移民的文化适应与生育观念调适——以宁夏吊庄移民为例

以扶贫与保护生态环境为重要出发点的宁夏吊庄移民规划,使居住在宁夏西海固地区的大量回族群众搬迁到了宁夏北部易于得到黄河灌溉的地区。伴随着这样的移民搬迁,回族群众的思想观念必然要发生变迁。在移民的各种思想观念中,生育观念的转变体现得最为直接与明显。因此,移民群众在生育观念方面的调适就显得极为重要。移民迁出地的历史传统、文化习俗以及迁入地的社会观念、价值标准,都深刘地影响着移民的生育观念。在这些因素中。迁入地城市文化的影响则是一个极为重要的因素。     

试论吊庄移民工程对回族移民生产、生活观念的影响

声势浩大的吊庄移民规划,使一部分居住在宁夏南部西海固地区的回族群众。搬迁到了距他们的原住地几百公里外的地方。伴随着这样的移民搬迁,回族群众的思想观念必然存在着变迁以及在迁入地进行调适的问题。吊庄作为沟通移民老家与迁入地——银川市的一个重要桥梁,使得移民群众在思想观念上发生的深刻变化,最终会通过文化的传播而使整个西海固地区的人们在思想意识深处．向以吊庄为平台的宁夏川区相对先进的文化产生趋同。从而最终影响到他们生活的方方面面。     

从社会人类学的视角阐释宁夏吊庄移民中出现的偏见与歧视现象

迁移者在搬迁过程中,受到的偏见与歧视问题在许多类型的移民工程中都存在。这两种社会现象的产生,可以用社会人类学的相关理论来解读。偏见与歧视问题其实反映了移民与迁入地居民在族群边界及文化认同上存在着差异。本文以银川市＂芦草洼＂地区的吊庄移民为例,采用社会人类学的视角,剖析了移民群众受到偏见与歧视的深层原因,并对解决这些问题提出了对策与建议。     

三峡移民迁移满意度的转变及其根源

三峡移民在搬迁到新迁入地后,对迁移的总体评价态度有一个从较高的满意度向较低的满意度过渡的转变。本文采用“同期群”研究方法,通过对三峡移民评价态度影响因素的回归分析,说明了三峡移民在安置地的适应过程大致可以分为三个阶段,即角色标签阶段、角色学习阶段、角色同化与比较阶段。而角色同化和比较阶段中,三峡移民的横向比较引起的相对剥夺感是三峡移民满意度变低的主要原因。     

浅析三峡库区移民过渡期的贫困问题

库区移民存在着历史性贫困。在搬迁后一段时间又面临着经济、文化、精神等新的贫困。贫困问题严重制约着移民的搬迁安置 ,从而影响国家的移民大业和库区经济的长远建设。经济上的补偿与扶持、区域文化的异地构建、精神心态的素质培育、文化教育手段的运用等都不失为库区移民过渡期贫困的解决良策。     

突出民族特色 深化婚育新风进万家活动

宁夏人口计生委结合回族聚集区特点,在全区广泛开展了婚育新风进万家活动,极大地促进了民族地区的计划生育宣传教育工作,促进了群众生育观念的转变,促进了新型生育文化的建设。我们的主要做法是:     

移民是否鸠占鹊巢?——来自迁入地公共品供给的经验证据

20世纪80年代中期以来,劳动力跨地区迁移为中国经济增长做出了突出贡献,但移民进入可能"挤占"迁入地居民享有的公共品也令许多人深感忧虑.事实上,移民进入对迁入地公共品供给的影响同时存在负向的竞争效应和正向的财政效应,而移民进入对迁入地公共品供给的净影响取决于竞争效应和财政效应规模的相对大小.使用2000-2012年地级市数据的研究发现,移民进入显著增加了迁入地医疗卫生、基础教育、道路交通、人居环境等公共品的供给,说明移民进入影响迁入地公共品供给的财政效应大于竞争效应.进一步基于回归的财政效应估计显示,在控制了财政支出及其他变量之后,移民人口占比每增加10%,迁入地财政收入占GDP的比重将会提高约1.01个百分点.     

三峡农村外迁移民的适应与融合——对上海荣明三峡移民的若干调查与思考

本文基于对上海崇明三峡移民的实地考察,描述了迁入地对三峡移民的总体安置工作以及移民在进入迁入地以后的基本生活状况,提出三峡移民的融合将是一个长期的过程,文章在结尾部分还针对相关结论对三峡移民工作做了几点思考与建议。     

中国城镇移民生育状况的初步分析

就某一具体城镇而言,城镇人口的增加不外两种途径:一是迁入,即迁移增长;一是生殖,即自然增长。但实际情况远比这种静态概括复杂得多。移民对城镇人口的增长具有重要影响,而且是一种链式反映。即以自然增长而论,既取决于原住居民的生育水平,又要受迁入者以及迁入者子女(间接迁移者)生育状况的影响。因此,研究人口迁移现象,应当把移民的生育状况、迁出地和迁入地的生育状况列为重要的研究内容。事实上,这早已成为国际人口学者深为关注的研究课题。     

水库移民长期补偿机制与移民惯习的契合性分析--人口迁移“惯习论”的视角

借鉴布迪厄的人口迁移“惯习论”,从文化的视角分析移民惯习对迁移决策的影响。阐述了移民归属感、平衡感、公平感和安全感四种惯习,构建了移民迁移意愿框架。结合长期补偿机制,分析其与移民惯习的契合性,结论表明：长期补偿机制与移民惯习契合性程度较高,移民搬迁意愿程度高。     

The fertility contribution of Mexican immigration to the United States

Crucial to the long-term contribution of immigration to a receiving country's population is the extent to which the immigrants reproduce themselves in subsequent, native-born generations. Using conventional projection methodologies, this fertility contribution may be poorly estimated primarily because of problems in projecting the number of immigrants who are at risk of childbearing. We propose an alternative method that obviates the need to project the number of immigrants by using the full sending-country birth cohort as the risk group to project their receiving-country childbearing. This "sending-country birth cohort" method is found to perform dramatically better than conventional methods when projecting to 1999 from base years both before and after the large increase in inflows of Mexican immigrants to the United States in the late 1980s. Projecting forward from 1999, we estimate a cumulative contribution of Mexican immigrant fertility from the 1980s to 2040 of 36 million births, including 25% to 50% more births after 1995 than are projected using conventional methods.     

Religiousness and Fertility among European Muslims

Based on official data on religion, national origin, and other indicators of ethnic origin, Muslim fertility in 13 European countries is higher than that for other women, but in most countries with trend data the differences are diminishing over time. Fertility varies by country of origin of immigrants. Various European survey data show that higher proportions of Muslim women are married and their commitment to traditional family values is greater than among other women. Muslim women are more religious than non‐Muslim women and religiousness is directly associated with fertility. Among Muslim women, religiousness and commitment to family values are equally important for fertility, while for non‐Muslim women religiousness is much less important.     

Immigration to the UK from High‐Fertility Countries: Intergenerational Adaptation and Fertility Convergence

The fertility of immigrants' children increasingly shapes the ethnic diversity of the population in Western Europe. However, few data are available on the fertility patterns of immigrants and their offspring. This article provides new fertility estimates of immigrants and immigrants' children by ethnic group in the United Kingdom that may provide better‐informed fertility assumptions for future population projection models. The impact of migration‐specific tempo effects on the period TFR of immigrants is analyzed. Among the results, intergenerational fertility transitions strongly contribute both to fertility convergence between ethnic groups and to fertility “assimilation” or “intergenerational adaptation” to the UK mainstream childbearing behavior. Ethnic fertility convergence, particularly marked for populations originating from high‐fertility countries, reflects in part decreasing fertility in sending countries and in part intergenerational adaptation to the UK mainstream. Higher educational enrollment of the daughters of immigrants may partly explain their relatively lower fertility.     

银川市失地农民住房问题研究

作为中国回族聚居的宁夏,近年来伴随着城市化的迅猛发展,失地农民人数连年增加。失地农民的住房问题是失地农民生存与发展中最基本的问题,同时也是党和政府需要下大力气解决的一个重要问题。以回族人口比较集中的宁夏银川为例,通过大量的实地调查,分析回族地区失地农民住房存在的问题,提出解决这些问题的对策与途径。     

Transitional stages and identity boundaries: the case of ethnic minorities in China

At the advent of the Republic in China in 1911, the minority issue took on its real dimension. Its founder Sun Yat Sen, aware of the fragility of the new Nation-State, and turning a deaf ear to the statistical evidence, tried to minimize the influence of the minorities and to enhance, in his writings and speeches, the demographic supremacy of the Hans. On the contrary, the communist regime since the very start (1949) made a full-fledge recognition (including religion as a criterionr of ethnic minorities. There are now 55 minority groups, amounting to 120 million inhabitants, almost 10% of the population. This article explores the relationship between fertility trends since 1970, as depicted in the single age and sex structures in the 1990 census, and socio-economic, cultural and religious factors. Most sinicized minorities (Manchu, Mongols, Koreans …) have more or less followed the same pace of fertility transition as the Hans, under the yoke of the tough restrictive population policy. On the other hand, fertility trends among the less sinicized groups (Tibetans, Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), have been largely at odds with the mainstream Han group. Their fertility remained high at the very moments when it was sharply reduced among Hans and decreased when Han fertility was remaining almost stable. This reflcts the fact that the Chinese authorities have conceded substantial privileges to their minorities, especially in the frontiers by relaxing the family planning policy. Religion as such does not emerge as a key explanatory variable explaining fertility differences. Hence, fertility among Moslem minorities has diverged to a great extent among the more integrated Hui minority, on the one hand, and the Turkic ones (Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), on the other. Whereas the patterns of the Hui fertility were always in line with those of the Hans, the Xinjiang populations have displayed a higher than expected fertility, which might be a demographic response to the ambitions of the central government, whose aim was to strenghten its buffer-zone in the Turkic regions by drowning them under the masses of Han immigrants. The proportion of ethnic Chinese in Xinjiang has thus increased from a mere 7% in 1953 to some 40% today. However, this proportion is unstable and likely to decrease in the near future under the impact of the higher natural growth of the Turkic populations.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

超低生育水平下的山东省区域人口老龄化趋势比较研究

“超低生育率”现象受到越来越多的关注,世界上有相当一部分国家与地区的总和生育率降低到1．5以下．已经进入了超低生育时代。在超低生育水平下预测山东省人口老龄化的变动趋势,并进行区域比较,发现不同区域的异同点。对指导山东省应对人口老龄化具有重要的参考价值和实际意义。