A Theory of Marital Fertility Transition

In this paper a theory of marital fertility transition that treats birth control diffusion processes and the effects of mortality decline and economic and social development on fertility within a common analytical framework is developed. Utility-cost concepts provide the means for an integrated treatment. Family size utility functions are used and the theory is focused on the effects of development and diffusion on the utilities and costs of alternative family sizes. The principal innovation lies in the conceptualization and analysis of diffusion of birth control, in which the psychic costs of violating social norms against birth control play a central role. When norms shift in favour of birth control, the psychic costs of birth control fall, causing a decline in the demand for children. In highly integrated populations this process can occur very rapidly, resulting in rapid diffusion of birth control and sudden and rapid fertility decline.     

Migration and Father Absence: Shifting Family Structure in Mexico

Despite many changing demographic processes in Mexico—declining adult mortality, rising divorce, and rising nonmarital fertility—Mexican children’s family structure has been most affected by rising migration rates. Data from five national surveys spanning three decades demonstrate that since 1976, migration has shifted from the least common to the most common form of father household absence. Presently, more than 1 in 5 children experience a father’s migration by age 15; 1 in 11 experiences his departure to the United States. The proportions are significantly higher among those children born in rural communities and those born to less-educated mothers. The findings emphasize the importance of framing migration as a family process with implications for children’s living arrangements and attendant well-being, particularly in resource-constrained countries. The stability of children’s family life in these regions constitutes a substantial but poorly measured cost of worldwide increases in migration.     

Industrialization,family and fertility: A structural-psychological analysis of the Brazilian case

This paper addresses itself to some linkages between macro-social structure (industrialization, social class), social psychological variables (husband-wife decision making), psychological variables (attitudes), and fertility. A total of 726 currently mated women with proven fertility in five Brazilian communities were interviewed to determine various attitudes, their work experience, their participation in family decisions, their fertility ideals, and actual fertility. The five communities were selected along a rural-urban-industrialization continuum to include a village, two non-industrial cities, and two industrial cities (one of which was Sao Paulo). Family size in the industrial cities was small in all social strata, while in the non-industrial cities family size was large in the lower strata and declined in the upper strata. Further analysis revealed that smaller family size is associated with generally higher levels of status among women—higher educational levels, greater social contacts and more skilled employment, and equality in family decision making. Our analysis supports the hypotheses that industrialization influences fertility through shifts in the social status of women, both in their work and at home. New education and work opportunities facilitate the emergence of modern conceptions of the role of women in society and egalitarian decision making in the family. These attitudes and patterns of husband-wife interaction are related to smaller family size ideals and lower fertility.     

基于符号互动论视角下的个体生育态度探究

近年来随着人口老龄化进程的明显加快,以及不同地区、城市出现的生育率持续走低等情况,中国未来人口数量的变化成为了一个十分重要的议题。近年来,国家先后制定了“双独生二胎”、“单独生二胎”以及全面放开二胎等鼓励民众生育的相关政策;相关学者也从人口学和经济学等视角对生育问题展开了诸多研究。本研究则是从符号互动论这一微观社会学视角出发,试图了解民众（主要集中在1970年至1995年出生的群体）生育态度是否会受到社会心理因素,尤其是从小生长的家庭环境中,兄弟姊妹等手足人数、手足关系、父母对待子女公平与否和出生排行的影响;以及当前生活环境,如社会治安状况、经济发展前景和政治稳定性等方面的主观判断对生育态度的影响;最后研究还将结婚意愿、性别等因素纳入到影响个体生育态度的分析模型之中。研究结果发现,兄弟姊妹等手足越多者,未来越倾向要生孩子;手足间关系越好者,未来也越倾向于要生孩子;排行中间的比排行老大的生孩子意愿高;无论父母对自己和手足公平情况怎样,都不会影响其生育态度。此外在所有外在环境中,经济状况是影响人们生育态度的主要因素,有结婚意愿者更倾向于生育孩子,男性也显著比女性更倾向于生育孩子。     

Private versus public old-age security

We directly compare two institutions, a family compact—a parent makes a transfer to her parent in anticipation of a possible future gift from her children—with a pay-as-you-go, public pension system, in a life cycle model with endogenous fertility wherein children are valued both as consumption and investment goods. Absent intragenerational heterogeneity, we show that a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing public pensions alongside thriving family compacts since the former is associated with inefficiently low fertility. This result hinges critically on a fiscal externality—the inability of middle age agents to internalize the impact of their fertility decisions on old-age transfers under a public pension system. With homogeneous agents, a strong-enough negative aggregate shock to middle-age incomes destroys all family compacts, and in such a setting, an optimal public pension system cannot enter. This suggests the raison d’être for social security must lie outside of its function as a pension system—specifically its redistributive function which emerges with heterogeneous agents. In a simple modification of our benchmark model—one that allows for idiosyncratic frictions to compact formation such as differences in infertility/mating status—a welfare-enhancing role for a public pension system emerges; such systems may flourish even when family compacts cannot.     

Post-disaster fertility: Hurricane Katrina and the changing racial composition of New Orleans

Large-scale climate events can have enduring effects on population size and composition. Natural disasters affect population fertility through multiple mechanisms, including displacement, demand for children, and reproductive care access. Fertility effects, in turn, influence the size and composition of new birth cohorts, extending the reach of climate events across generations. We study these processes in New Orleans during the decade spanning Hurricane Katrina. We combine census data, ACS data, and vital statistics data to describe fertility in New Orleans and seven comparison cities. Following Katrina, displacement contributed to a 30% decline in birth cohort size. Black fertility fell, and remained 4% below expected values through 2010. By contrast, white fertility increased by 5%. The largest share of births now occurs to white women. These fertility differences—beyond migration-driven population change—generate additional pressure on the renewal of New Orleans as a city in which the black population is substantially smaller in the disaster’s wake.     

Perspectives on family and fertility in developing countries

Abstract Two aspects of the family in relation to fertility in developing countries are discussed: set stratification within the family and extended family networks. As both these are central to J. C. Caldwell's theory of fertility transition, the paper is structured as a critique of his position. Drawing on examples and data from Asia, it is argued that the causal significance of sex stratification for fertility lies in the economic risks it imposes on women, deriving from their dependence on men, rather than, as Caldwell suggests, in the disproportionate gain that men derive from their dominant position within families. While Caldwell and others associate strong extended family networks of mutual obligation and support with persistent high fertility, it is argued here that such systems should, instead, facilitate fertility decline. Close-knit and strong kin networks can be viewed as alternatives to children as sources of insurance, and may facilitate fertility decline by preventing children from becoming the focal point of parental concerns for security.     

Women,Demography, and Politics: How Lower Fertility Rates Lead to Democracy

Where connections between demography and politics are examined in the literature, it is largely in the context of the effects of male aspects of demography on phenomena such as political violence. This project aims to place the study of demographic variables’ influence on politics, particularly on democracy, squarely within the scope of political and social sciences, and to focus on the effects of woman-related demographics—namely, fertility rate. I test the hypothesis that demographic variables—female-related predictors, in particular—have an independent effect on political structure. Comparing countries over time, this study finds a growth in democracy when fertility rates decline. In the theoretical framework developed, it is family structure as well as the economic and political status of women that account for this change at the macro and micro levels. Findings based on data for more than 140 countries over three decades are robust when controlling not only for alternative effects but also for reverse causality and data limitations.     

Recent changes in Negro fertility

Crude birth rates for the Negro population of the United States indicate that fertility declined while Negroes remained in the South and them climbed in the last twenty-five years as Negroes became urbanized. Cohort rates show more precisely the effects of the Depression upon childbearing as well as the magnitude and persistence of the post-Depression rise in fertility. More Negro women now become mothers, average family size has increased, and the proportion of women bearing six, seven, or eight children has risen. Negro fertility has risen despite the urbanization of Negroes and improvements in their socio-economic characteristics. Negro fertility rates present the paradox of falling when demographic transition theory would predict the maintenance of high rates and then rising when a decline would be expected. Urbanization does not appear to have reduced Negro fertility. Traditionally, urban living has dampened childbearing in two ways—first, health conditions in cities were inferior to those of rural areas, and thus urbanization affected fecundity adversely; second, city residents are more likely to know about and adopt birth control than rural residents. Negroes migrated to cities at the very time when diseases were being controlled and when public health and welfare facilities were being expanded to serve all residents. This has contributed to higher Negro fertility rates. If fertility rates are to fall because of family planning, not only must birth control be available but there must be a desire to limit family size. Such a desire may be linked to opportunities for social mobility. Negroes have not been assimilated into urban society as previous in-migrant groups were, and opportunities for mobility have been restricted. For these reasons Negroes may be slow to adopt stable monogamous families and the intentional control of fertility.     

论出生性别比失衡背后的生育意愿变迁

出生性别比失衡已经成为学界和政界共同关注的重要问题。通过运用"现存统计资料分析"的方法,对近三十年来多项生育意愿调查数据与出生性别比的统计资料进行研究与分析,发现生育意愿各要素的变迁为出生性别比失衡提供了社会心理基础,生育意愿各要素变迁的不协调性与非均衡性——理想子女数逐步减少,性别偏好持续存在,生育目的变化不大,使得生育意愿与出生性别比之间呈现出复杂关系,在生育政策、B超技术等的共同作用下,引致了出生性别比的失衡。要解决这一问题,需要调整政策,打击"两非",加强宣传教育,发展社会保障事业,促进实现真正的男女平等。     

Marital dissolution,remarriage, and childbearing

Earlier models of fertility hypothesize that marital dissolution and remarriage influence subsequent childbearing. This issue is examined by comparing the fertility of those in disrupted marriages with that of those in stable marriages. The results indicate that, by transferring women into a nonmarried status, marital dissolution decreases childbearing. The data also suggest that discord reduces fertility even before separation occurs—separated women had reduced fertility during the two years just before separation. It was found that marital dissolution without remarriage operates to truncate childbearing, thus decreasing family size. Dissolution followed by remarriage, however, lengthens the childbearing span of whites and has no influence on average family size; remarrying white women are able to make up for the childbearing lost between marriages. For nonwhites, we found that dissolution and remarriage increase the average time to childbirth, but, even more importantly, these events greatly decrease the number of children born.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Influence of Proximity to Kin on Residential Mobility and Destination Choice: Examining Local Movers in Metropolitan Areas

A growing body of research has examined how family dynamics shape residential mobility, highlighting the social—as opposed to economic—drivers of mobility. However, few studies have examined kin ties as both push and pull factors in mobility processes or revealed how the influence of kin ties on mobility varies across sociodemographic groups. Using data on local residential moves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1980 to 2013, we find that location of noncoresident kin influences the likelihood of moving out of the current neighborhood and the selection of a new destination neighborhood. Analyses of out-mobility reveal that parents and young adult children living near each other as well as low-income adult children living near parents are especially deterred from moving. Discrete-choice models of neighborhood selection indicate that movers are particularly drawn to neighborhoods close to aging parents, white and higher-income households tend to move close to parents and children, and lower-income households tend to move close to extended family. Our results highlight the social and economic trade-offs that households face when making residential mobility decisions, which have important implications for broader patterns of inequality in residential attainment.     

Evolution of fertility and mortality

Historical and current fertility trends in both Quebec and Canada as a whole are surveyed. While fertility among French Canadians was higher than that in neighboring provinces until the mid-20th century, in 1968 Quebec's crude birthrate was the lowest in Canada, and in 1972 it was 13.8 vs. 15.9 (the national birthrate). This reversal is explained in terms of the demographic transition theory, the declining influence of organized religion, and new opportunities for social mobility for minority groups. The birthrate throughout Canada is also declining. Although recent cohort studies are incomplete because women have not yet finished their reproductive years, it appears that completed family size will be lower than at any time in Canadian history. The period total fertility rate indicates an average family size of 1.8 children in 1976, but it is unclear whether this represents an actual reduction in family size or the postponement of childbearing. The sharpest fertility decline has been among women aged 35-49, but peak fertility rates have shifted from the 20-24 age group to those aged 25-29. Fertility is negatively related to education, and the lowest fertility is found among the intermediate income groups. Since the 1969 lifting of the ban on contraceptive sales and advertising, family planning activities have been stepped up. Also removed was the total ban on abortion. In 1975 there were 14.9 therapeutic abortions per 100 live births, but it has been charged that abortion standards are being applied inequitably from hospital to hospital.     

The influence of rural-urban migration on migrants' fertility in Korea,Mexico and Cameroon

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between rural-urban migration and fertility in Korea, Mexico, and Cameroon. Using an autoregressive model, the results show a significant rural-urban migration adaptation effect in Korea and Mexico, a reduction of 2.57 and 1.45 children during the entire childbearing period, respectively, when compared to a rural stayer, even after the effect of selection has been controlled. Rural-urban migration has a very small impact on fertility in Cameroon. The unexpected result for Cameroon is due to the fact that the fertility-increasing effect of urban residency on the improved supply conditions of births, such as reduced infertility, offsets the fertility-depressing effect of urban residency on the demand for births. As a result of the adaptation to urban fertility norms, the number of country-wide births was reduced significantly in Mexico and Korea over the time periods studied.     

Policy Lessons of the East Asian Demographic Transition

The usual lessons drawn from East Asia's striking experience of health and fertility transition concern the efficacy of well‐designed government programs catering to an existing or ideationally stimulated demand. An alternative interpretation sees the demographic change—and the uptake of services—as a byproduct of social and economic development together with, in some cases, strong government pressures. This article probes more deeply into this experience, seeking to identify common features of development design and administration that underlay it. The broad sequence entailed, initially, establishment of an effective, typically authoritarian, system of local administration, providing (sometimes incidentally) a framework for promotion and service delivery in health, education, and family planning. Subsequent economic liberalization offered new opportunities for upward mobility—and greater risks of backsliding—but along with erosion of social capital and the breakdown or privatization of service programs. The study is mainly focused on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea (“tiger” economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (“second wave” countries), and China and Vietnam (“market‐Leninist” economies). The period is roughly from the 1960s to the 1990s.     

Exploring the influence of precipitation on fertility timing in rural Mexico

The influence of environmental conditions on fertility decision-making is becoming increasingly important in the context of contemporary climate change. Deforestation, land availability, and environmental quality may shape decisions regarding family size, particularly in regions with high levels of natural resource dependence. This research examines the relationship between fertility timing and precipitation in rural Mexico by linking household event-history data to municipal-level precipitation measures. Even after controlling for other factors that impact fertility, in historically dry areas, households are more likely to have a child following above average precipitation, using both 1-year and 2-year prior precipitation measures. Conversely, the relationship between precipitation and fertility timing in humid areas of rural Mexico is not statistically significant. Overall, the findings reveal that the fertility-environment connection is highly context-specific and differs across climate zones in Mexico, but that fertility timing is associated with recent rainfall patterns for households in dry areas of rural Mexico.     

Determinants of national family planning effort

In light of recent research demonstrating a substantial impact of family planning programs on fertility, we develop and estimate a multivariate model of the determinants of national differences in family planning program effort (FPPE). The framework that guides the specification of this model identifies three broad classes of factors—those that create demand for family planning, those that facilitate the initiation and expansion of family planning programs, and finally those that encourage or inhibit program development. The results from multiple regression using 84 less developed countries indicate that demand for family planning, facilitating infrastructure, and certain demographic and geographic factors are important determinants of program effort. These results suggest that popular demand for family planning is helpful, but that policy makers must perceive the adverse consequences of high fertility and have the infrastructure necessary to develop an effective organized family planning program. Current U.S. policies relevant to reducing birth rates are discussed and found to reflect quite well research on determinants of fertility declines among LDCs. U.S. policy also balances the often competing claims of family planners and their opponents by encouraging support to both developmental projects as well as direct aid to family planning program activities.