A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.     

Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon in the European Union?

This article addresses two questions: (i) will the mere end of further postponement of fertility in the EU-countries lead to an appreciable rise in European fertility and bring total fertility rates closer to replacement level, as witnessed in the United States? and (ii) what are the chances that such a stop to postponement is imminent? The answer to the first question is positive, but only if there is enough recuperation of fertility at older ages. Translated in the Bongaarts–Feeney framework, this condition means that the birth-order-specific TFRs would indeed remain constant. In the absence of full recuperation at older ages, the induced rise in the national TFRs would be trivial and by no means restore period and cohort TFRs to replacement levels. Hence, caution is needed when using the Bongaarts–Feeney adjusted TFRs for pro-jective purposes. With respect to the second question, female education and employment trends in tandem with ideational and family disruption data are used to speculate about the prospects for such an end to further fertility postponement and for fertility increases at older ages. Strikingly, EU-countries that have the greatest potential for still later fertility are also the ones with very low TFRs (below 1.5) at present. The overall conclusion is that low to very low fertility in the EU is unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon     

The Emergence of Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s

Lowest‐low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate at or below 1.3, has rapidly spread in Europe during the 1990s. This article traces the emergence of this new phenomenon to the interaction of five factors. First, tempo and compositional distortions reduce the total fertility rate below the associated level of cohort fertility. Second, socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals and couples. Third, social interaction effects reinforce this behavioral adjustment and contribute to large and persistent postponement in the mean age at birth. Fourth, institutional settings favor an overall low quantum of fertility. Fifth, postponement–quantum interactions amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when combined with ongoing delays of child‐bearing. The article concludes with speculations about future trends in current and prospective lowest‐low‐fertility countries.     

The recent rise in malay fertility: A new trend or a temporary lull in a fertility transition?

Period fertility rates show a recent rise in the fertility of the Malay population of Peninsular Malaysia that became evident in the late 1970s, after more than fifteen years of slow but steady declines. Detailed analysis of age-parity-specific fertility rates suggests that the recent rise is largely due to a “making up” of lower order births (first, second, and third) that had been postponed by a rapid increase in age at marriage. The period trend in higher order births and cohort trends of cumulative fertility from census data point to a continued reduction in completed Malay fertility. Regional analysis shows several states on the east coast with persistent high fertility, although the revolution in marital postponement is national in scope.     

A turning point in Italian fertility

The second half of the 1990s was a turning point in Italian fertility: the postponement of births slowed and there was an increasing tendency to recover fertility after the age of 30. To study the determinants of this change, we employ individual-level data from the 2003 survey Family and Social Subjects, held by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. We focus on first births, analyzing the key role of education as a driving force both of postponement and then recovery, controlling also for relevant characteristics such as women’s employment status and family background. We estimate a probit model for postponement and an event history analysis model for recovery, thus offering a picture of both processes. Our findings indicate that the postponement of first order fertility in Italy involved mostly women holding a university degree in younger cohorts. Moreover, in the early 2000s a recovery process at later ages was just beginning, even if limited in magnitude. Finally, significant differences at a regional level were found: specifically, until recently, southern Italy still displayed a limited birth postponement and no recovery.     

Optimal life-cycle fertility in a Barro-Becker economy

Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989) to include two—instead of one—reproduction periods. We examine how the cost structure of early and late children in terms of time and goods affects the optimal fertility timing. Then, we identify conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium with a stationary cohort size. Finally, we examine how the model can rationalize the observed postponement of births, and we highlight two plausible causes: (1) a general rise in the cost of children in terms of goods and (2) a decline in the degree of family altruism.     

The End of the Fertility Transition in the Developed World

By the late 1990s the average period total fertility rate in the developed world had declined to 1.6, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed low, women's childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change. several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as great as 0.4 births per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But tempo effects are temporary, and once the postponement of childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility‐depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.     

Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in a model of fertility choice

We examine the relationship between assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and the microeconomics of fertility choice. Along the way, we develop a model consistent with between-country differences in overall fertility and fertility timing. Our analysis of ART centers around the distinction between biomedical and behavioral effects. While improvements in ART have the biomedical effect of raising fertility, they may cause some women who would otherwise have tried to have children earlier on in life to postpone childbirth to later in life when the conception success probability is lower. This behavioral effect of postponement may reduce the fertility rate.     

Has East Germany Overtaken West Germany? Recent Trends in Order‐Specific Fertility

Some 20 years after reunification, the contrast between East and West Germany offers a natural experiment for studying the degree of persistence of Communist-era family patterns, the effects of economic change, and fertility postponement. After reunification, period fertility rates plummeted in the former East Germany to record low levels. Since the mid-1990s, however, period fertility rates have been rising in East Germany, in contrast to the nearly constant rates seen in the West. By 2008, the TFR of East Germany had overtaken that of the West. We explore why fertility in East Germany is higher than in West Germany, despite unfavorable economic circumstances in the East. We address this and related questions by (a) presenting an account of the persisting East/West differences in attitudes toward and constraints on childbearing, (b) conducting an order-specific fertility analysis of recent fertility trends, and (c) projecting completed fertility for the recent East and west German cohorts. In addition to using the Human Fertility Database, perinatal statistics allow us to calculate a tempo-corrected TFR for East and West Germany.     

关于中国1990年代低生育水平的再讨论

本文根据全国第五次人口普查样本计算了 1 990年代各年份的分性别平均初婚年龄 ,这一结果再次表明这一时期中初婚年龄有显著提高。本文还根据以往历次调查的各年份年龄别生育率按队列计算了累计生育率 ,结果发现 2 0 0 0年时各队列的累计生育率水平高于五普数据中各队列的平均活产子女数。本文还就队列累计生育率计算结果详细分析了 1 990年代终身生育水平的趋势。这些分析从一个新的角度说明 ,1 990年代各队列的终身生育水平也在发生显著的下降 ,正在接近现行生育政策所要求的水平     

New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises,Falls, and Reversals

With period fertility having risen in many low‐fertility countries, an important emerging question is whether cohort fertility trends are also reversing. We produce new estimates of cohort fertility for 37 developed countries using a new, simple method that avoids the underestimation typical of previous approaches. Consistent with the idea that timing changes were largely responsible for the last decades' low period fertility, we find that family size has remained considerably higher than the period rates of 1.5 in many “low‐fertility” countries, averaging about 1.8 children. Our forecasts suggest that the long‐term decline in cohort fertility is flattening or reversing in many world regions previously characterized by low fertility. We document the marked increase of cohort fertility in the English‐speaking world and in Scandinavia; signs of an upward reversal in many low‐fertility countries, including Japan and Germany; and continued declines in countries such as Taiwan and Portugal. We include in our forecasts estimates of statistical uncertainty and the possible effects of the recent economic recession.     

Forecasting cohort incomplete fertility: A method and an application

Drawing on insights from previous work on fertility forecasts, we develop a method for forecasting incomplete cohort fertility. Our approach involves two basic steps. First, we use a singular-value-decomposition (SVD) model to establish a relationship between the level and the age pattern of fertility for completed cohorts. This relationship is then applied to incomplete cohorts to obtain forecast fertility. We propose techniques to evaluate model assumptions and illustrate our method using cohort data from Canada, the USA, Norway, and Japan. With the exception of Japan, our results show that the model fits the data well, and that the youngest cohort whose total fertility can be reliably forecast is age 25 for Canada, the USA, and Norway. Our method is less applicable to Japan, where the youngest cohort whose total fertility could be forecast was age 35 or older. We discuss the limitations of our method in the context of model assumptions.     

The formal dynamics of controlled populations and the echo,the boom and the bust

This paper analyzes the pattern of fluctuations of births in an age-structured population whose growth is subject to environmental or economic constraint. It synthesizes the traditional demographic analysis of age-structured renewal with constant vital rates and the economic analysis which treats population change endogenously. When cohort fertility depends on relative cohort size, or when period fertility depends on labor force size, fluctuations of forty or more years replace the traditional "echo" or generation-length cycle. Twentieth-century U. S. fertility change agrees well with the theory, as the "Easterlin Hypothesis" suggests; but the period model fits better than the cohort model.     

Timing effects and the interpretation of period fertility

Low fertility levels and later childbearing in many developed countries have reinvigorated the debate between period and cohort perspectives on fertility and on the meaningfulness of the period total fertility rate (TFR). Here, fertility-timing effects are defined as level changes in period fertility that do not reflect level changes in the completed fertility of cohorts. That definition leads to the average cohort fertility (ACF) as a measure of period fertility adjusted for timing effects. In an influential paper, Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) presented an alternative approach and a different measure, TFR*, to adjust for timing effects. Here, the two measures are compared. In the context of model populations, the ACF performs well, reflecting an average of the fertility of the active cohorts. The Bongaarts-Feeney TFR*, however, is frequently unreliable and can be erratic when there are cycles in period timing. When applied to twentieth-century U.S. experience, the TFR* behaves like a period measure and yields adjustments that are often wide of the mark. The ACF shows the stability associated with cohort measures and quantifies the substantial impact that timing effects had during the "birth dearth" of the 1970s. The period TFR reached a low of 1.74 in 1976, but the ACF never went below 2.06 during the 1970s.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.     

Fertility and union formation during crisis and societal consolidation in the Western Balkans

Fertility decline in central and eastern Europe (CEE) since the fall of the communist regimes has been driven by both stopping and postponement of childbearing: two processes that have been related to crisis and economic development, respectively. In the Western Balkans these economic and political contexts followed each other in the form of a biphasic transition. I examine whether this sequence triggered fertility responses like those observed elsewhere. Relying on three independent data sources, I cross-validate the levels of, and describe the trends in, union formation and fertility (by birth order) between 1980 and 2010. Results do not reveal widespread declines in fertility to lowest-low levels during the most acute period of crisis. The subsequent postponement of marriage and first birth was also limited, and the two-child family remains the norm. This relative resilience of childbearing patterns compared with other CEE countries is discussed with reference to the institutional context.     

Evolution of fertility and mortality

Historical and current fertility trends in both Quebec and Canada as a whole are surveyed. While fertility among French Canadians was higher than that in neighboring provinces until the mid-20th century, in 1968 Quebec's crude birthrate was the lowest in Canada, and in 1972 it was 13.8 vs. 15.9 (the national birthrate). This reversal is explained in terms of the demographic transition theory, the declining influence of organized religion, and new opportunities for social mobility for minority groups. The birthrate throughout Canada is also declining. Although recent cohort studies are incomplete because women have not yet finished their reproductive years, it appears that completed family size will be lower than at any time in Canadian history. The period total fertility rate indicates an average family size of 1.8 children in 1976, but it is unclear whether this represents an actual reduction in family size or the postponement of childbearing. The sharpest fertility decline has been among women aged 35-49, but peak fertility rates have shifted from the 20-24 age group to those aged 25-29. Fertility is negatively related to education, and the lowest fertility is found among the intermediate income groups. Since the 1969 lifting of the ban on contraceptive sales and advertising, family planning activities have been stepped up. Also removed was the total ban on abortion. In 1975 there were 14.9 therapeutic abortions per 100 live births, but it has been charged that abortion standards are being applied inequitably from hospital to hospital.     

Marital moratorium and fertility control in China

Abstract Since 1949, the issue of marital postponement has been extensively discussed in China. Unlike some other means of fertility control (e.g. abortion and oral contraception), marital postponement has been welcomed with the fewest misgivings. Lately, marital postponement has also been given renewed emphasis by those outside China who see a weak link between various current national family planning programmes based on improved technology and the goal of fertility reduction. One aim of this paper is to render a comprehensive account of the marital postponement programme in China in the course of the birth control campaign during the last two decades. The second objective is to discuss the lessons that may be learned from it, and its implications for the current fertility controversy in the United States. Four general conclusions emerge from a careful analysis of the available documents: (1) in China, proponents of delayed marriage were divided on the question of how to secure its general acceptance. One issue dividing them was whether or not China's Marriage Law of 1950 should be amended in order to achieve it. Those who favoured raising the minimum legal age disagreed on the details of the presumably needed change. There is enough evidence to suggest that medical personnel were the chief advocates of compulsory postponement of marriage. The government rejected this legalistic approach and, in so doing, agreed with Chen Ta (a noted demographer) and others who sought to achieve postponement of marriage through appropriate social and economic measures. (2) Decisions to delay matrimony in different socio-cultural settings are not necessarily identical sociological phenomena. In some societies, (e.g. the United States), they may amount to no more than a course of action that enables individuals involved to realize or develop alternate goals in life. In others (e.g. China), they are literally acts of rebellion. (3) The fertility policy dispute has been carried on in a context of revolutionary change, and involved persons who have committed themselves to transforming the Chinese family. This prior commitment was mainly responsible for the relative lack of controversy about marital postponement as a means of fertility control. (4) Use of contraception is private, hidden from open view. But postponement of marriage is public and may be a source of inter-generational and interpersonal conflict. In China and other parallel situations, a decision to delay marriage is in itself against tradition. In this sense, a full-scale marital moratorium cannot but be more than a partial assault on the hold that the family has over its offspring. This must be unequivocally reflected in discussions of fertility control policy everywhere.     

Modelling period fertility: Schooling and intervals following a birth in Eastern Africa

We describe a regression-based approach to the modelling of age-, order-, and duration-specific period fertility, using retrospective survey data. The approach produces results that are free of selection biases and can be used to study differential fertility. It is applied to Demographic and Health Survey data for Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to investigate differential trends in fertility by education. Parity progression fell and the intervals following each birth lengthened between the 1970s and 2000s in all four countries. Fertility fell most among women with secondary education. In contrast to other world regions, postponement of successive births for extended periods accounted for much of the initial drop in fertility in these African countries. However, family size limitation by women with secondary education in Ethiopia and Kenya and longer birth spacing in Zimbabwe also played significant roles. Thus, birth control is being adopted in Eastern Africa in response to diverse changes in fertility preferences.     

A cohort perspective of the effect of unemployment on fertility

This work offers an explanation for the apparent contradiction between empirical work that finds a negative relationship between unemployment and fertility, and theoretical work that emphasizes the lower opportunity cost of childbearing while unemployed. I reconcile these perspectives by distinguishing between two forms of unemployment. The first form is structural unemployment, while the second form is cyclical unemployment, a less permanent component of unemployment that is linked to the economic cycle. I apply a cohort-based model to study both effects over the life cycle using panel data methods applied to a sample of developed countries. My results show that higher levels of structural unemployment decrease fertility, but that the effects of cyclical variations in unemployment depend to a large extent on the age at which they are experienced. Cyclical reductions in the unemployment level mostly result in increases in fertility rates. However, for some age groups, positive variations in the cyclical component of unemployment can also have a positive impact on fertility.