Charter School Authorizations as Disputes: How School Board Members Justify Their Votes in a Neoliberal Context1

For charter schools to open they must gain the approval of an authorizing body, most commonly a local school board. When deciding whether or not to authorize a particular charter, school board members often engage in public disputes that entail clashes between multiple and conflicting conceptualizations of the goals of education. Drawing on insights from pragmatic sociology and institutional theory, this paper examines videos of 119 public meetings to document how members of a large, urban school board drew on competing ways of conceptualizing the common good to justify their votes on charter school authorizations. Moreover, it also shows how the neoliberal context of contemporary education limited the range of justifications used. Even school board members who argued against charter school authorizations did with justifications draped in neoliberal language. Neoliberalism thus impacted decisions not by becoming cognitively taken‐for‐granted but rather by shaping the range of arguments made for or against the choice to authorize particular schools.     

How does a board of directors influence within‐ and cross‐sector nonprofit collaboration?

Board members play a significant, yet largely unexamined, role in nonprofit collaboration. Processes, such as finding prospective partners, creating common ground with a partner, and establishing appropriate collaborative governance implicate nonprofit board members. In contrast to the scholarship of the role of interlocking directorates as potential networks for nonprofit collaboration, this paper examines the role of board members' social and human capital on nonprofit collaboration with other nonprofits, businesses, and government agencies. Drawing on online survey data from 636 nonprofit organizations, this paper finds that board social capital—but not board human capital—is positively related to the presence and number of within‐sector and cross‐sector nonprofit collaboration. However, board human capital enhances nonprofit‐government collaboration, when board social capital is also high. The results provide a novel perspective in nonprofit collaboration and board management research.     

Contracting and Patterns of Nonprofit Governance

Executive staff and board members in nonprofit organizations that operate with government grants and contracts often work together to perform important governance functions. This shared responsibility can be predicted by strong executive leadership of the board, a board with highly regarded members, and affiliation with an influential statewide or regional association. The results of our research suggest that the distribution of governance responsibility in nonprofit organizations with government revenues should command the attention of researchers and activists.     

Board development practices and competent board members: Implications for performance

This study explores underlying assumptions about board development practices in nonprofit governance. Specifically, a model was developed to determine if using recommended recruitment, board member orientation, and evaluation practices resulted in more competent board members and if the presence of these board members led to better board performance. The sample consisted of 1,051 survey responses from CEOs and board chairs representing 713 credit unions. As member‐benefit nonprofit organizations, credit unions rely almost exclusively on voluntary board members in an oversight capacity. Results support the contention that board development practices lead to more capable board members, and the presence of these board members tends to explain board performance. The study advances the understanding of nonprofit board development practices by further defining the concept and proposing an empirically tested assessment strategy. Furthermore, the findings support using specific recruitment practices that should strengthen nonprofit boards.     

The governance self‐assessment checklist: An instrument for assessing board effectiveness

This article describes the development and validation of the Governance Self‐Assessment Checklist (GSAC). The GSAC was designed to assist boards of directors of nonprofit and public sector organizations to identify strengths and weaknesses in the governance of their organizations, educate board members about the essentials of good governance, and improve their governance practices. The instrument comprises 144 items organized into twelve subscales. The results of the study indicated that the subscales have excellent internal consistency reliability, exhibit good criterion‐related validity, and are able to discriminate between stronger and weaker aspects of board functioning. The relative strengths and weaknesses in board effectiveness were identified, and the implications of the findings for the assessment of board effectiveness and field applications of the GSAC were discussed.     

Called to order: A board president in trouble

This is a fictionalized case based on real events. It is intended as a teaching tool to stimulate discussion about procedural issues in nonprofit governance; board roles and responsibilities; communications; and relationships between boards, chairs, and executives, particularly in the context of smaller organizations. It is meant to support sessions on nonprofit boards and governance in introductory courses on nonprofit management or for use in workshops with new or less experienced executives and board members. Set in an organization engaged in cultural exchange, the case can be used in introductions to nonprofit management, arts administration, or international nongovernmental management.     

Revisiting Agency and Stewardship Theories

Using principal–agent theories, this study examined differences in the perceptions of nonprofit chief executive officers (CEOs) and board chairs on key governance aspects, including board performance, leadership, satisfaction with diversity, and board meetings. Using data from the CEOs and board chairs of 474 nonprofit organizations, we found statistically significant differences in the governance perceptions of these leaders of nonprofit organizations. The findings provide support for an agency theory explanation about the differing interests of principals (board chairs) and agents (CEOs). The findings suggest that these two sets of nonprofit actors frequently operate from different perspectives, potentially affecting the governance of their organizations.     

Behavioral Determinants of Nonprofit Board Performance

There is an increased awareness that the performance of boards (good governance) is not only determined by structural determinants but by behavioral determinants as well. These behavioral determinants might be particularly important for public and nonprofit governance, where the role of the board is more diffuse and heterogeneous than in corporate governance. Here we investigate how social dynamics within boards in secondary education influence their performance. We follow a concise model that includes cognitive conflict, the use of expertise, effort norms, and social cohesion as determinants of board task performance. A survey among all secondary schools in the Netherlands serves as the empirical underpinning for this process‐oriented model of good governance. We show that the behavioral determinants have different effects on the control task and advice task of boards. Also, we find that cognitive conflicts in supervisory boards do not lead to less but rather to more social cohesion within boards. Building on these findings, we suggest a revised model of the behavioral determinants of nonprofit board performance.     

Power in and around nonprofit boards: A neglected dimension of governance

In this article we propose five patterns of board governance based on the distribution of power in and around boards of nonprofit organizations. The typology proposed grew out of our findings in in-depth case studies in which the dispersion of power became the critical variable for making sense of the patterns of governance observed. These governance patterns were then incorporated into a survey of boards in the voluntary sector. We present the results of this latter phase of the research by focusing on the associations between the five patterns and the background characteristics of board members, organizational and environmental variables, and board and organizational effectiveness. The results of the study suggest that power is an important while largely neglected aspect of board governance in the not-for-profit sector.     

Common Agency in Nonprofit Advocacy Organizations

Most theories of nonprofit organizations and nonprofit leadership recognize the multitude of stakeholders—including board members, donors and volunteers, funders, the media, and policy makers—that organizational leaders must contend with in doing their work. For nonprofits engaged in advocacy, demands from stakeholders may be even more challenging to meet. Although stakeholder theory recognizes the effect of various groups on an organization, it does not explain how leaders manage the preferences of their often‐competing stakeholders while they make choices for the organization. This study develops a common agency framework, evaluating the roles of three groups crucial to nonprofit advocacy organizations: the organization's board of directors, elected officials, and donors/members. The common agency framework is then illustrated with interviews with leaders of nonprofit advocacy organizations in California. Findings suggest that the leaders of these groups have a significant amount of discretion in guiding their organizations’ activities and operations.     

The Governance of International Nongovernmental Organizations: How Funding and Volunteer Involvement Affect Board Nomination Modes and Stakeholder Representation in International Nongovernmental Organizations

The governance of civil society organizations (CSOs) is a crucial determinant of organizational legitimacy, accountability, and performance. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are a subtype of CSOs and have received a lot of attention as actors in global governance. Research suggests that INGOs can follow a membership model, where the board is elected by the membership, or a board-managed model, where the board is appointed to represent major stakeholders. Following resource dependency theory, we argue that the choice between these two models depends on the INGOs different sources of funding and the degree of volunteer involvement: As donors and volunteers provide important resources, they are in turn granted the right to nominate board members or to sit on the board. In our quantitative study we show that individual members, regional member organizations, and governmental donors hold a stronger position in the governance of INGOs than philanthropists, foundations and volunteers. Our results inform research on CSO governance by highlighting the relevance of board nomination modes and by showing how CSOs can incorporate stakeholders into their governance mechanisms.     

Agency Problems between Managers and Employees in Nonprofit Organizations: A Discrete Choice Experiment

Most principal–agent literature of nonprofit organizations has focused on the relationship between board members and managers. However, in addition to the role as an agent of the board, the manager also performs a role as principal with respect to the nonprofit employees. By using a discrete choice experiment, we identify the objectives of managers and employees in nonprofit organizations and assess the presence of agency problems in this relationship. Our sample consists of 76 headmasters, 161 teachers, and 39 administrative employees in 74 secondary nonprofit schools in Belgium. We find that the six objectives set out in the experiment play an important role for both headmasters and subordinate staff. However, the results also indicate that some of these objectives are significantly more important for the headmasters. In sum, our results suggest that agency theory and stewardship theory are not necessarily in conflict with each other but can be combined into a more general governance framework for nonprofit organizations. Consequently, we argue that incentive structures that incorporate different types of objectives can facilitate the recruitment and retention of employees in nonprofit organizations.     

Lessons for successful nonprofit governance

Boards of nonprofit organizations malfunction as often as they function effectively. As the best-managed nonprofit organizations demonstrate, both the board and the executive are essential to the proper functioning of a nonprofit organization. These administrative organs must work as equal members of a team rather than one subordinate to the other. Moreover, the work of the executive and the board does not divide neatly into policy-making versus execution of policy. Boards and executives must be involved in both functions and must coordinate their work accordingly. In a well-functioning nonprofit organization, the executive will take responsibility for assuring that the governance function is properly organized and maintained.     

KIDS OR CASH? EXPLORING CHARTER SCHOOL RESPONSES TO DECLINING GOVERNMENT REVENUES

While the literature is extensive on school districts' revenue sources, less research has been done on the impact of donations on school district funds. In this paper, we extend the theoretical literature on crowding out of private donations by government grants for one type of nonprofit firm, namely charter schools. The theoretical model leads us to focus on the key relationships among fundraising effort, enrollment (which is tied to federal and state funding) and donations. Using a dataset on Texas charter schools we adopt a two-stage approach to examine the empirical relationship between changes in nondonor revenues and the donations received by charter schools. Like the extensive empirical estimates of the effects of government grants on donations for other types of nonprofit firms, we find evidence of crowding-out with respect to our sample of charter schools. We also find a significant, positive effect of fundraising on donations with a $1 increase in fundraising associated to a $0.58 increase in donations, a pattern consistent with overinvestment in fundraising. Enrollments exhibit a robust inverse relationship to changes in nondonor revenues. (JEL H00, H32, H50)     

Reframing Board‐Staff Relations: Exploring the Governance Function Using a Storytelling Metaphor

This article attempts to reframe board‐staff relations by presenting an alternative perspective on governance, management, and leadership functions within nonprofit organizations. It draws on an interpretative view of organizations and suggests that we can understand nonprofits as socially constructed entities by using the metaphor of storytelling. Seeing the role of board and staff through this theoretical lens allows us to reconceptualize them. This in turn enables us to enhance the creative potential of the governance function and allows governance to support the goal of creating resilient, adaptive, learning organizations.     

Board Accountability: Lessons from the Field

Accountability has become a major issue in the nonprofit sector. Numerous external and internal approaches to strengthening performance in this area exist, and many nonprofit boards expect their executives to account foruse of their organizations' resources. However, few boards apply any such expectations to themselves. Qualitative analysis of records from interviews, consultations, and meeting observations with 169 board members of thirty‐four diverse nonprofit organizations revealed six sets of practices that foster board accountability. They include setting clear expectations and standards for the group and for its members, actively using policies regarding conflicts of interests, identifying and staying focused on priorities, maintaining strong two‐way communications directly with constituency groups, conducting assessments of meetings and board performance, and experimenting intentionally with new approaches to their work. The experiences of these boards provide numerous examples of practical steps that others may consider when they seek to increase the value they add to their organizations as well as to strengthen public trust.     

Do magnet and charter schools exacerbate or ameliorate inequality?

School choice typically refers to opportunities to enroll youth in public and/or private educational alternatives to traditional neighborhood public schools. While these options continue to grow in the United States under the umbrella of school choice, magnet and charter schools are the most common forms of public school choice. In this article, we review the development of school choice and the differing historical and philosophical origins of magnet and charter schools. We then summarize what we know about the extent to which these public choice options exacerbate or ameliorate two forms of inequality—academic achievement and school segregation by race and class. Research suggests that magnet schools often encourage racial and class diversity, while charters contribute to racial and socioeconomic isolation. While low‐income minority students may benefit academically from attending magnet schools, it is unclear whether charter schools have any effect on achievement when comparing charter school students to their counterparts in traditional public school. We expect that continued growth of magnet schools will likely promote school diversity both within and between districts, though some types of magnets may also inadvertently promote segregation. However, expansion of the charter school sector will heighten school segregation and exacerbate racial and socioeconomic isolation.     

Leadership in faith‐based nonprofits

This case study illustrates the unique challenges of leading a faith‐based nonprofit organization within a multifaith constituency in Asia. The core themes of the case are based on research conducted with the staff, executive team, and board members of an international faith‐based nonprofit organization in Asia. Specifically, the case focuses on three identity‐based leadership dilemmas in relation to (1) creating a shared sense of organizational identity, (2) talent management, and (3) board governance. By describing the challenges faced by the CEO, the case shows how a strong faith‐based identification can positively bind an organization together, but also result in organizational blind spots with unintended consequences.     

Female participation in association governance and political representation: Women as executive directors,board members,lobbyists, and political action committee directors

This analysis of more than eleven hundred business, trade, and professional nonprofit associations identifies several internal organizational barriers to leadership for women. In addition, the analysis highlights the importance of female representation in governance positions, such as executive directors and board members, and of the selection of women as the political representatives of associations in roles such as lobbyists and political action committee directors.