CYCLICAL TAX ENFORCEMENT

We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data for the Spanish case (1994–2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter-cyclical), but if the tax administration prioritizes taxpayers' welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy. In particular, it presents a prevailing counter-cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical. (JEL D78, H12, H26, H83)     

ESTIMATING INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE TAX RESPONSIVENESS

Influential literatures have exploited tax policy changes to estimate the effects of income taxes on either intensive or extensive margin decisions. We extend this quasi-experimental approach to jointly estimate intensive and extensive margin tax elasticities to address selection issues that have hindered consistent estimation of labor supply effects. The extensive margin equation provides a way to control for selection in the intensive margin equation while consistent estimation of the intensive margin provides estimates of after-tax returns to working for nonworkers, a necessary input to study extensive behavioral responses. We apply this approach to study the tax responsiveness of older workers. (JEL C33, H24, J20, J26)     

PARTIAL TAX HARMONIZATION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION

In this article, we analyze the role of infrastructure coordination in facilitating partial tax harmonization within a coalition of asymmetric jurisdictions. Two main results are obtained. First, productivity asymmetries represent a serious handicap for partial tax harmonization that can be remedied by coordinating nontax instruments when they allow to reduce these asymmetries. Second, infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when asymmetries between potential members of a tax coalition are large. The current usage of European Union (EU) structural funds orientated to reduce regional infrastructure deficits is therefore suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the EU. (JEL H87, H54, H21)     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE DEFICIT BIAS

I analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits. I find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization. When countries differ in terms of capital mobility, further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge. Consistent with theory, I find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of OECD countries, controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits. (JEL E62, F62)     

DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A PROPERTY TAX REVOLT

Voters who support tax limitations measures such as California's Proposition 13 seem to feel that their expected gains more than compensate for whatever costs may follow from a successful tax revolt. Costs can arise from a decline in government services or from an increase in some replacement tax if service levels are maintained. This paper estimates the perceived and actual incidence of a property tax revolt under alternative assumptions about voter perceptions and eventual outcomes. Our results suggest that the most visible benefits of a tax cut favor low-income homeowners. In the event of government budget cutbacks, it is possible that the distribution of services is sufficiently skewed toward low-income groups to reverse the incidence of a property tax revolt.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX AVOIDANCE

We identify the effect of trade liberalization on corporate income tax avoidance in a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, taking advantage of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We find that firms engage in more tax avoidance in industries with larger tariff reductions. Further analysis shows that firms with a lack of cash or a high demand for cash before WTO entry tend to engage in more tax avoidance after WTO entry. Our study also provides evidence that manipulating costs is one way that firms avoid corporate income tax. (JEL D22, F61, F63, H26)     

TAX EFFECTS VERSUS BUDGET EFFECTS ON LABOR SUPPLY

This paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types. A number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of "budget effects," rather than isolated "tax effects." This comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets. Moreover, the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated, or possibly even removed, by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes.     

A THEORY OF THE POLITICALLY OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAX

A theory of the politically optimal tax is developed where tax rates are endogenous and determined by forces in the political market. The theory is used to explain the levels of alcoholic beverage taxes between states in the United States. It is shown that these rates are influenced by the ownership structure existing in the liquor industry, the consumption externalities associated with drinking, the minimum drinking age laws, the earmarking of tax revenues, the enforcement of regulations and real income.     

NEW ESTIMATES OF THE OPTIMAL TAX ON ALCOHOL

In this paper I use a new data set to estimate the optimal alcohol tax rate. As a benchmark, the empirical results imply that the optimal tax rate is over 100 percent of the net-of-tax price. However, alcohol taxation is a second-best solution to the problems associated with alcohol abuse. I conclude that the optimal alcohol tax rate would be much lower if punishment for drunk driving were more certain and severe. Government provision of information about the health consequences of heavy drinking would also remove part of the efficiency rationale for alcohol taxes.     

DOES A VALUE-ADDED TAX INCREASE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?

Theory predicts that a value-added tax (VAT) is an efficient tax system, which is one of the primary reasons for its rapid adoption worldwide. However, there is little empirical evidence supporting this prediction, especially for developing countries. I estimate the efficiency gains of introducing a VAT using the synthetic control method. I find that a VAT has, on average, positive and economically meaningful impact on economic efficiency. This result, however, is driven by richer countries only. There is no significant impact of the VAT on poorer countries. The findings are robust across a series of placebo studies and sensitivity checks. (JEL H20, H25, O40, E6)     

MONETARIST ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND TAX CUTS: COMMENT

The performance of monetarist 'reduced form' models in the period following the 1975 tax cut is…damaging to the credibility of such models. One who adhered to the simple quantity theory form of monetarism embodied in these specifications would not have predicted the sharp recovery in nominal income that followed the tax cut (p. 625).     

DO CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES MAXIMIZE REVENUE?

Buchanan and Lee [1982] suggest that politicians choose tax rates on the positively sloped segment of the short-run rate-revenue curve but the negatively sloped segment of the long-run curve. This paper uses recent estimates of the slope of the cigarette demand curve by Becker, Grossman and Murphy [1994] to test the hypothesis. Becker, Grossman and Murphy's parameter estimates combined with state-by-state data on key variables yields strong evidence against the hypothesis and instead suggests that marginal revenues from cigarette excise taxes are positive in every state.     

TAX RATES AND LABOR SUPPLY IN FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM

A central tenet of supply-side economics is that a balanced-budget reduction in the marginal tax rate on wage income increases aggregate labor supply. In contrast, the orthodox Keynesian analysis concludes that the relationship between tax rates and the economy-wide supply of labor is theoretically ambiguous. Our analysis of a general model reveals that these two propositions are associated, respectively, with the special assumptions of "compensated independence" and "ordinary independence" between leisure and public spending.     

INTEREST RATES, EXPECTED FUTURE DEFICITS AND TAX PROPOSALS

Several recent publications have presented evidence suggesting a negative wealth effect in response to federal deficits. This paper investigates the hypothesis that rational economic agents use the legislative process to forecast the future path of federal deficits and then act on that information. A tax legislation variable, included in a reduced form interest rate equation, is tested for significance. The legislative variable that mirrors the effects of current and past deficits is often significant.     

ON THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF LABORATORY TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENTS

An essential issue for laboratory experiments to inform policy debates is the “external validity” of the experimental results; that is, does behavior in the laboratory apply to behavior that occurs in the naturally occurring world? We examine this issue of external validity in the specific context of laboratory experiments on tax compliance, using two different types of evidence. We find that the behavioral patterns of subjects in the laboratory conform to those of individuals making a similar decision in naturally occurring settings. We also find that the behavioral responses of students are largely the same as those of nonstudents in identical experiments (JEL C9, H0, H3)     

A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EVALUATION OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM

This study provides new insights into the effects of the corporate income tax by introducing a general equilibrium model in which households choose portfolios composed of housing and non-housing assets, industries make investment decisions based on Hall-Jorgenson cost-of-capital formulas, and the corporate-noncorporate mix in each industry is endogenous. The annual efficiency cost of an unintegrated tax on corporations is found to be about 3 1/2 percent of expanded national income. This new estimate is intended to spur further investigation of individuals' demand for owner-occupied housing and firms' decisions about incorporation.