LIVING IN TWO NEIGHBORHOODS—SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS IN THE LABORATORY

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, that is, behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interaction effects. Our novel design feature is that each subject is simultaneously a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members (“neighbors”) are different. We study behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group‐specific decisions that depend on their respective neighbors' decisions. We find that a majority of subjects exhibit social interaction effects both when the game has multiple equilibria in material payoffs and when it only has one equilibrium. (JEL C91, H41, K42, H26)     

Social capital and the added value of social relations

Almost all empirical research reveals that social capital is a factor that enhances public goods, but scholars are divided into two strands of thought. According to the first strand, the enhancement of public goods does not need any network of social relations, while, according to the second, enhancement depends on the existence and good functioning of relational networks, to the point that it consists in the creation of social networks. Which one is right? In order to clarify the issue, one should ask: can a social relation have any added social value? If so, how can we conceive of the added social value of social relations, and how can we measure it? The author claims that the added social value of social relations can be observed in those processes through which social capital and public (relational) goods (re)generate or elide each other. These processes can be analyzed as morphogenetic cycles that work in temporal sequences and are not circular or recursive. By adopting this perspective, we can see and measure the added social value of social relations in primary and secondary networks, leading to the emergence of public goods. The relational approach can give abundant evidence as to how and why different public goods are produced and/or enhanced depending on the different added social value of the social relations that constitute them.     

REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63)     

Public goods: An ideal concept

I see the concept of ‘a public good’ as an ideal concept defined by a pair of related characteristics: an opportunity for gain for a collectivity because of nonrivalness in consumption, where the opportunity for gain is difficult to finance because of the nonexclusion possibility. Even at that ideal level, it is impossible to present a solution able to fully realize the opportunity for gain.Given the difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution even at the ideal level, it would be surprising if an analysis of concrete instantiations of public goods would be simple. I will show that economists use at least thirteen concepts to point to economic problems related to public goods. This is more than opponents of the concept ‘public good,’ Malkin and Wildavsky, accuse the economic profession of using.I will reject the conclusion of Malkin and Wildavsky that the concept of a public good is a social construct and thus a purely culturally relative concept. I will concede, nevertheless, that in trying to realize some of the gains presented by goods having public goods aspects, social and cultural preferences play an important role. My conclusion, which justifies the ideal concept ‘public good’, implies that there is potentially a legitimate governmental role in dealing with public goods. Recognizing the socio-political dimension of economics means that one recognizes that the economic reality is complex. It does not justify, however, scepticism about concepts.     

‘Social control of the self’ and pleading guilty in criminal court

In Donald Black's 1994 work The Social Structure of Right and Wrong, he introduces the intriguing concept of the self-application of social control. According to Black, the ‘social control of the self’ follows the same principles of the behavior of law. Conceptualizing a guilty plea as a self-application of social control, this study of 717 homicide cases processed in an urban American court represents the first empirical test of this theory. Support for Black's theoretical perspective was mixed, with only the predictions regarding the effects of social morphology on the self-application of social control finding support. Defendants who were less socially integrated than their victims were significantly more likely to plead guilty when compared to other case configurations. When relational distance between parties was low, the case was significantly less likely to be resolved with the self-application of social control in the form of a guilty plea. The importance of Black's perspective for elucidating the theoretical linkages between social structure and individual behavior is considered.     

Are social networks technologically embedded?: How networks are changing today with changes in communication technology

Communication mediated by various technologies (from ordinary mail to today's Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)) provides important evidence for the study of social networks. Given that networks generate the possibility of interpersonal communication, data on technology use can provide important information on sociability. However, it is also true that personal networks not only shape, but also are shaped by technological means for communication, since these entail the re-constituting of social ties and the re-drawing of social boundaries. We use material from empirical studies carried out over the last 3 years to develop our hypothesis of the way forms of relationship change with technology. In particular, we try to understand the relationship between social networks (a set of social ties possessing one or more relational dimensions), exchanges between actors (made up of a succession of embodied gestures and language acts) and the various technical means for communication available today, which enable an exchange to be completed. Each of these three poles poses constraints on interaction, and provides resources for it, and thus all three shape the form relational practices take. Empirical data show how technological means of communication allow people to re-negotiate the constraints of individual time rhythms, and of who one communicates with. They also illustrate how the relational economy (and power) is affected by the deployment of communication technologies. Tools of communication provide new resources to negotiate individual timetables and social exchanges, making it possible to adjust roles, hierarchies and forms of power in relational economies. We argue that the general change observed over the last 20 years is from established roles to mutual reachability. The traditional communication model, where tele-communication is used to connect people who are physically separated from each other, is gradually being supplanted with a new pattern of “connected presence”. In this new mode other people are telephoned, “SMSed”, seen and mailed in alternated way and small gestures or signs of attention are at least as important as the message content itself.     

Statistical Estimation of the Casual Effect of Social Economy on Subjective Well-Being

It is well known that measuring the noneconomic outcomes produced by social economy organizations is fairly difficult and complex. Usually, social economy organizations feature participatory and democratic decision-making processes that help create social capital and relational goods, and they are interested in social integration; accordingly, they tend to create an organizational culture that encourages their workers to contribute to local communities. Therefore, the hypothesis that the increased activities of social economy organizations have a causal effect on the subjective well-being of the people living near those organizations is highly plausible. In this paper, we estimate the causal effect and attempt to test the hypothesis statistically by using a dataset called the “Seoul Survey,” which provides observations on the subjective well-being of 45,496 citizens living in Seoul and the size of social economy organizations. Controlling for variables at the district level and the appropriate socioeconomic characteristics of each individual in the dataset, we find that the size of social organizations is highly significant.     

Contemporary organizational theory: The demographic,relational, and cultural perspectives

We review three perspectives—demographic, relational, and cultural—that have dominated sociological research on organizations during the past four decades. These perspectives arose in reaction to the atomistic and rationalist–adaptationist assumptions of earlier perspectives on organizations. These perspectives have different conceptions of social structure and thus different conceptions of what creates opportunities for and constraints on action. The demographic perspective holds that social structure is constituted by distributions of social actors along salient dimensions of social and physical space; the relational perspective, by webs of social relationships; and the cultural perspective, by widely shared and patterned understandings of reality and possibility. These perspectives also have different conceptions of identity and therefore motivations for action. For demographers, identity derives from position, absolute or relative, along salient dimensions of social life; for relational scholars, from ties among individuals, groups, and organizations; and for cultural scholars, from social interaction. All three perspectives have been applied to explain behavior at five different levels of analysis: the individual, group or organizational subunit, organization, industry or organizational population, and field. Up to the 1990s, these perspectives were generally applied separately, but over the past two decades, studies have increasingly used multiple perspectives.     

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Corruption has become one of the most popular topics in the social scientific disciplines. However, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption. Models developed by different academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. The purpose of this paper is to review several major approaches to corruption and draw them closer to each other. Most studies of corruption fall into three major categories: (i) rational‐actor models where corruption is viewed as resulting from cost/benefit analysis of individual actors; (ii) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption; and (iii) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks among corrupt actors. Focusing on actors' behavior and the social context, this article explains corruption concepts taken from sociology, economics, organization studies, political science, social anthropology, and social psychology.     

Do buyers and sellers evaluate air pollution reduction differently? Experimental evidence from China

This paper is the first study to investigate the good dealness account of the endowment effect in non-market goods. We designed a within-subjects experiment to measure the value of air pollution reduction through the evaluation of a market good, PM 2.5 filters. We divided the subjects into buyers and sellers and asked them to trade four PM 2.5 filters using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction under two treatments: a) a drop in air quality, which served to increase the market price of the filters; and b) the receipt of information on the relationship between death rates and air pollution, which served to increase the intrinsic value of the filters. Our results show that buyers’ willingness to pay for pollution reduction did not increase when air pollution worsened but did increase when informed of the possibility of health damage from air pollution. Sellers’ willingness to accept for air quality deterioration increased when pollution worsened but remained the same upon receiving information about health damage. We conclude that sellers are more sensitive to changes in market price, while buyers are more sensitive to changes in intrinsic value. Our findings support the theory of seeking a good deal in explaining the endowment effect.     

Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment

Sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods games, but not indiscriminately under all conditions and in all societies, and the mechanisms by which sanctioning exercises its impact on behavior are yet to be studied in detail. We show experimentally that in the presence of sanctioning, our experimental subjects adjust their behavior in order to avoid being a free rider. They do this not only in the STANDARD sanctions treatment, where they directly experience any sanctions assigned to them, but also in our main treatment, the SECRET sanctions treatment, where no information on sanctions received is available until the end of the experiment. We observe no such free riding avoidance in the treatment without sanctioning. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation among the members of our subject pool; subjects expect that non-strategic sanctioning occurs against the free riders. Moreover, these expectations are correct as we observe a similar pattern and extent of sanctioning in both treatments. We propose that sanctioning in itself is a social norm and may be culturally dependent, as suggested in the literature.     

Commodities in action: measuring embeddedness and imposing values

Recent approaches in political economy look at the effects of technology and social values on economic action. Combining these approaches with those of economic anthropologists, this article poses that the way the economy is instituted can be understood by looking at reasons actors have for participating in actor‐networks of production, distribution and consumption. Using the author's research on American recycling, this article first shows that much of the‘making’or instituting of the economy happens outside the market, through political machinations, contracts and standards. Second, it suggests that these relationships impose value upon goods differently than do market relations. The details of the recycling‘chain’show the ways actors shape the network and demonstrate that the social values that add‘economic value’to goods are not uniform, but are highly contextual. Starting from Mark Granovetter's notion of 'social embeddedness', the article explains that the measure of social embeddedness is not as important as the values imposed upon other actors through social structure in the economy. It calls for a close observation of economic action in the locales within which production takes place to understand better the‘actions‐at‐a‐distance’where the politics of technology, social movements and power create the empirical, instituted economy.     

Financial Altruism or Unilateral Resource Exchanges? Toward a Pure Sociology of Welfare

Questions concerning the essential nature of altruism, the existence of an altruistic personality, and the genetic, biosocial, and social psychological bases of altruistic behavior have dominated theory and research on the topic. The current paper reconceptualizes financial altruism sociologically as a form of unilateral resource exchanges, or welfare. The alternative definition employs Donald Black's (1979, 2000) analytic approach to describe and explain the behavior of welfare with its location and direction in social space. The paper offers several propositions that purport to explain variations in welfare by drawing upon cross‐cultural research. In general, welfare flows in the direction of those who are less integrated and who have lower social status. In addition, welfare varies directly with intimacy, conventionality, and respectability. Finally, welfare varies inversely with relational distance, cultural distance, and group size. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of strengths and limitations of the general propositions advanced.     

Punishment and status in collective action: How status hierarchies foster optimal punishment use

I provide a brief overview of the literature on human cooperation, punishment, and social dilemmas. After reviewing relevant literature, I move on to a series of predictions, intertwining findings on punishment, public goods, and social status. Leaning on Status Characteristics Theory, I explicate how the behavioral expectations that we derive from status positions foster a means of using punishment to secure public goods. Furthermore, I argue that we carry general expectations for high status actors to punish when deemed collectively necessary. Building on this expectation, I articulate how initially status‐homogenous groups can develop status ranks on the basis of punishment behavior, allowing task groups to mimic sanctioning institutions commonly seen in public goods research and everyday life.     

Teaching and learning: an exchange of knowledge in the university among students,service users,and professors

The education system's responsibility for social workers to be is a central argument in the academic arena. The purpose of the article is to present an innovative perspective about social work education promoted for several years in the Catholic University in Milan. The education experience with students, social workers to be, gave life to a particular workshop ‘Social Work Orientation’ characterized by different and innovative activities. The experience presented focuses on relational principles such as empowerment, peer facilitation, involvement of service users, and facilitation, following the idea that teaching and learning could be a simultaneous process. Revealing is the experience of ‘service users as professors’, a meeting day in the university between students and service users, a sharing of life stories and relationships. The future social workers learn from the service users, accustoming themselves to considering the service users as people able to cope with their life situations even before enrichment with all the professional tools. The feedback collected about this experience (from students, service users, and professors) shows that the possibility to experiment from the beginning in this approach facilitates the students to become social workers oriented to empowerment and relational processes.     

LIMITS OF THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFORMATION ON THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: EVIDENCE FROM FIELD EXPERIMENTS

Previous work has demonstrated the effect of social information in the voluntary provision of public goods in the field. In this article, we demonstrate the boundary conditions of the effect. We show that when social information is too extreme, it ceases to influence individual contributions. The results highlight a natural limitation of the social information effect, and provide a characterization of the most effective levels for an organization to use. (JEL M31, H41, D64)     

Collective violence as social control

Collective violence is often social control: self-help by a group. It typically defines and responds to conduct as deviant. When unilateral and nongovernmental, it appears in four major forms—lynching, rioting, vigilantism, and terrorism—each distinguished by its system of liability (individual or collective) and degree of organization (higher or lower). Following Donald Black's paradigm of pure sociology, the central assumption is that collective violence varies with its location and direction in social space—the conflict structure. I offer ten propositions that predict and explain the likelihood and severity of collective violence in general and the four forms of collective violence in particular. Conflict structures with a high degree of relational distance, cultural distance, functional independence, and inequality between the adversaries are associated with collective violence in general. Each of the four forms depends on the degree of social polarization between the parties as well as the continuity of the deviant behavior to which the violence responds. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, August 1992, and the Centennial Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, University of Paris (Sorbonne), Paris, June 1993.     

Intimacy-mediators of the proximity-gaze compensation effect: Movement,conversational role,acquaintance, and gender

Reduction of interpersonal gaze in response to close proximity was hypothesized to be affected by four intimacy-related variables: movement (active relocation vs. static location), conversational role (listener vs. speaker), acquaintance (strangers vs. friends), and gender (males vs. females). Hypotheses were tested in a factorial experiment with 72 university students as subjects. In general, the effects of the four variables on compensatory gaze were interactive. Gaze reduction in response to a same-sex confederate's presence in a subject's personal-intimate (vs. social) distance zone was more likely for subjects with less intimate histories—males (vs. females) and strangers to the confederate (vs. friends). Furthermore, these effects were more likely when the close distance was the result of movement by the confederate from an established farther distance than when a consistently close distance condition was compared to a consistently far distance condition, and also when gaze was assessed during the subject's conversational listening periods in contrast to speaking periods. The identification of limiting conditions under which the compensatory response occurs supports a more refined conception of the intimacy-equilibrium and proxemics models of interpersonal behavior.The research reported herein and preparation of this article were supported in part by NIMH postdoctoral grant #PHS T32 MH 14588-04, held by author Breck, and by Biomedical Sciences Support Grant 40827118, to author Rosenfeld. Preliminary results were reported at the 1981 annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association in Chicago. The authors wish to thank Katherine Wu and Sonya Clark for their assistance in data analysis.     

What is the Point of Change? Change Point Detection in Relational Event Models

This paper presents an extension to the relational event model with change points (REM-CP) to study abrupt changes to social interaction behavior in temporal networks. A change point detection algorithm is proposed for exploring when and which network effects abruptly change, and a confirmatory approach to test the presence of a change point at a given moment. The effectiveness of the methodology was assessed with numerical simulations and NASA’s Apollo 13 mission data. The latter revealed dynamic communication behavior and identified time zones where most change points occurred, including around the time of the famous quote “Houston, we’ve had a problem.”     

… Do as the Romans do. A model of conformity with the endogenous formation of preferences

This note is an answer to a previous model on conformity in public goods contributions developed by Carpenter (2004), where a population evolution is allowed according to the standard replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978, Maynard Smith, 1982). To confirm his theoretical prediction, Carpenter developed an experiment showing that free riding actually grows faster when agents have the information necessary to conform. The model and the experiment are, however, inherently different, for the time scales of the model are not able to capture the short run convergence of behavior in the experimental laboratory.We here present a model of conformity which offers the same laboratory results as Carpenter without resorting to evolutionary models, and also gives agents the chance to adopt different strategies implying various levels of cooperation.