Rule utilitarianism,rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility.The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior.     

Implementation without rationality assumptions

Hurwicz (Social Choice and public decision making. Essays in honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986) was the first to study an approach to implementation theory based on choice functions instead of preference relations. We argue that the solution concept used by him, the generalized Nash equilibrium, is not really compatible with the idea that individual behavior is describable by a choice function. A new solution concept that better fits the choice function framework is then introduced. Using this, we investigate what behavioral assumptions are needed for the full characterizations of Nash implementable social choice correspondences to still hold. We will show that a condition known as Property α is central.     

Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness

We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity.     

Adolescents with an entity theory of personality are more vigilant to social status and use relational aggression to maintain social status

The present research proposed that one social‐cognitive root of adolescents' willingness to use relational aggression to maintain social status in high school is an entity theory of personality, which is the belief that people's social status‐relevant traits are fixed and cannot change. Aggregated data from three studies (N = 882) showed that first‐year high school adolescents in the United States who endorsed more of an entity theory were more likely to show cognitive and motivational vigilance to social status, in terms of judgments on a novel social categorization task and reports of goals related to demonstrating social status to peers. Those with an entity theory then showed a greater willingness to use relational aggression, as measured by retrospective self‐reports, responses to a hypothetical scenario, and a choice task. Discussion centers on theoretical and translational implications of the model and of the novel measures.     

What Hindu Sati can teach us about the sociocultural and social psychological dynamics of suicide

By leveraging the case of Hindu sati, this paper elucidates the ways in which structure and culture condition suicidal behavior by way of social psychological and emotional dynamics. Conventionally, sati falls under Durkheim's discussion of altruistic suicides, or the self‐sacrifice of underindividuated or excessively integrated peoples like widows in traditional societies. In light of the fact that Durkheim's interpretation was based on uneven data, nineteenth century Eurocentric beliefs, and a theoretical framework that can no longer resist modification and elaboration, by reconsidering sati it is possible to sketch a new model that strengthens Durkheim's theory by making it more robust and generalizable. The following model is built on five principles. First, integration and regulation are not distinct causal forces, but overlapping contextual conditions. Second, to better explain the variation in suicidality across time and space, we must also pay attention to culture as it provides the underlying meanings of suicide that can increase the odds a person or class of persons become suicidal or are protected against suicidality. Third, structure still matters, but in many cases, the role power and power‐differentials play must be considered. Fourth, understanding why and how people choose suicide depends on incorporating identity and status processes. Fifth, because the expression of social emotions like shame are patterned by structural and cultural conditions, to understand how suicidality is socioculturally patterned we must further explore the link between identity/status, social emotions, and structure and culture.     

Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational Choice Theory versus the 'Culture of Now'

The rational choice theory of crime and its cognate field of study, situational crime prevention, have exerted a considerable influence in criminal justice policy and criminology. This article argues that, while undeniably useful as a means of reducing property or acquisitive crime, rational choice‐inspired situational crime prevention initiatives are limited when it comes to offering protection against a growing number of so‐called ‘expressive crimes’. Developing this critique, the article will criticize the sociologically hollow narrative associated with rational choice theories of crime by drawing on recent research in social theory and consumer studies. It argues that the growing tendency among many young individuals to engage in certain forms of criminal decision‐making ‘strategies’ may simply be the by‐product of a series of subjectivities and emotions that reflect the material values and cultural logic associated with late modern consumerism.     

Deservingness in the eye of the beholder: A vignette study on the moderating role of cultural profiles in supporting activation policies

People support welfare policy if its beneficiaries are perceived as deserving of support. This study found that individuals’ cultural worldviews play a role in assessing the deservingness of welfare recipients. We investigated whether four different cultural profiles find some beneficiaries to be more deserving than others and how this relates to support for social rights (welfare benefit, retraining, job coach) and obligations (mandatory volunteering). A Dutch vignette experiment showed that reasons for supporting social rights differ between people with different cultural profiles: equality advocates grant support if beneficiaries are needy, while the centre and trusting groups do so when beneficiaries reciprocate. We found that irrespective of deservingness, people with equality‐advocating and trusting profiles tend to be more supportive of social rights, whereas socially discontented citizens tend to emphasise the importance of obligations. In general, obliging beneficiaries to do volunteer work was deemed appropriate by almost all respondents in the study, whereas their cultural values determined the ways in which they considered social rights to have been earned.     

Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory

This paper discusses aspects of the theory of social choice when a nonempty choice set is to be determined for each situation, which consists of a feasible set of alternatives and a preference order for each voter on the set of nonempty subsets of alternatives. The individual preference assumptions include ordering properties and averaging conditions, the latter of which are motivated by the interpretation that subset A is preferred to subset B if and only if the individual prefers an even-chance lottery over the basic alternatives in A to an even-chance lottery over the basic alternatives in B. Corresponding to this interpretation, a choice set with two or more alternatives is resolved by an even-chance lottery over these alternatives. Thus, from the traditional no-lottery social choice theory viewpoint, ties are resolved by even-chance lotteries on the tied alternatives. Compared to the approach which allows all lotteries to compete along with the basic alternatives, the present approach is a contraction which allows only even-chance lotteries.After discussing individual preference axioms, the paper examines Pareto optimality for nonempty subsets of a feasible set in a social choice context with n voters. Aspects of simple-majority comparisons in the even-chance context follow, including an analysis of single-peaked preferences. The paper concludes with an Arrowian type impossibility theorem that is designed for the even-chance setting.     

Understanding Multiple Group Identities: Inserting Women into Cultural Transformations

The study of cultural transformations in the United States has been studied predominantly from an assimilation/acculturation framework. There are several drawbacks to this theoretical perspective, chief among them being the exclusion of gender in examining what happens to different ethnic/racial groups when they come into contact. Feminist writings in the last twenty years provide a rich discussion of how inserting women into this social process would enrich our knowledge about human behavior in general and cultural change specifically. This paper reviews the literature on the assimilation/acculturation framework and integrates the most recent developments in feminist theory to provide a new alternative to studying cultural transformations. The social engagement model takes into account gender as well as other significant social identities like ethnicity/race, class, and sexuality to study how groups change as they come into contact with each other.     

Moral decisionism and its discontents

Decisionists use decision/choice concepts to understand and represent X: bees, Deep Blue, and Ron Carter make decisions. Explicit decisionists argue that X should be understood and represented using decision/choice concepts: it's correct to speak of bees', computers', and jazz improvisers' decision‐making. Explicit anti‐decisionists disagree: bees, computers, jazz improvisers, algorithms, and drug addicts aren't correctly understood and represented as decision‐makers. Sociologists look at decisionism and explicit decisionism as social phenomena, which show up in discourses, practices, technologies, and organizations. I make a contribution to the sociology of decisionism and the sociology of morality by examining three kinds of explicit moral anti‐decisionism: Murdochian, sociological/structural, and Confucian/Daoist. I show why these discontents are discontent, what theories and evidence they draw on, what assumptions they make, and how they conceive of morality without decision/choice concepts. Then, I consider how moral anti‐decisionism might matter, how the sociology of decisionism might matter, and where to go from here (if anywhere).     

Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting

In social choice theory there has been, and for some authors there still is, a confusion between Arrow'sIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and somechoice consistency conditions. In this paper we analyze this confusion. It is often thought that Arrow himself was confused, but we show that this is not so. What happened was that Arrow had in mind a condition we callregularity, which implies IIA, but which he could not state formally in his model because his model was not rich enough to permit certain distinctions that would have been necessary. It is the combination of regularity and IIA that he discusses, and the origin of the confusion lies in the fact that if one uses a model that does not permit a distinction between regularity and IIA, regularity looks like a consistency condition, which it is not. We also show that the famous example that proves that Arrow was confused does not prove this at all if it is correctly interpreted.     

Analysis of Intertemporal Choice: A New Framework and Experimental Results

This paper reports the results of a series of experiments examining intertemporal choice. The paper makes three contributions: First, it presents a new analytic device, the intertemporal choice triangle, which is analogous to the Marschak--Machina choice triangle used in the analysis of choice under risk. Second, we have developed a new experimental design based on the intertemporal choice triangle which allows subjects greater flexibility in making choices, and which allows the researcher to make more subtle inferences, than are possible with designs previously employed. Subjects are able to create their most-preferred outcome in each choice situation by choosing a constrained linear combination of two extreme options. Third, our results show that while subjects do not typically maximize present value, they are significantly influenced break by present value considerations. We refer to this finding as it present value-seeking behavior. We find only weak evidence of several previously documented intertemporal choice anomalies in our framework.     

Social choice in a sequential environment

In a recent paper [2] we presented a model of societies. In the context of that model, we argued that in the field of social choice it is necessary to consider some type of cardinal utility indices if we want to develop a sensible analysis. The main purpose of the present article is to complete and extend an argument initiated in Section 5 of [2] by giving a rigorous formulation and proof of a theorem informally discussed there.To formulate rigorously our theorem a concept of impersonality is introduced that appears to be more general than those which have been used in the economic literature.Our arguments concerning the need to use cardinal utility indices in the field of social choice are shown to be similar to those used by the proponents of decentralization in the controversy regarding centralization and decentralization as alternative ways of organizing the economic activity of a society.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Econometric Society Winter Meeting held in Toronto, Canada, December 1972.     

Social Work As The Privatized Solution of Public Ills

Summary This paper takes the motivation of the social work recruit asthe point of departure for an exploration of some aspects ofthe low-key politics of social work. Attempting to cut paststereotypical and occupationally agreed conceptions of why socialworkers enter their occupation, it suggests that the socialwork recruit's choice is most usefully understood as an attemptedsolution to central cultural problems in advanced capitalistsocieties, and it directs attention to the moral-political rootsof social work. While the choice of social work as a careerrepresents for some a sort of primitive political rebellion,the implications of this 'rebellion' are not grasped, and itbecomes the privatized solution of a privileged minority     

Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises

A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, smallest or largest) distance from some reference point. We explore the workability and the limits of metric rationalization in bargaining theory where compromising is a core issue. We demonstrate that many well-known bargaining solutions are social compromises with respect to reasonable metrics. In the metric approach, bargaining solutions can be grounded in axioms on how society measures differences between utility allocations. Using this approach, we provide an axiomatic characterization for the class of social compromises that are based on p-norms and for the attending bargaining solutions. We further show that bargaining solutions which satisfy Pareto Optimality and Individual Rationality can always be metrically rationalized.     

The social economy of excluded families

Families with material, social and cultural resources can be seen as triply advantaged, while those without are thrice disadvantaged. The authors contend that families' connectedness or exclusion from their communities, and the processes that marginalize or substantially exclude families from the benefits of the wider society, are among the most important dimensions for practice in the family services field. Using selected theory relating to individuals and families in society, this paper proposes a conceptual framework for understanding all families in their social economy, with special attention to families who experience material, social and cultural poverty. These families are vulnerable to becoming excluded families, not only propelled into a survival mode of living that evokes distinct skills and strengths in family members, but also has profound deleterious effects on both children and their parents. When child and family services encounter these excluded families, they need to respond with complex linked strategies at individual, family, network and policy levels.     

Rules of behavior and expected utility theory. Compatibility versus dependence

Conclusions We have seen that many decision rules which are intuitively and/or empirically supported and compatible with MEU, are compatible with it but not dependent on it.There are of course rules of behavior which are implied in MEU and also depend on it like this:If the hope of winning any of the prizes in a lottery motivates you to buy a ticket, and if you win half the amount of the highest prize, you should play double or nothing with your prize.Suppose you would prefer a one in a million chance of winning $2 million to a two in a million chance of winning $1 million, but your first choice is not available so you buy a ticket for $1 million. If you win, you should play 50–50 double or nothing with your prize. Generalize: put x in the place of $1 million and p in the place of 1/1 000000, and test yourself against this principle (Pf = preferred to): (p, 2x)Pf(2p, x) (0.5, 2x)Pf(1, x).See Friedmann and Savage (1968).In the real world lotteries are multiprize, i.e., composite games of elements like these. The same applies: If you would not have preferred the highest prize exchanged for a higher probability of some lower prize, then winning a lower prize would put you in the market for some simple bet like above. If you stand up to this test, you are a unique person because, as we know, such bets are not made.While in the process of finishing the final draft, I got hold of (Samuelson, 1983). He expresses grave doubts as to what he calls the dogma of Expected Utility maximizing. In a somewhat apologetic way, he preserves some formulations deriving behavior from EUM because, as he states in a general way, they do not depend on that particular dogma. More specifically: many models incompatible with EUM imply risk aversion, which would result also from maximizing the expectation of a concave utility function,In view of the authoritarian disposition of some of the strongest defenders of EUM and of Samuelson's (well deserved) authority and his leading role in the school of EUM theory, his open expression of doubt may well mark the beginning of the last chapter in the history of the rise and fall of the most powerful school that has so far been active in 20th century decision theory.     

Cultural evolution

In this paper I consider the problem of man's evolution - in particular the evolutionary problems raised when we consider man as a cultural animal as well as a biological one. I argue that any adequate cultural evolutionary theory must have the notion of adaptation as a central concept, where this must be construed in a fairly literal (biological) sense, that is as something which aids its possessors (i.e. men) to survive and reproduce. I argue against theories which treat adaptation in a metaphorical sense, particularly those speaking of the adaptation of cultures without reference to men. Iron tools per se are not better adapted than bronze tools - it is the men with iron tools who are better adapted than men with bronze tools. I show that by taking the approach that I do, one can apply at once in a fruitful manner some conclusions of biological evolutionary theory directly to men and their cultures. I conclude with a brief discussion of methodological issues raised by cultural evolutionary theories, particularly those of confirmation and falsification.     

Greater Downside Risk Aversion

Although investors are concerned foremost with mean and variance, they are also sensitive to downside risk. In this paper, we introduce an index of downside risk aversion to distinguish risk aversion from higher-order aspects of risk preference, including prudence. We show that the index of downside risk aversion S increases with monotonic downside risk averse transformations of utility, thereby directly linking S to the definition of downside risk aversion introduced by Menezes et al. (American Economic Review, 70, 921–932, 1980). Although the index S applies equally to risk averse and risk loving decision makers, for a given positive degree of risk aversion, S is greater when the index of prudence is greater and vice versa.