Feedback quality and performance in organisations

The provision of feedback is fundamental for promoting employee performance in modern organisations; however, little is known about how the quality of feedback affects performance. We report an experiment where subjects perform a real-effort task repeatedly in a flat-wage environment which varies the quality of feedback across treatments. In the baseline treatment, subjects receive no feedback about their rank in their group. In the two main treatments, feedback quality varies in that subjects know (“High-Quality Feedback”) or do not know (“Low-Quality Feedback”) their exact rank in their group. We show that the quality of feedback is an important driver of productivity. Average performance is significantly higher for high-quality feedback than for low-quality or no feedback, where no significant overall performance differences are observed. Our results have significant implications for designing and implementing cost-effective policies within organisations.     

Foresight activities in the U.S.A.: Time for a re-assessment?

This article reports on a brief, informal, reconnaissance study of ‘foresight’ activities now being conducted in the private sector and the Federal government. Such activities include: external environmental assessment, internal organizational assessment, direction setting, definition, and selection of base and contingent plans, implementation, performance evaluation and feedback. The study involved the reading and analysis of the existing literature and discussions with over 50 people in diverse private and public sector organizations. The objective was to determine what foresight activities are being done, how, by whom, with what results, and what are the implications and options.     

MONITORING IN TEAMS: USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO STUDY A THEORY OF THE FIRM

Alchian and Demsetz’s influential explanation of the classical business firm (The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 777–795) argues that there is need for a concentrated residual claim in the hands of a central agent, to motivate the monitoring of workers. We model monitoring as a way to transform team production from a collective action dilemma with strong free riding incentives to a productivity‐enhancing opportunity with strong private marginal incentives to contribute effort. In an experiment, we have subjects experience team production without monitoring, team production with a central monitor, and team production with peer monitoring. Then subjects vote on whether to employ the central monitor, who gets to keep a fixed share of the team output, or to rely on peer monitoring, which entails a coordination or free riding problem. Our subjects usually prefer peer monitoring but they switch to the specialist when unable to successfully self‐monitor. We provide evidence for situations in which team members resist the appointing of a central monitor and succeed in overcoming coordination and free riding problems as well as for a situation in which an Alchian–Demsetz‐like firm grows in the laboratory.     

MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE

Rising healthcare costs have sparked debate about the best way to provide high‐quality affordable health insurance. We discuss the potential for regulated insurance markets to outperform single‐payer public insurance. We use as an example the private Medicare plans that now provide insurance to almost a third of seniors in the United States. The evidence suggests that private plans can limit costs and potentially appeal to enrollees, and that well‐designed risk adjustment can mitigate market failures due to adverse selection. However, fostering competition between insurers, especially in smaller markets, is difficult. We discuss how future research might illuminate the relative advantages of public and private health insurance.     

A Review of Risk Perceptions and Other Factors that Influence Flood Mitigation Behavior

In flood risk management, a shift can be observed toward more integrated approaches that increasingly address the role of private households in implementing flood damage mitigation measures. This has resulted in a growing number of studies into the supposed positive relationship between individual flood risk perceptions and mitigation behavior. Our literature review shows, however, that, actually, this relationship is hardly observed in empirical studies. Two arguments are provided as an explanation. First, on the basis of protection motivation theory, a theoretical framework is discussed suggesting that individuals’ high‐risk perceptions need to be accompanied by coping appraisal to result in a protective response. Second, it is pointed out that possible feedback from already‐adopted mitigation measures on risk perceptions has hardly been considered by current studies. In addition, we also provide a review of factors that drive precautionary behavior other than risk perceptions. It is found that factors such as coping appraisal are consistently related to mitigation behavior. We conclude, therefore, that the current focus on risk perceptions as a means to explain and promote private flood mitigation behavior is not supported on either theoretical or empirical grounds.     

Private Labels: Facilitators or Impediments to Supply Chain Coordination

We consider a retailer’s decision of whether to develop an internally produced, private label version of a national brand and the role that this decision plays in coordinating the supply chain. Our model assumes that the perceived quality of the private label is lower than that of the national brand, and we allow for the two products to have different marginal costs. We further allow for a fixed development cost that the retailer must incur to develop private label capability, and distinguish two types of private labels depending upon whether they would or would not be developed as product line extensions by a vertically integrated supply chain. We refer to these two types as first‐best (FB) and non‐first‐best (NFB) product line extensions, respectively. When the private label can be characterized as a NFB product line extension, its development creates adverse cannibalization effects, yet it also helps to mitigate the effects of double marginalization with respect to the national brand. We characterize the conditions under which the retailer will develop private label capability, and distinguish among the conditions under which this is either beneficial or detrimental to the overall performance of the supply chain.     

Does the internet change how we die and mourn? Overview and analysis

The article outlines the issues that the internet presents to death studies. Part 1 describes a range of online practices that may affect dying, the funeral, grief and memorialization, inheritance and archaeology; it also summarizes the kinds of research that have been done in these fields. Part 2 argues that these new online practices have implications for, and may be illuminated by, key concepts in death studies: the sequestration (or separation from everyday life) of death and dying, disenfranchisement of grief, private grief, social death, illness and grief narratives, continuing bonds with the dead, and the presence of the dead in society. In particular, social network sites can bring dying and grieving out of both the private and public realms and into the everyday life of social networks beyond the immediate family, and provide an audience for once private communications with the dead.     

PARTISAN CONTROL,MEDIA BIAS,AND VIEWER RESPONSES: EVIDENCE FROM BERLUSCONI'S ITALY

This paper examines whether and how viewers respond to changes in partisan bias in media news. We use data from Italy, where the main private television network is owned by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center‐right coalition, and the public television corporation is largely controlled by the ruling coalition. We first document that after the 2001 national elections, when the control of the government moved from the center‐left to the center‐right, news content on public television shifted to the right. Using individual survey data, we find robust evidence that viewers responded to these changes by modifying their choice of favorite news programs. On the one hand, right‐leaning viewers increased their propensity to watch public channels which, even after the change, remained to the left of private channels. On the other hand, left‐wing viewers reacted by switching from the main public channel to another public channel that was controlled by the left during both periods. We show that this behavioral response, which tended to shift ideological exposure to the left, significantly, though only partially, offset the movement of public news content to the right.     

Treating and Drinking Well Water in the Presence of Health Risks from Arsenic Contamination: Results from a U.S. Hot Spot

The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 regulates water quality in public drinking water supply systems but does not pertain to private domestic wells, often found in rural areas throughout the country. The recent decision to tighten the drinking water standard for arsenic from 50 parts per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb may therefore affect some households in rural communities, but may not directly reduce health risks for those on private wells. The article reports results from a survey conducted in a U.S. arsenic hot spot, the rural area of Churchill County, Nevada. This area has elevated levels of arsenic in groundwater. We find that a significant proportion of households on private wells are consuming drinking water with arsenic levels that pose a health risk. The decision to treat tap water for those on private wells in this area is modeled, and the predicted probability of treatment is used to help explain drinking water consumption. This probability represents behaviors relating to the household's perception of risk.     

LETTER GRADING GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY

We mailed letters to non‐existent business addresses in 159 countries (10 per country), and measured whether they come back to the return address in the United States and how long it takes. About 60% of the letters were returned, taking over six months, on average. The results provide new objective indicators of government efficiency across countries, based on a simple and universal service, and allow us to shed light on its determinants. The evidence suggests that both technology and management quality influence government efficiency, just as they do that of the private sector.     

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex‐ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex‐post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey‐Clark‐Groves mechanism guarantees both ex‐ante as well as ex‐post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex‐ante and ex‐post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub‐ and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex‐post efficient mechanisms lead to private under‐ or over‐acquisition of information.     

Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues

We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.     

Making ‘my’ problem ‘our’ problem: Warfare as collective action,and the role of leader manipulation

Warfare is a collective action problem, and groups often stand to benefit from the quick and coordinated action that leaders can provide. This basic principle is as true in modern political contexts as it has been across our evolutionary history, and there is growing evidence that leadership has evolved, in part, to solve such collective action problems. Despite the material and reproductive benefits of leadership for groups, leaders may also seek private gains at the expense of group interests. Drawing upon insights from social and evolutionary psychology, I explain how leaders solve collective action problems in warfare, but also how leaders manipulate audience preferences when their own interests do not align with group interests. Specifically, when leaders anticipate great private gain from foreign aggression while facing steep public resistance at home, leaders will misframe the conflict as defensive rather than offensive in nature. I provide an evolutionary analysis that explains why leaders exploit this framing specifically, and I identify the specific aspects of conflict framing that are most likely to be exploited toward this end.     

Is it All About Money? – Affective Commitment and the Difference Between Family and Non‐family Sellers in Buyouts

In this paper we investigate private equity firm perceptions of sellers’ affective deal commitment in buyout transactions. Using a sample of 174 buyouts, we test trust, goal congruence and private equity reputation as potential antecedents of perceived deal commitment. We also examine whether and how different types of sellers, family versus non‐family firms, moderate sources of perceived affective deal commitment. In sum, we find evidence that non‐financial factors play a role in buyouts, particularly for family firm sellers.     

MARKET DISTORTIONS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY

In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.     

Public–private versus public ownership and economic performance: evidence from Italian local utilities

In the last century local public services have often been reformed. The declared outcome of the most recent reforms is the privatization and liberalization of the sector. However, in almost all European countries, the privatization of local public services has been only partial, because local governments have sought to privatise a minority stake in the public owned-companies, while remaining committed to retaining public ownership and control over the longer-term as a means of protecting public interest. The phenomenon of mixed public–private companies emerged as a result of this process. In this context, the article investigates whether differences in financial performance can be found between public–private companies and totally public-owned enterprises. Empirical quantitative studies on this particular topic are quite lacking at the moment. The present study tries to fill this gap through an empirical analysis on a sample of 623 Italian local utilities. The results of the study suggest that there are differences in economic performance between local utility companies with varying degrees of public ownership. In particular, public–private utilities show better economic performance than publicly owned firms, especially in terms of profitability. The results also seem to suggest that the majority private ownership is not necessary for better performance. In other terms, public–private partnership—and not private majority ownership—seems to be the key point for good performance.     

政府补贴、所有权性质与企业研发决策

本文将企业研发行为分为"是否研发"和"投入多少"两个阶段,就政府补贴对不同所有制企业研发决策的影响进行研究.理论方面,构建企业研发决策的两阶段模型,讨论了补贴对企业研发投资的作用机制.实证方面,以中国工业企业为对象,选择Heckman两步法和2SLS分别处理了样本选择性偏误及变量间的内生性问题,对来自国有、私营和外资企业的分类样本进行了检验,结果表明:在不同的所有权性质下,政府补贴对企业研发投资的作用存在一定差别,国有企业面对优惠政策的倾斜和需要担负的社会责任,从事技术创新活动的概率较高,但由于特殊的产权关系和预算软约束等原因,缺乏扩大研发投入的动力;对于治理机制完善的外资企业和处于市场竞争弱势地位的私营企业而言,政府补贴的研发激励效果更为明显.     

The Courage Factor: Living People-Based Leadership by Geller,E. S. & Veazie,B

We adapted the Performance Diagnostic Checklist to analyze the environmental events contributing to safe and at-risk behaviors by employees in organizations. We then used the resulting tool, the Performance Diagnostic Checklist–Safety (PDC-Safety), to identify variables contributing to unsafe equipment usage by 3 members of a landscaping crew at a private university. Based on PDC-Safety results, an intervention consisting of graphic feedback was implemented. The intervention increased safe performance for all participants.     

REFERENCE POINTS,SOCIAL NORMS,AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS

How does an ex‐ante contract affect behavior in an ex‐post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical buyer–seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex‐ante contract was written. The ex‐ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45% lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. These effects do not depend on whether the contract was written under competitive or monopolistic conditions. Our results provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contracts serve as reference points that shape and coordinate the expectations of the contracting parties.     

The Effects of Temporal Placement of Feedback on Performance With and Without Goals

ABSTRACT

This report from the field evaluated the effects of temporal placement of feedback, and presence or absence of stated goals, on employee skill acquisition in the context of an organization-wide training. Four conditions were examined: feedback before performance with goals, feedback before performance without goals, feedback after performance with goals, and feedback after performance without goals. The results of this study found no statistically significant difference in performance across the four conditions.