Second and Third Births in Armenia and Moldova: An Economic Perspective of Recent Behaviour and Current Preferences

Little is known about fertility in Armenia and Moldova, the two countries that have both, according to national statistics, experienced very low levels of fertility during the dramatic economic, social and political restructuring in the last two decades. This article fills this gap and explores recent fertility behaviour and current fertility preferences using 2005 Demographic and Health Survey data. Educational differences in fertility decline and the association between socioeconomic indicators and fertility preferences are considered from an economic perspective. Special emphasis is given to determining whether and how diverging economic conditions in the two countries as well as crisis conditions may have influenced fertility. Second parity progression ratios (PPR) reveal a positive relationship between the degree of decline from 1990 to 2005 and education, whereas third PPR declines appear the greatest for women with both the lowest and highest education. In both countries, logistic regression results suggest that working women are more likely to want a second child, as well as want the child sooner university than later in Armenia, and the wealthiest women in Armenia have a higher odds of wanting a third child. Dual-jobless couples are less likely to want a second child in Moldova and more likely to postpone the next child in Armenia. These findings offer some insight into the shifts in fertility behaviour in these two post-Soviet countries and suggest that despite diverging economic trajectories and a lessening commitment to the two-child norm in Moldova, determinants of fertility behaviour and preferences have remained similar in both countries.     

Spatial Aspects of the Rise of Nonmarital Fertility Across Europe Since 1960: The Role of States and Regions in Shaping Patterns of Change

This article investigates the role of states and regions in shaping spatial patterns of nonmarital fertility in Europe since 1960 using a dataset of 497 European subnational regions and smaller countries. Almost all regions registered substantial nonmarital fertility increases over the last 50 years. Prior research has shown that in the first half of the twentieth century states played a dominant role in drawing the demographic map of Europe (Watkins, From provinces into nations: demographic integration in Western Europe 1870–1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991). As a result, subnational regional variation decreased, while differences between countries increased. In this article, we investigate whether states continue to play such a dominant role in delineating patterns of nonmarital fertility between 1960 and 2007. We find that variation in nonmarital fertility levels increased as a whole across Europe, and states continued to be important for determining these patterns. However, the role of states relative to regions declined in the latest period examined (1990 and 2007). Possible explanations for the changes include increased supranational integration, for example, within the European Union, and decentralisation within states leading to increases in variation in subnational contextual conditions.     

Social Differences in the Decline of Marital Reproduction in Rural Navarre (Spain)

The continued decline of marital fertility in Navarre (Spain) during the first few decades of the twentieth century was associated with an increase in life expectancy and greater survival to adulthood. This decline affected all social strata and all geographical regions, rural areas as well as cities. Nonetheless, the decline was not homogeneous. Some sectors of Navarrese society began the fertility transition earlier than others.Cross sectional analysis is presented for different years of diverse variables that could be related to the levels of marital fertility: level of urbanization, occupation of the father, level of religious devotion and political factors. Statistical evidence is presented that confirms the relationship of these variables to the levels of fertility.     

Population trends in the european community, 1960–1986

This paper sets the scene for the subsequent discussion by describing recent demographic trends in Europe, more particularly in the countries of the European Community. Special attention is paid to the generalized decline of fertility to levels well below those needed for replacement of the present population. The decline in fertility is linked to the emergence of new patterns of union and family formation, and the implications for the future are briefly discussed.     

Italy’s Path to Very Low Fertility: The Adequacy of Economic and Second Demographic Transition Theories

The deep drop of the fertility rate in Italy to among the lowest in the world challenges contemporary theories of childbearing and family building. Among high-income countries, Italy was presumed to have characteristics of family values and female labor force participation that would favor higher fertility than its European neighbors to the north. We test competing economic and cultural explanations, drawing on new nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine first union, first birth, and second birth. Our event history analysis finds some support for economic determinants of family formation and fertility, but the clear importance of regional differences and of secularization suggests that such an explanation is at best incomplete and that cultural and ideational factors must be considered.     

The fall of marital fertility in nineteenth-century france: Exemplar or exception? (Part I)

Marital fertility began to fall early in France. The fall was already in train by 1800, seventy years earlier than in other European countries. It has often been treated as differing from the later falls elsewhere only in timing but not in nature. In the first part of this two-part article an alternative view is advanced. The fall is seen as falling into two halves, of which the earlier sets France apart from her neighbours. In this period, lasting until about 1870, the techniques used to limit fertility may be ‘modern’ but the demographic system as a whole appears to continue to behave in a ‘traditional’ manner. The evidence is examined for France as a national entity. In the second part of the article regional evidence will be reviewed and the post-1870 convergence of demographic history of France and other countries will be surveyed.     

Racing Against the Biological Clock? Childbearing and Sterility Among Men and Women in Second Unions in France

In developed countries, rising rates of union disruption have induced an increase in the share of people experiencing several fertile partnerships during their fertile life-span. However, from the large-scale 1999 French Family Survey, in the 1939–1954 birth cohorts it appears that completed fertility of repartnered men is slightly higher than that of never-separated men while repartnered women have fertility levels similar to those who remain in a first intact partnership. Following this observation, this article aims to study whether people, and especially women, have enough time to have children in the context of second union before they become limited by the “biological clock”. Using a cure model, we find that once age-related sterility is controlled for, the decrease in risk of having children with age is not visible anymore up to age 40. This offers some evidence that people in their second partnership, especially women, are constrained in their childbearing by the decline in fecundity with age. Additionally, childless women seem to respond proactively to the decline in fecundity with age by accelerating childbearing.     

Analysis of Latin American Fertility in Terms of Probable Social Classes

Theories of demographic change have not paid enough attention to how factors associated with fertility decline play different roles across social classes that are defined multidimensionally. I use a multidimensional definition of social class along with information on the reproductive histories of women born between 1920 and 1965 in six Latin American countries to show the following: the enduring connection between social stratification and fertility differentials, the concomitance of diverse fertility decline trajectories by class, and the role of within- and between-class social distances in promoting/preventing ideational change towards the acceptance of lower fertility. These results enable me to revisit the scope of theories of fertility change and to provide an explanatory narrative centred on empirically constructed social classes (probable social classes) and the macro- and micro-level conditions that influenced their life courses. I use 21 census samples collected between 1970 and 2005 in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Paraguay.     

Marital and Reproductive Behavior in Italy After 1995: Bridging the Gap with Western Europe?

Despite a delay of 20–25 years, when it comes to cohabitation, Italy has now begun to resemble other Western countries. In addition, the increase in legal separations has accelerated since 1995, although their number still remains far from that observed in countries such as the USA, the UK, and France. Finally, Italy’s fertility decline has come to a halt: the cohort of women born in the early 1970s will likely have the same TFR as those born in the mid-1960s (around 1.55). Moreover, in the Centre–North areas, period TFR rose from 1.1 in 1995 to 1.35 children per woman 10 years later. The territorial diffusion of cohabitation, legal separation, out-of-wedlock births, and fertility recovery overlaps closely with that of the decline in births during the first half of the twentieth century. A similar geographical pattern has been observed for the diffusion of school enrolment, industrialization, secularization, and (during the last 20 years) foreign immigration.     

Religion and Fertility in Western Europe: Trends Across Cohorts in Britain,France and the Netherlands

The role of religion in explaining fertility differences is often overlooked in demographic studies, particularly in Western Europe, where there has been a substantial decline in institutional forms of religious adherence. The current study explores the changing relationships between religion and childbearing in Britain, France and the Netherlands. Using data from the Generations and Gender Programme and the British Household Panel Survey, religious differences in completed fertility and the transition to first birth are explored across cohorts of women. In addition, a longitudinal analysis is employed to examine the influence of religion on subsequent childbearing. Although the secularization paradigm assumes that the influence of religion on individual behavior will diminish over time, it is found that religious affiliation and practice continue to be important determinants of fertility and family formation patterns. However, there is some variation in the relationship between religion and fertility across countries; while in France and the Netherlands fertility gaps by religiosity are either consistent or increasing, in Britain, this gap appears to have narrowed over time. These findings suggest that fertility differences by religion also depend on the particular social context of religious institutions in each country.     

The historical decline of fertility in Eastern Europe

I test the hypothesis that the growth of autonomy was the factor responsible for the decline of marital fertility in eight Eastern European countries. By growth of autonomy I mean increased control over one's political, personal, religious, economic and reproductive life. This increased control was manifested in revolutions, democratic political reforms, nationalist movements and declining marital fertility. The political reforms were the result of the growth of autonomy but they also accelerated the dissemination of these new ideas among the populace contributing to further growth of autonomy. My hypothesis is generally supported by the historical data.     

Fertility Decline in Russia in the Early and Mid 1990s: The Role of Economic Uncertainty and Labour Market Crises

This paper analyses the fertility decline in Russia during theearly and mid 1990s from both a macro- and micro-perspective and presents astriking divergence between these two empirical viewpoints. While the formersuggests that the fertility decline after 1989 is associated with theeconomic hardship accompanying the transition to a market economy, themicro-evidence using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey is to thecontrary. There is no negative association between labour market uncertaintyor a labour market crisis and fertility, and frequently there is even apositive association. That is, women or couples who are themselves affectedby labour market crises often had a higher probability of having anotherchild in the period 1994–1996 than women/couples who were less affected bysuch crises. The lack of a negative association, and the presence of apositive association in many instances, is surprising from the standpoint ofeconomic fertility theory. It is also contrary to many explanatory theoriesabout the recent fertility decline in Central and Eastern European countriesthat are built on a more or less direct connection between the labour marketor an economic crisis and low fertility.     

Deferment of the First Birth and Fluctuating Fertility in Sweden

In Sweden, as in other industrialized countries, a decades-old decline in fertility rates has been accompanied by a rise in the age at first birth. In contrast to other industrialized countries, however, fertility rates rose sharply in the 1980s before plummeting in the 1990s. In this paper we apply hazard regression to data from the 1992 Swedish Family Survey, supplemented by annual earnings data linked to individuals and by annual time series of national-level economic indicators, to investigate the predictors of the timing of the first birth of women in Sweden since the mid-1960s. The discovery that both individual characteristics and aggregate-level factors influence the timing of the first birth casts light on both the continuing trend of postponement of the first birth and annual fluctuations in first-birth rates.     

Preference Theory and Low Fertility: A Comparative Perspective

The discussion on the causes of the most recent fertility decline in Europe, and in particular on the emergence of lowest-low fertility, emphasizes the relevance of cultural factors in addition to economic ones. As part of such a cultural framework, the heterogeneity of preferences concerning the “career vs. family” dichotomy has been systematized in the “Preference Theory” approach developed by Catherine Hakim. This heterogeneity in preferences, however, has so far been underinvestigated in a comparative framework. This paper makes use of comparative data from the 2004/2005 Round of the European Social Survey to test the links between individual-level preferences and both fertility outcomes and fertility intentions, in a variety of societal settings. Results confirm an association between work–family lifestyle preferences and realized fertility in a variety of European countries, while they do not show a relationship between lifestyle preferences and fertility intentions. Results further support the existence of heterogeneous patterns of association between lifestyle preferences and fertility choices among welfare regimes.     

Less Partnering,Less Children,or Both? Analysis of the Drivers of First Birth Decline in Finland Since 2010

European Journal of Population - In the 2010s, fertility has declined in the Nordic countries, most strikingly in Finland, and first births drive the decline. It remains unclear whether this...     

The Cost of Low Fertility in Europe

We analyze the effect of fertility on income per capita with a particular focus on the experience of Europe. For European countries with below-replacement fertility, the cost of continued low fertility will only be observed in the long run. We show that in the short run, a fall in the fertility rate will lower the youth dependency ratio and increase the working-age share, thus raising income per capita. In the long run, however, the burden of old-age dependency dominates the youth dependency decline, and continued low fertility will lead to small working-age shares in the absence of large migration inflows. We show that the currently very high working-age shares generated by the recent declines in fertility and migration inflows are not sustainable, and that significant drops in the relative size of the working-age population should be expected. Without substantial adjustments in labor force participation or migration policies, the potential negative repercussions on the European economy are large.     

Fertility Decline During Albania’s Societal Crisis and its Subsequent Consolidation

Cross-sectional comparisons of the decline in fertility in former socialist countries point to a bi-phasic response: a crisis-induced family limitation followed by the postponement of childbearing during economic and political consolidation. In this article, the last two decades of Albania’s fertility transition are documented. The bi-phasic response model is tested in a period analysis of adaptations in marriage and parity-specific fertility to the socio-economic and political transformations since the fall of communist rule. We find that the timing and patterns of changes in Albanian family behaviours generally adhere to the model. Socio-economic differentials and trends are congruent with the major role played by the crisis and structural change. However, the Albanian case also highlights the enduring importance of traditional family formation models during the crisis, as well as among specific subpopulations more recently. These results are discussed with reference to a sociological account of Albanian society.     

Attitudes towards demographic trends and population policy

This paper reports on the results of a comparative analysis of public opinion surveys held in Italy and the Netherlands. The analysis focuses on two relationships: between knowledge about population trends and the evaluation of these trends, and between individual perception of the causes of the fertility decline and acceptance of a government policy to influence current trends. The central hypothesis is that the mechanisms which underlie the evaluation of population trends and the opinions on what is desirable for the future are very much alike in both countries.     

美国重新谈判北美自贸协定的原因

美国现政府竞选时就提出了重新谈判北美自由贸易协定的设想并在执政后将其变成了现实。现有研究主要从选举、利益集团、大国博弈、贸易失衡等角度进行解读。不过,重新谈判这样的安排,若非是一体化的根基出现了动摇,很难具备经济上的合理性,也难以得到广泛的国内支持。北美自由贸易区内部贸易结构的变化是美国态度发生变化的重要原因,除了相关理论自身的前提条件和现实世界存在差距外,区域生产网络和区域价值链的重塑、内部市场容量增长有限、技术创新能力和潜力的相对下降、国际直接投资的直接和间接影响是其内部贸易结构变化的主要原因,这给予包括我国在内的各国和地区诸多启示。     

The Effect of Changing Sexual, Marital and Contraceptive Behaviour on Conceptions, Abortions, and Births

A model is proposed to estimate the number of conceptions during a single year using scarce survey data, official data on births and abortions for the two years following the survey, and some parameters on contraception failure. The model is fitted for 1979, 1989, 1994 to Puglia, a Southern Italian region with a population of 4 millions. Simulations are also produced.The decrease in births is caused mainly by the decline in wanted births, whereas the decline in abortions is caused by diffusion of the pill, IUD, and condom. The rapid increase in the proportion of never-married women explains the slow decrease in unwanted births and conceptions, compared to the fast decline in wanted ones. This situation is different compared to other Western countries (e.g. France, UK, and USA) where the decline in TFR during the 1960s and 1970s was largely caused by the decline in unwanted fertility, thanks to improved modern contraception and sterilisation.