Competitive Quality Choice and Remanufacturing

We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product, which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The IR's entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Furthermore, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM's quality choice leads to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition, we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making remanufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.     

COMPETITION IN REMANUFACTURING

We present a two‐period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition. In our model, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items. After establishing the Nash Equilibrium in the second period sub‐game, we use numerical experiments for comparative statics. OEM wants to increase L'S remanufacturing cost. Surprisingly, while L competes in the sales market, she has incentives to reduce oem's remanufacturing cost. A social planner who wants to increase remanufacturing can give incentives to the OEM to increase the fraction available for remanufacturing, or reduce his remanufacturing costs.     

电商平台资金约束下电商闭环供应链的回收决策研究

考虑电商平台独自承担服务成本还是与再造商共同承担服务成本，同时考虑电商平台是否选择贷款策略解除资金约束，本文构建了资金约束下的电商闭环供应链博弈模型。通过对四种决策模型的决策进行分析，给出再造商分担回收服务成本的条件和电商平台选择贷款的条件。文章研究表明：当电商平台存在资金约束时，再造商分担电商平台部分服务成本的同时，也分割了电商平台的部分利润，但是这对双方来说是一种“双赢”的结果。当电商平台不选择贷款策略时，自有资金越多，对再造商越有利；但是当电商平台选择贷款策略时，自有资金越多，对电商平台越有利，对再造商不再产生影响。而且，自有资金越多，再造商分担回收服务成本的比例会减小，回收服务水平提升度会减小。同时开展再造商分担回收服务成本和电商平台向银行贷款两种策略，是解除资金约束的最优选择。     

Outsourcing to a Powerful Contract Manufacturer: The Effect of Learning‐by‐Doing

The contract manufacturing industry has grown rapidly in recent years as firms have increasingly outsourced production to reduce costs. This growth has created powerful contract manufacturers (CMs) in several industries. Achieving a competitive cost position is often a primary motive for outsourcing. Outsourcing influences both the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) and the CM's production levels, and, therefore, through learning‐by‐doing renders future costs dependent on past outsourcing decisions. As such, outsourcing should not be viewed as a static decision that, once made, is not revisited. We address these considerations by analyzing a two‐period game between an OEM and a powerful CM wherein both firms can reduce their production costs through learning‐by‐doing. We find that partial outsourcing, wherein the OEM simultaneously outsources and produces in‐house, can be an optimal strategy. Also, we find that the OEM's outsourcing strategy may be dynamic—i.e., change from period to period. In addition, we find both that the OEM may engage in production for leverage (i.e., produce internally when at a cost disadvantage) and that the CM may engage in low balling. These and other findings in this paper demonstrate the importance of considering learning, the power of the CM, and future periods when making outsourcing decisions.     

New product development and the effect of supplier involvement

This study investigates the problem of new product development (NPD) under supplier involvement (SI) program in a supply chain comprising a single supplier and a single buyer. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain, configures the design quality of the product and determines the extent of SI – the degree to which the supplier is involved in the NPD project – in order to utilize the complementary capability of the supplier. The supplier in charge of production determines the level of conformance quality to design specifications. Using the principal-agent paradigm, we propose an analytical framework that investigates the role of the SI program in the NPD project, incorporating essential factors such as the R&D cost, the transactional inefficiency, the production cost, and the transfer payment. We provide rich managerial insights into the decentralized NPD practice by analyzing the equilibrium behaviors of major decision variables (design quality, conformance quality and SI extent) with respect to internal and external environmental conditions.     

政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响研究

为分析政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响,基于政府两种政策构建了外包再制造下制造/再制造博弈模型。基于博弈模型,对比分析政府两种对策对外包再制造下最优解的影响,研究主要得到：政府补贴政策可以有效提高废旧产品回收率,但只有当单位新产品碳税额度只有大于某一阈值时,政府碳税政策才会提高废旧产品回收率;政府采取补贴政策时,原始制造商通过降低单位再制造产品外包费用来获取政府补贴;政府采取碳税政策时,原始制造商通过提高单位新产品零售价格,把部分碳税转移给消费者;政府补贴政策可以同时增加原始制造商和再制造商收益;政府碳税政策可以增加再制造商收益,但只有单位新产品碳税额度大于某一阈值时,才可以增加原始制造商收益;当单位新产品对环境造成影响一定,并且单位再制造产品对环境造成影响与单位新产品对环境造成影响之比大于某一阈值时,政府补贴政策对环境造成影响最大、政府碳税政策对环境造成影响最小。     

基于市场划分的再制造许可费对定价策略的影响

研究了基于市场划分的再制造许可费对闭环供应链定价策略的影响。考虑到再制造商具有只针对于绿色消费者进行销售的高价策略和针对于全体消费者进行销售的低价策略，基于回收量约束构建了包含一个原制造商和一个再制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型，求解两类定价策略下的最优决策。分析表明存在再制造许可费取值区间，当再制造许可费在不同的区间时，原制造商将通过在闭环供应链中的领导者地位迫使再制造商决定不同的定价策略。最后通过数值分析验证了再制造许可费的取值区间以及不同许可费时的闭环供应链定价策略和利润。     

电商平台公平关切下低碳E-CLSC的决策研究

针对单一再造商与单一电商平台构成的低碳E-闭环供应链，文章构建了电商平台有无公平关切的分散决策和联合决策，并给出三种模型的最优策略。然后，分析公平关切、消费者对低碳产品的认知度等参数对决策的影响。在此基础上，对不同模型的决策进行比较分析，并设计"收益共享联合双成本共担"契约实现系统的协调。最后，采用数值分析验证文章的结论。研究表明：（1）电商平台不理性的公平关切行为不仅对再造商和系统运作不利，对自身也不利，而且不利于再造商和电商平台的合作。（2）提高消费者对低碳产品的认知度，不仅可以增加废旧品的回收量，而且可以增加再造商节能减排的积极性，有利于提高系统的经济效益和环境效益。（3）联合决策下，废旧品回收价格和碳减排水平最高，电商平台佣金最低，系统利润最优。采用文章设计的"收益共享联合双成本共担"契约可以实现系统协调。这些研究结论不仅有利于丰富完善低碳E-闭环供应链的理论基础，同时也为电商平台的决策提供理论依据。     

闭环供应链中新件制造商和再制造商的价格及质量水平竞争

综合考虑新件与再制造件的质量水平之间的内在关系、新件对再制造件的数量限制、以及不同消费者的价格敏感性差异的基础上,本文通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,采用单一的成本函数簇探讨了新件制造商和再制造商同时进入存在消费转移的市场后,如何进行质量和价格竞争,从而实现各自的利润最大化.本文还给出了新件制造商的均衡利润存在下限的充分条件.     

Offshore Remanufacturing with Variable Used Product Condition

We consider the acquisition and production decisions of a remanufacturer who acquires used products of variable condition and allocates remanufacturing activity to domestic and offshore facilities. The problem is formulated as a multicommodity network flow model with economies of scale and product obsolescence. We show that the remanufacturer's optimal strategy can be chosen from a finite set of simple policies in which each product is routed to a facility based on its condition. We then numerically investigate the impact of key parameters on optimal decisions regarding offshore remanufacturing.     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

Forecast Updating and Supplier Coordination for Complementary Component Purchases

We study a supply chain where an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) buys subassemblies, comprised of two complementary sets of components, from a contract manufacturer (CM). The OEM provides a demand forecast at the time when the CM must order the long lead‐time set of components, but must decide whether or not to provide updated forecasts as a matter of practice. Forecast updates affect the CM's short lead‐time purchase decision, and the anticipation of updates may also affect the long lead‐time purchase decision. While the OEM and CM both incur lost sales costs, the OEM can decide whether or not to share the overage costs otherwise fully borne by the CM. We investigate when the OEM is better served by committing to provide updated forecasts and/or committing to share overage costs. For a distribution‐free, two‐stage forecast‐update model, we show that (1) the practice of providing forecast updates may be harmful to the OEM and (2) at the OEM's optimal levels of overage risk sharing, the CM undersupplies relative to the supply chain optimal quantity. For a specific forecast‐update model, we computationally investigate conditions under which forecast updating and risk sharing are in the best interest of the OEM.     

Strategic Supply Chain Structure Design for a Proprietary Component Manufacturer

This paper examines the choice of supply chain structure for a proprietary component manufacturer (PCM). The PCM, who is the sole supply source of a critical component used to assemble an end product, can either provide its component to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the end‐product market (component supplier structure), develop the end product exclusively under its own brand (monopoly structure), or provide the component to the OEM as well as develop the end product under its own brand (dual distributor structure). Typically, the end products of the PCM and the OEM will be differentiated, and the OEM tends to have a capability advantage (compared with the PCM) in producing the end product. Our paper studies the impact of this degree of differentiation and capability advantage on the optimal choice of distribution structure. We then investigate how investing in component branding, enhancing the value of the end product, using alternative supply contracts, and product valuation uncertainty influence the PCM's optimal choice of distribution structure.     

Lowest Cost May Not Lower Total Cost: Using “Spackling” to Smooth Mass‐Customized Production

Consider a manufacturer who mass customizes variants of a product in make‐to‐order fashion, and also produces standard variants as make‐to‐stock. A traditional manufacturing strategy would be to employ two separate manufacturing facilities: a flexible plant for mass‐customized items and an efficient plant for standard items. We contrast this traditional focus strategy with an alternative that better utilizes capacity by combining production of mass‐customized and standard items in one of two alternate spackling strategies: (1) a pure‐spackling strategy, where the manufacturer produces everything in a (single) flexible plant, first manufacturing custom products as demanded each period, and then filling in the production schedule with make‐to‐stock output of standard products; or (2) a layered‐spackling strategy, which uses an efficient plant to make a portion of its standard items and a separate flexible plant where it spackles. We identify the optimal production strategy considering the tradeoff between the cost premium for flexible (versus efficient) production capacity and the opportunity costs of idle capacity. Spackling amortizes fixed costs of capacity more effectively and thus can increase profits from mass customization vis‐à‐vis a focus strategy, even with higher cost production for the standard goods. We illustrate our framework with data from a messenger bag manufacturer.     

Product Line Extensions and Technology Licensing with a Strategic Supplier

In many industries, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) must obtain critical components from a few powerful suppliers. To the extent that the OEMs are also concentrated, the interactions between the suppliers of critical components and the OEMs are strategic, and have implications for how an incumbent OEM chooses its product line and interacts with potential rivals. We demonstrate that, by adding a low‐end product line extension, an OEM can induce a strategic supplier to offer more favorable pricing. Moreover, depending upon the cost structure and relative performance of the product line extension, the OEM may benefit even more from the low‐end line extension if it is produced by a rival instead of by itself, even if it cannot obtain any licensing income from it. Among other things, we show that this can result in a decentralized OEM accommodating competition from rivals producing product line extensions that would not be developed in a vertically integrated supply chain. In an extension, we re‐examine the common assumption that the supplier unilaterally dictates a single wholesale price that is available to all downstream buyers. We demonstrate that, by committing to offer a “lowest available” wholesale price to all downstream buyers, a supplier can encourage an incumbent OEM to share its technology (or otherwise accommodate the entry of a rival) so that the supplier, the incumbent OEM, and the rival are all better off.     

Cost models for evaluating virtual design strategies in multicycle product families

Rapid technological change and increased competition are forcing firms to compress the time it takes to develop product families and rapidly realize innovations among successive family members (models). Competition in rapidly changing high-variety markets requires effective management of design information across successive generations of products as well as in the same product generation. This paper considers two complementary approaches to design information management: virtual design and modular design. Virtual design describes the abstraction hierarchy used to represent product function. Modular design describes the hierarchy of physical realizations of the product and leads to a group technology approach to manufacturing. An analytical model is used to describe the impact of design management strategy characterized by investment in tools and infrastructure for virtual design and group technology on product development costs. This model provides insight into the impacts on costs of the mix of standard and revised parts in a product family. Virtual design has greatest impact on cost when there is a large proportion of parts revision, while group technology has most impact on cost when large numbers of standard parts are re-used. Effective management strategy for high variety rapidly changing products should combine both of these approaches and emphasize compatible organizational methods and technology integration.     

Impact of Take‐Back Regulation on the Remanufacturing Industry

As waste from used electronic products grows steadily, manufacturers face take‐back regulations mandating its collection and proper treatment through recycling, or remanufacturing. Environmentalists greet such regulation with enthusiasm, but its effect on remanufacturing activity and industry competition remains unclear. We research these questions, using a stylized model with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) facing competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). We examine the effects of regulation on three key factors: remanufacturing levels, consumer surplus, and the OEM profit. First, we find that total OEM remanufacturing actually may decrease under high collection and/or reuse targets, meaning more stringent targets do not imply more remanufacturing. Consumer surplus and the OEM profit, meanwhile, may increase when OEM‐IR competition exists in a regulated market. Finally, through a numerical study, we investigate how total welfare changes in the collection target, what happens when the cost of collection is not linear, and what happens when IR products are valued differently by consumers.     

考虑市场细分的零售商自主以旧换新策略研究

在越来越多企业开始自主推行以旧换新业务的背景下,本文从供应链的视角出发,构建考虑市场细分和消费者效用的策略模型,研究零售商自主以旧换新策略选择及相应的供应链决策问题,着重分析市场细分和旧产品折旧程度对策略选择、决策和供应链效率的影响.研究发现:零售商的策略选择除了受产品制造成本影响外,还依赖于外部客户比例和旧产品折旧程度;当老客户占比和旧产品折旧度处于某区域时,自主以旧换新策略优于无以旧换新策略;在某些情况下,制造商的期望策略与零售商的最优策略相悖;供应链效率受客户比例和旧产品折旧度影响.此外,当老客户占比或旧产品折旧度高于某阈值时,老客户对主体的利润贡献大于新客户.本文的研究结论对企业在供应链环境下推行以旧换新政策有一定的理论指导意义.     

The Impact of Outsourced Manufacturing on Timing of Entry in Uncertain Markets

Several firms are interested in manufacturing and selling new products based on a new process technology. Before manufacturing can begin, either these Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), or a Contract Manufacturer (CM) needs to adopt the process technology, i. e., make a capacity investment in it. Due to market uncertainty, the timing of capacity investment is crucial. In such a setting, we investigate how the timing of process adoption, an important determinant of time‐to‐market, is impacted by the make/buy decision. We first characterize the optimal time for process adoption and show that this delay depends on competitive intensity, cost structure and the rate of forecast improvement. Due to differing cost structures, incentives and risks, an OEM and a CM may invest in a new process technology at different times. We show that while there are conditions where outsourced manufacturing can be advantageous for the OEM from a time‐to‐market perspective, there are also cases where the OEM would be disadvantaged. In these cases, the OEM can accelerate process adoption by risk sharing through joint investment. Finally, the right choice of CM is extremely important for an OEM that faces a short time window for product introduction: An efficient CM not only provides low costs but also rapid access to new process technologies, and therefore higher revenues.     

专利保护下闭环供应链的再制造策略研究

在专利完善市场,受专利保护的原制造商享有产品再制造的专有权利,只有获得原制造商的专利许可,第三方再制造商才能进行旧产品的回收再制造。本文分析了受专利保护下原制造商所采取的不同再制造策略:阻止旧产品再制造(N策略)、原制造商自己再制造(O策略)和许可第三方再制造商进行再制造(A策略),并建立了由零售商负责旧产品回收的闭环供应链模型。通过比较发现,只有在第三方再制造商处理旧产品的节省成本足够低时,受专利保护的原制造商才会选择许可第三方再制造商进行旧产品再制造。