Targeting occupations with varying reputations to increase tax revenue

If the government's goal is to raise tax revenue in a cost-effective manner, which (if any) occupation categories could be targeted with a higher probability of an audit to yield increased revenue? Looking beyond mere opportunity to evade (e.g., self-employment) and starting from the premise that taxpayers in certain occupations evade more than others, the issue is whether these taxpayers respond to a change in the audit rate. Theory suggests that compliance increases in response to higher audit rates; the occupations with the higher evaders could therefore be targeted. This theory is tested by drawing a connection between occupation, reputation, and tax compliance. We assume that taxpayers in occupations with high need for reputation respond to a lower extent to increased tax audits than taxpayers whose achievement does not depend on reputation. The results support the effectiveness of raising tax revenue by targeting specific occupations, non-managers, with a higher probability of an audit.     

Oversight and accountability in the social auditing industry: The role of social compliance initiatives

The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse led to increased awareness of abusive working conditions in the garment industry. Much attention has since been paid to the role and responsibility of retailing companies. The responsibility of social auditing companies, however, has often been overlooked. The authors investigate the systems in place to detect and address substandard auditing that fails to detect violations of workers' rights. They find that, in practice, oversight of social auditors and sanctions for substandard audits are both limited. In this light, this article explores how social compliance initiatives can play a role in improving verification of audit quality and ensuring accountability.     

The backfiring effect of auditing on tax compliance

Using country-level data from 2003–2014, we examine the association between auditing level (measured as number of verification actions taken by tax authorities per 100 taxpayers in each country) and tax compliance (measured as business executives’ perception of tax evasion). Our hypothesis is that compliance increases until a certain auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an elevated auditing level backfires). In line with our expectation, the results of a series of tests indicate that there is a U-shaped association between auditing and tax evasion. We discuss how a potential backfiring effect may depend on the extent to which compliance is voluntary.     

Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers. We compare the bounded rule to the widely studied flat-rate rule, where taxpayers are informed that they will be audited with a constant probability. The experimental evidence shows that, as theoretically predicted, the bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as the flat-rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a higher level of compliance when strategic uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also induces distinctive tax evasion dynamics compared to the flat-rate rule. The results suggest that increasing the level of strategic uncertainty among taxpayers could be an effective device to deter tax evasion.     

Misperception of chance and loss repair: On the dynamics of tax compliance

Previous experimental studies on tax behavior have been particularly concerned with determining the absolute effect of detection rate and punishment on tax filing, leading to mixed results. In this paper, we shed some additional light on the effectiveness of audit probability and sanctions by drawing upon a dynamic setting with particular focus on the time lag between audits. Our results showed that tax compliance decreased immediately after a random audit, suggesting that subjects were prone to misperception of chance. Sanctions decreased compliance to a lesser extent; they were, however, associated with the tendency of subjects to repair their losses by increasing their capital stock.     

AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward-looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JEL H26, C91)     

Community and anti-poverty targeting

The standard theory of anti-poverty targeting assumes individual incomes cannot be observed, but statistical properties of income distribution in broadly defined groups are known. ‘Indicator targeting’ rules are then derived for the forms of transfers conditioned on group membership of individuals. In this literature the motivating notion of a ‘group’ is purely statistical, even when it is groups such as localities and ethnicities. We focus instead on groups which are ‘communities’, meaning thereby collections of individuals who have access to community-specific public goods, from which non-members are excluded. Such differential access constitutes a source of inequality among poor individuals belonging to different communities, which is not captured by monetary earnings. We show that this formulation of what constitutes a group changes many of the basic results of the indicator targeting literature. Optimal targeting for poverty alleviation leads to seemingly paradoxical rules, such as targeting transfers to the community that is richer. Total wealth of non-poor members of a community and its distribution both become relevant for specifying optimal indicator targeting rules. In addition, a poverty measure that is sensitive to the community identities of poor individuals, yet defined on nominal incomes, may be incompatible with some of the basic axioms in the standard literature on poverty measurement.     

地方政府审计职能软化问题研究

政府审计是对权力的监督和制约,现阶段,我国地方政府审计面临的发展困境主要是审计职能软化问题,针对地方政府审计存在的主要问题,剖析原因,从多角度提出解决审计职能软化的对策。     

Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance

The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics – including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty – and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations.     

Citizenship and power in an agent-based model of tax compliance with public expenditure

In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers’ compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed “citizenship”. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents.The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different “societies”. We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of taxpayers’ traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more important than the latter.     

Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational Perspective

Using an aggregate-level model of Supreme Court–circuitcourt interactions, this study assesses the extent to whichthe Court's auditing process of circuit court outputs is shapedby organizational dynamics such as structural capacity, institutionalization,and demographic characteristics. Principals in organizationalhierarchies must audit the behavior of their agents to ensurethat the agents are faithfully complying with the principals'preferences. In the case of the Supreme Court, such auditingactivities must take place in the face of very limited institutionalcapacity on the Court's part. We propose that the Court considerscertain broad organizational and institutional characteristicsat the circuit level when performing this task. In particular,we find that the Court strategically allocates its limited institutionalresources to audit decisions to respond to its recent interactionswith individual circuits in past terms, the circuits' internaldecision-making dynamics (including dissent and reversal rates),and goal conflict between the circuit and the Supreme Court.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COMPLIANCE AND LEVERAGE IN AUDITING AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Evidence suggests that individuals often comply with regulations even though the frequency of inspections and audits is low. We report a laboratory experiment based on the dynamic model suggested by Harrington (1988) to explain this puzzle in which participants move between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity of fine. Enforcement leverage arises in the Harrington model from movement between the groups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance. We find that compliance behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts. A simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimal behavior. (JEL C91, Q20, Q28 )     

Counting the cost of difference: a reply to Sullivan

ABSTRACT

Counting the Cost of Difference’ replies to Alice Sullivan’s piece on gender auditing in the UK Census. While Sullivan argues that the proposed changes to audit gender identity will dilute the meaning of ‘sex’ and thus the needs of women, I suggest that auditing on self-declared gender in Census 2021 signals a move towards the further recognition that gender is fluidly and diversely experienced and practiced in contemporary society. This should, I suggest, be welcomed rather than feared by feminist thinkers.     

Honesty or dishonesty of taxpayer communications in an enforcement regime

In many settings the true likelihood of capture when engaging in an illegal activity, such as tax evasion, is not well known to an individual. “Official” statements from the tax administration regarding enforcement effort provide some information. In addition, “informal”, or “unofficial”, communication among taxpayers can supplement these official announcements, but individuals do not know with certainty whether such unofficial information is honest (or accurate) versus dishonest (or inaccurate). We examine the truthfulness of an individual’s revelation of unofficial information to other individuals, along with the factors that affect any revelation, focusing on the intrinsic motivations for revelations. Our experimental design allows us to examine the type and the honesty of messages that an individual chooses to send to other individuals regarding their own audit outcome and their own compliance behavior. Our results indicate that most individuals send accurate messages about their own audit outcomes and their own compliance behaviors. Nevertheless, many individuals are also systematically dishonest about being audited; that is, we observe a significant tendency for individuals to claim that they were audited when they were not. We also observe a strong interaction between individuals’ audit outcomes and their compliance behaviors, so that individuals who engaged in tax evasion and who were audited were more truthful in their communications than those whose tax evasion went undetected.     

Equity versus equality: Spectators,stakeholders and groups

Justice figures prominently in a wide variety of economically important contexts that involve both third parties and involved parties, e.g., in environmental regulation, international trade, and legal proceedings. The primary rivals for fairness rules over the distribution of a fixed good are equality and equity (i.e., allocations that are proportional to contributions). This paper reports the results of a dictator experiment in relation to a large variety of factors that might affect these rules, including performance on a real effort task, in-group identity, subject pools, allocative power, cultural orientation and demographic variables. We find impersonal third parties (i.e., Spectators) allocating anonymously for others favor equity. Subjects who share personal stakes anonymously with recipients (i.e., Stakeholders) allocate amounts between equity and equality. Stakeholders, who meet and communicate with their recipients (i.e., In-groups), allocate even more equally than anonymous stakeholders to their own recipients and behave more selfishly toward other subjects (i.e., Out-groups). These findings are robust with respect to subject pool, a measure of culture, and demographic variables, which seldom matter. We conclude that there is considerable agreement about these fairness rules, when parties are well informed, although there remain important differences across subject pools in the willingness to act on those rules.     

Performance Management and the Stifling of Academic Freedom and Knowledge Production

In an era of neoliberal reforms, academics in UK universities have become increasingly enmeshed in audit, particularly of research ‘outputs’. Using the data of performance management and training documents, this paper analyses the role of discourse in redefining the meaning of research, and in colonizing a new kind of entrepreneurial, corporate academic. The new regime in universities is characterized by slippage between the audit and disciplinary functions of performance management. We conclude that academic freedom is unlikely to emerge from a system which demands compliance with a regime of unattainable targets and constant surveillance.     

Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability through the Ethical Audit Regime

Over the past two decades multinational corporations have been expanding ‘ethical’ audit programs with the stated aim of reducing the risk of sourcing from suppliers with poor practices. A wave of government regulation—such as the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (2012) and the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015)—has enhanced the legitimacy of auditing as a tool to govern labor and environmental standards in global supply chains, backed by a broad range of civil society actors championing audits as a way of promoting corporate accountability. The growing adoption of auditing as a governance tool is a puzzling trend, given two decades of evidence that audit programs generally fail to detect or correct labor and environmental problems in global supply chains. Drawing on original field research, this article shows that in spite of its growing legitimacy and traction among government and civil society actors, the audit regime continues to respond to and protect industry commercial interests. Conceptually, the article challenges prevailing characterizations of the audit regime as a technical, neutral, and benign tool of supply chain governance, and highlights its embeddedness in struggles over the legitimacy and effectiveness of the industry-led privatization of global governance.     

Briefly Noted

A federal audit of opioid treatment programs (OTPs) — methadone clinics — in New York City found that of 115 random sample claims, 35 did not comply with Medicaid requirements, and that of 598 claims in a non‐random sample, 299 were billed in error. Extrapolating these errors, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) says the state improperly claimed at least $39.3 million in the federal share of Medicaid reimbursement, and owes that money back. Improper claims were mainly due to failure to record patients in the central registry, which exists to make sure patients aren't enrolled in multiple OTPs (18 of the 35 noncompliant claims). This was not an audit alleging fraud. Extrapolation as an accounting method for OTPs, where patients often come in every day, so that each patient has more than 300 claims a year, is questionable, but OTPs are used to this even in state audits. In other words, one OTP patient comes in six days a week, with six claims, and the database balloons. “You're extrapolating over our universe, and our universe becomes large because people come in for medication,” said Allegra Schorr, president of the Coalition of Medication‐Assisted Treatment Providers and Advocates, a New York–based membership organization, and board member of the American Association for the Treatment of Opioid Dependence. “When you're just trying to get money, this counts,” said Schorr. “They hit the lottery when it comes to an audit because of that extrapolation.” However, Schorr, who is also an owner and vice president of West Midtown Medical Group, a Manhattan‐based group that was the first OTP to dispense buprenorphine in New York state, stresses that compliance is always important. “It's critical that there is oversight,” she told ADAW. Meanwhile, the state is reviewing the audit and will respond. “The Office of Addiction Services and Supports (OASAS), in partnership with the NYS Office of Medicaid Inspector General, intends to review the specific findings of this audit cited by OIG [Office of Inspector General] to verify its accuracy and to determine an appropriate course of action,” said Evan Frost, spokesman for OASAS. “As a proactive measure, we will remind our OTP providers of their obligations to comply with state and federal laws and rules for providing and claiming Medicaid reimbursement and ensuring the quality of care for those receiving OTP services.” OA SAS regulates OTPs in the state. For the audit, go to https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region2/21701021.pdf     

Learning in experiments: Dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion

While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.     

The conduct of program evaluation reviews in the general accounting office

Professional behavior during the General Accounting Office's (GAO's) present era of oversight can best be understood by reviewing the audit types that populate village life in the GAO and the repertoire the office uses in conducting program evaluation audits. Four types of auditors are present, each of which has a role to play in the audit repertoire. This repertoire focuses on finding faults in government programs in order to catch or sustain congressional interest in GAO's work. The “audit trail” of each report may last up to 3 years and involves considerable organizational strife and conflict with outside groups. To sustain themselves through this arduous auditing process, auditors have developed a creed through which they conceptualize themselves as an elite with a mission to insure good government.