Does family policy affect fertility?

From the mid-1960s to around 1980, Sweden extended its family policies that provide financial and in-kind support to families with children very quickly. The benefits were closely tied to previous work experience. Thus, women born in the 1950s faced markedly different incentives when making fertility choices compared to women born only 15–20 years earlier. This paper examines the evolution of completed fertility patterns for Swedish women born in 1925–1958 and makes comparisons to women in neighbouring countries where the policies were not extended as much as in Sweden. The results suggest that the extension of the policy raised the level of fertility, shortened the spacing of births, and induced fluctuations in the period fertility rates, but it did not change the negative relationship between women’s educational level and completed fertility.     

Couple childbearing plans and births in Sweden

We use data from a nationally representative sample of Swedish couples to estimate effects of partners’ childbearing plans on the rate of subsequent childbearing. Only 11% of the couples in this sample expressed plans in opposite directions (plan to have a child versus not to have a child), but 24% had differing levels of certainty about their plans. Of the couples in which both partners said they definitely planned to have another child, 44% had a child within two years. If neither partner planned to have another child, less than 2% of couples had a birth. The figure was 6% if the partners had opposing childbearing plans. Thus, both men and women exerted veto power over further childbearing. Disagreements were equally likely to be resolved in favor of the woman as of the man, and effects of partners’ plans on the birth hazard did not depend on the couple’s gender arrangements, family ideologies, or marital status. We discuss these results in the context of Sweden’s public support for gender equality and for childrearing, its pervasive contraceptive regime, and its high rates of cohabitation. We also argue for the collection of data from partners in future family and fertility surveys.     

Gender inequalities and demographic behavior

A summary was provided of the central findings about gender inequalities in Egypt, India, Ghana, and Kenya published by the Population Council in 1994. These countries exhibited gender inequalities in different ways: the legal, economic, and educational systems; family planning and reproductive health services; and the health care system. All countries had in common a high incidence of widowhood. Widowhood was linked with high levels of insecurity, which were linked with high fertility. Children thus became insurance in old age. In Ghana, women's insecurity was threatened through high levels of marital instability and polygyny. In Egypt, insecurity was translated into economic vulnerability because of legal discrimination against women when family systems were disrupted. In India and all four countries, insecurity was reflective of limited access to education, an impediment to economic autonomy. In all four countries, women's status was inferior due to limited control over reproductive decision making about childbearing limits and contraception. In India, the cultural devaluation of girls contributed to higher fertility to satisfy the desire for sons. In India and Egypt, family planning programs were dominated by male-run organizations that were more concerned about demographic objectives than reproductive health. The universal inequality was the burden women carry for contraception. Family planning programs have ignored the local realities of reproductive behavior, family structures, and gender relations. The assumption that husbands and wives have similar fertility goals or that fathers fully share the costs of children is mistaken in countries such as Ghana. Consequently, fertility has declined less than 13% in Ghana, but fertility has declined by over 30% in Kenya. Family planning programs must be aware of gender issues.     

The educational gradient of childbearing within cohabitation in Europe

Nearly every European Country has experienced some increase in nonmarital childbearing, largely due to increasing births within cohabitation. Relatively few studies in Europe, however, investigate the educational gradient of childbearing within cohabitation or how it changed over time. Using retrospective union and fertility histories, we employ competing risk hazard models to examine the educational gradient of childbearing in cohabitation in eight countries across europe. In all countries studied, birth risks within cohabitation demonstrated a negative educational gradient. When directly comparing cohabiting fertility with marital fertility, the negative educational gradient persists in all countries except Italy, although differences were not significant in Austria, France, and West Germany. To explain these findings, we present an alternative explanation for the increase in childbearing within cohabitation that goes beyond the explanation of the Second Demographic Transition and provides a new interpretation of the underlying mechanisms that may influence childbearing within cohabitation.     

East Asian childbearing patterns and policy developments

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, singapore, south Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being "recuperated," which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting.     

Gendering family composition: Sex preferences for children and childbearing behavior in the Nordic countries

It has been argued that a society's gender system may influence parents' sex preferences for children. If this is true, one should expect to find no evidence of such preferences in countries with a high level of gender equality. In this article, we exploit data from population registers from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to examine continuities and changes in parental sex preferences in the Nordic countries during the past three to four decades. First, we do not observe an effect of the sex of the first born child on second-birth risks. Second, we detect a distinct preference for at least one child of each sex among parents of two children. For third births, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish parents seem to develop a preference for having a daughter, while Finns exhibit a significant preference for having a son. These findings show that modernization and more equal opportunities for women and men do not necessarily lead to parental gender indifference. On the contrary, they may even result in new sex preferences.     

Back to the Future: a Sensitivity Analysis to Predict Future Fertility Rates Considering the Influence of Family Policies—The Cases of Spain and Norway

This article analyzes the relationship between family policies focused on childcare for children under the age of three and fertility levels. In the current context of very low European fertility, it is important to understand whether public support for families can help increase fertility or if, on the contrary, existing fertility levels are the exact reflection of the reproductive desires of families, regardless of the family-support of the policies that may exist in each country. This analysis was carried out through a stochastic dynamic mathematical model that incorporates both demographic variables and family policy variables. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on Spain and Norway, two countries that have very different models of family policies. This sensitivity analysis allows establishing a relationship between the existing family policies and the total fertility rate and also the expected evolution of fertility rates in the future, if the current family policies remain constant. The results showed that the models which lead to an increase in fertility are those which are most generous and which also incorporate a gender perspective, so they allow the identification of good practices and maximum levels of policy efficiency in regards to different objectives such as increase fertility and advances towards gender equality. By contrast, models with erratic and insufficient support clearly contribute to maintaining fertility at very low levels and perpetuate unequal gender relationships. There is, therefore, space for state agency to develop more effective public policies in both dimensions.

     

Adolescent fertility: worldwide concerns

There is growing concern over the adverse health, social, economic, and demographic effects of adolescent fertility. Morbidity and mortality rates ar significantly higher for teenage mothers and their infants, and early initiation of childbearing generally means truncated education, lower future family income, and larger completed family size. Adolescent fertility rates, which largely reflect marriage patterns, range from 4/1000 in Mauritania; in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all rates are over 100. In most countries, adolescent fertility rates are declining due to rising age at marriage, increased educational and economic opportunities for young women, changes in social customs, increased use of contraception, and access to abortion. However, even if fertility rates were to decline dramatically among adolescent women in developing countries, their sheer numbers imply that their fertility will have a major impact on world population growth in the years ahead. The number of women in the world ages 15-19 years is expected to increase from 245 million in 1985 to over 320 million in the years 2020; 82% of these women live in developing countries. As a result of more and earlier premarital sexual activity, fostered by the lengthening gap between puberty and marriage, diminished parental and social controls, and increasing peer and media pressure to be sexually active, abortion and out-of-wedlock childbearing are increasing among teenagers in many developed and rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Laws and policies regarding sex education in the schools and access to family planning services by adolescents can either inhibit or support efforts to reduce adolescent fertility. Since contraceptive use is often sporadic and ineffective among adolescents, family planning services are crucial. Such programs should aim to reduce adolescents' dependence on abortion through preventive measures and increase awareness of the benefits of delayed sexual activity. Similarly, sex education should seek to provide a basis for intelligent, informed decision making. Programs tailored to reach teenagers in schools, recreational centers, and the workplace have particular potential.     

Settlement size and fertility in the Nordic countries

While the variation in childbearing patterns across countries and between socio-economic groups within a country has been studied in detail, less is known about the differences in fertility patterns across settlements within a country. Using aggregate and individual-level register data, we examine fertility variation across settlements in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. We observe a significant variation in fertility level by settlement size in all four of these Nordic countries - the larger the settlement, the lower the fertility. Second, the variation in fertility level has decreased over time, but significant differences in fertility between settlements of different size persist. Third, the timing of childbearing also varies across settlements - the larger the settlement, the later the peak of fertility. Fourth, our analysis of parity-specific fertility in Sweden shows that the major socio-economic characteristics of women account for only a small portion of fertility variation across settlements.     

Childbearing Across Partnerships in Australia,the United States,Norway, and Sweden

This article compares mothers’ experience of having children with more than one partner in two liberal welfare regimes (the United States and Australia) and two social democratic regimes (Sweden and Norway). We use survey-based union and birth histories in Australia and the United States and data from national population registers in Norway and Sweden to estimate the likelihood of experiencing childbearing across partnerships at any point in the childbearing career. We find that births with new partners constitute a substantial proportion of all births in each country we study. Despite quite different arrangements for social welfare, the determinants of childbearing across partnerships are very similar. Women who had their first birth at a very young age or who are less well-educated are most likely to have children with different partners. The educational gradient in childbearing across partnerships is also consistently negative across countries, particularly in contrast to educational gradients in childbearing with the same partner. The risk of childbearing across partnerships increased dramatically in all countries from the 1980s to the 2000s, and educational differences also increased, again, in both liberal and social democratic welfare regimes.     

The Educational Gradient in Marriage: A Comparison of 25 European Countries

Previous research has suggested that a new marriage gradient has emerged in the United States, with marriage becoming increasingly the privilege of the better-educated. This article examines whether this is true for Europe and explores differences in the marriage gradient among 25 European countries, using multilevel models. The focus is on the chances of living in a marital (or cohabiting) union during midlife (ages 40–49). Multilevel analyses show that the direction and strength of the gradient depend on the societal context. In countries where gender roles are traditional, better-educated women are less likely to be married than less-educated women; in gender-egalitarian countries, better-educated women are more likely to be married. For men, the educational effect on marriage is absent in traditional countries but becomes positive as gender roles become more equal. Inequality in a society also modifies the gradient: if the degree of economic inequality between educational groups in a society is strong, better-educated men are more likely to be married than less-educated men. In general, the results suggest that there may be an accumulation of social and economic disadvantages for the less well educated in more-developed countries.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

The Changing Institutional Context of Low Fertility

Using data for 1960–97 for 22 low fertility countries, we document a dramatic change in the association of fertility levels to women's levels of labor force participation. Until the 1980s, this association had been strongly negative. However, during the 1980s itbecame positive, and since 1990 strongly positive. We also document an emerging positive association of the country-level total fertility ratio (TFR) and nonmarital ratio (e.g., the proportion of births to unmarried women). We argue that these transformed associations reflect societal level responses that, in some contexts, have eased the incompatibility between mother and worker roles, and loosened the link betweenmarriage and childbearing. These arguments imply that societal responses to mother/worker incompatibility exert substantial influence on fertility levels in low fertility countries.     

Family structure and child outcomes in the USA and Sweden

Previous research shows that living in a non-intact family is associated with educational disadvantages. This paper compares the relationships between childhood family structure, schooling, and earnings in Sweden and the USA. This comparison is interesting because both family structure and public policies differ significantly. We find a negative relationship between living in a non-intact family and child outcomes, and the estimates are remarkably similar in both countries. After using sibling-difference models, the correlation with family structure is no longer significant. These results cast doubt on the causal interpretation of the negative relationship between non-intact family structures and child outcomes.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

Gender,power, and population change

This report describes fertility and mortality trends in developing countries and discusses how gender is defined and measured in some countries. The discussion relies on case studies and country statistics to reveal how gender shapes the lives of all people in all societies. Gender is defined as the different roles women and men play in society. Gender is manifested in institutional structures, power relations, and culturally determined behavior. In no society do women and men share equal roles. The effects of inequality for women are manifested differently between countries. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo established the goal of gender equality. Educational enrollment and illiteracy are two measures of gender inequality that affect opportunities in society for advancement, power, and status. Girls are less likely to be enrolled in school than boys and more likely to have higher absenteeism rates. In China, absenteeism of girls is actually increasing under reforms. Marriage practices may devalue the investment in girls' education. Women experience different working conditions: they work longer hours, are paid less or not at all, and hold lower-status jobs. The exceptions are found in the Philippines and Brazil, where women hold more professional jobs than men. Women carry multiple responsibilities that consume time and prevent greater involvement in public life. Dowry and brideprice can constrain family relations. Women generally have fewer inheritance rights. Few women hold high-level public office positions or parliamentary seats. The extent to which gender inequality is reflected in demographic processes depends upon the gap in power in education, employment, and income. The relationship between gender and demographic processes is a central topic currently being researched.     

欧洲生育支持政策效果的评估及启示——基于模糊集定性比较的分析

采用组态比较方法中的模糊集定性比较分析,系统性检验了2000—2018年29个欧洲典型国家社会情境和现行生育支持政策的条件组合与生育率变化的关系,试图为我国借鉴欧洲国家生育支持政策提供新的研究思路。通过欧洲各国三类生育支持政策(育儿津贴、生育假期和儿童照料设施供给)与三类社会情境的条件(经济发展水平、性别平等及家庭重视文化)进行必要条件检验,得到五类影响生育率的组态方案。通过将不同社会情境下各国生育支持政策的实施效果与我国国情的比较和讨论,本研究提出,我国生育支持政策的出台要充分考虑地区差异:对于性别较为平等的经济发达地区,大力发展儿童照料设施和有针对性的育儿津贴可以稳定生育率;对于性别平等较差的西部欠发达地区,育儿津贴更能提高生育率;在性别差距较大、重视后代的经济发达地区,较慷慨的生育假期和提供儿童照料设施双管齐下会有助于提升生育水平。     

Fertility Decline,Girls’ Well-being,and Gender Gaps in Children’s Well-being in Poor Countries

The influences of recent dramatic declines in fertility on girls’ and boys’ well-being in poorer countries are understudied. In panels of 67–75 poorer countries, using 152–185 Demographic and Health Surveys spanning 1985–2008, we examined how declining total fertility and women’s increasing median age at first birth were associated with changes in girls’ well-being and gender gaps in children’s well-being, as reflected in their survival, nutrition, and access to preventive healthcare. In adjusted random-effects models, these changes in fertility were associated with gains in girls’ survival at ages 1–4 years, vaccination coverage at ages 12–23 months, and nutrition at 0–36 months (for women’s later first childbearing). Declining total fertility was associated with similar gains for boys and girls with respect to vaccination coverage but intensified gender gaps in mortality at ages 1–4 years and malnutrition at ages 0–36 months, especially in higher-son-preference populations. Later increases in women’s median age at first birth—reflecting more equitable gender norms—were associated with declines in these gaps. Promoting equitable investments in children through family planning programs in higher-fertility societies is warranted.     

New strategies for slowing population growth

Growth of world population over the next 100 years, until the year 2100, will produce an estimated 11.5 billion people. The past focus on reducing rapid population growth exclusively through family planning has not been sufficient. Population policy needs to be broadened to include health care, education, and poverty reduction. The population policy recommendations of Population Council Vice-President John Bongaarts and Senior Associate Judith Bruce were to reduce unwanted pregnancies by expanding services that promote reproductive choice and better health, to reduce the demand for large families by creating favorable conditions for small families, and to invest in adolescents. The Population Council 1994 publication "Population Growth and Our Caring Capacity" outlined these issues. Another similar article by John Bongaarts appeared in the journal "Science" in 1994. In developing countries, excluding China, about 25% of all births are unwanted; 25 million abortions are performed for unwanted pregnancies. The provision of comprehensive family planning programs will go a long way toward achieving a reduction in unwanted pregnancies. In addition, changes are needed in male control over female sexuality and fertility and in cultural beliefs that are obstacles to use of contraception. Stabilization of population at 2 children per family will not occur unless there is a desire for small families. In most less developed countries, large family sizes are preferred. Governments have an opportunity to adopt policies that reduce economic and social risks of having small families. This can be accomplished through the widespread education of children, a reduction in infant and child mortality, improvement in the economic and social and legal status of women, and provision of equitable gender relations in marriage and child rearing. The rights of children to be wanted, planned, and adequately cared for need to be supported. These aforementioned measures will help to reduce fertility, provide support for small families, and justify investment in social development. Population momentum will keep population growing for some time even with replacement level fertility. Investment in adolescents through enhancement of self-esteem and promotion of later childbearing can lengthen the span between generations and slow population momentum. Population policies will be more effective when human rights are protected.     

To have or not to have? Australian women’s childbearing desires,expectations and outcomes

Australia’s low fertility rate is commonly attributed to deliberate decisions by women to avoid having children. Existing theoretical explanations of fertility decision-making mostly view childbearing as a rational, voluntary process and focus on the ‘costs’ to women of having children. Although this may help explain why women do not have children, it contributes very little to understanding why women do have children. This study describes childbearing desires, expectations and outcomes in a population-based sample of 569 30–34-years-old Australian women recruited from the Australian Electoral Roll in 2005. Most women surveyed wanted to have children, and their childbearing outcomes were associated with biological, psychological and social factors including the lack of a partner and adverse health conditions. The factors and their relative importance varied by parity. Most women had fewer children than they desired, and many would have children, or more children, if their circumstances were different. These data challenge prevailing assumptions about women’s childbearing behaviour that women are able to choose when and if they have a child. Based on the findings, a conceptual framework of childbearing behaviour is proposed which builds on existing theoretical explanations to explain why women do and do not have children, differences by parity, and the role of circumstances in women’s childbearing behaviour. The findings and conceptual framework have implications for public policies, and indicate that multiple approaches are required which are sensitive to and address the barriers women face in family formation.