Preliminary results of the IRCA legalization programs at the end of phase I

A remarkable gulf in interpretation and evaluation of the 1986 implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) exists between various schools of analysts. Some feel that the law has not changed conditions much, while others consider the legalization program and employer sanctions successful. Altogether, IRCA included 6 specific legalization opportunities. The 2 major ones concerned aliens who had resided illegally in the US since January 1, 1982 and alien farm workers who had worked illegally in the US for at least 90 days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. Issues concerning the pre-1982 or general legalization program include 1) the 5-year gap between the eligibility cutoff and the start of the legalization program made the principal US legalization program more restrictive than comparable legalization policies in other market economy countries, 2) it did not provide for immediate derivative legislation for family members of an illegal alien eligible for legalization, and 3) analysts disagree on the evaluation and the effectiveness of the public information campaign to inform eligible aliens of the legalization opportunity. The application procedure for the Special Agricultural Worker or SAW was much simpler than for the general legalization program. SAW applicants could apply at US borders. 10% of SAW applications were denied, due to fraud and other reasons, as opposed to 2% for applicants to the major legalization program. Both programs attracted mainly Mexican applicants. The total number of SAW applications received will help to determine future need for alien farm workers. 1 of the most important differences between the SAW and the pre-1982 legalization programs is the legal status of the newly legalized: 1) to secure permanent resident alien status, pre-1982 program applicants must pass civics and English examinations within a set period of time, whereas SAW applicants do not; and 2) SAW applicants are eligible for a broader range of social benefits than those in the major program.     

The U.S. legalization program: a preliminary final report

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 made 4 types of aliens eligible to receive legalization benefits: 1) those who resided "continuously" in the US since January 1, 1982; 2) those who had worked in the US perishable-crop agriculture for 90 "man-days" in specified time periods (Special Agricultural Workers [SAWS]); 3) those who were in the US since before January 1, 1972; and 4) those classified as Cuban/Haitian entrants and who had been in the US since January 1, 1982. Estimates of the number of aliens eligible for legalization, not including SAWS, ranges from 1.834 million to 2.56 million. Estimates of undercounts of undocumented aliens are 10% for those who entered before 1975 and 37.5% for those who arrived after 1975. Other refinements in the estimates of undocumented aliens include adjustments for 1) ethnic group and location, 2) the growth of the undocumented population between the census date and the legalization eligibility date under IRCA, and 3) emigration and deportation rates. Out of the 1,581,800 applicants entered into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) computers (from a total of 2.15 million applicants) as of May 20, 1988, 73.7% were Mexican nationals. Only 5 other countries contributed more than 1%: El Salvador (6.5%), Haiti (2.3%), Guatemala (2.2%), the Philippines (1%), and Colombia (1%). The Mexican percentage was unexpectedly high, perhaps because the legalization had been much more successful in the Southwest than anywhere else in the country. Reasons that Mexicans have a higher legalization participation rate than other nationalities include 1) the distant eligibility date; 2) ethnic differences among non-Mexican nationalities; 3) particularly in the northeast, fears of exposing one's illegal status to INS; 4) the difficulty of information reaching ethnic communities, 5) the reluctance of those already undergoing the naturalization process to risk the legalization process; and 6) the reluctance of employees to admit employment of undocumented aliens. In the end, more than 90% of applicants are expected to be granted temporary resident alien status (and about 70% of agricultural workers), for a total of more than 2 million people. Researchers estimate that 2.5 - 3 million more persons remain in an undocumented status in the US.     

Unauthorized workers and immigration reform: what can we ascertain from employers?

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 attempts to curb unauthorized migration by requiring employers to screen the authorizing documents of all workers. Many different documents may be used, with employers required to simply attest to the face validity of workers' documents upon an I-9 form. The authors report findings from their study estimating the unauthorized US labor force and exploring employers' initial reactions to the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. The findings are based upon hiring practices information supplied by a sample of businesses in an evaluation of the IRCA impact. A selectivity correction model is used to impute 2.6 million unauthorized workers in the entire sample. The estimate, which compares favorably with other estimates, is tabulated by questions about IRCA. Findings suggest that a large proportion of the unauthorized labor force uses fraudulent documents, many without the knowledge of their employer. It appears that Immigration and Naturalization Service-targeted establishments hire 20% of unauthorized workers and that the employers of unauthorized workers are no more likely than other employers to believe that they can be sanctioned under IRCA. This may be associated with the apparent lack of marked change in patterns of unauthorized hiring in the period immediately following IRCA passage. There was some change in hiring behaviors in establishments hiring unauthorized workers, affecting wage offers and documentation, but US employers do not seem to perceive changes in the supply or availability of authorized workers. Study findings indicate only marginal IRCA-related changes in the characteristics of unauthorized hires during the very initial phase of IRCA's implementation. The combination of readily available fraudulent documents, the difficulty in detecting such documents, and the steady demand for low-skilled workers creates conditions which are not conducive to markedly changed hiring behavior.     

The "amnesty" aftermath: current policy issues stemming from the legalization programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act

"The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) created two one-time only legalization programs affecting nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants. Legalization has produced important changes among immigrants and in immigration policy. These changes include new patterns of immigrant social and economic adaptation to the United States and new immigrant flows through family ties to IRCA-legalized aliens.... This article combines data from a longitudinal survey of the IRCA-legalized population with qualitative field data on current immigration issues from key informants in eight high-immigration metropolitan areas. It reviews the political evolution and early implementation of legalization, the current socioeconomic position of legalized aliens, and changes in the immigration ?policy space' resulting from legalization."     

Occupational status and mobility among undocumented immigrants by gender

Immigration has long been a national and state concern. The 1989 Legalized Population Survey (LPS-1) collected data on illegal immigrants to the US who subsequently became legalized aliens under the provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. These data are used in a study assessing whether undocumented male and female immigrants improve their earnings and occupational status over time and the extent of variation in occupational status and mobility by gender and region. The data indicate that both undocumented men and women, on average, improved their earnings and occupational status between their first jobs in the US and their jobs just before applying for legalization under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. However, the earnings, occupational status, and occupational mobility of men were greater than for women.     

Implementation of Congressional intent: a study of amnesty policy and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Despite the passage of the Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) the United States Border Patrol arrested about 1 million illegal aliens crossing the border in 1990. This phenomenon suggests that the IRCA has failed to control illegal immigration to the United States. Structural analysis of its implementation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was analyzed. Under an agreement with the INS to process illegal workers, community-based organizations in Arizona and New York became certified Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs). In 1988 the INS carried out a study to measure the impact of IRCA and solicited data from 9 QDEs. Data were obtained from 308 illegal aliens who failed to apply for amnesty and another 286 temporary legal residents. In the New York study information was collected from the QDEs between 1987 and 1989, and also in the summer of 1989 a group of 171 amnesty applicants were surveyed. All QDEs stated that implementation was hampered by excessive documentation, lack of strong family unification provisions, the financial cost of seeking legalization, and a fear of the INS. The Arizona and New York studies indicated that excessive documentation, fear of the INS (46% in New York), and fear of family separation (47% in New York) were the major factors why the targeted people did not come forward. Instead of seeking a proper balance between the written words of IRCA and the intent of Congress, INS developed guidelines that ignored the relevant facts presented by respected QDEs and Latino groups. In reality, INS sought to prevent illegal entry through amnesty offices throughout the United States. The eligibility requirements issued by the INS for amnesty served to limit and constrain participation in that program.     

The impact of IRCA on the job opportunities and earnings of Mexican-American and Hispanic-American workers

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) introduced substantial civil and/or criminal penalties to employers who hire illegal workers, with the main goal of reducing the demand for undocumented labor. However, in the interest of addressing certain concerns about the law, the Immigration Act of 1990 was passed to require various branches of the federal government to intensify efforts to disseminate the antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA. The authors studied the earnings gap between Mexican, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic white male workers which resulted from changes in both the wage structure and immigration laws of the 1980s. It appears that Mexican and Hispanic workers were adversely affected by the changes. The analysis of data from the 1980 and 1990 1% Public Use Microdata Samples determined that Mexican and Hispanic labor were adversely affected by the increase in the returns to skills during the 1980s given their relatively lower levels of educational attainment and labor market experience. At-risk workers increased their work effort and level of productivity to reduce the effects of legislation-induced employment losses. Data were also used from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for the period 1983-92.     

Immigration reform,American style

This article reviews the background of the proposed Immigration and Reform Act (also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill), which seeks to overhaul US immigration law for the first time since 1952. This bill is consistent with President Reagan's hard line on border enforcement and mandates stiff penalties for those who transport illegal aliens for commercial advantage or private profit. It further offers Mexico preferential treatment in immigration (40,000 additional visas/year). It includes an amnesty program to offer legal status to qualified illegal residents. The bill directs the President to develop a secure national worker identification system and would create a large-scale temporary foreign agricultural program for perishable commodities. Agricultural workers' families would not be eligible to accompany them unless they also obtain temporary visas. Foreign temporary workers, employable only in cases where local domestic workers are not available, must be provided with wages and working conditions equal to those prevailing among domestic workers. Stiff penalties are stipulated for employers who fail to abide with the terms of the program. In the author's opinion, this bill fails to appreciate the global character of international migration and its complexity. It relects a fundamental ambivalence about a strictly controlled main gate versus a back door approach to immigration as well as the conflicting images of the US as a nation of immigrants versus the historical reality of American nativism and xenophobia. Needed are comprehensive initiatives whose mutually reinforcing components can address the multiple dimensions of the immigration problem within a framework that does not ignore workers who have contributed to the economic well-being of the US, regardless of their legal status.     

Gender differences in the occupational status of undocumented immigrants in the United States: experience before and after legalization

"This article examines the incorporation of a national sample of undocumented immigrants both before and after they applied to legalize their status under the provisions of the [U.S.] Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Data from the 1989 and 1992 Legalized Population Surveys (LPS-1 and LPS-2) are used. These surveys provide labor force and occupational data for three critical reference periods: as newly arrived undocumented immigrants, as experienced undocumented immigrants, and as documented immigrants.... The overall upward mobility of both men and women between first job and the occupation held at time of application for legalization continued after legalization. On average, men also continued to report higher status jobs than women, although women did somewhat better after their status was legalized." This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America.     

Improved legal status as the major source of earnings premiums associated with intermarriage: evidence from the 1986 IRCA amnesty

Exploiting a natural experiment, this paper uses the 1990 US Census data and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act amnesty to investigate the major mechanism through which intermarriage influences immigrant earnings. My strategy involves comparing international marriage premiums received by two groups of Mexican immigrants who arrived before and after the cutoff date of eligibility. Both groups face similar language and culture related obstacles and have to adapt themselves to the new environment, except that unauthorized Mexican workers who arrived before 1982 could obtain legal status through the amnesty while those who arrived after the cutoff date obtained legal status through marriage to a US citizen. Instrumental variables estimates show a significantly larger intermarriage premium for Mexican immigrants who migrated after the cutoff date and no statistically significant intermarriage premium is found in the pre-1982 group. The 35 % premium gap indicates a large effect of intermarriage on immigrant labor market outcomes, operating primarily through an improvement of legal status.     

Immigration Policy and Employment Conditions of US Immigrants from Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic1

Prior studies suggest that the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 signalled a deterioration in the labour market conditions of Mexican migrants. In this paper, we examine whether and how labour market conditions worsened for Dominicans and Nicaraguans after 1986, and the extent to which these shifts were comparable to those experienced by Mexicans. Our analysis relies on a new source of data that offers comparable data across the three national origins. We estimate multivariate models that capture the effects of demographic attributes, human and social capital, migration‐specific human and social capital, legal status, period of trip, national origin, and other controls on the hourly wages earned by household heads and whether they received cash wages on their last US trip. Models with interaction terms reveal significant pre‐ and post‐1986 wage effects, but few differences in these effects between Mexicans and Dominicans or Nicaraguans. In contrast, group differences appear in the risk of cash receipt of wages. Dominicans and Nicaraguans experienced a greater increase in this risk relative to Mexicans pre‐ and post‐1986. Together, these findings depict a broader, negative impact of IRCA on Latino migrant wages than has been documented elsewhere.     

Language skill definition: a study of legalized aliens

"The robustness of the model for the acquisition of destination language skills is studied using the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) of aliens who received amnesty under the 1986 [U.S.] Immigration Reform and Control Act. The English language proficiency variables include self-assessed overall speaking skills (the census question), speaking and reading skills in specific situations, perceptions as to whether language skills limit job opportunities, and measures of speaking and reading proficiency at work. The model is found to be robust across definitions of proficiency. Proficiency increases with exposure, efficiency and economic incentives for English language acquisition. The panel feature of the data is used to analyze changes in proficiency over time."     

Immigration reform in France and the United States: reflections and documentation

This paper analyzes similarities and dissimilarities in French and American efforts to come to grip with irregular migration. The symbolic importance of immigration reform is argued to be a key political concern in both nations, although the politics of immigration reform has assumed a more partisan flavor in France, particularly since the municipal elections of 1983. In France, the theme of control and security, associated with the notion of preventing "automatic" immigration which would endanger the cohesion of French society, was widely utilized for political ends prior to and after May 10, 1981 (the date of Francois Mitterand's investiture). The American government, on the other hand, is confronted with the unenviable task of obtaining a legislative consensus on legalization and employer sanctions through an approach seeking to harmonize and integrate the demands articulated by various groups: employers, unions, and alien and ethnic interest groups (principally Hispanic groups divided into a hierarchy along a recently arrived/established cleavage). The American situation most sharply differs from the French case in terms of the absence of a right/left political cleavage. The real effects of clandestine immigration are to be found at the local level. In France, as in the US, the ability of local actors to exert pressure raises the fear that legalization and sanctions will change little, except in terms of symbolic legitimacy.     

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: an overview

"On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. After an intense lobbying effort by the business community, most provisions relating to legal immigration were omitted from the final bill. Instead, the 1996 Act focuses on illegal immigration reform and includes some of the toughest measures ever taken against illegal immigration." Aspects considered include border enforcement, penalities against alien smuggling and document fraud, deportation and exclusion proceedings, employer sanctions, welfare provisions, and changes to existing refugee and asylum procedures.     

From IRCA to Orca: Apprehending the Other in 'Your San Antonio Experience'

Abstract From the Alamo to Sea World, the San Antonio tourist experience reiterates an historical and ethnic narrative that positions the Anglo-American subject in relation to the Mexican as 'other'. Like the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, this strategy of definition and containment is inseparable from profound ambivalences about the possibility of effectively 'naturalizing' difference. In 'remembering the Alamo', the tourist is faced with the possibility of dis-integration and an inversion of the colonizer/colonized relationship.     

U.S. immigration policy: the guestworker option revisited

In guestworker programs foreign nationals are admitted into another country on a nonmigrant status with severely curtailed social and limited labor market rights. The duration of stay is always finite and compliance with the terms of the contract are entered through a network of legal arrangements which allow officials in the receiving country a substantial amount of administrative discretion. Pro-guestworker arguments say that the borders cannot be closed, that guestworkers can be substituted for illegal aliens, that guestworkers are better than illegal aliens, and that additional labor benefits the US economy. Those against guestworker programs stress longterm socioeconomic issues rather than short-term economic advantages, saying that guestworker programs are no quick answer for illegal immigration, for domestic labor shortages, or for the US poor population. Guestworker programs, its opponents say, provide short-run economic benefits to a few employers and individuals at the expense of more widespread and longterm socioeconomic costs. They oppose: 1) the concept of admitting foreign workers with restricted rights, 2) the concentration of any negative labor market impacts on already disadvantaged domestic groups, 3) the proliferation of "jobs which Americans won't take," 4) many temporary guests ending up permanent residents, and 5) that exporting workers is as likely to impede as accelerate job-creating economic development in immigration countries. Most economists believe that diminishing marginal productivity produces downward-sloping short-run demand for labor schedules. The European experience with these programs has been different than those in the US since foreign workers in Europe were initially recruited in response to actual labor shortages and have always had legal status, but both Europe and the US have experienced large contingents of workers who remain in the countries and are at a pronounced power disadvantage regarding the society's institutions. Studies of guestworker programs have shown that worker flows eventually become impervious to the receiver's actual labor needs as employers disaggregate jobs into components which match the low skills of migrants and create additional foreign worker jobs which are then shunned by native labor, thus perpetuating a need for such labor. If the US opts for a large-scale guestworker program this will only replace 1 set of problems with another and it is not at all certain that large-scale guestworker admissions will proportionately reduce illegal migration inflows.     

The politics of immigration reform

The US is the target for international migration, now more than ever. Population growth and economic stragnation in the Third World are increasing the pressures for out-migration, and current immigration law is wholly incapable of responding to the ever increasing flow of illegal immigrants. Border apprehensions of illegal aliens in the US were up 40% during 1983, and total apprehensions reached 1.25 million by the year's end. Recent public opinion polls have disclosed that an overwhelming majority of the American public demands immigration reform, and yet we as a nation have been distinctly unwilling or unable to respond to this clear public sentiment. This paper discusses the politics of the "Simpson-Mazzoli" Immigration Reform and Control Act, previous immigration legislation, current counterproposals for US immigration policy, and the political realities of immigration reform.     

Immigration: an international economic perspective

The creation of an effective US immigration policy has been complicated by the diversity of political interests and the absence of reliable statistics to determine the magnitude of the impact on the American economy. Estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the US range from 1 to 12 million. While political biases and complexities and data inadequacies complicate this analysis, some generalizations seem to be confirmed by worldwide experience. There are 2 mutually-supportive, short-run ways to reduce the flow of undocumented workers: 1) to better police US borders and shorelines and 2) to remove the motive for entry by making it illegal for employers to hire workers who are not authorized to work in the US. To give employers an easy defense and to facilitate their compliance with immigration laws, an effective worker identification system should be developed. To avoid the civil liberties, international relations, and human problems associated with mass deportations, illegal immigrants who entered the US before January 1, 1981 and who have been in continuous residence for at least 1 year, should be permitted to remain in the US as permanent resident aliens. The US should not adopt a new guest worker program. The proper sequence of changes in immigration policy is very important. Dealing with illegal immigration is essential; all these measures should be in place before an amnesty is granted. Because it is important to have friendly relations with neighboring countries and because the ultimate solution to illegal immigration is to reduce the wide disparities in employment opportunities between countries, the US should work with other countries to control illegal immigration, but should not link control to energy, trade, or other policies. It is particularly important to discuss immigration control plans with other countries, especially Mexico, and to do everything consistent with US interests to minimize the adverse impact of our immigration policies on our neighbors.     

Geographic distribution of undocumented immigrants: estimates of undocumented aliens counted in the 1980 census by state

"This article presents estimates of the number of undocumented aliens counted in the 1980 [U.S.] census for each state and the District of Columbia. The estimates, which indicate that 2.06 million undocumented aliens were counted in the 1980 census, are not based on individual records, but are aggregate estimates derived by a residual technique. The census count of aliens (modified somewhat to account for deficiencies in the data) is compared with estimates of the legally resident alien population based on data collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in January 1980." Estimates are provided "for each of the states for selected countries of birth and for age, sex, and period of entry categories.... The origins of the undocumented alien population [are described], as well as some of their demographic characteristics. Some of the implications of the numbers and distribution of undocumented aliens are also discussed." This paper was originally presented at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America (see Population Index, Vol. 50, No. 3, Fall 1984, p. 435).     

The Impact of Legal Status on Immigrants’ Earnings and Human Capital: Evidence from the IRCA 1986

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the largest amnesty in U.S. history, took effect in 1986 and legalized all immigrants who arrived before 1982. The IRCA creates a discontinuity, according to the year of entry, in the probability of having legal status. Therefore, I use the regression discontinuity approach to study the impact of legality on immigrants’ labor market outcomes and human capital. Using Californian Latino immigrants from Census 1990, I find that the 1975–81 arrivals, on average, outperform the 1982–86 arrivals in male wages, female employment probability, and male English-speaking ability. These findings are not due to a general trend in U.S. labor market conditions because the same analysis, using refugees, Puerto Rican migrants and U.S.-born Latinos—three comparison groups without legality issues—indicates no difference in outcomes between the 1975–81 and 1982–86 cohorts. However, the advantage of Latino immigrants of the earlier cohort over the later cohort diminishes in Census 2000.