Pensions and job search: Survey evidence from unionized workers in canada

Research on the disincentives for quitting under employer-sponsored pension plans have limited generalizability as tests of the implicit contract thesis because of the way that job changing, pension back-loading, and plausible alternative explanations for pension effects have been operationalized. Using a unique data set that addresses some of these concerns, I find that pension back-loading and insecurity about the viability of a long-term employment contract are quantitatively the most significant determinants of job search intentions, followed by other seniority related benefits, such as vacation pay and shared investments in firm-specific training. No support for pension information, wage tilt, or efficiency wage arguments is found. Males and the better educated are also more likely to intend to search. Implications for theory, policy, and future research are discussed. I thank Morley Gunderson for helpful comments made on an earlier draft of this paper. Financial assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.     

THE QUANTITY-ADJUSTED VALUE OF LIFE

The traditional compensating differential analysis is extended to reflect the effects on wages of the duration of life at risk and of insurance benefits to the surviving spouse and dependents. The implicit discount rate that workers use in making their life-cycle employment decisions is also estimated. The revealed discount rate ranges from 10 to 12 percent, and the implicit value per year of life is 175,000. There is also evidence of significant wage reductions resulting from higher workers' compensation benefits for fatal and nonfatal injuries, suggesting an important tradeoff between ex ante and ex post compensation for risk.     

Education,Skills, and Wage Gaps in Canada and the United States

We analyse data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies to reveal that immigrants in Canada and the United States make over $200 less per month than native‐born workers. In the United States, immigrants disproportionately work in low‐wage occupations, leading to large mean national differences between immigrants and native workers. The wage differential disappears after accounting for education and cognitive skills, indicating policies must focus on reducing education and skill gaps in the United States. In Canada, an immigrant wage gap persists in nearly all occupational fields, suggesting that the better skilled and educated immigrants in Canada are not receiving the same wage premium as native workers. We close with implications for policy and future research.     

Comparative advantage and the welfare effects of uniform wage policies

This paper analyzes the theoretical impact of a commonly cited union goal — the elimination or reduction of wage differentials within occupations. By dropping the usual assumption of homogeneous labor, we show how, and under what market conditions, workers will receive rents due to individual comparative advantage. In competitive labor markets a union-imposed uniform wage may lower the earnings of workers holding a productive advantage, causing a reduction in employment and a welfare loss of comparative advantage rents. The implications of a strict uniform wage rule imply that unions may be forced to adapt their wage policy to allow more productive workers to receive wage differentials. This consideration helps explain some common trade union institutions.     

The minimum wage can harm workers by reducing unemployment

Economists may disagree over how much raising the minimum wage increases unemployment, though few argue that the unemployment effect is zero. According to the standard model, the less the unemployment caused by a minimum wage increase, the less the harm (or greater the good) that results. But by recognizing that minimum wage workers receive fringe benefits, I show that increasing the minimum wage may not cause any unemployment and harms workers because it doesn 't. Furthermore, when there is lumpiness in providing fringe benefits, a minimum wage increase may harm workers by     

How has public policy shaped defined-benefit pension coverage in Canada?

Unlike federal regulation in the United States, variation in provincial regulation across Canada provides a natural laboratory to examine the impact of public policy on pension coverage. Using data from a nationally representative sample of private sector workers in Canada in 1994, we find that higher marginal taxes, earlier vesting, and more permissive eligibility rules increase coverage, while a ban on mandatory retirement has a negative, but insignificant effect. Implications for differences in defined-benefit coverage between Canada and the United States, and pension theory, research, and practice are discussed.     

THE CHANGING RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGES TO PRICE-LEVEL SHOCKS: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INDEXATION

The article provides evidence for the U.S over the period 1961-84 that the responsiveness of nonunion wages to price-level shocks changes through time much as the degree of indexation in union contracts does, suggesting that there exists implicit as well as explicit indexation. When coupled with the result from previous research that indexation responds positively to inflation uncertainty, the findings indicate that greater inflation uncertainty may lead to reduced overall wage rigidity. In the context of a rational expectations model with long-term wage contracts, a decline in the effectiveness of an activist monetary policy could result.     

DISCONTINUITIES IN PENSION BENEFIT FORMULAS AND THE SPOT MODEL OF THE LABOR MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS

In their analysis of corporate pension plans, financial economists typically invoke the simplest and the most tractable model of the labor market. This is the spot model, where the worker's cash wage plus accruing pension benefit equals the value of his marginal product in each and every period. This paper provides evidence against the empirical validity of the spot model, and uses provisions common to most pension plans to do so. These findings are relevant to the appropriate measurement of pension liabilities and thus to the present controversy surrounding the termination of overfunded plans and the recapture of surplus assets by the employer. The existence of incentive effects, ruled out by the spot model, may help to unravel certain well known "puzzles," such as the failure of employers to fully fund their plans in spite of the tax advantages of doing so.     

Workers’ participation in wage setting: A gift-exchange experiment

This study analyzes the consequences of workers’ participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified gift-exchange game with firms specifying contract alternatives and workers deciding about the finally implemented alternative. The experimental data reveals that workers with participation rights are more sensitive to differences in wage offers: Low wage offers trigger negative reciprocity which dominates the positive incentive effects from high wage offers. On average, participation in the wage setting process leads to a decline in effort exertion.     

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES IN THE PRESENCE OF FRINGE BENEFITS: AN EXPANDED MODEL

Firms may react to a minimum wage hike by reducing their expenditures on fringe benefits. This possibility is incorporated into an expanded model of minimum wages. A set of predictions that differentiate this expanded model from current minimum wage models is derived and tested. The expanded model is shown to better predict the effect of minimum wages on labor force participation, quit rates, and prices than previous models. An interesting result of the expanded model is that a covered worker may be worse off due to a minimum wage hike even if he retains his job.     

The political economy of pension reform in Russia: Why partial privatization?

We begin with a brief history of social security policy in Russia both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We describe the current pension scheme and present an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the model, with particular attention to the way in which it may disadvantage women and low-wage and informal sector workers. The reasons why Russia is in the process of implementing a social security scheme based largely on a model proposed by the World Bank is also explored. We argue that the decision reflects the effects of both internal and external economic pressures as well as cultural diffusion via the network of neo-liberal economists and pension experts associated with international financial institutions, most notably the World Bank. We conclude with a discussion of how we would restructure the Russian scheme making greater use of the notional defined contribution (NDC) model.     

The economics of the decision to join a union

This article attempts to bring about a synthesis of the theory of human capital and the disparate and largely empirical literature on the impact of unions on an individual worker’s terms and conditions of employment. This is done by modeling the decision of a worker to join a unionized firm or vote for a union in an NLRB election. From this model both the theoretically correct valuation and some empirical estimates of the value of the major wage and nonwage (seniority, discipline and discharge, strikes, dues) impacts of unions are presented. Extensions to risk averse workers, free rider problems, union elections and contract ratification votes are also briefly considered.     

Changes in Firm Pension Policy: Trends Away from Traditional Defined Benefit Plans

In light of the recent concerns regarding the solvency of Social Security’s Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), private pensions may play an increasingly important role in retirement welfare of US retirees. However, the private pension landscape has evolved in ways that may result in lower private pension wealth for retirees. One recent such phenomenon involves the conversion of traditional defined benefit pension plans to cash balance plans, which results in lower pension benefits for many workers. In this study, I investigated how characteristics of the firm’s workforce influenced whether the firm converted their traditional pension plan to a cash balance plan and how these characteristics related to the firm’s pension plan policy more generally. Using the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data and pension plan data from the Department of Labor/Internal Revenue Service and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, I found little evidence of workforce age distribution effects on the likelihood of DB plan conversion to a cash balance plan in the 1990s. More generally, I consistently found positive associations between firms with older and more female workforces and defined contribution plans during the same time.     

Can a minimum wage increase have an adverse impact on inequality? Evidence from two Latin American economies

This paper uses a semiparametric model to analyze the impact of an increase in the real minimum wage on inequality in Colombia between 1995 and 1999 and in Paraguay between 1993 and 2000–2001. Simulations suggest that if the employment effects of the minimum wage increase are ignored, the underlying policies would contribute to reduce earnings inequality in Colombia and would be inequality neutral in Paraguay. By considering the drop in wages of those who lost their jobs, simulations suggest that in both countries the policy in question would increase earnings inequality under some assumptions about the employment elasticity of the minimum wage and the new level of earnings unemployed workers rely upon. While these findings do not mean that minimum wage increases in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) necessarily have adverse distributional affects, they suggest that minimum wage policy should be implemented with care depending on how sensitive employment is to wage increases. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Privatizing public pension systems: Lessons from Latin America

The major goal of this analysis is to examine the pros and cons of privatizing public pension schemes based on the Latin American experience. The study draws on evidence from four countries that have fully privatized their public pension schemes (Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and El Salvador) and four that have partially privatized (Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, and Peru). Some evidence suggests that privatization is having positive economic effects, contributing to the development of financial institutions and the availability of investment capital. It may also be increasing national savings rates and the rates of economic growth, but on these issues there is less agreement. The benefits of privatization go primarily to high-wage male workers with few benefits for low-wage and female workers. As a result, privatization contributes to both income and gender inequality. Efforts to draw lessons for the US must take into consideration numerous political and economic differences.     

Privatization of Social Security in the United Kingdom warning or exemplar?

This study draws lessons for the debate about the proposed partial privatization of Social Security in the United States based on evidence from the United Kingdom. The British case suggests that privatization may lead to a reduction in the pension burden on the national budget if combined with substantial cuts in benefits. Such reforms may have positive effects on the economy, but any such benefits would come at a price that would include much higher administrative costs, exposure to stock market fluctuations, increased inequality, and potentially lower pension benefits for many low-wage workers, particularly women.     

Pensions and the uses of ignorance by unions and firms

Pensions are contingent claims contracts that are often fashioned by collective bargaining under conditions of asymmetric information and market power. Pensions are not an employer’s or a union’s optimal contract; they represent compromise. Employers use pensions to minimize labor costs and to adjust to market changes. Pensions help unions improve and protect their members’ work lives and help unions to survive as institutions. When workers’ estimations of their pensions differ from their employers’ estimations a moral hazard can exist. Less mobile workers and those with less influence subsidize the pension benefits of other workers or reduce an employer’s costs. Econometric results based on data from the President’s Commission on Pension Policy show that certain workers, namely women, overvalue their plans, which provides an opportunity to lower labor costs and redistribute benefits. Unions have a contradictory effect on information. The author thanks participants in the Cornell University Collective Bargaining workshop and the Harvard Labor Economics workshop. I especially thank James Medoff for his comments.     

A THEORY OF DOWNWARD-RIGID WAGES AND CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT

The theory presented below provides a rationale for downward wage rigidity and consequent cyclical unemployment by modifying the neoclassical assumption of behavioral independence. Such a modification permits an examination of important nonmarket relationships holding between the individual's wage and the wages paid to other people and between perceived equity in wages received and worker productivity—both linkages widely recognized by personnel managers but little explored by economists. The resulting model predicts a pattern of behavior that is consistent with the available evidence on the actual operation of labor markets.     

A cross-national test of propositions from the neo-pluralist perspective on Social Security expenditures.

Much of the existing literature on cross-national differences in retirement wage policy has focused on the inception of programs and the factors leading to their introduction. The explanations may be less adequate in accounting for post-war changes in social security programs. To interpret the evolution of programs in the post-war period, we stress the importance of divisions among workers themselves. We argue here that such divisions may occur along three fault lines: (1) ethnic, racial, and linguistic differentiation (2) the split between heavily urbanized and other segments of the working population and (3) fractionalization brought about by domination of a single industry. Using a longitudinal design to measure changes in social security expenditures in 34 nations between 1965 and 1983, we test hypotheses asserting that fragmentation among workers is inversely correlated with expanded investment in benefits for workers. We find general support for these hypotheses.     

LABOR SUPPLY ESTIMATION BIASES FROM DISREGARDING NONWAGE BENEFITS

Labor supply models and research underpinned by labor supply decisions often assume that workers' choices are functions of wage and wage offers. However, the literature shows evidence that such decisions at least partly depend on nonwage benefits encompassed in jobs and occupations. In this paper, I develop and estimate a stochastic dynamic model of occupation and job choice, where nonwage benefits are directly incorporated into the decision alongside wages (a full model). Nested within the full model is a wage model, which represents the common practice in the literature of basing selection solely on wages and disregarding nonwage benefits. I separately estimate the full model and the nested wage model to compare the implications (biases) of omitting nonwage benefits. I compare the two models' estimates of elasticities and an inequality reduction intervention policy. I find that disregarding nonwage benefits generally causes biases. There are cases when the two models predict very similar outcomes and have close estimates, such as in occupation‐specific elasticities and job transition elasticities. But these special cases are products of canceling biases. In most cases, ignoring nonwage benefits will bias estimates by overestimating the importance of wage in the selection process and by disregarding changes in relative prices between wage and nonwage benefits. (JEL J20, J32, D91)