Drivers and Outcomes of Long‐term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships

We argue in this paper that a buyer may deliberately develop long‐term orientation as a governance mechanism to deal with risks arising from exchange hazards, and to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of a supplier. While the exchange hazards of asset specificity pose a safeguarding problem, those of market uncertainty pose an adaptation problem. We test our model on a sample of 221 procurement partnerships. Our results show that satisfactory prior history of a supplier, asset specificity of the buyer and market uncertainty are all positively related to a buyer's long‐term orientation towards a supplier. Consistent with the idea that asset specificity and market uncertainty pose different governance problems, we find that satisfactory prior history reduces the positive relationship between asset specificity and a buyer's long‐term orientation, but enhances the positive relationship between market uncertainty and a buyer's long‐term orientation. We also find that a buyer's long‐term orientation fully mediates the relationship between satisfactory prior history and a supplier's opportunistic behaviour. Finally, implications on the theory and the practices of relationship governance are discussed.     

The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short‐Term Funds

We study European banks' demand for short‐term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank's auctions for one‐week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Our analysis provides a high‐frequency, disaggregated perspective on the 2007 crisis, which was previously studied through comparisons of collateralized and uncollateralized interbank money market rates which do not capture the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on individual banks. Through a model of bidding, we show that banks' bids reflect their cost of obtaining short‐term funds elsewhere (e.g., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders. The strategic response is empirically important: while a naïve interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suffered an increase in the cost of short‐term funding, we find that, for about one third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the short‐term funding costs among banks: for over one third of the bidders, funding costs increased by more than 20 basis points, and funding costs vary widely with respect to the country‐of‐origin. The funding costs we estimate using bidding data are also predictive of market‐ and accounting‐based measures of bank performance, reinforcing the usefulness of “revealed preference” information contained in bids.     

Older and Wiser: How CEOs’ Time Perspective Influences Long‐Term Investments in Environmentally Responsible Technologies

Most theories of corporate governance argue that chief executive officers (CEOs) take less risk as they near the end of their career, and therefore are less likely to make major investments. This prediction is based on decisions related to firm‐specific benefits; however, it may not be generalizable to decisions that involve broad societal goals. In terms of societal investments, CEOs with a longer time perspective may be more likely, rather than less likely, to invest. In this paper, we argue that a CEO's future time perspective is fostered by shorter career horizons, longer tenures, higher organizational ownership and less short‐term compensation. We test these hypotheses on 150 observations from the US investor‐owned electric power generation sector over a three‐year unbalanced sample (64.3% of the population). We applied random‐effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimations to test our hypotheses, and found support for three out of four hypothesized relationships.     

Opportunism in Capital Budget Recommendations: The Effects of Past Performance and Its Attributions*

This study uses an experiment to examine the separate and combined effects of managers' loss aversion and their causal attributions about their divisions' performance on tendencies to make goal‐incongruent capital budget recommendations. We find that managers' recommendations are biased by their loss aversion. In particular, managers of high‐performing divisions are more likely than managers of low‐performing divisions to propose investments that maximize their division's short‐term profits at the expense of the firm's long‐term value. We also find that managers' recommendations are biased by their causal attributions. In particular, managers are more likely to propose investments that maximize their division's short‐term profits at the expense of the firm's long‐term value when they attribute their division's performance to external causes (e.g., task difficulty or luck) rather than to internal causes (e.g., managerial ability or effort). Further, the effects of causal attributions are greater for managers of high‐performing divisions than for managers of low‐performing divisions. The study's findings are important because loss aversion and causal attributions are often manifested in firms. Thus, they may bias managers' decisions, which in turn may be detrimental to the firms' long‐term value.     

Team‐specific Human Capital and Performance

In this paper we explore the effects of team‐specific human capital (TSHC) on performance. We do so by delineating between two dimensions of TSHC, relating to team members and the team manager, and then exploring how the two dimensions may interact in shaping performance. Employing a 10‐year panel of football teams from the English Premier League we find that team members’ TSHC has a positive and significant effect on team performance, which is positively moderated by managers’ TSHC. Our results attest to the importance of considering both the team member and team manager dimensions of TSHC, and how the performance effects of team members’ TSHC are shaped by managers’ TSHC. Our results stand in stark contrast to the dramatic reduction in managerial tenure that has characterized the English Premier League in recent years.     

Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms: The Role of (Dys)Function in Long‐term Inter‐organizational Relationships

This paper explores the dynamic interplay of formal/informal governance mechanisms, in terms of functional and dysfunctional consequences for both sides of the dyad, in long‐term inter‐organizational relationships. Using two longitudinal cases of UK defence sector procurement (warship commissioning) we move beyond notions of complementarity and substitution in governance towards a more nuanced view where the governance mix of inter‐organizational relationships can be convergent or divergent. Our findings, showing that relationships can exhibit functional and dysfunctional behaviour simultaneously, lead us to conclude that mismatches in governance mechanisms can be positive as well as negative. In building a context‐dependent understanding of governance we both summarize the (dys)functions associated with formal and informal governance mechanisms and explore their impact on relationship exchange performance over time.     

Bayesian Inventory Management with Potential Change‐Points in Demand

We consider the inventory management problem of a firm reacting to potential change points in demand, which we define as known epochs at which the demand distribution may (or may not) abruptly change. Motivating examples include global news events (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks), local events (e.g., the opening of a nearby attraction), or internal events (e.g., a product redesign). In the periods following such a potential change point in demand, a manager is torn between using a possibly obsolete demand model estimated from a long data history and using a model estimated from a short, recent history. We formulate a Bayesian inventory problem just after a potential change point. We pursue heuristic policies coupled with cost lower bounds, including a new lower bounding approach to non‐perishable Bayesian inventory problems that relaxes the dependence between physical demand and demand signals and that can be applied for a broad set of belief and demand distributions. Our numerical studies reveal small gaps between the costs implied by our heuristic solutions and our lower bounds. We also provide analytical and numerical sensitivity results suggesting that a manager worried about downside profit risk should err on the side of underestimating demand at a potential change point.     

Information‐Sensitive Replenishment when Inventory Records Are Inaccurate

Inspired by recent empirical work on inventory record inaccuracy, we consider a periodic review inventory system with imperfect inventory records and unobserved lost sales. Record inaccuracies are assumed to arrive via an error process that perturbs physical inventory but is unobserved by the inventory manager. The inventory manager maintains a probability distribution around the physical inventory level that he updates based on sales observations using Bayes Theorem. The focus of this study is on understanding, approximating, and evaluating optimal forward‐looking replenishment in this environment. By analyzing one‐ and two‐period versions of the problem, we demonstrate several mechanisms by which the error process and associated record inaccuracy can impact optimal replenishment. Record inaccuracy generally brings an incentive for a myopic manager to increase stock to buffer the added uncertainty. On the other hand, a forward‐looking manager will stock less than a myopic manager, in part to improve information content for future decisions. Using an approximate partially observed dynamic programming policy and associated bound, we numerically corroborate our analytical findings and measure the effectiveness of an intelligent myopic heuristic. We find that the myopic heuristic is likely sufficiently good in practical settings targeting high service levels.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

SHORT‐TERM E‐PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES VERSUS LONG‐TERM CONTRACTS

In this paper we compare the following procurement strategies based on their expected costs: strategic partnership, which is based on a long‐term relationship with a single supplier; online search, which is a short‐term strategy; and a combined strategy, which is some combination of the first two strategies. In addition, we determine for the online search and combined strategy the optimal number of suppliers to contact for a price quote, and analyze how it depends on the various cost and demand parameters. The main contribution of this paper is that it does not assume a single procurement strategy, but rather compares three alternatives.     

The Effectiveness of Management‐By‐Walking‐Around: A Randomized Field Study

Management‐by‐walking‐around (MBWA) is a widely adopted technique in hospitals that involves senior managers directly observing frontline work. However, few studies have rigorously examined its impact on organizational outcomes. This study examines an improvement program based on MBWA in which senior managers observe frontline employees, solicit ideas about improvement opportunities, and work with staff to resolve the issues. We randomly selected hospitals to implement the 18‐month‐long, MBWA‐based improvement program; 56 work areas participated. We find that the program, on average, had a negative impact on performance. To explain this surprising finding, we use mixed methods to examine the impact of the work area's problem‐solving approach. Results suggest that prioritizing easy‐to‐solve problems was associated with improved performance. We believe this was because it resulted in greater action‐taking. A different approach was characterized by prioritizing high‐value problems, which was not successful in our study. We also find that assigning to senior managers responsibility for ensuring that identified problems get resolved resulted in better performance. Overall, our study suggests that senior managers' physical presence in their organizations' front lines was not helpful unless it enabled active problem solving.     

LONG‐TERM PERSISTENCE

We study whether a positive historical shock can generate long‐term persistence in development. We show that Italian cities that achieved self‐government in the Middle Ages have a higher level of civic capital today than similar cities in the same area that did not. The size of this effect increases with the length of the period of independence and its intensity. This effect persists even after accounting for the fact that cities did not become independent randomly. We conjecture that the Middle‐Age experience of self‐government fostered self‐efficacy beliefs—beliefs in one's own ability to complete tasks and reach goals—and this positive attitude, transmitted across generations, enhances civic capital today. Consistently, we find that fifth‐graders in former free city‐states exhibit stronger self‐efficacy beliefs and that these beliefs are correlated with a higher level of civic capital. (JEL: O43, P16, O10)     

Constructing Interlocking Rationales in Top‐driven Strategic Renewal

Under top‐driven change, active involvement of middle managers in strategy‐making requires top and middle to find common ground. The paper offers inductive theoretical development of top managers’ role as enablers for the strategic contribution of the middle levels. Central to this role is the symbolic reorganization where the middle managers’ position is set. Next, middle managers’ operational efficiency allows their performance to be shown and increases their reputation. In consequence, the middle level can actively shape the role suggested by top management, which increases their power base. Finally, when these previous interactions escalate into a two‐way process where the middle and top management contribute to each other's efforts, interlocking rationales are achieved.     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

Understanding the Processes Underlying Inter‐firm Collaboration: Mutual Forbearance and the Principle of Congruity

This paper makes a theoretical innovation by integrating two key principles – mutual forbearance and the principle of congruity – into one general process model. It examines the micro‐mechanisms underlying the formation of a mutual‐forbearance agreement and explicates the role of time and of individual actions. We further understanding of the process of cooperation building by drawing a parallel between early stages of the formation process of mutual forbearance and cooperation, and argue that mutual forbearance may, under certain conditions, lead to long‐term cooperation or, if mismanaged, completely smother any chances of it. A prospective agreement may be put at risk when potential contributions are evaluated differently by each party and no action to mitigate the consequences is taken; even more so in a mutual‐forbearance context when the parties can only observe their counterparts’ actions through the market. Our model takes into account the micro‐mechanisms associated with the time between the actions of one entity/individual (e.g. the top manager) and the reaction of another entity/individual, the boundary conditions of the background to those actions and the alternative actions available during this time. Propositions for further exploration and implications are drawn.     

Knowledge Life Cycle,Knowledge Inventory,and Knowledge Acquisition Strategies*

For a knowledge‐ and skill‐centric organization, the process of knowledge management encompasses three important and closely related elements: (i) task assignments, (ii) knowledge acquisition through training, and (iii) maintaining a proper level of knowledge inventory among the existing workforce. Trade‐off on choices between profit maximization in the short run and agility and flexibility in the long term is a vexing problem in knowledge management. In this study, we examine the effects of different training strategies on short‐term operational efficiency and long‐term workforce flexibility. We address our research objective by developing a computational model for task and training assignment in a dynamic knowledge environment consisting of multiple distinct knowledge dimensions. Overall, we find that organizational slack is an important variable in determining the effectiveness of training strategies. Training strategies focused on the most recent skills are found to be the preferred option in most of the considered scenarios. Interestingly, increased efficiencies in training can actually create preference conflict between employees and the firm. Our findings indicate that firms facing longer knowledge life cycles, higher slack in workforce capacity, and better training efficiencies actually face more difficult challenges in knowledge management.     

Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long‐Term Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers

The well‐documented failure of the majority of acquisitions to create value is often identified in popular discussion with hostile acquisitions, whereas friendly acquirers seem to get a friendly press. The relative performance of friendly and hostile acquirers therefore warrants a rigorous empirical investigation. Clear evidence of superior value creation in hostile over friendly acquisitions allows us to judge the efficacy of the market for corporate control. In this article we examine the long‐term shareholder wealth performance of four types of acquirers – friendly bidder, hostile bidder, white knight and hostile bidder facing a white knight or another hostile bidder. For a sample of 519 acquisitions of UK target firms during 1983–1995, we estimated the three‐year post‐acquisition gains to acquirer shareholders and found that hostile acquirers deliver significantly higher shareholder value than friendly acquirers. We found that friendly acquirers with high stock‐market ratings destroyed more value than hostile acquirers with a similar rating. Friendly acquirer top managers suffered greater job losses than those of hostile acquirers, perhaps paying the price for their inferior value‐creation performance. Our study provides evidence of the superior value‐creation performance of hostile acquirers and makes the case against takeover regulatory rules that may impede hostile takeovers.     

Long‐Term Risk: A Martingale Approach

This paper extends the long‐term factorization of the stochastic discount factor introduced and studied by Alvarez and Jermann (2005) in discrete‐time ergodic environments and by Hansen and Scheinkman (2009) and Hansen (2012) in Markovian environments to general semimartingale environments. The transitory component discounts at the stochastic rate of return on the long bond and is factorized into discounting at the long‐term yield and a positive semimartingale that extends the principal eigenfunction of Hansen and Scheinkman (2009) to the semimartingale setting. The permanent component is a martingale that accomplishes a change of probabilities to the long forward measure, the limit of T‐forward measures. The change of probabilities from the data‐generating to the long forward measure absorbs the long‐term risk‐return trade‐off and interprets the latter as the long‐term risk‐neutral measure.     

Survival during a Crisis: Alliances by Singapore Firms

In this study, we focus on the under‐researched issue of how environmental shocks impact alliance survival. We draw from several different theoretical perspectives such as industrial organization economics, managerial theories of the firm (such as agency theory) and institutional theories. We argue that the relationship between the occurrence of environmental shock and alliance survival is a contingent one. Specifically, we hypothesize that the following types of alliances will exhibit better likelihood of survival: alliances that yield a balance of short‐term and long‐term benefits (scale alliances) rather than purely long‐term benefits (link alliances); alliances that lead to either cost reduction or near‐term improvement in revenue realization (marketing alliances); and alliances that bring together partners from different economic regions (those involving Western and Asian partners). Based on an analysis of 348 alliances formed by Singapore firms, we find that marketing alliances and those involving at least one Western partner indeed exhibit a better likelihood of survival during the Asian economic crisis. We conclude that alliances that can enhance revenue potential in the short‐term are more robust to environmental shocks and that alliances can benefit from an effect similar to risk reduction through international diversification.