HEALTH CARE INFLATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY

Motivated by recent findings on the cyclical movement of both health and health spending, we construct a general equilibrium model that distinguishes health care demand from the demand for other goods. Using this model, we are able to generate inflation dynamics and cyclicality of health that match the US data. When the model is subjected to an expansionary monetary policy shock, it yields different output and inflation responses compared with a two‐sector model with homogeneous demand. We show that the trade‐off between leisure and health spending plays an important role in model dynamics. The model further predicts different degrees of inflation stabilization across sectors when a shift in the monetary policy occurs. (JEL E52, E31, E32, I10)     

THE COMPOSITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF MONETARY AGGREGATES

An economic monetary aggregate is composed from a set of monetary goods that are at least weakly separable from other goods in the optimizing agent's utility function. We construct such an aggregate using a Divisia index number. We demonstrate that through the middle of the 1980s forecasts of the inflation rate based on our economic monetary aggregate are superior to forecasts based on the simple sum monetary aggregates M1 or M2.     

THE SUCCESS OF THE FED AND THE DEATH OF MONETARISM

We propose an explanation for the demise of monetarism in the United States. We show that optimal monetary policy would lead to zero correlation between monetary aggregates and inflation if the effect of monetary aggregates on inflation is known precisely and to negative correlations if there is coefficient uncertainty. From 1960 to 1982 the correlation of the monetary base and inflation was positive and so the variance in the growth rate of monetary base in the United States was clearly too large monetary base growth destabilized inflation. However, from 1983 to 2003 variations in monetary base growth were clearly stabilizing and could have been just right. ( JEL E52, E31, E32)     

DETERMINING OUTPUT AND INFLATION VARIABILITY: ARE THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND THE MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTION RESPONSIBLE?

This study analyzes the policy parameters in a Taylor monetary policy reaction function and a Phillips curve equation to determine the variability of inflation and output. The theoretical and empirical investigations yield two key results. First, countries with large parameters in the monetary policy reaction function have low and stable inflation. Second, countries with flatter Phillips curves (i.e., those with a higher degree of price stickiness) have larger output variability. This article also examines the determinants of inflation and output variability as well as determinants of the slope of the Phillips curve.(JEL E32 , E52 )     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

STICKY PRICE AND STICKY INFORMATION PRICE‐SETTING MODELS: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

Using a partial equilibrium framework, Mankiw and Reis show that a sticky information model can generate a lagged and gradual inflation response after a monetary policy shock, whereas a sticky price model cannot. Our study demonstrates that the finding is sensitive to their model's parameterization. To determine a plausible parameterization, we specify a general equilibrium model with sticky information. In that model, we find that inflation peaks only one period after a monetary disturbance. A sensitivity analysis of our results reveals that the inflation peak is delayed by including real rigidities when the monetary policy instrument is money growth, whereas inflation peaks immediately when the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. ( JEL E31, E32, E52)     

Breaking the taboo: a history of monetary financing in Canada, 1930–1975

Monetary financing – the funding of state expenditure via the creation of new money rather than through taxation or borrowing – has become a taboo policy instrument in advanced economies. It is generally associated with dangerously high inflation and/or war. Relatedly, a key institutional feature of modern independent central banks is that they are not obligated to support government expenditure via money creation. Since the financial crisis of 2007–2008, however, unorthodox monetary policies, in particular quantitative easing, coupled with stagnant growth and high levels of public and private debt have led to questions over the monetary financing taboo. Debates on the topic have so far been mainly theoretical with little attention to the social and political dynamics of historical instances of monetary financing. This paper analyses one of the most significant twentieth‐century cases: Canada from the period after the Great Depression up until the monetarist revolution of the 1970s. The period was a successful one for the Canadian economy, with high growth and employment and manageable inflation. It offers some interesting insights into the relationship between states and central banks and present‐day discussions around the governance of money creation.     

MONETARY INTEGRATION, INFLATION CONVERGENCE AND OUTPUT SHOCKS IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

Studies on monetary convergence in Europe have reached mixed conclusions, raising questions about whether the European Monetary System failed to expedite convergence, or whether convergence requires redefining. A definition of convergence is explored that conditions monetary policy on factors affecting real exchange rates. Inflation rates have converged, while unconditional monetary policies have not. Once conditioning factors are considered, much of the gap between inflation and monetary convergence is explained. Differences in output trends do not explain the gap, while velocity variability does. (JEL F33)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

The Macro Content of PRSPs: Assessing the Need for a More Flexible Macroeconomic Policy Framework

This article analyses the content of 15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. Contrary to new trends in developed and middle‐income countries, their policy frameworks lack the necessary flexibility to deal with external shocks and address macroeconomic volatility appropriately. Their fiscal and monetary policies are too narrowly focused on fiscal balance and price stability and consequently pay too little attention to economic fluctuations arising from external shocks, which have major effects on poverty and growth. To address these issues, the article proposes a set of policy measures, including avoidance of excessively tight inflation and fiscal targets (with provisions for fluctuations in commodity prices), more room for countercyclical policy and the adoption of permanent safety nets.     

ARMEN ALCHIAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO MACROECONOMICS

Armen Alchian's contributions to macroeconomics forged important paths that are still crucial to the understanding of monetary theory and monetary policy. We outline Alchian's examination of the fundamental role of money in society and his work (with Benjamin Klein) on the measurement of inflation. We also detail how, in research with Reuben Kessel, Alchian brought insight into the problems that followed the erratic inflation policies of the 1960s and 1970s, explained the effects of anticipated and unanticipated inflation on the real economy, and described the difficulty of identifying the effects of monetary shocks in macroeconomic data.     

MONEY AND PRODUCT QUALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

This article examines the effects of money on product quality, as well as the price pattern of heterogeneous quality goods, in a search‐theoretical monetary model with divisible money and divisible commodities. We establish the existence and uniqueness/multiplicity of monetary equilibrium in several different cases. The steady‐state equilibrium of our model displays several properties that are absent or distinct from those of previous studies. In particular, we find that under egalitarian bargaining, the Friedman rule cannot achieve socially efficient allocation due to asymmetric information. We find that the price of informed high‐quality goods is higher than the price of uninformed quality goods. We also find that an increase in inflation can improve product quality. (JEL E40)     

Central Bank Autonomy without Monetary Policy

The autonomy of a country’s central bank from political authorities has been advocated both as a remedy against the inflationary bias that would otherwise be present in the conduct of the government’s monetary policy and, more recently, on the basis of empirical evidence. However, both theoretical arguments and empirical findings have associated central bank autonomy with the conduct of monetary policy, while often failing to pay attention to those institutional cases where a central bank is in place but is not responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. These cases are particularly relevant for those countries which do not possess their own currency, or where extreme monetary regimes such as dollarization, currency boards, or monetary unions are present. These institutional settings, where a central bank exists, but there is no monetary policy to be conducted, raise the issue of central bank autonomy in a framework where the inflation bias is no longer pertinent. In other words: Is central bank autonomy still a relevant objective when a country does not run its own monetary policy? The present paper addresses this question, discusses dimensions of autonomy and accountability and maintains that central bank autonomy still does matter, particularly if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and financial regulation.     

INTERNATIONAL PRICE BEHAVIOR AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY

Oil prices, commodity prices and American monetary policy, the last operating through a variety of channels, have all figured prominently in explanations of the international inflation process in the late 1960s and early 70s. OUT major purpose in this paper is to test these various hypotheses. We do so in the context of a reduced-form rational-expectations price equation which we estimate for the United States and seven other industrial countries using quarterly data for the period 1955 through 1976.
The principal conclusion that emerges from this exercise is that movements in domestic money in these countries served as the key link in the inflation process. The factors that produced these monetary changes, however, differed among countries. Price shocks of various sorts were clearly of secondary importance.
The other important set of conclusions concerns the demand for money. In place of a traditional stock adjustment model, we used GLS with a second-order correction for autocorrelation. We believe this produced more plausible estimates of the parameters of the long-run demand function and of the adjustment process itself.     

Nominal and Real Disturbances and Money Demand in Chinese Hyperinflation

This article reexamines the dynamics of hyperinflation by allowing variability in the relative price of capital goods in units of consumption goods that reflects interactions between the real and monetary sectors. The theory generates empirically testable implications that suggest expanding the standard Caganian money demand function to include both anticipated inflation and relative price effects in a nonlinear fashion. Employing data from the post–WW II Chinese hyperinflationary episode, the empirical findings suggest that conventional econometric investigations of money demand during hyperinflation overlook important nonlinear interactions between real and monetary activities and, hence, underestimate the welfare costs of hyperinflation.     

AN OPEN‐ECONOMY MODEL WITH MONEY,ENDOGENOUS SEARCH,AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper describes a new monetary open‐economy model where firms have market power due to search frictions in the goods market, and endogenous search effort by consumers mitigates this market power. The optimal inflation rate generally depends positively on the cost of search effort, the cost of firm entry, and the cost of trade. Higher inflation always improves a country's terms‐of‐trade against its trading partners. I also characterize a general class of matching processes which offer a novel approach to modeling firm sales. (JEL D43, E40, F12)     

THE LONG-RUN LINK BETWEEN MONEY GROWTH AND INFLATION

Is inflation always a monetary phenomenon? Many economists believe that the link between money growth and inflation in the U.S. has weakened over the last two decades due in part to the Federal Reserve's policy experiment in 1979–1982 and innovations in the financial sector of the economy. I find that the long-run relationship between money growth and inflation is strong in a statistical sense and important economically. The key result is that the trend or growth component in CPI inflation is entirely due to the trend component of monetary base growth. (JEL C32, E31, E51)     

Expectations of inflation: The biasing effect of thoughts about specific prices

National surveys follow consumers’ expectations of future inflation, because these may directly affect the economic choices they make, indirectly affect macro-economic outcomes, and are considered in monetary policy. Yet, relatively little is known about how individuals form the inflation expectations they report on consumer surveys. Medians of reported inflation expectations tend to track official estimates of realized inflation, but show large heterogeneity between respondents, due to some expecting seemingly extreme inflation. We present two studies to examine whether individuals who consider specific price changes when forming their inflation expectations report more extreme and disagreeing inflation expectations due to focusing on specific extreme price changes. In Study 1, participants who were instructed to recall any price changes or to recall the largest price changes both thought of items for which price changes were perceived to have been extreme. Moreover, they reported more extreme year-ahead inflation expectations and showed more disagreement than did a third group that had been asked to recall the average change in price changes. Study 2 asked participants to report their year-ahead expectations of inflation, without first prompting them to recall specific price changes. Half of participants nevertheless thought of specific prices when generating their inflation expectations. Those who thought of specific prices reported more extreme and more disagreeing inflation expectations, because they were biased towards various items associated with more extreme perceived price changes. Our findings provide new insights into expectation formation processes and have implications for the design of survey-based measures of inflation.     

Policy Disciplining Effect of Capital Account Openness in India

In this paper, the policy disciplining effect of capital account openness in India is examined by examining the impact of capital account openness on inflation and fiscal deficit. Multivariate modeling, which includes other relevant variables identified in the literature, is used for the analysis. Our results show capital account openness has a strong disciplining effect on inflation whereas it has no significant effect on fiscal deficit. In the case of fiscal deficit, trade openness and number of government changes only are the significant determinants. The moves of the RBI tend to reaffirm the disciplinary effect of capital account openness. In the meantime, since the mid 1990s, RBI kept a strict vigil over inflation and inflation expectations in the context of a more open capital account. One major reason for the problem concerning inflation expectation by RBI is the threat of capital outflow in the face of loose monetary policy and high inflation.