An Optimum Population for North and Latin America

The population of North America, which now stands at nearly 300 million people, is projected to double in about 60 years, while the population of nearly 500 million people in South America is projected to double in less than 40 years. Both of these populations obtain more than 99% of their food from the land, and this percentage will increase as these populations grow. Maintaining fertile and ample land is critical if these large populations are to be fed. Soil degradation by soil erosion is a serious problem on both continents. In addition, agricultural land is being lost to urbanization and highways because of rapid population growth. Nearly a half hectare of land is needed for urbanization for each person added to the North American population; this is already causing serious problems with agriculture in some states in the United States. The land resources that are critical for food production will be especially so if the populations of both continents double to nearly 2 billion. Land resources will also be critical when both continents deplete their fossil fuels in less than 100 years and have to turn to renewable energy sources. With about 2 billion people, there will be serious shortages of food, water, and energy resources and the standard of living will significantly decline. Our assessment suggests that for a relatively high standard of living in North and South America each continent should have no more than about 200 million people, or a total of 400 million.     

Israel's population: the challenge of pluralism

This Bulletin describes the interplay of demographic and sociopolitical processes in Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948 and projects what it might be until the year 2015. Heavy Jewish immigration, especially during the mass immigration of 1948-51, has balanced the high natural increase of Moslems, who comprise the majority of Israeli Arabs, so that the proportion of Jews in Israel's population at the end of 1982 (83% of 4.1 million) was little changed from June 1948 (81% of 806,000). Even with Jewish immigration now low, this proportion is likely to be no lower than 76% in 2015, the Jewish proportion could be only 50% in a Greater Israel as Israel annexes the Occupied Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 1.2 million Arabs now live. Oriental Jews from less developed North African and Asian countries, 15% of Israel's Jewish population in 1984, with their largescale immigration to the mid-1960s and initially higher fertility, have managed to outnumber European-American Jews by 1970. This was an important factor in the 1977 shift of political dominance from the leftwing Labor parties, supported by the better educated, socialist leaning European-American Jews, to the rightwing Likud bloc, espousing economic policies based on more private initiative and Israel's historic rights to Judea and Samaria (West Bank). Western oriented Jews of European or American origin, although still the country's establishment, comprised only 40% of Israel's population by 1981. By 2015, their share is likely to be down to 30% within Israel's present boundaries and would be only 22% of the population of a Greater Israel. First raised by 19th century Zionists in Europe who set off the drive for the reestablishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the quesions of whether or not Israel will be a Jewish state and remain a Western society will continue salient into the 21st century.     

Short-term fluctuations in fertility and economic activity in Israel

This paper investigates the relation between fluctuations in fertility and in economic activity in Israel over the period 1950–1970. The paper opens with some comments on the theoretical basis for expecting procyclical behavior of fertility. This is followed by analysis of annual data of total fertility, unemployment, GNP and an index of industrial production. Total fertility tends to respond to the cyclical indicators among Jews from Europe and America, those born in Israel and those from Asian and African countries, but the response is larger among the former. Cyclical response can be discerned also in the fertility of the non-Jewish population. The performance of the alternative cyclical indicators is compared. Some examination of data on marriage suggests that the cyclical response of birth is not just a reflection of the cyclical response of marriage. In the annual data there is a tendency for.Jewish fertility to be more related to the contemporaneous cyclical indicator than the lagged indicator, while the reverse is true for the non-Jewish population. Examination of quarterly and monthly data for a shorter period corroborates this finding. Many factors are involved in determining the lag between an observed cyclical indicator and observed birth; it is being conjectured that the prevalence of abortions in the Jewish population is one contributing factor to the difference in the lag between.Jews and Arabs.     

A SRES-based gridded global population dataset for 1990–2100

Spatially explicit population data can play an important role in studies on environment and sustainability. Several gridded datasets on the present population exist, but global data on future populations are largely lacking. This paper presents a dataset covering three global population forecasts for the period 1990–2100 at 0.5-degrees resolution. The basis for these forecasts is the SRES scenarios developed for the IPCC climate-modeling framework. In addition, a gridded dataset of urban and rural populations for the period 1990–2050 is presented. To illustrate how the datasets can be used, future changes in population density and urbanization were analyzed for some of the world’s major river basins. This analysis shows that the population density in the Ganges basin, which is already very high, is likely to increase considerably. The highest future increase rates were found in some African and Middle-Eastern basins. The population dataset for 2015 was compared with one previously published gridded dataset. The comparison shows some differences in population density, mainly in small, highly urbanized coastal river basins, while for large basins, the two datasets agree fairly well. We hope that the datasets here presented will prove to be a useful resource also for other researchers of global environmental change and sustainable development.     

Externalities of air pollution: Estimates for heart diseases

This study attempts to establish a quantitative relationship between air pollution and heart diseases. It proposes that in addition to air pollution, population density, sunshine, racial composition, age composition, and income are important variables to explain the variations in the death rates due to heart diseases in the urban areas of the United States. The analysis suggests that a fifty percent decrease in the air pollution would imply a decrease in the mortality rate by about 24–35 percent. Such a reduction in the air pollution level would be accompanied by a social savings of the order of $2140 to $3130 million per year in terms of the heart diseases only. Social savings in terms of all diseases would obviously be of a much higher order.     

The Middle East population puzzle

An overview is provided of Middle Eastern countries on the following topics; population change, epidemiological transition theory and 4 patterns of transition in the middle East, transition in causes of death, infant mortality declines, war mortality, fertility, family planning, age and sex composition, ethnicity, educational status, urbanization, labor force, international labor migration, refugees, Jewish immigration, families, marriage patterns, and future growth. The Middle East is geographically defined as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The Middle East's population grew very little until 1990 when the population was 43 million. Population was about doubled in the mid-1950s at 80 million. Rapid growth occurred after 1950 with declines in mortality due to widespread disease control and sanitation efforts. Countries are grouped in the following ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). As birth and death rates decline, there is an accompanying shift from communicable diseases to degenerative diseases and increases in life expectancy; this pattern is reflected in the available data from Egypt, Kuwait, and Israel. High infant and child mortality tends to remain a problem throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the Gulf States. War casualties are undetermined, yet have not impeded the fastest growing population growth rate in the world. The average fertility is 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Muslim countries tend to have larger families. Contraceptive use is low in the region, with the exception of Turkey and Egypt and among urban and educated populations. More than 40% of the population is under 15 years of age. The region is about 50% Arabic (140 million). Educational status has increased, particularly for men; the lowest literacy rates for women are in Yemen and Egypt. The largest countries are Iran, Turkey, and Egypt.     

SMPD Scenarios of Spatial Distribution of Human Population in China

Three scenarios of spatial distribution of human population in China are developed in the years 2010 and 2020, respectively by means of the method of surface modeling of population distribution (SMPD). Each one of the SMPD scenarios is defined as a plausible alternative future under particular assumptions of elevation, water system, net primary productivity (NPP), urbanization, transport infrastructure development, and population growth. The SMPD scenarios show that if population could freely migrate within the whole China, the balanced ratios of population in the western region, the middle region and the eastern region to total population in the whole China would be 16%, 33% and 52%, respectively.     

Population Scenarios Based on Probabilistic Projections: An Application for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

Probabilistic population forecasts offer a number of advantages to users. However, in some cases population is one component of a larger analysis that may take a different approach to uncertainty. For example, integrated assessments of environmental issues such as climate change or ecosystem degradation have typically used a small number of alternative scenarios to explore uncertainty in future environmental outcomes. In such cases, population projections that are provided only as probability distributions are difficult to use. I present a method of employing probabilistic population projections to derive individual, deterministic projections that can be used within scenarios for integrated assessments. The principal advantages of this approach are that (1) it provides a less ad hoc way of defining deterministic projections intended to be consistent with more comprehensive scenarios that describe, among other things, future socio-economic developments; (2) it provides more flexibility in specifying input assumptions for deterministic projections as compared to choosing off-the-shelf projections, allowing population assumptions to be tailored to the scenario; and (3) it provides a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty associated with any given deterministic projection. I describe the application of the method to the development of population projections used in integrated scenarios for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, an international scientific effort to assess the current conditions of and future outlook for global ecosystem goods and services. Results show that the MA scenarios are each consistent with a relatively wide range of demographic outcomes. For some scenarios, ranges of plausible outcomes in some regions overlap substantially, indicating that particular population projections could be consistent with more than one scenario. In other cases, uncertainty ranges for different scenarios are distinct, indicating that a projection consistent with one scenario is unlikely to be also consistent with another. Comparing variances of the conditional projections also provides insight into how much different storylines constrain future demographic developments. The development of the MA projections points to important areas of future research on correlations among demographic rates and on uncertainty across scales. It also serves as an illustration of how probabilistic and alternative scenario-based approaches to uncertainty can be combined within a single integrated analysis.This revised version was published online in April 2005 with corrections to figures 1-3.     

Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.     

中国长期护理保险制度的可持续评价与趋势分析

长期护理保险制度是我国正在探索建立的新的社会保险项目。从2012年青岛基本医疗护理保险试点开始,2017年底15个试点城市相继出台政策方案。在对试点城市持续跟踪和深入调研后发现我国长期护理保险制度试点中普遍存在受益面过窄的问题,暴露出地方政府对这项制度财务可持续性的担忧。研究表明长期护理保险的基金支出对待遇水平的敏感度显著高于受益面,缴费率对缴费年龄的敏感度高于待遇水平和受益面。在宽、中、窄受益面下,不同待遇水平的基金支出规模差异大,2015年最小和最大支出规模分别为GDP的0.08%和1.90%,随着老龄化和高龄化推高失能发生率,到2055年这一比例将分别升至0.28%和5.90%;相应地,维持基金收支平衡的缴费率最低由0.13%升至0.55%,最高由0.74%升至3.32%。借鉴国外同类制度的运行规律和国内已有社会保险项目的经验,应以制度的财务可持续为目标控制基金支出规模,据此设立受益资格和待遇门槛。研究显示制度的最优选择应是宽受益面和低待遇率的组合,在此基础上尽可能实现全员参保缴费。     

Alternative Projections of the U.S. population

The U.S. Bureau of the Census recently released a set of population projections that include middle and high projections that we argue are too conservative. The projections discount the possibility of future baby booms and assume slow rates of mortality decline and low levels of immigration. In this article we explore the impact on the size and age composition of the U.S. population of alternative scenarios of plausible fertility, mortality, and immigration assumptions. We conclude that (1) the Census Bureau's highest projection might be interpreted as a reasonable middle projection, (2) a reasonable high projection would yield a U.S. population in 2080 some 300 million persons larger than the Bureau's highest projection, with the population 85 and older more than twice the Bureau's greatest estimate, and (3) uncertainty about the pace of population growth is substantially greater than the Bureau's projections suggest.     

中国未来人口发展的粮食安全与耕地保障

中国人口发展的粮食安全与耕地保证程度研究表明,随着人口增长和消费扩张,中国未来的耕地规模和人均耕地面积会进一步下降,人均粮食消费水平和粮食需求总量将进一步提高;2020年在人均粮食420~435kg的消费水平上,基于18亿亩耕地保证的粮食生产能力可以基本满足14.36亿人口的粮食需求;在人均450kg的消费水平上,中国未来耕地的粮食生产能力足以支持人口高锋时间的14.73亿人,但受耕地资源有限约束,人均粮食占有水平很难有进一步提高。从耕地、粮食与人口关系看,中国未来人口的粮食安全必须向食物安全转变,从耕地资源约束的粮食生产与人口增长驱动的食物消费两端着眼:一方面要重视耕地与粮食安全——藏粮于土,全面提高土地资源综合生产能力;一方面要关注食物与消费安全——倡导适度消费,建立动植物并重型食物结构;从生产与消费两方面来认识和解决中国中长期人口发展的食物安全与耕地保障问题。     

Social indicators and crime rate forecasting

This paper presents an attempt to use macrodynamic social indicators in a time series analysis of three crime categories-homicide; property and; robbery offenses in Israel. Earlier findings such as the relationship between homicide and unemployment, and density of population and property offenses are confirmed by the analysis. The models that are constructed are used later for forecasting and yield a satisfactory performance of at least two of the crime models.     

Communicating future water needs to an at-risk population: lessons learned following defeat of the Applewhite Dam and Reservoir Project in San Antonio,Texas

San Antonio, Texas, the seventh largest city in the United States, has experienced steady population growth, since the “boom” of the 1960s. Projected water shortages due to this growth were realized as early as the 1970s by city leaders and south-central Texas regional development decision makers. To reduce dependence on the already over-taxed, Edwards aquifer, a solution, the Applewhite Dam and Reservoir Project, was developed with wide acceptance by federal, state, and city leaders who regarded the project as a necessary measure for regional growth and development. However, opposition by taxpayer and environmental groups led to referendums of 1991 and 1994 in which voters blocked construction of the dam and reservoir leaving the city with limited options for water provision. This case study investigated the factors which led to a clear mismatch in communication between decision makers—those who were aware of the actual and quantifiable risk to the region in terms of reduced water supplies—and the general public, a population that did not have complete and/or adequate knowledge of their actual risk regarding future water shortages, nor, of solutions being developed, such as the Applewhite project. The findings from this case study indicate that when municipal leadership fails to adequately communicate risk regarding resource shortage to an affected public, as well as, openly planned solutions, that voters are likely to underestimate future impacts of water shortages, heed last-minute opposition, and reject long-standing, publicly proposed projects. The intent of this research is not to support either side in the Applewhite controversy, but to shed perspective on the process of adequately and effectively communicating future water needs to an at-risk population. Decision makers in cities across the United States who are faced with solving problems of limited resources needed by a large populace may be informed by the results of this research.     

Thailand population statistics

A few statistics on population for Thailand are reported for April 1, 1993. Total population is determined to be 58,113,000 of which 29,039,000 are males and 29,074,000 are females. The urban population was 17,852,000 and the rural population was 40,261,000. Regional distribution showed population in the north to be 9,443,000, in the northeast to be 19,590,000, in the south to be 7,107,000, and in the center excluding Bangkok to be 14,517,000. The population of Bangkok Metropolitan area was 7.5 million. Age distribution was 16.7 million under the age of 15 years, 19.4 million 6-21 years, 37.1 million 15-59 years, 4.2 million 60 years and older, and 35.3 million 20 years and older. There were 15,002,000 women in the reproductive ages of 15-44 years. The crude birth rate was 17.4/1000 population. The crude death rate was 5.9/1000 population. Infant mortality was 35.5/1000 live births. The natural growth rate was 1.15%. Life expectancy at birth was 66.4 years for males and 71.8 years for females. Life expectancy at 60 years was 17.9 years for males and 21.2 years for females. The total fertility rate was 2.2/woman. Contraceptive prevalence was 75.0%. Estimated population in the year 2012 is expected to be 71,310,000. A graph provides the projected number of living children per 1000 aged 12 years or younger who would be born to mothers with HIV infection and the number who would be orphans between 1990 and 2000. 350,000 children 12 years and under are expected to be born to HIV-infected mothers in the year 2000.     

“五普”人口总量和结构的分析与调整

以人口普查资料为基础,运用人口存活分析方法和数值拟合思想,并辅之以其他统计数据和对比分析方法,分析五普数据中的重报和漏报,对普查人口总量和结构进行调整。研究发现,“五普”0-9岁人口存在漏报,漏报人口为3 743万;而10-60岁人口存在重报,重报人口为1 134万人;最终调整五普人口总数为127 120万,普查人口漏报率为2.05%。     

Estimating the approximate size of the illegal alien population in the united states by the comparative trend analysis of age-specific death rates

This paper presents the results of an attempt to determine, through the use of demographic analysis, the approximate magnitude of the resident illegal alien population in the United States. The method described is the comparative analysis of trends in age-specific death rates in the United States and selected States, 1950 to 1975. The procedure depends on two assumptions: (a) that few or no illegal aliens are included in decennial census counts or current population estimates; and (b) that the reported statistics on deaths include deaths to all or nearly all illegal aliens. If the illegal alien population has increased by several million since 1970, then death rates in geographic areas where illegal aliens are most concentrated should show substantial excesses over the rates for the remainder of the country. A roughly similar downward trend in the death rates of all age groups since 1970 in all areas of the United States is apparent and hence does not support the view that many millions of illegal residents (perhaps over 6 million) are living here. However, the finding of a persistent deviation in the death rate trend for 10 selected States since 1960 for whites males, ages 20 to 44, and for no other group, suggests that the deaths of illegal aliens are being recorded in our vital statistics system. A range of estimates of the illegal alien population based on this analysis is presented and compared with the results of other studies.     

城镇化进程中人口因素对水资源消耗的驱动作用分析——以太湖流域为例

基于IPAT模型及对数平均迪氏指数(LMDI)分解法构建了包括人口规模、城镇化水平和城乡居民生活用水强度等人口因素在内的水资源消耗驱动因素模型,该模型从人口、经济角度全面探讨了水资源消耗的驱动因素并作了系统的量化。运用该模型研究太湖流域水资源消耗变化的驱动因素,分析结果表明:经济规模是影响太湖流域用水变化的主导因素;产业结构和产业用水强度对水资源消耗的增加起到抑制作用,并且产业用水强度对水资源消耗增长的抑制效应大于产业结构;人口规模对水资源消耗的增长具有显著影响;城镇化水平和城乡居民生活用水强度的历史驱动贡献率相对较小,但驱动力巨大,应予以足够重视。通过优化产业结构,以及降低单位GDP耗水量,提高水资源利用效率能够有效降低太湖流域水资源消耗。     

Competition, substitution, or discretion: an analysis of Palestinian and foreign guest workers in the Israeli labor market

This paper investigates the effects of foreign workers on labor market outcomes for Palestinian workers in the Israeli labor market. The paper utilizes a micro-dataset on the Palestinian labor force combined with time-series data on foreign workers in Israel. The data covers the period 1999–2003, a period in which Israel enforced a strict closure on labor (and goods) movement, particularly in 2001 and 2002. The evidence suggests that foreign workers in Israel do not affect Palestinian employment; however, an increase in the number of foreign workers in Israel tends to reduce Israeli wages paid to Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli closure policy appears to be the main cause for the substantial reduction in long-run Palestinian employment levels in Israel, not the presence of foreign workers.     

Who are American Indians? Some observations about the perils and pitfalls of data for race and ethnicity

The data for race and ethnicity published from the 1980 Census are based on racial and ethnic self-identification of respondents. Selfidentification of race and ethnicity is problematic mainly because analysts are frequently inclined to treat this information as immutable. However, as this paper suggests, for some groups such as American Indians, racial and ethnic identity is an extremely complex phenomenon which has the potential to be highly variable. American Indians present an ideal case to demonstrate the possible problems facing analysts who do not recognize the potentially variable meanings of race and ethnicity data. This paper shows that, depending on how American Indians are defined, population estimates can range from less than 1.0 million to nearly 7.0 million. Furthermore, it is possible to isolate three types of American Indian identities in 1980 Census data, and each of these groups have different socioeconomic profiles.