The Johannesburg Summit on Health and Sustainable Development

The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August‐4 September 2002. The meeting was a follow‐up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 but with a mandate broader than that of the Rio conference: the Summit was to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. According to the opening paragraph of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Johannesburg Summit, the Rio conference “provided the fundamental principles and the programme of action for achieving sustainable development.” But while reaffirming commitment to the Rio principles, the Plan states that it intends to “further build on the achievements made since UNCED and expedite the realization of the remaining goals.” A topic conspicuously missing from the deliberations of the Rio conference was population, even though rapid population growth has a plausible bearing on sustainable development and specifically on the problem of poverty, an issue at the center of the discussions concerning sustainability. It had been expected that Johannesburg would make amends for that omission. In the ten years between the two conferences, the size of the world's population increased by some 790 million persons. Of this growth, 754 million, or 95 percent, occurred in the countries the United Nations classifies as “less developed.” The population of these countries grew by 18 percent between the two conferences, as compared with a 3 percent growth in the more developed countries. The countries classified as “least developed“—a subset of the less developed countries consisting of 48 countries, predominantly African, with a 2002 population of nearly 700 million—grew during the interconference period by 29 percent. This record of population growth since the Rio conference may be supplemented by the projections of the United Nations up to 2050. The medium variant of these projections for the next 48 years envisages a slight population decline in the more developed countries and an addition of some 2 billion persons to the less developed group. For the least developed countries, the UN projects a population of more than 1.8 billion in 2050, some 164 percent larger than the current population size. Although the magnitudes of past population growth and its likely future dynamics are well known, they attracted very little attention at the Johannesburg meeting. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, a concise political document issued at the closing of the conference along with the Plan of Implementation, pledges “to place particular focus on, and give priority attention to, the fight against the worldwide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of our people.” It then proceeds to specifics: “Among these conditions are: chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking, in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis” (Paragraph 19 of the Declaration,). The Plan of Implementation, a 27,000‐word document, was the main product of the Johannesburg meeting. Apart from a mention of the Cairo conference on Population and Development, the Plan's treatment of population issues is confined to health. The relevant section—section VI, titled Health and sustainable development—is reproduced below in full. (Paragraph numbers have been retained.) It presents a statement of goals couched in general exhortative terms (“integrate,”“promote,”“provide,”“improve,”“develop”), and specifies some quantitative targets, notably to reduce “by the year 2015, mortality rates for infants and children under 5 by two thirds, and maternal mortality rates by three quarters,” and “reduction of HIV prevalence among young men and women aged 15–24 by 25 per cent in the most affected countries by 2005 and globally by 2010.” The full text of the Plan can be found at http://www.un.org/jsummitlhtmlldocumentslsummit_docsl21Q9_planfinal.htm     

On the Socioeconomic Impact of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

The UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS met 25–2 7 June 2001 and adopted a Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. The Declaration, in 103 paragraphs, sets out a comprehensive response strategy for governments and UN agencies, supports establishment of a global HIV/AIDS and health fund, and calls for an annual progress report to be reviewed by the Assembly. As part of the Special Session, four “round tables” were conducted on substantive topics: prevention and care, human rights, socioeconomic impact, and international funding. Round Table 3, Socioeconomic impact of the epidemic and the strengthening of national capacities to combat HIV/AIDS, was led by the United Nations Development Programme. The background document prepared for it is reproduced in full below. It argues that the brunt of the epidemic's impact on human development has been borne by households, communities, and civil society organizations. The emphasis of national and international action has been on prevention and care rather than on counteracting that impact. “Extraordinary efforts” are now required to intensify poverty‐reduction measures, to assist caregivers and orphaned children, to prevent the collapse of public services, and to promote workplace tolerance and flexibility. “While HIV/AIDS must be seen as an emergency of the highest order, steady progress in reducing poverty is still the long‐term and sustainable solution to the health crisis in the developing world. In the long run, prevention and care will only succeed if people and nations can lift themselves out of poverty.” (The Declaration was not much influenced by such arguments. It devotes two paragraphs to socio‐economic impact, both setting diffuse goals: “By 2003, evaluate the economic and social impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and develop multisectoral strategies [on poverty alleviation, etc.]” and “By 2003, develop a national legal and policy framework that protects in the workplace the rights and dignity of persons living with and affected by HIV/AIDS.…”) The Millennium Summit referred to in the document was the meeting on the role of the UN in the twenty‐first century held in September 2000 as part of the 55th session of the General Assembly. The Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the Round Table 3 document can both be found at http://www.unaids.org/ungass/index.html .     

The United Nations on the Implementation of the Cairo Program of Action

Progress and challenges in implementing strategies on population and development were the focus of a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly that met at UN headquarters in New York, 30 June-2 July 1999. Participating at the Assembly were representatives of nearly 180 governments, with some 150 of these, and a number of observers and nongovernmental organizations, making statements. The delegates reviewed and appraised the implementation of the Program of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development held at Cairo in 1994. The main topics discussed concerned women's rights, reproductive health issues, and abortion. The Assembly's work culminated in the adoption of a 106-paragraph statement titled Key actions…, formally issued as United Nations Document A/S-21/5. The document is reprinted below in full. It affirms the comprehensive approach to population and development issues articulated at the Cairo conference and identifies needs for further action. Also reproduced below is the address delivered at the Special Session by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. According to a popular lapidary characterization of the program adopted at the 1994 conference, that program concluded that “population is not about numbers.” Thus the Secretary-General's address is particularly notable for a clear affirmation of the importance of the quantitative dimension of the population issue. “[W]e have to stabilize the population of this planet. Quite simply, there is a limit to the pressures our global environment can stand.”     

Global Warming: New Scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to review the state of knowledge about human‐induced climate change and assess possible responses. Most of its activities are conducted by three working groups, concerned respectively with scientific aspects of the climate system, with the vulnerability of human and natural systems to climate change, and with options for mitigating that change. The major IPCC reports have been highly detailed statements of scientific consensus on changes in the climate system, issued at roughly five‐year intervals. These reflect the input of some hundreds of scientists, with drafts scrutinized by expert reviewers, revised to attain consensus, and eventually approved (or “accepted”) by the full Panel. The first such assessment, published in 1990, was influential in formulating the Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at the 1992 Rio conference. The second assessment report (SAR), Climate Change 1995, produced the widely cited estimate that global warming would raise average temperatures by 1°–3.5°C by 2100, with a “best estimate” of 2°C, and produce a sea‐level rise of 0.13 – 0.94 meters. That report took the further step of explicitly linking the warming to anthropogenic (human‐caused) emissions of greenhouse gases. Its cautious conclusion: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.” Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis is Working Group I's contribution to the third IPCC assessment. The document was finalized at the Group's meeting in Shanghai in January 2001. A brief (18‐page) “Summary for Policymakers” was also released at this meeting, distilling the findings of the full report and putting them in more accessible language. Two sections of this summary document, presenting the Group's projections of atmospheric temperature trends and sea‐level rises, are reproduced below. The procedure followed was to assemble hypothetical alternative combinations of future greenhouse gas emissions in the form of emission scenarios, which were fed into large‐scale climate models to produce estimates of future temperature and sea‐level trends. For the third assessment report the scenarios used were set out in the IPCC Working Group Ill's Special Report on Emission Scenarios (March 2000), and are referred to below as the “SRES scenarios.” There are 35 of them in all. They fall into six groups, detailed in the text box, from each of which an illustrative case is plotted in the charts. (The shaded areas in the charts are envelopes spanning the 35 scenarios. Some additional details shown in the original charts have been omitted here for clarity.) The SAR scenarios are referred to as IS92. The major difference from the second assessment is in the projected temperature increase, which is now put at 1.4°–5.8°C (or in Fahrenheit degrees, 2.5°–10.4°). The projected sea‐level rise is slightly smaller, at 0.09 – 0.88 meters. There is also a strengthening of the statement on anthropogenic causes, which now reads: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the [atmospheric] warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” The report notes that even with stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions, there may be continuing climate effects beyond the twenty‐first century. One such effect is the “weakening of ocean thermohaline circulation “—the ocean currents that, for example, transport heat into high northern‐hemisphere latitudes and moderate the coastal climates of those regions. The summary report is available online at the IPCC's website, www.ipcc.ch . The complete third assessment report, covering also the conclusions of Working Groups II and III (particularly on the social and economic costs of forecast climate change), will be released shortly.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

The United Nations on Levels and Trends of International Migration and Related Policies

Issues of international migration are drawing increasing attention not only from governments and their national constituencies but also from international organizations, notably from various components of the United Nations system. Better understanding of the causes of the flows of international migration and their relationship with development and answers to policy questions arising therefrom are, however, hampered by scarcity of up‐to‐date and reliable quantitative information concerning international migration. As a step toward remedying this gap, in March 2003 the Population Division of the United Nations issued a report, presumably the first of a series, titled International Migration Report 2002. A review essay by David Coleman discussing this publication appears in the book review section of the present issue of PDR. The bulk of this 323‐page document presents statistical profiles for more than 200 countries and territories and also for various regional aggregates. These summaries provide data or estimates (when available or feasible) on population, migrant stock, refugees, and remittances by migrant workers for 1990 and 2000, and on average annual net migration flows for 1990–95 and 1995–2000. These profiles also offer characterization of government views on policies relating to levels of immigration and emigration. According to the report, the total number of international migrants—those residing in a country other than where they were born—was 175 million in 2000, or about 3 percent of the world population. In absolute terms, this global number is about twice as large as it was in 1970, and exceeds the 1990 estimate by some 21 million. The introductory chapters of the report discuss problems in measuring international migration and summarize major trends in international migration policies since the mid‐1970s. An additional chapter reproduces a recent report of the Secretary‐General to the United Nations General Assembly on international migration. Reproduced below is much of the “Overview” section of the report (pp. 1–5). In addition to its published form (New York: United Nations, 2002, ST/ESA/SER.A/220), the full report is accessible on the Internet: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/ittmigrep2002.htm     

Estimates of Regional and Global Life Expectancy, 1800–2001

Historians and demographers have gone to considerable trouble to reconstruct life expectancy in the past in individual countries. This overview collects information from a large body of that work and links estimates for historical populations to those provided by the United Nations, the World Bank, and other sources for 1950–2001. The result is a picture of regional and global life expectancy at birth for selected years from 1800 to 2001. The bibliography of more than 700 sources is published separately on the web.     

The Global Science Panel on Population in Sustainable Development

The forthcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa (26 August – 4 September 2002) has been called by the United Nations to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. Hence, its mandate is broader than that of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Conference). Population issues have previously been discussed in a separate series of World Population Conferences (Bucharest 1974, Mexico City 1984, Cairo 1994). With no new World Population Conference scheduled for 2004 and Johannesburg having a mandate that explicitly includes social and economic aspects, population as a key component of sustainable development should figure prominently in the deliberations. Yet, after the third of four preparatory meetings for WSSD (which ended in New York on 5 April), population considerations are absent from the planned agenda. A plausible explanation for this absence is bureaucratic: in most countries inputs to Johannesburg are being prepared mainly by environment ministries that have little experience in dealing with population questions. There may also be political reasons for not wanting to discuss population issues in Johannesburg. But, arguably, sustainable development strategies that do not take into account the diversity and the dynamics of human populations will fail. This is one of the conclusions of the Global Science Panel on Population and Environment. The Panel is an independent body of international experts from the fields of population and environment that was organized by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), and the United Nations University (UNU). (Members of the Panel acted in their individual capacity, rather than representing their institutions.) After a ten‐month preparatory process, in April 2002 the Panel finalized a statement that summarizes its understanding of the role of population in sustainable development and outlines key policy priorities. The full text of this statement, titled Population in sustainable development, is reproduced below.     

CDC on Vaccines and Children's Health: United States 1900–98

During the twentieth century, the health and life expectancy of persons residing in the United States—as in most other countries of the globe—have improved greatly. (For a discussion of some aspects of that improvement, see the article in this issue by Kevin White assessing the effects of changes in cardiovascular and tuberculosis mortality in the United States since 1900.) A considerable share of this change is attributable to advances in public health. To highlight these advances the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (an agency of the US Department of Health and Human Services) is issuing a series of reports profiling ten great public health achievements in the United States during the present century. The first of these reports discusses vaccination: “Impact of vaccines universally recommended for children—United States, 1900–1998,” MMWR 48 (12), 2 April 1999. It is reproduced below in full. The improvements chronicled in the report are especially great with respect to morbidity. In many developing countries mortality resulting from vaccine-preventable causes is, however, still very high. Recent international initiatives, involving UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies, foundations, and the vaccine industry, aim at accelerating the outreach of immunization in developing countries. A meeting discussing an expanded program of vaccination (Bellagio, March 1999) estimated that global immunization, at a cost of approximately $3 billion per year, could save some 40 million lives over the next ten years.     

An Italian Statement on International Migration

Increasing realization of the implications of persisting below‐replacement fertility in Europe—shrinking absolute numbers combined with a rising proportion of the elderly—is giving new salience to policy considerations regarding immigration in the countries most affected by low fertility. The recent United Nations report on “replacement migration” (see the Documents section in the June 2000 PDR) highlighted the issue through illustrative calculations showing the size of immigrant streams that would be needed for achieving specified demographic targets in selected lowfertility countries, given continuation of present fertility and mortality trends. For example, the UN report suggested that in Italy—which has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world—maintaining a constant population over time would require a net influx of some 12.6 million immigrants during the next 50 years, and maintaining a constant labor forceage population (ages 15–64) would require a net inflow of 18.6 million. Yet immigration policy in Western Europe has become increasingly restrictive during the last quartercentury, and the official policy stance that regulating immigration is strictly within the domain of a country's sovereign right has been assiduously maintained. (International treaty obligations qualify that right in the case of bona fide asylum seekers; however, the definition of that category is also subject to the discretion of the receiving countries.) Thus, although within the European Union national borders are open to EU citizens, the power of regulating immigration from outside the EU is retained by the individual countries rather than subject to EU‐wide decisions. Suggestions coming from the developing countries to follow up the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development with an intergovernmental conference on international migration and development were set aside by the potential immigrant‐receiving countries as overly contentious. A statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Lamberto Dini, delivered at the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, 13 September 2000, may be a sign of a notable shift in official approaches to immigration policy by at least one EU member state. The statement, in a departure from the practice of touching lightly upon a wide range of issues in international affairs, typical in high‐level ministerial speeches given at that UN forum, is devoted essentially to a single topic: international migration. It characterizes migration “between or within continents” as an international problem and advocates “coordinated and integrated” instruments in seeking a solution. It suggests that “today, with a declining birth rate and an aging population, Europe needs a strategy that embraces the complex process of integrating people from different regions of the world.” The rules for international migration, the statement claims, should be set in a global framework, such as provided by the United Nations. In the “age of globalization,”“a solidarity pact is needed to find the best and most effective way of balancing the supply and demand of labor.” With the omission of opening and closing ceremonial passages and a brief comment on the problem of debt relief, the statement is reproduced below.     

Destabilizing Science From the Right: The Rhetoric of Heterosexual Victimhood in the World Health Organization's 2008 HIV/AIDS Controversy

This article examines the 2008 World Health Organization/Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS controversy through original reports and media coverage. Analysis reveals that discourse rhetorically exonerates heterosexuals from HIV/AIDS while reifying homophobic and morally righteous ideology about HIV/AIDS and homosexuality. Discourses of “fraudulent science,” “heterosexual absence,” and reverse victimization destabilize meaning of HIV/AIDS and heterosexuality. “AIDS,” “heterosexuality,” and even victimhood and minority status were destabilized and resignified in a rhetoric that benefited from its status as science even as it rendered past science suspect as ideological.     

Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia's Birth Rate

The total fertility rate in what is now the Russian Federation has been below replacement level during much of the last 40 years. By the late 1990s it was barely above 1.2 children per woman. There may have been some recovery since: the United Nations estimate for 2000–05 is 1.33. Other reports set the 2004 rate at 1.17. Countries elsewhere in Europe have fertility levels that are equally low or even lower, but the Russian demographic predicament is aggravated by mortality that is exceptionally high by modern standards. Thus, despite large‐scale net immigration (mostly due to return of ethnic Russians from other republics of the former Soviet Union), the population in the last decade‐and‐a‐half has been shrinking: of late by some 700,000 persons per year. The United Nations medium estimate assumes a steady recovery of the total fertility rate to reach a level of 1.85 by 2050 and a considerable improvement in survival rates during that period—notably an increase in male life expectancy at birth of more than ten years. It also assumes further modest net immigration at a steady rate, amounting to a total of somewhat over 2 million by midcentury. Under these stipulations the projected population of Russia in 2050 would be 112 million—some 31 million below its present size. By that time, 23 percent of the population would be aged 65 and older. The government's concern with the demographic situation of the country and its intent to improve it have been manifest in various official statements, notably in the annual State of the Nation Address given by the president to the Federal Assembly (or State Duma). Formerly a subordinate theme (see the Documents item in the June 2005 issue of PDR), the issue constituted the centerpiece of the 2006 Address, delivered on 10 May in the Kremlin by President Vladimir Putin. Policies regarding health and mortality were given short shrift in the speech—road safety, bootleg alcohol, and cardiovascular diseases being singled out as areas of special concern. The president's remarks on immigration are of greater interest: immigration of skilled persons is to be encouraged. They must be educated and law‐abiding and must treat the country's culture and national tradition with respect. The main focus of the address, however, was on the birth rate and policies to be introduced to raise it. (The need for an “effective demographic policy” as seen from the Kremlin was of course also voiced in the later stages of the Soviet era. See, for example, the excerpts from the addresses delivered by then Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 that appear in the Documents item in the June 1981 issue of PDR.) In detail and specificity, and also in terms of the economic cost of the measures envisaged, Putin's speech is without parallel in addressing population policy matters by a head of state in Europe. The demo graphically relevant portion of the address is reproduced below in the English translation provided by the website of the president's office « http://www.kremlin.ru/eng ». Calling Russia's demographic situation “the most acute problem facing our country today,” Putin terms its causes as “well known,” but lists only economic factors, presumably because these, at least in principle, lend themselves to remedial measures that the Russian government, its coffers now swollen with petrodollars, should be able to provide. His starkly economic interpretation of the problem of low fertility (in Russia apparently taking the form of convergence to a single‐child pattern) may be overly optimistic. Causes of electing to have only one child may lie deeper than those Putin names: low incomes, inadequate housing, poor‐quality health care and inadequate educational opportunities for children, and even lack of food. Putin's proposed policies to attack these problems in part consist of a major upgrading of existing child care benefits: to 1,500 roubles a month for the first child and 3,000 roubles for the second. The latter amount is roughly equivalent to US$113, a significant sum given Russian income levels. Maternity leave for 18 months at 40 percent of the mother's previous wage (subject to a ceiling) and compensation for the cost of preschool childcare round out the basic package proposed. Benefits are to be parity‐dependent, highlighting the pronatalist intent of the measures. Thus the child benefit for the second child is to be twice as large as for the first, and payment for preschool childcare is to cover 20 percent of parental costs for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 70 percent for the third child. Putin mentions “young families” as recipients, but the payments are clearly directed to mothers. (Even the usually obligatory reference to western European–style paternity leave is missing.) The most innovative element of the proposed measures, however, is support for women who have a second birth. The state should provide such women (not the child, as called for in some European precedents) “with an initial maternity capital that will raise their social status and help resolve future problems.” Citing expert opinion, Putin says that such support “should total at least 250,000 roubles [about $9,300] indexed to annual inflation.” Evidently assuming, optimistically, that there will be many takers, Putin says that carrying out all these plans will require not only a lot of work but also “an immense amount of money.” The measures are to be launched starting January 2007.     

Transitions Between Compensated Work Disability,Joblessness, and Self-Sufficiency: A Cohort Study 1997–2010 of Those Jobless in 1995

Associations between unemployment, work, and disability have been researched in many studies. The findings are often based on cross-sectional data and single outcomes. The present study analysed multiple outcomes over a period of 15 years among long-term unemployed individuals. Based on all individuals aged 20–40 living in Sweden in 1995, prospective cohort analyses were conducted. Individual annual labour market proximity 1995–2010 was estimated and categorised into three mutually exclusive categories: “Jobless”, “Self-sufficient” (i.e. main income from work), or “Disabled”. Individuals in the category “Jobless” (n = 638,622) in 1995 constituted the study population. Using autoregressive multinomial logistic regression, transitions between the three states during 1997–2010 were analysed. Socio-economic factors, previous inpatient care, and national unemployment rates in different time periods were included in the regression models. Among those “Jobless” in 1995, 17 % were also “Jobless” in 2010, while 10 % were “Disabled” and 61 % “Self-sufficient”. The transitions were stable over time periods for transitions into “Self-sufficient” and “Disabled” but less so for “Jobless”. Previous state was the best predictor of subsequent state. “Jobless” individuals with previous morbidity had a higher transition probability into “Disabled” and a lower transition probability into “Self-sufficient”. The transition rates into “Self-sufficient” were higher in periods with lower unemployment levels. The study supports the interpretation that return to work was affected both by the individuals’ previous health status and by the national unemployment level. Transition from being “Jobless” into “Disability” may be influenced by previous ill health and by negative health effects of being “Jobless”.     

Major Natural Catastrophes, 1950–2001

The organizations with most interest in recording worldwide disaster statistics are humani‐tarian agencies such as the International Red Cross (see its annual World Disasters Report) and the large reinsurance companies. The latter are likely to be more meticulous. The data and the brief text below come from an annual report on natural disasters, Topics 2001, issued in March 2002 by Munich Reinsurance Company (more familiarly known as Munich Re), and are reproduced by permission. The trend in economic losses from “great catastrophes” (those requiring interregional or international assistance) over the last 50 years is strongly upward, as shown in the annual statistics and decadal comparisons. Both total losses and insured losses have been rising, the latter more sharply. An implication is that insurance premiums calculated on the basis of historical experience will underestimate future risks. The trend in disasters mainly results from greater exposure to risk through thegrowth of economies and populations rather than from changes in natural hazards themselves. One exception noted in the report is an increasing likelihood of “extreme precipitation” during hurricanes and other windstorms, which may be associated with global warming‐a warmer atmosphere can hold more water vapor. (There is no consensus on whether the frequency or intensity of storms is increasing, but there is evidence that they are getting wetter.) Greater allowance will have to be made for flood damage: Hurricane Andrew in the United States in 1992, causing a record $30 billion in estimated total losses, was a relatively “dry” storm‐ and it missed Miami and New Orleans. Munich Re describes 2001 as an “average year” for natural disasters, with an estimated 25,000 fatalities worldwide and total economic losses of some $36 billion. The four events during the year classed as great catastrophes were an earthquake and landslides in El Salvador in January, killing 845 persons; a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in Gujarat in the same month, killing more than 14,000; a hailstorm in Kansas City in April, killing no one but costing the insurance industry $2 billion; and Tropical Storm Allison in June, in which 72 m of rain over 12 hoursjlooded Houston, Texas, causing about $6 billion in total losses‐ “the costliest non‐hurricane of all time.” A recurrent concern of Topics 2001 is the problem of what are termed unidentified loss potentials. These are low‐risk but high‐loss events, exemplified by the 1999 Taiwan earth‐quake, which had an estimated return period of 10,000–100.000 years (or, more exotically, by the remote chance but catastrophic eflect o f a large meteorite impact‐the subject of one section of the report). Other kinds of hard‐to‐calculate loss potentials are related to unanticipated chains of events leading to or following from a disaster. The September terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center, although unambiguously man‐made and thus not treated in the report, has been a further stimulus to wide‐angled thinking on loss potentials. It demonstrates the broad scope of worst‐case scenarios that now have to be considered by under‐writers who must seek to eliminate “the ‘bare patches’ on the ‘risk landscape.’” The full report is available online at http://www.munichre.com/pdf/topics~2001‐e.pdf     

The United Nations on the Demographic Impact of the AIDS Epidemic

A report prepared by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and released in Geneva on 27 June 2000 (just prior to the XIIIth International AIDS Conference held in Durban, South Africa) updates estimates of the demographic impact of the epidemic. It characterizes AIDS in the new millennium as presenting “a grim picture with glimmers of hope”—the latter based on the expectation that national responses aimed at preventing and fighting the disease are in some places becoming more effective. According to the report, which emphasizes the considerable statistical weaknesses of its global estimates, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in 1999 was 34.3 million (of which 33.0 million were adults and 1.3 million were children under age 15; slightly less than half of the adults affected, 15.7 million, were women). Deaths attributed to AIDS in 1999 amounted to 2.8 million, bringing the total since the beginning of the epidemic to 18.8 million. These figures represent moderate upward revisions of earlier UN estimates shown in the Documents section of PDR 25, no. 4. The revised estimate of the number of persons newly infected with HIV in 1999 is, in contrast, slightly lower: 5.4 million, of which 4.7 million were adults and 2.3 million were women. An excerpt from the 135‐page Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, focusing on countries in the worst‐affected area, sub‐Saharan Africa, is reproduced below. (Figures shown have been renumbered.)     

The President of Russia on Population

Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2005 annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, delivered on 25 April, was widely noted in the world press for the startling statement that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” The address also contained a brief passage discussing the demographic problems of Russia. This passage, touching upon the issues of high mortality and the low birth rate, and commenting on drug abuse and alcoholism and on immigration policy, is reproduced below. The president expressed confidence that by creating conditions to “encourage people to have children, lower the mortality rate and bring order to immigration,” the size of the Russian population will gradually stabilize. (The United Nations medium population projection for Russia, which assumes gradual improvement of fertility and mortality, reaching a TFR of 1.85 and an expectation of life of 72 years by the 2040s, as well as net immigration exceeding 2 million persons, foresees a decline from the current 143 million to 112 million by 2050.) The full English text of the address can be accessed at http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/ .     

Paul Fauchille on the Rights of Emigration and Immigration

International migration is squarely on the present‐day agenda of the international community, as attested by the newly released report of the Global Commission on International Migration (see the Documents section of this issue) and by recurrent controversy over proposals to establish a migration analogue to the World Trade Organization. Conventional assumptions about the prerogatives of national sovereignty come up against universalist views of human rights, the logic of globalization, and, in some measure, the regulative ambitions of international organizations. The last period in which this subject aroused comparable ferment was in the 1920s. At that time the main sources of migrants were not countries of the global “South” but self‐described overpopulated countries in Europe. In May 1924 one such country, Italy, convened what became known as the First International Emigration and Immigration Conference. Held in Rome, the meeting was attended by delegates from 57 countries and the League of Nations. Among its resolutions was an “Emigrants' Charter,” recognizing rights to emigrate and immigrate but with strong provisos. Thus the right to immigrate was subject to restrictions “imposed for economic and social reasons based in particular on the state of the labour market and the necessity of safeguarding the hygienic and moral interests of the country of immigration” (see the Notes on Migration section in Industrial and Labour Information [Geneva], Vol. XI, July‐Sept. 1924, pp. 54–68). A more systematic discussion of these putative rights appeared in an article published a few months earlier by a prominent French jurist, Paul Fauchille, which is excerpted below. The rights to emigrate and to immigrate are seen as broad and fairly symmetrical, able to be limited by a state only by appeal to its own right of self‐preservation. Circumscribing the right to emigrate may seem dated in the light of the blanket provision in Article 13 of the (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” (In Fauchille's extreme case, a state can seek to prohibit the wholesale flight of its population.) However, on immigration, about which the Universal Declaration is silent, “self‐preservation” yields a longer list of grounds for restriction. An issue with contemporary resonance is whether those grounds can include the wish by a state “to prevent a fusion of races which might alter its ethnic character or obliterate its national culture.” Restriction on such a basis would be justified, says Fauchille, only where the intending migrants “belonged to an absolutely different civilisation” and were large in number. Paul Fauchille (1858–1926) was an expert in international law, author of the four‐volume Traité de Droit International Public (8th ed., Paris, 1921–26). He was the founding editor of Revue générale du droit international public and founding director (from 1921) of the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales within the University of Paris. The excerpt below is the major part (subtitled “State and Individual Rights in Theory”) of Fauchille's article “The rights of emigration and immigration,” which appeared in the International Labour Review (Geneva), vol. IX, no. 3 (March 1924), pp. 317–333.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

Demographic Prospects 2000–2050 According to the 2000 Revision of the United Nations Population Projections

The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat biennially issues revised versions of detailed population estimates and projections for over 200 countries, territories, and regional aggregates of the world. Highlights of the latest set, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, were released 28 February 2001 (Draft ESA/P/WP.165). This 76‐page document is available at « http://www.un.org/esa/population/wpp2000.htm ». The full results of the projections will be published in a series of three volumes, currently under preparation. Key findings of the projections, as presented in the Executive Summary of the document, are reproduced below.     

Plans for the 1970 census of population and housing

The Nineteenth Decennial Census of the United States, covering both population and housing, will be conducted as of April 1, 1970. Planning, testing, and preparatory activities have been underway since early in the decade. Extensive discussions with users of census data led to relatively minor changes in subject content as compared to 1960, but a major increase in the amount of statistics to be tabulated, especially for small geographic areas. For about 60 to 65 percent of the population, the information will be collected through a new mail-out/mail-back system. The rest of the country will be covered by house-to-house canvass. Special efforts to alleviate the serious problem of underenumeration are being undertaken, particularly in the hard-to-enumerate portions of the big cities. The geographic program includes an “address coding guide” through which location identification in most urban areas can be made to specific side of block; this will permit tabulations for new types of small areas. Processing of the data will be performed with the Census Bureau’s Fosdic equipment and advanced computers. Dissemination of the census results will be in the traditional type of printed reports but also, in substantially greater subject and area detail, through magnetic tape, special printouts, etc. To help users exploit the potentialities of the latter material, the Bureau has instituted a “data access” informational program. As in previous censuses, there will be a number of studies to evaluate the 1970 procedures and results.