公共投资、经济增长与腐败的相关问题研究

投资是社会经济发展的动力 ,但腐败的存在 ,极大地影响了投资的绩效和经济发展的质量 ,在公共投资领域的表现尤为明显。为了提高公共投资推动经济增长的绩效 ,必须剔除或弱化腐败对公共投资的消极影响 ,要求在公共投资项目决策与实施过程中 ,设置有效的腐败预防制度     

Do economic growth and institutional quality reduce poverty and inequality in West Africa?

Over the past two decades, the West African region has experienced much faster economic growth than other parts of the world. However, despite this economic upturn, the region has continued to experience high levels of inequality and poverty, yet economic growth is considered to be one of the main drivers of poverty reduction. An interesting literature indicates that local conditions may limit the expected effects of economic growth on poverty and income inequality. In this study, we are interested in the role of institutional factors that have been largely ignored in explaining poverty reduction and inequality outcomes in this region. Thus, this study empirically examines the role of economic growth and institutional quality on inequality and poverty reduction in West Africa. Using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), our results show that economic growth remains a necessary condition for poverty reduction and that the overall improvement in the quality of institutions contributes significantly to reducing poverty and income inequality in the long term. This contribution is made in particular through the improvement of democratic institutions, the alleviation of bureaucratic constraints, the quality of the judicial and regulatory system, the control of corruption and the quality of government stability. Furthermore, we show that improvements in the judicial system, low levels of corruption and better bureaucratic quality happen to be prerequisites for economic growth to significantly reduce income inequality. These results therefore call on policy makers in the West African region to improve their institutional framework and especially these dimensions with a view to enabling the region citizens to improve their living conditions.     

市场化改革与腐败治理：基于微观案件数据的实证分析

随着市场化改革的深入，中国的腐败现象也呈增长趋势。本文通过对1993—2013年3 843个腐败案件的分析发现，那些具有配置资源权力的官员出现腐败问题的可能性更大，程度也更严重。这一效应在官员的任职领域正处于市场化改革阶段时被放大，但随着改革的完成而大幅度减小。市场化过程中腐败问题的制度性根源在于市场化改革没有完成或不彻底的市场化，而不是市场化本身。因此，只有坚持市场化改革，才能清除权力寻租的土壤，进而遏制腐败问题。     

惩罚机制对阻断腐败循环的演化博弈分析

腐败循环是一种典型的社会困境问题,其根源在于反腐败组织无法打破腐败利益交易双方在长期博弈中形成的稳定均衡态势。通过演化博弈分析发现,惩罚机制可以起到促进反腐败组织协调高效运作的作用,有助于打破腐败交易双方的长期合作关系,从而为最终阻断腐败循环提供可能性。     

The impact of government expenditure on economic growth: How sensitive to the level of development?

Previous studies generally find mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between government spending and economic growth. In this paper, we re-examine the causal relationship between government expenditure and economic growth by conducting the panel Granger causality test recently developed by (Hurlin, 2004) and (Hurlin, 2005) and by utilizing a richer panel data set which includes 182 countries that cover the period from 1950 to 2004. Our empirical results strongly support both Wagner's law and the hypothesis that government spending is helpful to economic growth regardless of how we measure the government size and economic growth. When the countries are disaggregated by income levels and the degree of corruption, our results also confirm the bi-directional causality between government activities and economic growth for the different subsamples of countries, with the exception of the low-income countries. It is suggested that the distinct feature of the low-income countries is likely owing to their inefficient governments and inferior institutions.     

Public corruption: A study across regions in Italy

This work explores the determinants of public corruption using a regional panel dataset on crimes perpetrated in Italy by public officials against the public administration in combination with a set of demographic and socio-economic variables. The results suggest that both the size and the composition of public spending at the local level explain corruption. We also find that regions where social capital is higher are more likely to face a lower incidence of corruption crimes. Moreover, regions which have historically placed less importance on rooting out corruption may be stuck in a vicious circle of higher levels of corruption.     

腐败经历与腐败感知:基于调查实验与直接提问的双重检验

本文采用“列举实验法”来解决测量腐败经历时的社会意愿偏差问题,提出两个核心发现：与没有腐败经历的个体相比,有过腐败经历的个体会更倾向于认为政府是腐败的,同时认为政府的反腐败能力更弱,对政府的反腐败满意度也更低;腐败经历对腐败感知的影响在不同层级的政府中有差异,与中央政府相比,腐败经历对地方政府的腐败感知和反腐败评价影响更强烈。民众可以绕过间接因素直接获得对腐败的认知,因此,要改善民众对政府腐败和反腐败的主观态度,提升获得感,仅仅靠舆论和宣传是不够的,只有切实解决与老百姓生活密切的腐败问题,才能真正赢得反腐败的胜利。     

Social determinants of police corruption: toward public policies for the prevention of police corruption

Strategies for the prevention of police corruption, for example, bribery, commonly neglects its social dimension in spite of the fact that police corruption has societal causes and undertaking a reform of the police requires, to some extent, reforming society. In this paper, we built a decision tree from socioeconomic profiles of 103 countries classified according to their level of police corruption using data from the United Nations Statistics Division and Transparency International. From the rules of the resultant decision tree, we identified and analyzed social determinants of police corruption to assist policy-makers in designing societal level strategies to control police corruption by improving socioeconomic conditions. We found that school life expectancy, involvement of women in society, economic development, and work-related indicators are relevant to police corruption. Moreover, empirical results indicate that countries should gradually improve social indicators to reduce police corruption.     

中国古代吏治腐败根源探析

利用政治权力 ,谋取非法的经济利益 ,这是封建社会吏治腐败的主要表现。造成吏治腐败的原因有三 :一是管理权与所有权的分离 ;二是监察权与行政权的合流 ;三是专制君主对腐败现象的放纵。各种政治制度均不能解决吏治腐败问题 ,最后只好将其交给道德伦理来解决了 ,而道德伦理是无法解决应由法律制度来解决的腐败问题的。     

Corruption, anti-corruption, and inter-county income disparity in China

The rapid economic growth in China has been connected with a large income gap across regions. While most existing research has focused on economic factors to explain the problem, we argue that local government's anti-corruption endeavors also play a very significant role in influencing local income levels. Recent research shows that corruption undermines economic growth and generates poverty, we therefore hypothesize that government anti-corruption measures should increase local income levels. Using county-level data and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates, we find counties with higher degree of anti-corruption tend to have higher income measured by county-level per capita GDP. We also employ a recently developed Shapley value decomposition technique to quantify the contributions of each variable. We find that anti-corruption plays a large role in explaining inter-county income disparity in China.     

A contingency theory of corruption: The effect of human development and national culture

Corruption is a world-wide problem that disproportionately affects those with the fewest personal and economic resources. It was hypothesized that human development restricts corruption, and the magnitude of such an effect is contingent upon the conditions of national culture. Measures were gathered for 68 countries that account for 80% of the world's population. Support was found for the main effect of human development on corruption. Consistent with contingency theory, results also indicate that the relation between human development and corruption is moderated by power distance and individualism. Implications for policy making to reduce corruption are discussed.     

地方政府公司化的运作逻辑与后果

地方政府公司化是我国地方政府行为的形象解释。地方政府公司化面临经济资源配置不当、政府职能承担越位与缺位并存,从而加剧民众对社会矛盾、官员腐败、环境恶化等社会问题的批评。本文在探讨地方政府公司化运作逻辑的基础上,综合归纳对地方政府公司化的主要批评类型,并对批评的合理性进行再审视。     

FDI,democracy and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper investigates the relationship between FDI, democracy and corruption among 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the period of 1985–2014 to determine whether the ‘helping hand’ or ‘grabbing hand’ hypothesis is most applicable. The results of GMM analysis show that corruption is used by FDI investors to overcome the region’s weak democratic regulatory and institutional status and thus the ‘helping hand’ is more prevalent. However, the results further show that as democratic capital accumulates, this association may outlive its usefulness and thus corruption as a ‘helping hand’ in time becomes a ‘grabbing hand’ instead. These results imply that SSA countries should focus on integrating into the international economy so as to take advantage of existing financial enforcement legislation while reconstructing and strengthening domestic constitutional anti-corruption legislation and institutions.     

The effect of incentive regulation on productive efficiency in telecommunications

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The issue explored here is whether incentive regulation has resulted in an increase in productive efficiency. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, one methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency is reviewed. This methodology is data envelopment analysis (DEA) and allows for the measurement of both scale efficiency and technical efficiency of individual local exchange carriers (LECs). The results indicate that most LECs were technically efficient over the 1988–1998 period. Four LECs, however, consistently demonstrate scale inefficiency. In the aggregate, however, based on the DEA results there was no identifiable improvement in aggregate LECs' technical efficiency between 1988 and 1998. Subsequently, an alternative methodology, a stochastic frontier production function approach, is considered. The results from this methodology confirm that there was no change in technical efficiency over the period of study, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to enhance.     

Efficiency of the Greek banking system in view of the EMU: a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier approach

The paper estimates empirically cost efficiency of the Greek banking system for the period 1993–1998. The beginning of the examination period coincides with the acceleration of liberalization and deregulation of the Greek financial system, in view of the country joining the EMU. The study uses a multi-input, multi-output technology and adopts a heteroscedastic frontier model instead of a commonly used homoscedastic one to measure cost efficiency in the banking system. The empirical results show that larger banks are less efficient than smaller ones. Also, it is found that economic performance, bank loans and investments are positive related to the cost efficiency of the Greek commercial banking sector.     

The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross‐National Analysis*

Objective. How do we explain variations across nations in the incidence of political corruption? Recent theoretical work locates the causes for corruption in a combination of institutional conditions: monopoly power, little accountability, and wide discretion. This focus on the form of political institutions clarifies the micro‐scale causes of political corruption, but it leaves unanswered questions about the macro‐scale causes of corruption. Methods. This article addresses these questions about the macro scale through an analysis of perceived levels of corruption across nations. Results. Our work identifies poverty, large populations, and small public sectors as contextual causes of corruption. Historically‐based differences in political cultures across broad geographical regions also affect the perceived incidence of corruption in nations. Conclusion. Further research should attempt to link micro‐ and macro‐scale causes together in a single, multi‐scalar model of corruption.     

到位而不越位：驻京办信息传播功能之匡正

驻京办事处是各级地方政府部门在北京的派出机构。作为中央与地方政府间上情下达、下情上诉的信息传播中介与桥梁,传播政务信息、经济信息、“形象”信息已成为驻京办诸多作用中的主要功能。但近年来,其正常的信息传播功能不仅被弱化,甚至被出现的“异化”功能所掩盖：“跑部钱进”、注重政治信息、编织关系网等。根据驻京办事处的历史由来,从信息传播的角度来看,驻京办应回归并强化原有的信息传播功能。     

Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of the Transition

This paper discusses the challenges facing the education system of Central Asia and evaluates how these have been addressed in the market economy. We first review the evidence on the economic return to education and determine how the rewards to different levels of education changed during the transition. We then examine the trends in school enrolment and evaluate whether changes in supply or demand explain the enrolment trends we observe. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of the delivery of education and whether market forces have improved the management of schools. We conclude with a summary of the economic and policy lessons derived thus far from the educational transition. The paper uses aggregate administrative data supplemented with survey data, primarily from the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, on enrolment, completion, and expenditures.     

The mechanisms of corruption in agricultural price intervention projects: Case studies from Thailand

In Thailand, agricultural price intervention has recently been under severe criticism for its ineffective management and proneness to corruption. This study focuses on the mechanisms of corruption and how such destructive activities might be minimized. Case studies of three well-known crops in Thailand, namely paddy, cassava, and shallots, were utilized as the main investigative tool. Findings suggest that government price intervention programs generate significant economic rents for various stakeholders (i.e. farmers, millers, warehouse owners, exporters, etc.). To deal with this problem, the magnitude of economic rents should be curtailed through strict quantity limits and monitoring needs to be enhance both through better human resources and integrated information technology. In the long term, such blunt intervention projects should be replaced with more sophisticated, market-oriented risk management techniques, and strict information transparency must be ensured.     

Are corrupt acts contagious?: Evidence from the United States

This paper adds to the literature by shedding new light on the causes of corruption. Specifically, we provide evidence on the extent to which corruption might be contagious. In other words, what is the extent to which a demonstration effect is at play at inducing corrupt acts? Using state-level U.S. data over the 1995–2004 period, the results show that the effect of neighboring corruption is positive and statistically significant in all cases, implying that corruption does appear to be contagious. Specifically, a 10% increase in corruption in neighboring states appears to increase corruption in a state by about 4–11%. Of the different types of government activity, the size of defense and non-defense federal sectors in a state seem to have opposite effects on corruption, with the former contributing to corruption and the latter serving as a deterrent. The size of the state and local governments does not seem to be relevant. Of the variables controlling for detection and punishment of corrupt individuals, greater corrections employment reduces corruption, while greater judicial employment seems to increase corruption. Changes in the police force do not seem to have a statistically significant impact. These findings generally hold when we control for the disproportionate effects of the Washington, DC area and when a pooled data set is estimated. Contagion effects are also found for other crimes. Policy implications are discussed.