非对称信息条件下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付决策

研究了不同信息条件下业务外包的产品质量评价问题,在文献[l,2]基础上考虑购买商作为委托人和供应商作为代理人建立了业务外包的委托代理模型。其中,质量预防水平为供应商的决策变量,购买商对供应商的转移支付和质量评价水平为购买商的决策变量。本文考虑了供应商质量预防信息隐匿情况,重点研究了非对称信息下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付问题,运用极大值原理推导了购买商的质量评价和转移支付的最优解。最后结合一个农机公司拖拉机生产业务外包问题进行了仿真计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果。     

非对称信息下业务外包中的质量评价决策

研究了不同信息下供应链业务外包的产品质量评价决策问题,考虑购买商作为委托人和供应商作为代理人分别建立了他们的质量决策模型,重点研究了非对称信息下的决策问题已经变成最优控制问题,运用极大值原理推导了供应商质量预防信息隐匿情况下购买商的质量评价的最优解,并进行了仿真计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果。     

非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析

基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下供应链节点企业间如何进行质量信号传递的问题。供应商对生产过程投资水平进行决策并采取质量预防策略,为获得最优质量契约可将其生产过程水平类型以信号传递给生产商,其对接收到的中间部件或原材料进行质量评价决策和加工处理决策。运用最优化原理,构建了生产商产品质量决策控制模型,并对生产商支付的"信息租金"进行了量化的描述并进行了仿真检验,结果证明:供应商有激励性动机将其生产过程水平类型以信号传递给生产商,并提高中间部件或原材料质量水平;当生产商观测到供应商所提供的产品质量信号后,将降低其产品质量检验水平、提高加工处理水平,增加向供应商的前向支付,作为对供应商提高产品质量水平的质量奖励,同时整个供应链的联合期望收益将显著增加,并使生产商为获取供应商产品质量水平向其支付的"信息租金"减少。最后论证了供应商进行产品质量信号传递过程中"棘轮效应"的成因,并给出了以上各结论相应的定量分析与证明。     

非对称信息下建设供应链质量监督决策研究

本文研究了总承包商和分包商组成的建设供应链中总承包商在不同信息下的质量监督决策问题.以质量监督水平和工程转移支付为总承包商的决策变量,质量控制水平为分包商的决策变量,建立了建设供应链质量收益模型,运用极大值原理推导了总承包商在非对称信息下的质量监督决策的最优解.对比了不同信息环境下总承包商的质量监督决策结果和质量成本的变化,并进行了仿真计算.     

两级供应链产品质量控制契约模型分析

基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究在两级供应链中如何进行质量控制契约设计的问题。建立生产商和购买商的期望收益函数模型,生产商对其生产过程投资水平进行决策并确定其产品质量预防水平;购买商进行质量评价决策并确定其产品质量检验水平。生产商存在降低其生产过程投资水平的道德风险问题,在生产过程中将"削减投资",购买商为激励生产商提高其生产过程投资水平将支付"信息租金"的成本。购买商在进行产品质量检验决策时,存在夸大产品质量缺陷率的道德风险问题,在产品质量检验过程中将"过度检验"。运用最优化原理,求解生产商的最优生产过程投资水平、产品质量预防水平和价格折扣额与购买商的最优质量检验水平和外部损失分摊比例,并进行了算例分析,结果表明:当生产商提高其生产过程投资水平时,其质量预防水平将显著增加,购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降;随着购买商质量检验水平的提高,生产商所提供的价格折扣额先增大后减少,生产商所承担的外部损失分摊比例将会下降,其期望收益增加,购买商的期望收益将会减少,供应链联合期望收益将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的质量控制契约模型是可行的。     

质量预防水平不确定下供应链质量控制鲁棒设计模型

研究了由一个制造商和一个购买商构成的多产品、多阶段供应链质量控制鲁棒运作问题.将制造商、购买商质量收益最大和制造商交付量等于购买商订货量三个运作目标整合成目标函数,以制造商和购买商的质量运作能力限制为基本约束条件,采用基于区间分析法描述制造商质量预防水平不确定性,建立目标规划模型,并进行优化求解.模型能够实现供应链协调运作和制造商、购买商的利润目标,并且在制造商质量预防水平不确定的情况下具有鲁棒性.数值算例的结果表明,制造商质量预防水平在一定范围内波动不改变供应链的质量控制运作策略,仅对其运作性能产生一定影响,即所提出的质量控制模型是鲁棒的.     

考虑保鲜努力与数量/质量弹性的农产品三级供应链协调优化

以供应具有季节性的农产品为研究对象,研究了由农户-第三方物流供应商（TPLP）-零售商组成的三级供应链协调问题。将农产品的数量和质量损耗均视为TPLP保鲜努力的内生变量,分别建立了分散与集中决策模式下的动态博弈模型。分析表明分散决策模式下供应链各成员的决策会导致产品销售量和销售价格扭曲,严重影响供应链绩效。针对三级供应链中的两个交易过程,并基于对系统中相关决策变量的变化及影响因素分析,分别设计了成本分担和收益共享协调契约,并论证了在一定条件下该组合协调机制可以显著扩大农产品的销售量,实现供应链各成员收益的帕累托改进。最后,通过算例验证了文章结论,并分析了努力水平对不同农产品质量和数量损耗的改善程度（数量/质量弹性）对农产品三级供应链决策及协调效果的影响。     

基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制设计

针对供应链质量问题频发的现状,运用单阶段静态质量激励模型揭示了供应商质量投入动机不足的原因,并提出基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制。研究表明:在基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励模型中,博弈末期的双方最优决策与单阶段静态模型一致,即供应商的质量投入水平等于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,而博弈第一阶段的供应商质量投入水平将大于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,从而实现了零售商对供应商质量投入的有效激励。最后通过算例仿真验证了当零售商与供应商的绝对风险规避系数、随机冲击的波动增大时,基于跨期约束的动态质量激励模型的供应链总体效用要明显高于静态模型,实现了供应链绩效的帕累托改进。     

多个零售商情况下使用转移支付协调发生突发事件的供应链

考虑存在突发事件的供应链中使用转移支付合同协调供应链的问题.给出了按照时间顺序研究突发事件的两阶段模型,研究了可以协调该供应链的转移支付合同应满足的条件,给出了可以协调供应链的转移支付的表达式,分析了供应商两阶段最优决策变量以及决策变量大小与相关参数的关系.最后通过教例说明结论的有效.     

产品定价及质量投资决策序列对两级装配系统的影响研究

为研究供应链结构对供应链绩效的影响,构建了两级装配系统中质量投资与价格决策模型。分析了3种不同决策序列的纳什均衡,并从各参与方的角度讨论了其最优决策序列,即供应商先同时进行质量决策后再同时进行批发价格决策、供应商同时进行质量决策和批发价格决策以及供应商1先进行质量和批发价格决策。研究发现,集中决策优于独立决策,且价格敏感系数越低、质量敏感系数越高集中决策的优势越显著;第1种决策序列下供应链总利润最高;第2种决策序列是制造商的占优策略,但是供应商1的最差策略;第3种决策序列下供应商2的利润最低。     

New product development and the effect of supplier involvement

This study investigates the problem of new product development (NPD) under supplier involvement (SI) program in a supply chain comprising a single supplier and a single buyer. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain, configures the design quality of the product and determines the extent of SI – the degree to which the supplier is involved in the NPD project – in order to utilize the complementary capability of the supplier. The supplier in charge of production determines the level of conformance quality to design specifications. Using the principal-agent paradigm, we propose an analytical framework that investigates the role of the SI program in the NPD project, incorporating essential factors such as the R&D cost, the transactional inefficiency, the production cost, and the transfer payment. We provide rich managerial insights into the decentralized NPD practice by analyzing the equilibrium behaviors of major decision variables (design quality, conformance quality and SI extent) with respect to internal and external environmental conditions.     

Requirement or Promise? An Analysis of the First‐Mover Advantage in Quality Contracting

Quality contracting is critical and challenging due to the many unique issues related to quality. In this study, we analyze the first‐mover right in quality contracting by considering two different strategies for the buyer: the quality requirement strategy (QR) where buyer moves first by posting quality requirement to suppliers and quality promise strategy (QP) where buyer voluntarily gives up the first‐mover right to suppliers to ask them to promise quality. We study which strategy (1) better encourages suppliers' quality improvement efforts and (2) leads to a higher expected profit for the buyer. To analyze the drivers behind the buyer's choice between QR and QP, we start with the basic model where buyer faces only one supplier who has the opportunity to make quality improvements. We then gradually add other business features such as information asymmetry and supplier competition, analyzing how each feature adds/changes the driving forces and how they interact in the buyer's decision between QR and QP. We consider both the case where the wholesale price is fixed (when the buyer has the power to dictate price or price is set by the market) and the case where the wholesale price is included as a variable (when price is part of the negotiation). We find that QP always leads to the first‐best quality efforts from the supplier(s) while QR limits their efforts. However, this does not guarantee higher expected profit for the buyer under QP. We provide insightful guidelines in buyer's choice between QP and QR. This research enriches the limited literature on quality contracting with quality improvement opportunity and asymmetric information.     

The influence of financial conditions on optimal ordering and payment policies under progressive interest schemes

In many business-to-business transactions, the buyer is not required to pay immediately after the receipt of an order, but is instead allowed to postpone the payment to its suppliers for a certain period. In such a situation, the buyer can either settle the account at the end of the credit period or authorize the payment later, usually at the expense of interest that is charged by the supplier on the outstanding balance. Some payment terms, which are often referred to as trade credit contracts, contain progressive interest charges. In such cases, the supplier offers a sequence of credit periods, where the interest rate that is charged on the outstanding balance usually increases from period to period. If a buyer faces a progressive trade credit scheme, various options for settling the unpaid balance exist, where the financial impact of each option depends on the current credit interest structure and the alternative investment conditions. This paper studies the influence of different financial conditions in terms of alternative investment opportunities and credit interest structure on the optimal ordering and payment policies of a buyer on the condition that the supplier provides a progressive interest scheme. For this purpose, mathematical models are developed and analyzed.     

Supply Management Under High Goal Incongruence: An Empirical Examination of Disintermediation in the Aerospace Supply Chain

Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame supply chain disintermediation (SCD) as a principal–agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multimethod study, combining an Internet‐based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer–supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction‐cost‐based models of buyer–supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets.     

基于非对称信息理论的第三方物流合作博弈分析

假定在物流外包过程中,第三方物流服务提供商的运作能力与努力水平双因素均为非对称信息,在此基础上,建立第三方物流服务需求方(委托人)与提供商(代理人)之间的合作博弈模型;接着利用最大值原理求解得出博弈双方的合作策略;最后,在代理人为风险中性的假设下,进一步分析了物流外包方的风险成本、激励成本和总代理成本。     

非对称信息下供应链应急管理和信息价值研究

研究了非对称信息下供应链在突发事件下的应急管理和信息价值问题。当供应链生产计划已经完成后,突发事件发生并导致零售商所面临的市场需求规模以及供应商的生产成本同时发生突变,而且这些突变信息对于供应链成员而言是非对称的。分析了非对称信息对应急管理的影响以及相应的管理对策,发现非对称信息下的最优生产量不超过对称信息下的最优生产量,导致供应链系统收益减少并产生了信息价值,分析了非对称信息下供应链系统的信息价值规律以及影响因素。最后给出数值算例说明了信息在供应链中的重要价值,同时也说明了突发事件情况下实施应急管理的必要性和重要性。