigration policies frequently do not correspond to the reality, making it necessary to examine the actual context.     

Peasants in reserve: temporary West Indian labor in the U.S. farm labor market

In the past 10 years, the British West Indies Temporary Alien Labor Program has received widespread judicial and legislative support and criticism. While sugar and apple producers who import West Indians argue that domestic labor is insufficient to harvest their crops, labor organizations and their supporters maintain that domestic labor is adequate. The resulting labor disputes focus primarily on the issue of whether or not West Indians are displacing US workers or undermining wage rates and working conditions. This article examines the relationships among legal issues surrounding the program, the US farm labor market, and the Jamaican peasantry. It argues that continued imports of foreign labor during times of high domestic unemployment, as well as the varied factors which underlie the continued willingness and ability of Jamaican peasant households to supply workers to US producers, can be most clearly understood from an international and historical perspective, rather than focussing on the needs and problems of any 1 nation.     

Preliminary results of the IRCA legalization programs at the end of phase I

A remarkable gulf in interpretation and evaluation of the 1986 implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) exists between various schools of analysts. Some feel that the law has not changed conditions much, while others consider the legalization program and employer sanctions successful. Altogether, IRCA included 6 specific legalization opportunities. The 2 major ones concerned aliens who had resided illegally in the US since January 1, 1982 and alien farm workers who had worked illegally in the US for at least 90 days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. Issues concerning the pre-1982 or general legalization program include 1) the 5-year gap between the eligibility cutoff and the start of the legalization program made the principal US legalization program more restrictive than comparable legalization policies in other market economy countries, 2) it did not provide for immediate derivative legislation for family members of an illegal alien eligible for legalization, and 3) analysts disagree on the evaluation and the effectiveness of the public information campaign to inform eligible aliens of the legalization opportunity. The application procedure for the Special Agricultural Worker or SAW was much simpler than for the general legalization program. SAW applicants could apply at US borders. 10% of SAW applications were denied, due to fraud and other reasons, as opposed to 2% for applicants to the major legalization program. Both programs attracted mainly Mexican applicants. The total number of SAW applications received will help to determine future need for alien farm workers. 1 of the most important differences between the SAW and the pre-1982 legalization programs is the legal status of the newly legalized: 1) to secure permanent resident alien status, pre-1982 program applicants must pass civics and English examinations within a set period of time, whereas SAW applicants do not; and 2) SAW applicants are eligible for a broader range of social benefits than those in the major program.     

Cultural pluralism and the future of American unity: the impact of illegal aliens

This paper explores the question of the impact of illegal migration on American unity and cultural pluralism in the US. Assuming that over time the descendants of undocumented workers now in the US will behave substantially like descendants of those who immigrate legally, the long-term impact of illegal migration barely will be noticeable provided it is reduced substantially in the future. The process of acculturation will work in the same way for both groups as it has for other ethnic groups in the past, given comparable levels of education and length of family residence in the US. The author takes special notice of the illegal migration of Spanish-speaking workers and hypothesizes that the behavior of their descendants will not differ from that of the descendants of other immigrants, legal or illegal, in ways that disrupt fundamental patterns of American political unity and cultural pluralism.     

Chinese Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market: Effects of Post‐Tiananmen Immigration Policy1

The Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and ensuing government crackdown affected Chinese nationals not only at home but also around the world. The U.S. government responded to the events in China by enacting multiple measures to protect Chinese nationals present in the United States. It first suspended all forced departures among Chinese nationals present in the country as of June 1989 and later gave them authorization to work legally. The Chinese Student Protection Act, passed in October 1992, made those Chinese nationals eligible for lawful permanent resident status. These actions applied to about 80,000 Chinese nationals residing in the United States on student or other temporary visas or illegally. Receiving permission to work legally and then a green card is likely to have affected recipients’ labor market outcomes. This study uses 1990 and 2000 census data to examine employment and earnings among Chinese immigrants who were likely beneficiaries of the U.S. government’s actions. Relative to immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea – countries not covered by the post‐Tiananmen immigration policy measures – highly educated immigrants from mainland China experienced significant employment and earnings gains during the 1990s. Chinese immigrants who arrived in the U.S in time to benefit from the measures also had higher relative earnings in 2000 than Chinese immigrants who arrived too late to benefit. The results suggest that getting legal work status and then a green card has a significant positive effect on skilled migrants’ labor market outcomes.     

Implementation of Congressional intent: a study of amnesty policy and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Despite the passage of the Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) the United States Border Patrol arrested about 1 million illegal aliens crossing the border in 1990. This phenomenon suggests that the IRCA has failed to control illegal immigration to the United States. Structural analysis of its implementation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was analyzed. Under an agreement with the INS to process illegal workers, community-based organizations in Arizona and New York became certified Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs). In 1988 the INS carried out a study to measure the impact of IRCA and solicited data from 9 QDEs. Data were obtained from 308 illegal aliens who failed to apply for amnesty and another 286 temporary legal residents. In the New York study information was collected from the QDEs between 1987 and 1989, and also in the summer of 1989 a group of 171 amnesty applicants were surveyed. All QDEs stated that implementation was hampered by excessive documentation, lack of strong family unification provisions, the financial cost of seeking legalization, and a fear of the INS. The Arizona and New York studies indicated that excessive documentation, fear of the INS (46% in New York), and fear of family separation (47% in New York) were the major factors why the targeted people did not come forward. Instead of seeking a proper balance between the written words of IRCA and the intent of Congress, INS developed guidelines that ignored the relevant facts presented by respected QDEs and Latino groups. In reality, INS sought to prevent illegal entry through amnesty offices throughout the United States. The eligibility requirements issued by the INS for amnesty served to limit and constrain participation in that program.     

How Many Highly Skilled Foreign-Born are Waiting in Line for U.S. Legal Permanent Residence?1

While the United States welcomes foreign-born students and trainees and, less warmly, temporary workers such as H-1B visa holders, it places an array of requirements, obstacles, and delays upon persons who would like to make the U.S. their permanent home. The number of people in the queue for legal permanent residence (LPR) is, however, difficult to ascertain. This paper estimates the number of highly skilled foreign-born persons waiting for LPR via the three main employment-based categories, separately by whether they are living in the United States or abroad, as well as the number of family members. We find that as of the end of FY 2006 there were about half a million employment-based principals awaiting LPR in the United States, together with over half a million family members, plus over 125 thousand principals and family members waiting abroad. These numbers dwarf the visas available annually – 120,120 plus any not used in the family preferences – suggesting that the long delays in gaining legal permanent residence are a visa number problem, not an administrative processing problem, as many believe. The backlog thus cannot be eliminated without a large change in public policy. The delay in gaining legal permanent residence could contribute to the decision of many highly skilled foreign-born to leave the United States.     

Migration and development in the Caribbean: relating policies and people

Throughout the 20th century, the US has feared that political instability in the Caribbean area could be exploited by adversaries; therefore, the US and the nations of the Caribbean share a compelling interest in the region's development. The dramatic increase in legal and illegal immigration to the US from the Caribbean in the last 2 decades has offered an additional human reason for US interest in the region. This migration has also created a new source of dependence and vulnerability for the region. Curtailment of migration would undoubtedly affect the region, and if the effect were social and political instability, then the US would also share those consequences. The 1984 Conference on Migration and Development in the Caribbean held discussions to 1) enhance the benefits of migration to Caribbean development, 2) identify development strategies, policies, and projects that would reduce pressures that have accelerated the rate of international migration, making it less manageable and more costly, and 3) identify ways to reduce dependence on migration by expanding employment and assisting economies in the region to become more self-reliant. The attitudes of both US and Caribbean participants seemed to reflect a considerable degree of ambivalence on the migration issue. The US views itself as "a nation of immigrants" and yet is troubled by the recent large influx of immigrants, particularly illegal migrants and refugees. While Americans recognize that the "brain" reduces the development capacity of developing countries, the US still needs and benefits from young immigrants trained in the sciences, engineering, and computers. Caribbean participants were also ambivalent about immigration. They consider immigration "a way of life" and a "right," but they also recognize that there are significant developmental costs to some types of migration. While many want the US to keep a wide open door to Caribbean immigrants, they are aware that most Caribbean Community (CARICOM) governments are currently closing the door to immigrants even from other CARICOM countries.     

Rational Migration Policy Should Tolerate Non-zero Illegal Migration Flows: Lessons from Modelling the Market for Illegal Migration

The debate on the immigration policies in OECD countries has turned its attention towards illegal migrants. Given that migration flows are determined by immigration laws, the probability of potential detection, penalties for unauthorized migrants and their employers, and income differences between sending and receiving countries, this paper presents a new approach to the problem of illegal migration, grounded on the economic theory of illegal behaviour. The framework considers the interaction of potential migrants, citizens, employers, and the government. After introducing the supply function of illegal migration and its determinants, the trade-off between social costs and benefits of preventing and combating illegal migration is demonstrated. This trade-off results in an optimal level of migration larger than zero. A complete "market model" of illegal migration is offered by presentation of a demand curve of illegal migration, based on the tolerance of the society towards clandestine foreigners. Equilibrium forces predict a non-zero level of illegal migration. The rule of law of our legal systems, according to which any illegal activity has to be reduced to zero, bears the danger of producing inefficient disequilibria. A reasonable policy of wanted and unwanted migration should address the question of how to allocate scarce resources. Ignoring social optima and equilibrium forces means to abandon public resources that could be used for other public assignments, such as schooling or foreign aid, for instance, i.e., measures that could strike the problem of illegal migration at its root.     

IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE

We develop a theoretical model using migration and trade theory to examine the effects of domestic and border enforcement policies on unauthorized workers and the U.S. agricultural sector. The theoretical results show that heightened immigration policies increase the illegal farm wage rate, and reduce the employment of unauthorized farm workers and exports. The empirical analysis show that increased domestic enforcements curtail the number of undocumented farm workers by an average of 8,947 and commodity exports to Mexico by an average of $180 million. The tighter border control curbs illegal farm workers by 8,147 and reduces farm exports by $181 million. (JEL F160)