考虑货主价格参照效应的海运运力合同定价策略

研究了考虑货主价格参照效应时的2级海运链的运力合同分配和定价问题.分别建立了考虑与不考虑下游货主价格参照效应时的运力合同分配与定价数学模型,分析了模型的性质,并通过数值仿真比较分析了货主的价格参照效应对货运代理运力采购量与承运商运力定价策略的影响.研究发现:货运代理的最优运力合同采购量受到运力合同价格和下游货主价格参照效应的双重影响,而承运商的最优合同价格会小于不考虑参照效应时的定价,且随着参照效应的增加,承运商的最优合同价格和最大利润都会降低;同时,参照效应存在上限,如果货主价格参照效应大于该值,那么承运商会选择完全的现货市场交易.     

考虑顾客效用和时变品质度的乳品供应链品质激励契约研究

考虑时间因素对乳制品品质的影响,构建“时变品质度”函数,结合消费者效用的敏感性,将乳品品质加成和时变特性与厂商收益管理有机结合,设计“批发价+收益共享”契约和“收益共享+品质投入成本共担”契约作为激励机制,来促进乳制品供应链上的主体企业提高品质投入水平。研究结果表明：单纯的“批发价+收益共享”契约对加工企业品质投入的激励效果有限,而“收益共享+品质投入成本共担”契约可以实现供销双方经济利润的帕累托改进,明晰供销双方在品质投入问题上的利益分配与权责关系,并在一定参数取值区间内,协调实现整体供应链利润最优。最后通过数值算例进行参数敏感性分析并验证相关结论。     

合同订购与现货市场混合交易下的双渠道供应链优化决策

为了更好地匹配需求与供应, 提高企业收益和服务水平, 本文研究了合同订购与现货市场交易结合下的双渠道供应链优化决策问题。首先分析了单纯批发价合同订购模式下的决策, 进一步考虑现货市场单向交易及双向交易的情形, 将供应链回购合同与数量柔性合同引入单向现货市场, 建立了这两类合同订购分别与现货市场补货、现货市场卖货相结合的订购模型, 以及批发价合同订购与现货市场买卖双向交易联合的决策模型。分析了不同模式下回购价格、缺货成本、补货成本、现货价格、现货价格波动及风险偏好对订购决策的影响, 并通过算例仿真, 分析了各类现货市场的使用对销售商收益的影响。结果表明, 合同订购与双向现货市场结合可以充分利用现货市场即时交易的优势, 提高供应链效益;而合同订购与单向现货市场结合, 虽然可以通过合同提高供货水平, 降低库存积压风险, 但该情形需要考虑供应商的回购或补货价格, 销售商仍有一定风险。不论单向或双向现货市场与合同订购的联合, 均可使供应链的利润优于单纯合同订购的情形。     

政府激励政策下人造板绿色供应链谈判-协调机制研究

当前我国人造板产业面临效率低下、资源浪费和环境污染等问题,上下游企业缺乏合作与协调。本文界定了人造板绿色供应链系统,运用契约理论和纳什谈判理论,分别构建了政府激励政策下人造板绿色供应链集中优化决策、分散均衡决策和谈判协调决策模型,从而建立了相应的收益分享-成本分担契约谈判协调机制,并基于相关行业和企业经验数据,与传统人造板供应链进行了对比数值分析。研究结果表明:(1)收益分享-成本分担契约谈判-协调机制能够很好地实现人造板绿色供应链的协调运营,提高资源效率,降低环境负影响和提升运营绩效。(2)人造板绿色供应链管理模式下供应链及其成员的最优利润均高于传统管理模式,谈判协调决策情形下供应链及其成员的最优利润均高于分散均衡决策情形。(3)制定有"门槛"的增值税即征即退政策和适当的环境税政策,自建经济林场、选用经济型枝桠材,强化技术研发和工艺改进,有助于提高人造板供应链运营绩效。     

Demand Growth in Services: A Discrete Choice Analysis of Customer Preferences and Online Selling

The selling of perishable services (e.g., hotel rooms, airline seats, and rental cars) online is increasingly popular with both retailers and consumers. Among the innovative approaches to online sales is opaque selling. First popularized by Priceline.com's name‐your‐own‐price model, opaque selling hides some attributes of the service (notably, brand and specific location) until after the purchase decision, in exchange for a discounted price. This means that a branded “product” is being sold as somewhat of a commodity, but the brand “name” is protected by the opaque model. The attraction of this model for retailers is that they are presumably able to increase their revenue stream, albeit at a lower rate, by selling rooms that otherwise would remain in inventory. In this article, we outline the development and analysis of an online choice survey to understand consumer preferences among three types of online distribution channels: regular full information sales channels, and opaque sales channels with or without consumer bidding. A Multinomial Logit model is employed to analyze the data and measure the consumer trade‐offs between price and other attributes of the product. We use the estimated model to calculate the incremental demand and revenue created by using an opaque channel simultaneously with regular full information channels. On balance, we find that correctly priced opaque channels can add to hotels revenue streams without undue cannibalization of regular room sales.     

智联产品服务供应链研发运维多阶段联合优化与协调

在智联化和服务化背景下,智能产品服务系统成为制造企业转型升级的重要方向。产品的“智能”和“互联”特性给供应链中的产品和服务都带来了新的变化。考虑产品的“智能”和“互联”对产品、服务的需求和成本的影响,构建了供应链两阶段动态博弈模型。刻画了分散决策和集中决策下供应链的最优运作行为,基于产品收益和服务收益提出了“双元收益共享”的供应链协调机制。通过算例分析,探讨了“服务化”、“智能互联”与“双元收益共享”契约对供应链利润的影响。研究表明,智联产品供应链中融入智能服务,不总是能增加供应链利润,存在“服务化悖论”;当产品智联化后,智能互联特性加强了产品与服务的融合,使供应链各方的利润都有较大提高;“双元收益共享”契约不仅能实现供应链Pareto改进,还能提高消费者剩余。     

Optimal procurement of long-term contracts in the presence of imperfect spot market

B2B spot market has grown rapidly and become an effective trading channel for commodity products. Besides long-term contract procurement from conventional suppliers (forward and option), a buyer can procure or sell commodities at any time in B2B spot market to adjust her inventory level. However, spot prices are generally volatile and the market is imperfect in the sense that spot trading may be realized with uncertainty in a given period of time and often comes with extra transaction cost. This paper considers a commodity buyer who can order forward and option contracts in advance and trade in a B2B spot market when spot price and demand are observed stochastically. Based on a single-period newsvendor model, we discuss three optimal order strategies and derive respective expected profits when the buyer is risk-neutral. The sensitivity of purchase costs, market liquidity and transaction cost is investigated. We also compare the optimal expected profits for different strategies to illustrate the effects of the two long-term contracts in the presence of the B2B spot market. We then extend our model to a multi-period setting and derive the optimal strategy. Finally, we numerically compute the optimal order strategy for a risk-averse buyer and analyze the impact of spot market, risk aversion, as well as the correlation between customer demand and spot price.     

一种能力外包且费用时变批量问题的启发式算法

当企业自身能力不能满足需求时考虑外包,可以有效提高企业的竞争力。一种带能力外包的多产品动态经济批量问题得以提出,并设定外包能力使用价格较高且费用时变。建立混合整数规划模型,通过约束松弛与模型分解,设计出一个基于拉格朗日松弛理论的启发式算法进行模型求解。大量随机实验表明,无论解的质量还是求解时间都表现较好。     

基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

研究了单个供应商和单个零售商构成的供应链中,零售商采用收益共享契约对供应链成员质量控制决策的协调作用。分析了使用收益共享契约、供应商与零售商合作、使用批发价格契约三种情况下供应链成员的博弈均衡,并进一步通过比较讨论了收益共享契约对于供应链成员质量控制的优势和局限。研究表明,当销售量的变化对产品质量改进的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好,但对于零售商来说,虽然其利润高于采用批发价格契约,可利润份额却有所下降,这意味着收益共享契约对供应商更有利。     

The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue‐sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue‐sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue‐sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue‐sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.     

需求具有价格敏感性的供应链的利益共享合约

利益共享合约是促使供应链协作的一种重要手段。本文建立了具有价格敏感性的最终消费需求的利益共享合约模型。在考虑最终销售价格为内生变量的条件下,借助于报童模型,分别分析在此合约下销售商和供应商的决策行为,并给出销售商的最优决策的计算公式以及该合约参数Φ的取值范围。最后给出实例分析,验证在利益共享合约下的供应链能达到协作状态。     

基于改进收益共享契约的双渠道供应链协调研究

在需求具有价格敏感性条件下,结合双渠道供应链的特点,研究了双渠道供应链中的两种协调方式,即传统分销渠道与电子直销渠道之间的协调及上下游节点之间的协调。首先,制造商将电子直销渠道所得收益按一定比例分享给零售商。其次,制造商提供给零售商一个较低的批发价格,而零售商将其在传统分销渠道的收益按一定比例分享给制造商作为补偿。从而构建了能够实现双渠道供应链协调的收益共享契约模型,给出了实现双渠道供应链协调时,契约参数取值范围的计算公式,并进一步探讨了双渠道供应链完美共赢协调存在的条件。最后通过算例分析,验证了所设计的收益共享契约模型对双渠道供应链协调的有效性。     

Procurement strategies in the presence of the spot market—an analytical framework

This paper investigates a problem in which a buyer can procure from a regular supplier as well as from a supplier in a spot market, possibly formed over the Internet. The contract with the regular supplier specifies a predetermined order volume and price, while the spot market has unlimited supply but a varying spot price. We analyse this problem from a buyer/supplier perspective, and an analytical model is developed to analyse two distinctive procurement strategies: the pure procurement system (PS) and the mixed procurement system of regular supplier with a supplier in spot markets (MS). Without loss of generality, we obtained a closed-forms solution that enabled us to provide numerical analysis on the procurement strategies, and allowed us to compare further the different characteristics between PS and MS. The results of our analysis demonstrate that the use of spot market could effectively mitigate the risk associated with demand uncertainty facing the buyer. The results also show that adopting MS can generate a higher buyer's profit than the PS, and significant supply-chain profit improvements can indeed be achieved through buyer/supplier coordination. Furthermore, spot price volatility leads to the facilitation of the use of spot markets, improving the buyer and the supply-chain profitability.     

突发性产出下的供应链协调应对策略

针对突发事件影响制造商产出的情形，研究了收益共享契约协调应对突发产出事件的有效性问题。首先论证了无突发产出事件时收益共享契约协调供应链的有效性，进而分析了突发产出事件对供应链最优生产计划、定价决策、绩效和协调性的影响。然后，建立了突发产出事件下的收益共享契约协调应对模型，并对原收益共享契约和修正后的收益共享契约进行了对比分析。研究表明：当突发产出事件导致产出扰动范围较小时，供应链的最优生产计划、批发价格和零售价格几乎保持不变，仅当产出扰动范围较大时，三者才需要同时调整，此时原供应链的协调性也将被打破，而修正后的收益共享契约具有良好的抗突发性。最后，通过算例进行了验证。     

生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择

供应链协调是提高供应链整体利润、改善供应链各方利益的根本手段.旨在探讨生产商具有生产规模不经济特性的双渠道供应链协调策略.给出了集中决策下双渠道供应链的市场价格与整体利润,以及分散决策下批发价契约与收益共享契约的设计方法.提出了协调度的概念,即契约使供应链协调的程度.证明了批发价契约的协调度小于1,不能实现供应链的协调;而收益共享契约的协调度等于1,但相对于批发价契约,收益共享契约不能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润,导致收益共享契约不可实施.为找到双渠道供应链可实施的协调策略,提出了带固定补偿的收益共享契约的设计方法和用纳什讨价还价协商模型确定固定补偿的方法.结果表明,该契约的协调度等于1,并且相对于批发价契约能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润.另外,研究还表明:生产不经济的弹性系数与销售价格成正比、与供应链的整体利润成反比,并且不同渠道间的竞争越激烈,双渠道供应链的销售价格和需求反而越高,双渠道供应链的总利润也越高,并且,带固定补偿的收益共享契约同样可以协调线性成本下的双渠道供应链.最后用算例验证了本文结论的正确性和有效性.     

考虑长期运力合同的班轮收益管理运输路径优化模型

基于收益管理的方法,文章对随机需求环境下班轮运力分配和路径优化问题进行了定量研究。首先针对海运收益管理的特征,建立了考虑长期运力合同、空箱调运的轮运力分配和路径选择随机规划模型,然后应用稳健优化方法对此模型进行求解。最后,通过数值仿真得到了优化的舱位分配方案,比较发现稳健优化模型取得了较确定性规划模型更好的收益,显示了模型和方法对于集装箱海运企业的收益管理问题具有应用价值。     

基于收益共享-双向期权契约的供应链金融风险控制研究

通过核心企业的信用水平为中小企业获取贷款提供担保,使得整个供应链有效运行是实施供应链金融的重要意义。本文考虑分销商（核心企业）-零售商（贷款企业）组成的二级供应链,为了降低银行面临的零售商违约风险,在银行监督下,分销商与零售商引入收益共享—双向期权契约。本文计算得到了零售商的违约概率,在此基础上,深入分析了各方期望收益、零售商最优初始订货量与最优期权购买数量、分销商最优收益共享比例、银行下侧风险规避前提下可参考的收益共享比例范围。并构造了数值算例,探讨了期权执行价格、收益共享比例及银行质押率等关键参数对风险控制方面的影响。本文所得结果能够为银行及企业在供应链金融决策方面提供参考。     

模糊需求下n级供应链的收益共享契约机制研究

在模糊需求环境下,研究n级供应链系统的收益共享契约机制。将市场需求视为模糊变量,通过模糊截集理论建立了模糊需求下n级供应链的分散决策模型、集中决策模型以及收益共享契约机制模型,并给出了各模型中的最优策略。研究结果表明:零售商的产品最优订购量处于模糊需求中心点的左侧还是右侧,取决于产品零售价格和单位产品成本,并且随着零售价格的增加而提高;单位产品批发价格并不随着零售价格的变化而改变;供应链各成员的最优模糊期望利润随着零售价格的增加而增加。最后通过数值算例对模型进行了分析。     

Revenue‐Sharing vs. Wholesale‐Price Contracts in Assembly Systems with Random Demand

Assembly and kitting operations, as well as jointly sold products, are rather basic yet intriguing A decentralized supply chains, where achieving coordination through appropriate incentives is very important, especially when demand is uncertain. We investigate two very distinct types of arrangements between an assembler/retailer and its suppliers. One scheme is a vendor‐managed inventory with revenue sharing, and the other a wholesale‐price driven contract. In the VMI case, each supplier faces strategic uncertainty as to the amounts of components, which need to be mated with its own, that other suppliers will deliver. We explore the resulting components' delivery quantities equilibrium in this decentralized supply chain and its implications for participants' and system's expected profits. We derive the revenue shares the assembler should select in order to maximize its own profits. We then explore a revenue‐plus‐surplus‐subsidy incentive scheme, where, in addition to a share of revenue, the assembler also provides a subsidy to component suppliers for their unsold components. We show that, by using this two‐parameter contract, the assembler can achieve channel coordination and increase the profits of all parties involved. We then explore a wholesale‐price‐driven scheme, both as a single lever and in combination with buybacks. The channel performance of a wholesale‐price‐only scheme is shown to degrade with the number of suppliers, which is not the case with a revenue‐share‐only contract.     

Motivating Retail Marketing Effort: Optimal Contract Design

We study a distribution channel where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product, and for investing in the most appropriate marketing effort. The agent's effort is hard to monitor. In addition, the cost of effort is the agent's private information. These impose challenges to the manufacturer in its endeavor to influence the agent's marketing effort provisions and to allocate profit between the two parties. We propose two contract forms. The franchise fee contract is a two‐part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee. The retail price maintenance contract links the allowed retail price that the agent charges customers with total payment to the manufacturer and sales level. Under information asymmetry, for implementing either contract form, the manufacturer needs to offer a menu of contracts, hoping to invoke the “revelation principle” when the agent picks a certain contract from that menu. We show that the two contract forms perform differently, and each party's preference toward a particular contract form is linked with the total reservation profit level and/or the sales agent's cost type. We provide managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in selecting a better contract form under different conditions.