CHANGING RACIAL LABELS: FROM "COLORED" TO "NEGRO" TO "BLACK" TO "AFRICAN AMERICAN"

Labels play an important role in defining groups and individualswho belong to the groups. This has been especially true forracial and ethnic groups in general and for Blacks in particular.Over the past century the standard term for Blacks has shiftedfrom "Colored" to "Negro" to "Black" and now perhaps to "AfricanAmerican." The changes can be seen as attempts by Blacks toredefine themselves and to gain respect and standing in a societythat has held them to be subordinate and inferior.     

"Coloured Power" or "Coloured Bourgeoisie"? Political Attitudes among South African Coloureds

Why have Coloureds in South Africa—people of mixed racialdescent—voiced less opposition to white minority rulethan have black Africans? A theoretical analysis suggests thatColoureds feel both "relatively deprived" in comparison withwhites and "relatively gratified" in comparison with Africans,that they believe they may eventually be accepted by whites,and that individually they have difficulty identifying withthe broader Coloured community; in short, seemingly ideal conditionsfor the emergence of a "Coloured Bourgeoisie" rather than a"Coloured Power" ideology.     

Reporting "The Polls" in 2004

Media reports of polls indicate how well public opinion pollshave been integrated into campaign coverage. This article examineshow polls were used in 2004. Although there were relativelylimited methodological changes in how polls were conducted in2004, there were changes in how the polls were treated in themedia. Americans in 2004 were subjected to intense debates aboutpolls and to as much reporting about "the polls" as there wasof the polls themselves. The discussion of "the polls" in 2004included claims of electability during the Democratic nominatingprocess, increased reporting about methodological issues, andheightened political criticisms of "the polls." The articleconcludes with a discussion of the current state and the futureof news polling.     

"BY PUBLIC OPINION I MEAN"--

"Where all people talk on the same subject, they should be agreedabout the vocabulary with which they discuss it: or, at anyrate, they should be aware that they are not agreed."     

On More Reliably Employing the Concept of "Reliability"

Confusion has resulted from using the term "reliability" tomean both measurement-error variance and sampling-error variance.This article discusses the conceptual similarities and differencesbetween the various types of variance subsumed under "reliability"in order to distinguish among them.     

DO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS MEASURE "SALIENT" ISSUES?

Closed-ended questions dominate most interview schedules. Yetthe almost exclusive use of this form did not arise becauseopen-ended questions, its major competitor, proved to be weakindicators of public opinion. Instead, responses from open-endedquestions proved more difficult and expensive to code and analyzethan those from closed-ended questions. Although such practicalconcerns are important, the real task of survey researchersis to measure public opinion accurately. Using an experimentaldesign, this article tests whether open-ended questions measurethe important concerns of respondents—one of the long-claimedadvantages of this format. The results, on balance, show thatopen-ended comments reflect such concerns, suggesting that pollstersmay want to include more of these questions in their surveysof public opinion.     

Correction to "The Polls: Environmental Protection"

In "The Polls: Environmental Protection" (POQ 50 (2):273) thefollowing figures are the correct ones: NORC-GSS, 1985, Toomuch: 8%, Dk: 4%; Roper, 1983, Too far: 14%.     

ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF "WINNING" TELEVISED CAMPAIGN DEBATES

This study explores the long-neglected impact of a candidatebeing perceived as the "winner" of political debates on individualvoting behaviour in West Germany. While there has been muchresearch on the effects of debates on perceptions of candidatepolicy stands and personality atttributes, there has been littlework that attempts to guage how much "winning" the debate helpsa candidate at the polls. I investigate this process with straightforwardprobit models of the vote choice, including party identificationand candiate evaluation as well as whether the individual judgeda particular candidate as the "winner", or "fared best" in thedebate. These models are run for the 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1983elections in West Germany. The results show that there is aconsistent impact of "winning" the debate on individual votingchoices in West Germany; controlling for party and other factors,there is a significantly higher probability of voting for theparty of the politician the respondent feels won the contest.Debates, then, do ultimately make a substabtial electoral difference.     

"SECRET BALLOTS" AND SELF-REPORTS IN AN EXIT-POLL EXPERIMENT

A controlled exit-poll experiment on Election Day (November3, 1992) shows that refusals to answer questions and other evasiveforms of responding were significantly lower when respondentswere given a self-administered "secret-ballot" questionnairethan when they were interviewed face-to-face. While there weresome suggestive interactions of this mode-of-data collectioneffect with age and sex, and with the partisan atmosphere ofthe precinct in which the interviews were conducted, they wereborderline in significance, inconsistent in pattern, or difficuitto interpret. More important, comparisons with official electionreturns (the truth) indicated that the secret-ballot techniquewas more accurate than were face-to-face interviews in estimatingthe final outcome on the most socially sensitive of three self-reportedvotes: a vote for or against a tax levy for elderly services.Using a genuine secret ballot in the tradition of the olderGallup preelection polls can thus increase the validity of self-reportsin exit polls today.     

Making Child Care "Affordable" in the United States

Two alternative federally financed plans are presented as modelsfor a program which would make child care of acceptable quality"affordable" for millions of American families. Taking a cuefrom currently operating state programs, care is defined as"affordable" if it costs parents no more than 30 percent ofthe amount by which their income exceeds the poverty line. Thefirst plan would cost the government $25 billion per year andwould concentrate help on families with incomes up to twicethe poverty line. The second would cost $39 billion per year,would provide higher quality care, and would allow all UnitedStates families to have access to care that was "affordable"by our definition. Costs of these magnitudes preclude financingof any significant part by employers or philanthropies. Whilesome government savings might result from the beneficial effectsof these programs, the main rationale for them rests, not onthe calculation that they will save the government money (althoughthey might), but on the fact that they will prevent considerablemisery to children and their families. Making quality childcare affordable to all families would result in safer, moreeducational, and more enjoyable care for children, and wouldgive a financial boost to families pitifully short of resourcesin a non-stigmatizing way. It would reduce child poverty andreduce enrollment in welfare-type programs. It would also giveparents a chance to particiopate in the world of work and toachieve the gains in resources and status that such a participationwould alllow.     

In Search of a Constituency for the "New Religious Right"

The paper evaluates claims by the "New Religious Right" to havecreated a mass constituency or a new "moral majority." The paperexamines evidence for the development over the l970s of newconsciousness which reflected politicization of a growing moralopposition to three feminist issues: abortion, sexual preference,and women's liberation. Comparisons are drawn with attitudestoward 11 national spending priorities. All the findings runcontrary to claims for a newly politicized "moral majority."The basic findings are these: (1) there is no conservative trendon the three feminist issues for 1972–80; (2) factor analytictechniques reveal simple factor structure within the three issuesbut not between the three issues over the decade; (3) politicizationof the issues is greater in 1974 than in 1977; and (4) the differencesbetween the religiously involved and others have existed sincethe beginning of the decade and show no evidence of increasingpoliticization during the 1970s. Data are from the NORC GeneralSocial Surveys, 1972–80.