股东参与治理的私人收益和社会收益的实证研究

本文探讨了股东参与治理所带来的私人收益、特定股权结构的社会收益以及股权集中成本三者之间的关系。我们分析的结果表明,当股东与经理人员之间的利益冲突水平较高、其它治理机制的作用较弱时,股权集中(股东参与治理的积极性较高)可以创造大量的社会收益;反之,股权的集中与分散程度(股东参与治理的积极性较低)对社会收益的影响不明显。本文的研究结论为我国股东参与治理及股权结构改革提供了重要启示。     

Ownership structure,investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. Similarly, there is no homogeneous evidence documenting family ownership concentration is always positively or negatively correlated with firm value, or irrelevant. This paper analyses whether and how the de facto investor protection provided by the judicial system affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1314 firms operating in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a five-year period, 2010–2014. Moreover, we analyse whether judicial system efficiency influences if and how family firms in the controlling coalition collude for expropriating minority shareholders. Our findings show that the level of shareholder protection, derived from judicial efficiency, is relevant to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, thus corroborating literature in that institutional contexts matter in explaining such relations. The results suggest the need for more efficient external mechanisms of corporate governance to facilitate investment in equity capital, thus decreasing the country risk perceived by investors.     

It’s all about culture! Institutional context and ownership concentration across Europe

It is widely recognised that the formal institutional context affects firm ownership concentration. However, the impact of the informal institutional context has received less research attention. Drawing from institutional theory, we tested our hypothesis that both the formal and informal (cultural) institutional contexts simultaneously influence firm ownership concentration. Based on a firm-level database of the largest 600 listed companies in 19 European countries for the period 2009–2015, we found that both formal and informal institutional contexts, considered independently from each other, affect the level of firm ownership concentration. However, when these institutional contexts are considered together, the significance of the formal institutional context's effect on ownership concentration disappears while the informal (cultural) institutional context remains significant. Specifically, our findings indicate that high power distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, restraint, and short-term orientation favour firm ownership concentration. Overall, our findings demonstrate that the diversity in European cultures explains firms' different levels of ownership concentration across European firms, signalling that the European Union's efforts towards a common regulatory frame may not necessarily lead to a convergence of European firms' ownership structures and, consequently, of corporate governance practices.     

DEEP FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND VOLATILITY

We investigate the relationship between foreign direct ownership of firms and firm‐ and region‐level output volatility using a novel panel data set for European countries. We document a positive, highly robust, relationship between firm‐level foreign ownership and volatility of value added. This relationship holds cross‐sectionally and in panels with firm fixed effects where the relationship captures within‐firm variation over time. Considering domestic firms with assets in foreign countries, we document that it is international diversification, rather than the nationality of the owner, that explains this positive correlation. Our results can also be found at the aggregate level, where we show that region‐level volatility is correlated positively with foreign investment in the region. We show that this positive relation between aggregate volatility and foreign investment can be explained by the granularity of the firm size distribution and the fact that foreign ownership is concentrated among the largest firms.     

Ownership and Control in Closely‐held Family‐owned Firms: An Exploration of Strategic and Operational Control

Much of the existing research into the divorce of ownership and control either focuses on the propensity for the separation of decision functions or upon scrutinizing conceptions, gauges or the practicalities of organizational control in large corporations. Although far from equivocal, such research appears broadly to concur that where ownership is dispersed, de facto control is likely to be exerted by management and that where ownership is closely‐held, de facto as well as legal control is exerted by owners. This study examines this assumption through exploring the nature of control in a closely‐held family firm. In this regard, the focus of this study is not on consequences of divorced ownership and control but rather on exploring the contingencies where ownership and control diverge. This research reveals a case wherein a closely‐held family firm is strategically and operationally controlled by its managers. Case research leads to the development of a range of insights regarding the owner/family and the management characteristics that contribute to this scenario. The paper concludes with a series of implications and conclusions.     

我国上市公司的实证研究：股权结构和高层梯队与公司绩效的关系

分析了股权结构和高层梯队对公司绩效的影响并进行了实证研究。股权结构与公司绩效的实证结果显示,流通股对公司绩效有显著负面影响,而法人股则与之呈弱的正相关关系。在国有股权控股的企业中,股权一定程度上的集中对公司是有利的,且政府直接控股比间接控股更有利于企业的整体价值。在论证高层梯队与公司绩效关系上,从团队的传记性特征方面作了实证分析,初步得出了公司绩效与高层梯队平均年龄和平均受教育状况正相关,而与年龄和教育背景的差异性呈负相关关系这一结论。此外,在不同股权结构下,高层梯队对公司绩效影响具有差异性。     

Financial Ownership,Diversification and Firm Profitability in Japan

The Japanese system of corporate governance andin particular the role played by banks andother financial institutions have been thesubject of considerable research andcontroversy in recent years. We estimate theimpact of equity ownership by financialinstitutions on firm performance in Japan for1986–1991, a period that precedes many of theproblems of the ensuing decade. We find thatwhile ownership by financial institutions isassociated with unprofitable diversification,such ownership is, on balance, positivelyassociated with firm profitability. Someimplications of these findings for Japan'sunique system of governance are discussed.     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

A cyclical view of the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management

The vast majority of research on the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management focuses on the impact of corporate governance on strategic management. In this article we propose a cyclical model, highlighting that strategic decisions can also affect corporate governance through shaping firm ownership structure. We discuss the impacts of strategic decisions on firm ownership structure and corporate governance in the contexts of publicly traded firms, private firms, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. We hope that our cyclical model can promote researchers to develop a more complete view about the relationships between strategic management, ownership structure, and corporate governance.     

The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance, and postulate that this relationship in private family firms is more complex than the inverted “U” relationship found in public family firms. Second, we predict a potential moderating effect of the second largest owner, who may exert a monitoring role on family CEOs. We focus on private family firms as recent studies show that private family firms have distinct features compared to public family firms, and that findings documented in public family firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but much less studied, private family firms. We have applied agency theory to develop the two hypotheses, used secondary data on a large sample of private family firms, utilized an adjusted conventional quadratic technique to test the hypotheses, and validated the findings using a second method of piecewise linear specification. The results show that the non-linear relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance is more complicated than the often-documented inverted “U” shape from public firms. Meanwhile, the second largest owner with a high enough ownership stake can impose a positive moderating effect by mitigating potential agency problems caused by family CEOs.     

Internal corporate governance mechanisms as drivers of firm value: panel data evidence for Chilean firms

The paper analyses to what extent ownership structure, capital structure, and dividend policy as corporate governance mechanisms drive the firm value. From a data panel of publicly quoted Chilean firms for the years 2002–2010, we find that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. The positive slope is supported by the supervision hypothesis; whilst the negative relation between ownership concentration and firm value is supported by the expropriation hypothesis. We also find that there is a positive impact of both leverage and the dividend pay-out on the firm value. In this case, these two mechanisms reduce the free cash flows which otherwise might be used opportunistically by managers in their own interests (free rider problem). Contrary to the previous empirical literature in Chile, it is found that the mere fact that a firm is affiliated to a business group/conglomerate impacts positively its value. This positive effect is basically driven by the development of intragroup capital markets, and the governance imposed by the rules of the conglomerate.     

Market Orientation,Ownership Type,and E‐Business Assimilation: Evidence from Chinese Firms

While more and more firms have implemented e‐business in business operations, a better understanding of the factors that successfully drive the assimilation of e‐business will provide insights for firm executives and practitioners to develop effective strategies for e‐business. Different from previous studies that focus on individual‐level factors related to business executives and top management teams, this study examines how firm‐level strategic and cultural factors shape e‐business assimilation. Based on the strategy and marketing literature on market orientation and firm ownership, we developed a research model to describe how a firm's market orientation impacts e‐business assimilation. The model also describes the moderating effect of firm ownership type on the relationship between market orientation and e‐business assimilation. Based on data from 301 Chinese international trade firms, we found that two dimensions of market orientation (i.e., customer orientation, competitor orientation) had significant effects on e‐business assimilation. However, the third dimension, interfunctional coordination, was only partially significant. In addition, ownership type was a significant moderator of the effects of customer orientation and competitor orientation on e‐business assimilation, although ownership type was not a moderator of interfunctional coordination. Being one of the first studies of the impact of market orientation and firm ownership type on e‐business assimilation, we conclude with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice.     

所有权结构与企业创新效率

本文就企业所有权结构对企业创新效率的影响,从理论和实证上进行了分析研究。研究表明:(1)就总体而言,增加经营者的企业所有权或减少政府的企业所有权,将有助于改善企业创新效率;(2)法人或业主的所有权份额的增加,可能是引发“创新泡沫”的诱因之一;(3)市场竞争可以促进企业创新效率的改善,而企业规模扩大则可能因“大企业病”问题损害创新效率。     

Capital structure,managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt

This paper focuses on an important issue, which has generally received less attention in corporate governance literature, being the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between debt and firm performance. By employing a sample of Egyptian listed firms, the generalized least squares method, as a panel data technique, is used to examine the joint effect of debt and managerial ownership on various measures of firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q and ROA). The results reveal that managerial ownership moderates the relationship between debt and firm performance, with the relationship being negative (positive) in presence (absence) of managerial ownership concentration. The implication of this finding is that the optimal capital structure is more likely to be contingent on contextual variables as well as the roles, power, and stakes of key internal and external actors. Put simply, the effectiveness of one corporate governance mechanism (i.e., debt) is more likely to be contingent on the effect of other existed corporate governance mechanisms, and hence, there is not one best arrangement of either capital structure or ownership structure, but different arrangements are not equally good.     

不完全契约、资产专用性与最优企业所有权安排

不完全契约和资产专用性引致了交易中的敲竹杠问题,带来生产成本和交易成本的上升。由于人力资本的产权特征,企业内也存在敲竹杠问题,因而最优的企业所有权安排必定是能使敲竹杠问题总成本最小化的结构。通过比较,本文认为,由非人力资本所有者和人力资本所有者共同拥有企业所有权是最优的。     

An empirical investigation of advanced manufacturing technology investment patterns: Evidence from a developing country

Advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) investment patterns in developing countries is in need of further investigation, particularly in the light of the conflicting evidence from the literature. This paper provides new evidence on AMT investment patterns from the Turkish automotive industry and develops a taxonomy by exploring the relationships between AMT investment patterns, ownership structure, firm size and performance. Analysis of industry survey data suggests the existence of three groups with different AMT investment strategies. Results suggest that AMT investment patterns are not only significantly correlated with firm performance or ownership, but also reveals significant differences in manufacturing performance across investment patterns.     

Does governance confer organisational resilience? Evidence from UK employee owned businesses

Current economic crisis has highlighted the importance of an organization’s ability to withstand economic shocks. This has rekindled interest in organization resilience on the one hand, and the relationship between alternative governance forms such as employee owned businesses (EOBs) on the other. We explore this relationship using performance data on 204 publicly traded non-employee owned businesses and 49 EOBs prior to the economic downturn (2004–2008), and during the economic downturn (2008–2009). This data is complemented with a survey of resilience related governance and organizational practices in 41 EOBs and 22 non-EOBs. Our results show that: (a) employee ownership that is combined with employee involvement in firm governance is associated with greater stability in business performance over a business cycle; (b) EOBs have longer investment payback horizon when compared to non-EOBs across a number of activities; (c) Top management in EOBs are more likely to seek employee input in strategic decision making; (d) EOBs are more likely to use employee involvement to achieve tighter coupling between feedback from operations and the setting of strategic direction for the firm. These results suggest that employee stock ownership programs alone are not sufficient to develop higher levels of organizational resilience. Managers must combine employee stock ownership with employee involvement in governance if they wish to build up resilience in advance of adverse economic conditions.     

Ownership Structure,Corporate Value and Firm Investment: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Spanish Companies

This paper is concerned with the set of mutualrelationships between firm valuation andinvestment, and with the possible endogeneityof ownership structure. In order to deal withthem properly, we aim to test the mutual impactof investment, corporate value and ownership bybroadening the usual framework with asimultaneous equations approach. Using a sampleof 140 Spanish listed companies for the1991–1997 period, we have found that,consistent with previous research, thealignment and entrenchment hypotheses seem tobe confirmed by the estimation of aone-equation model. However, when analyzed bymeans of a system of simultaneous equations inwhich a set of mutual relationships isintroduced, quite different results wereobtained. Although valuation and investment offirms are determined by managerial ownership,we have found that ownership structure may alsobe influenced both by investment and value.Consequently, it is not completely right toinfer that ownership structure determines firmvalue unidirectionally; however the benchmarkshould be broadened so as to take an explicitaccount of the mutual links between firm value,investment and ownership.     

合伙人团队特征对契约治理与企业成长关系的调节作用研究

基于高阶理论和新制度经济学交易成本理论,通过对313个合伙人团队的问卷调研,分析了合伙人团队特征在合伙人团队契约治理影响企业成长过程中的调节作用。研究结果表明,在合伙人团队规模、受教育程度异质性以及职能和产业经验异质性较大的企业,合伙人团队契约治理越明确和周详,企业成长绩效更好;在合伙人团队规模、职能和产业经验异质性较大的企业,当合伙人团队存在绝对控股权安排时,企业成长绩效更好。但合伙人团队先前网络关系的强弱对契约治理的调节作用不明显;合伙人团队受教育程度异质性对绝对控股权安排的调节作用不明显。     

Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, while accounting for the endogeneity of the ownership structure, a potential curvilinearity of the performance effect, differences in corporate governance systems, and alternative performance measures. Using a sample of 1,079 firms from 8 countries we find evidence for a curvilinear effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, which becomes insignificant after controlling for endogeneity. Hence, our results support the findings by Demsetz and Villalonga (J Corp Fin 7(3):209?C233, 2001). More research is needed to disentangle the contradictory findings in prior works.