信息技术对价格信息不对称的影响研究

信息技术降低了企业和客户获取信息的成本,从而对价格信息不对称产生影响。本文从客户搜索产品价格信息的角度,分别对四种市场进行分析,得出了在短期市场中,考虑IT影响时信息不对称降低、客户获得较低价格的结论;长期市场中,考虑IT影响时,信息不对称消失、市场演变为完全竞争市场的结论。最后,给出企业制定价格策略的建议。     

Bundling of Vertically Differentiated Products in a Supply Chain*

We consider a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer produces a basic and a premium product. If desired, a bundle of the two products might also be produced at a unit bundling cost. We allow either the manufacturer or the retailer to produce the bundle from the component products. All products, however, must be sold exclusively through the retailer. Using game theoretic models, we compare and contrast the equilibrium outcomes under retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling scenarios. We show that under manufacturer bundling, the manufacturer never offers the full product line composed of the basic product, the premium product, and the bundle, at equilibrium; while the same does not hold under retailer bundling. We show that total supply chain profit under retailer bundling weakly dominates that under manufacturer bundling and characterize the region in the parameter space where this domination is strict. We explore an extension where there is a capacity constraint in producing one or both of the component products and characterize the equilibrium outcomes. We show that unlike the infinite capacity case, offering the full product line is an equilibrium outcome under manufacturer bundling when the capacity of the premium good is limited.     

The Severity of Supply Chain Disruptions: Design Characteristics and Mitigation Capabilities

Supply chain disruptions and the associated operational and financial risks represent the most pressing concern facing firms that compete in today's global marketplace. Extant research has not only confirmed the costly nature of supply chain disruptions but has also contributed relevant insights on such related issues as supply chain risks, vulnerability, resilience, and continuity. In this conceptual note, we focus on a relatively unexplored issue, asking and answering the question of how and why one supply chain disruption would be more severe than another. In doing so, we argue, de facto, that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable and, as a consequence, that all supply chains are inherently risky. Employing a multiple‐method, multiple‐source empirical research design, we derive novel insights, presented as six propositions that relate the severity of supply chain disruptions (i) to the three supply chain design characteristics of density, complexity, and node criticality and (ii) to the two supply chain mitigation capabilities of recovery and warning. These findings not only augment existing knowledge related to supply chain risk, vulnerability, resilience, and business continuity planning but also call into question the wisdom of pursuing such practices as supply base reduction, global sourcing, and sourcing from supply clusters.     

Acquisition and Disclosure of Operational Information*

We study a firm's strategy for acquisition and disclosure of operational information by establishing linkages among information quality, managerial self‐interest, and production planning. We develop a multistage model in which a manager of a publicly traded firm first receives private information about the product demand and then uses it to make production and disclosure decisions. We consider two prevalent disclosure models employed in the accounting literature: all‐or‐nothing and cheap‐talk models. In the all‐or‐nothing model, it is assumed that any disclosure must be truthful, but the manager can strategically withhold information. We show that the manager commits to acquire the value‐added operational information if (i) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is low or (ii) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is high, but the fixed disclosure cost is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. We demonstrate that the firm is better off if the production level is observable to the financial market because multidimensional signaling reduces costs. In the cheap‐talk model, we assume that the manager's disclosure may not be truthful. We show that the manager's incentive to acquire value‐added operational information increases along with the penalty cost for misleading investors. Therefore, a high penalty cost for misleading investors can encourage the manager to obtain more precise information, which in turn improves the firm's cash flow.     

Equity‐Based Incentives and Supply Chain Buy‐Back Contracts*

We analyze the effect of equity‐based incentives in a supply chain with a downstream firm and an upstream supplier. By using the operational decision as a signal to influence external investors’ beliefs, the downstream firm's manager intends to maximize a convex combination of the interim share price and the terminal cash flows. We show that equity‐based incentives create a side effect. Specifically, with a universal buy‐back contract, the deadweight loss of signaling induced by equity‐based incentives could spread throughout the supply chain and cause chain‐wide damages. To mitigate such undesirable consequences, we propose a new mechanism to eliminate the inefficiency. We derive the optimal mechanism that maximizes the downstream firm's profits subject to the constraint that the supply chain efficiency is not undermined. In contrast to the full‐information benchmark, this mechanism gives positive surplus to the supplier. [Submitted: January 5, 2011. Revisions received: June 20, 2011; December 11, 2011. Accepted: December 22, 2011.]     

Effect of Inventory Information Discrepancy in a Drop‐Shipping Supply Chain

This article investigates the impact of information discrepancy between a drop‐shipper and an online retailer on the drop‐shipping supply chain performance. The inventory information misalignment between them contributes to the failure of order fulfillment and demand satisfaction, and hence the associated penalties are incurred. In this article, we first analyze the penalties of ignoring such information discrepancy on both the drop‐shipper and the online retailer. We then assess the impact of information discrepancy on both parties when the drop‐shipper understands the existence of the information discrepancy but is not able to eliminate the errors. The numerical experiments indicate that both parties can have significant amount of the percentage cost reductions if the information discrepancy can be eliminated, and the potential savings are substantial especially when the errors have large variability. Furthermore, we observe that the online retailer is more vulnerable to information discrepancy than the drop‐shipper, and the drop‐shipper is likely to suffer from the online retailer's underestimation of the physical inventory level more than the problem of its overestimation. Moreover, even if eliminating errors is not possible, both parties could still benefit from taking the possibility of errors into consideration in decision making.     

非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究

研究了非对称信息下一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级闭环供应链在回购契约下的协调问题。在考虑零售商销售成本信息为非对称信息和随机性市场需求基础上,首先,分析了在正常状态下分散式系统决策情况,通过重新设计可变参数解决了信息不对称的问题,实现了回购契约下的信息共享和供应链的完美协调;然后,探讨了闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件的协调问题。研究结果表明：当突发事件造成市场规模和制造商生产成本同时扰动时,闭环供应链的销售活动将受影响,闭环供应链的协调将被打破,而闭环供应链的废旧品回收活动却不受突发事件的影响。为此,给出了闭环供应链回购契约的应急决策。最后通过数值算例验证了结论。     

The Financial Impact of FSC Certification in the United States: A Contingency Perspective

This article focuses on an important and emergent standard for sustainable operations management: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. Unlike similar certifications, its focus is on the entire upstream supply chain, reflecting the criticality of supply chain management to ensure sustainable products. We investigate the financial impact from FSC certification, offering valuable decision support for managers considering this certification. Taking a contingency perspective, we view a firm's supply chain position and its prior certification to the ISO 14001 standard as influencing the results. Drawing on signaling theory, we suggest that firms farther downstream in the supply chain realize significantly greater abnormal financial performance benefits than firms upstream in the supply chain. We further hypothesize that firms that were not ISO 14001 certified at the time of FSC certification realize significantly greater abnormal financial performance benefits than firms that did have the ISO 14001 certification. To test these hypotheses, we utilize financial data of all publicly traded firms in the United States that have obtained the FSC certification, and assess whether FSC certification leads to abnormal performance benefits considering the above contingencies. Data collected from the FSC Certificate Database and Compustat, employed in an event study, provide support for our hypotheses. Overall, our findings contribute to research on decision making in the context of sustainable operations management, and offer a plausible explanation for contradictory results in prior studies. We highlight the applicability of signaling theory to decision sciences research, and stress the need to consider contingencies in sustainability management research.     

双重信息不对称下闭环供应链的激励机制研究

针对废旧电子产品市场中由再制造商、回收商和消费者构成的闭环供应链,研究了再制造商处理回收商回收能力隐匿的逆向选择问题和努力水平隐匿的道德风险问题。运用激励理论研究在双重信息不对称下,再制造商如何设计激励机制引导回收商努力回收废旧电子产品的问题。根据委托代理理论,运用信息甄别原理,考虑回收商回收的所有产品中只有部分产品满足于再制造的条件,构建了委托代理框架下闭环供应链的激励机制模型,并对模型进行求解、分析,讨论了各相关因素对努力程度的影响,并通过数值仿真进一步验证了相关因素对甄别契约参数和双方期望利润的影响。研究结果表明：低能力回收商获得的再制造产品数量的提成系数向下扭曲,只有如实汇报能力类型才能获得保留利润;高回收能力的回收商既获得保留利润,又获得额外的信息租金;再制造商签约高能力者获得的利润高于签约低能力者,随着市场中高能力者比例的增加,签约高能力者使得再制造商获得更多利润。     

信息不对称下供应链成员的决策顺序研究

市场需求通常是不确定的,而供应链成员之间关于需求信息会存在不对称性。本文采用"信号"博弈（Signaling）的方法,探讨信息不对称结构下供应链成员的最优决策顺序。考虑由两个成员组成的供应链,各成员需要决定自己的边际收益,后决策方可以观测到先决策方的决策,并推测（Infer）市场需求信息。研究表明：1）当信息精确度较低时,拥有信息的一方偏向于先决策,而当信息精确度较高时,其会偏向于后决策;2）无论信息精确度的高低,不拥有信息的一方总是偏向于先决策;3）对于整个供应链而言,当信息精确度较低时,拥有信息的一方先决策较优,而当信息精确度较高时,拥有信息的一方后决策较优。一些结论与直观相悖,取决于"信号"成本（Signaling cost）、先行者优势（First-mover advantage）以及后行者对先行者的反应之间的权衡。     

Optimal Procurement Design of an Assembly Supply Chain with Information Asymmetry

We study a decentralized assembly supply chain in which an assembler (she) assembles a set of n components, each produced by a different supplier (he), into a final product to satisfy an uncertain market demand. Each supplier holds private cost information to himself, for which the assembler only has a subjective estimate. Furthermore, the assembler believes that the suppliers' costs follow a joint discrete probability distribution. The assembler aims to design an optimal menu of contracts to maximize her own expected profit. The assembler's problem is a complex multi‐dimensional constrained optimization problem. We prove that there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts for the assembler, and we further develop an efficient algorithm with a complexity of O(n) to compute the optimal contract. In addition, we conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis to analyze how environmental parameters affect individual firm's performance and the value of information to the assembler, to each supplier, and to the supply chain. Our results suggest that each supplier's private cost information becomes more valuable to the assembler and each supplier when the average market demand increases or when the final product unit revenue increases. Surprisingly, when a supplier's cost volatility increases and its mean remains the same, the value of information to the assembler or to each supplier does not necessarily increase. Furthermore, we show that when the suppliers' cost distributions become more positively correlated, the suppliers are always worse off, but the assembler is better off. However, the value of information for the assembler might increase or decrease.     

信息不对称条件下的供应链利益共享契约研究

本文通过讨论供应链中零售商的销售成本为不对称信息时,供应链收益共享契约的参数制订问题,为供应商制定供应链契约参数提出了一些建议.     

Trust, the Asymmetry Principle, and the Role of Prior Beliefs

Within the risk literature there is an ongoing debate on whether trust is vulnerable or enduring. Previous research on nuclear energy by Slovic in 1993 has shown that negative events have much greater impact on self-reported trust than do positive events. Slovic attributes this to the asymmetry principle: specifically, that trust is much easier to destroy than to create. In a questionnaire survey concerning genetically modified (GM) food in Britain (n= 396) we similarly find that negative events have a greater impact on trust than positive events. Because public opinion in Britain is skewed in the direction of opposition toward GM food, the pattern of results could either be caused by the fact that negative information is more informative than positive information (a negativity bias) or reflect the influence of people's prior attitudes toward the issue (a confirmatory bias). The results were largely in line with the confirmatory bias hypothesis: participants with clear positive or negative beliefs interpreted events in line with their existing attitude position. However, for participants with intermediate attitudes, negative items still had greater impact than the positive. This latter finding suggests that, congruent with the negativity bias hypothesis, negative information may still be more informative than positive information for undecided people. The study also identified the labeling of GM products, consulting the public, making biotechnology companies liable for any damage, and making a test available to detect GM produce as being particularly important preconditions for maintaining trust in the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.     

时间约束下不对称信息鲜活农产品供应链应对突发事件协调模型

针对一个由供应商和一个零售商构成的鲜活农产品供应链,在考虑损耗和新鲜度的影响下,假设产品的市场需求为零售价格的非线性函数,零售商成本为私有信息,研究如何协调供应链应对突发事件。 首先,给出了对称信息下供应链协调模型;然后,研究了不对称信息下集权式与分权式供应链的协调机制;再次,研究了在突发事件引起零售商成本分布函数扰动情况下,供应链的最优应对策略。 研究表明,供应链的最优生产计划、最优批发价格和最优零售价格均具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件造成零售商期望成本在一定范围内发生扰动时,三者可以保持不变。最后,通过数值仿真验证了相关结论。     

A Data‐Driven Inventory Control Policy for Cash Logistics Operations: An Exploratory Case Study Application at a Financial Institution

A number of market changes are impacting the way financial institutions are managing their automated teller machines (ATMs). We propose a new class of adaptive data‐driven policies for a stochastic inventory control problem faced by a large financial institution that manages cash at several ATMs. Senior management were concerned that their current cash supply system to manage ATMs was inefficient and outdated, and suspected that using improved cash management could reduce overall system cost. Our task was to provide a robust procedure to tackle the ATM's cash deployment strategies. Current industry practice uses a periodic review system with infrequent parameter updates for cash management based on the assumption that demand is normally distributed during the review period. This assumption did not hold during our investigation, warranting a new and robust analysis. Moreover, we discovered that forecast errors are often not normally distributed and that these error distributions change dramatically over time. Our approach finds the optimal time series forecaster and the best‐fitting weekly forecast error distribution. The guaranteed optimal target cash inventory level and time between orders could only be obtained through an optimization module that was embedded in a simulation routine that we built for the institution. We employed an exploratory case study methodology to collect cash withdrawal data at 21 ATMs owned and operated by the financial institution. Our new approach shows a 4.6% overall cost reduction. This reflects an annual cost savings of over $250,000 for the 2,500 ATM units that are operated by the bank.     

需求和零售商购买成本同时扰动的供应链应急协调

供应链的契约协调机制是供应链管理的重要内容,突发事件下的供应链协调机制是近年来的研究热点。 研究了在单制造商单零售商组成的供应链中,假设生产成本是其生产数量的凸函数下,当市场需求为零售价格的非线性函数,突发事件造成需求和零售商购买成本同时发生扰动时,集权、分权供应链应对突发事件的最优策略。 首先证明了稳定环境下的数量折扣契约可以实现该供应链的协调,在集权式决策下,供应链的原有生产计划对突发事件具有一定的鲁棒性,但是当突发事件造成的扰动超过一定幅度时,供应链的协调将会被打破,供应链系统必须改变生产计划才能实现其利润最大化。 在分权式决策下,供应链的原数量折扣契约不能使扰动后的供应链达到协调,因此,设计了新的数量折扣契约来使扰动后的供应链达到协调。最后给出一个算例验证了相关结论。     

虚拟第三方控制下供应链对突发事件的协调研究

为了提高供应链内部激励的效率,文章引入虚拟第三方对供应链进行集中控制,对供应商以及销售商进行激励。并且深入分析了虚拟第三方控制下供应链的需求突变情况,对第三方的产品定价以及分配份额的影响。研究发现需求突变不会影响分配份额,但定价却随需求突变程度不同而有所增加或降低。     

不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链合同协调研究

在具有需求预测更新的计划模型中,信息不对称和双重定价问题仍然在困扰着上下游企业间的关系。本文在报童模型和贝叶斯分析模型的基础上对不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链系统进行了描述,并分析了信息不对称和双重定价问题。而后通过运用委托代理理论的激励原理设计最小订货比例合同,激励零售商共享其私人信息来消除双方的信息不对称,通过设计补贴合同来消除双重边际化造成的低效率,进而实现供应链上下游企业间的协调运作。最后通过运用百佳汽车公司与一汽大众供应链系统的运营数据,计算了两个合同的参数,进一步证明了最小订货比例合同和补贴合同的有效性。     

政府奖惩下闭环供应链中信息不对称时的最优合同设计

考虑政府奖惩机制,在制造商依赖零售商回收的闭环供应链中,当零售商的回收成本信息是不对称时,为探究制造商最优激励合同设计问题,本文构建制造商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过运用委托代理理论和显示原理求得实现对零售商信息甄别的最优两部定价合同菜单,并分析该合同菜单性质以及信息不对称的影响,最后探讨政府奖惩机制对均衡结果的影响。研究发现,随着零售商回收效率降低,制造商会提高批发价、减少转移支付。回收成本信息不对称会使制造商和供应链利润减少,零售商利润增加。政府奖惩机制的出台会使制造商降低批发价、提高转移支付。当政府的回收标准较高而奖惩力度较小时,奖惩机制的出台会使供应链利润减少,否则,会使供应链利润增加。     

Interorganizational Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment Systems and Supply Chain Implications

Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment (CFAR) is a new interorganizational system that enables retailers and manufacturers to forecast demand and schedule production jointly. The capabilities of CFAR exceed those of the traditional EDI because CFAR allows exchange of complex decision support models and manufacturer/retailer strategies. The proponents of CFAR claim that the fastest way for retailers and manufacturers to slash inventory costs and product shortages is by coordinating their decisions. The impact of CFAR on the supply chain using a model consisting of a manufacturer selling its product through two independent identical retailers is analyzed. The model assumes that the manufacturer doesn't face capacity constraints, the demand is stationary, and retailer prices are constant over time; the shortages are backordered at the manufacturer and retailers to isolate the effects of information sharing in CFAR. The most significant findings relate to the increase in the cost incurred by the nonparticipant in CFAR, the increase in the manufacturer's cost of serving the nonparticipant if the participant can obtain delivery guarantees in return for demand information sharing, and the incentives of the players to move towards universal retailer participation in CFAR. The findings are explained using the risk structure faced by the players in the supply chain. The managerial implications of the impact of CFAR on the supply chain structure are also discussed.