AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE PERSISTENCE OF GENDER‐BASED STEREOTYPES

This paper experimentally investigates the role of gender‐based stereotypes in the forecasting of risk attitudes. Subjects predict the gamble choice of target subjects in one of three treatments: (1) Visual—the predictor can only observe the target; (2) Information—the predictor has individuating information about the targets' response to two statements from a risk‐preference survey; and (3) Combined—the predictor both observes the targets and has the targets' two responses to the risk‐preference survey. Our results suggest that stereotypes play a considerable role in forming predictions about others' risk attitudes and that these stereotypes persist even when individuating information is available. (JEL C91, D8, J16)     

PRIMING THE CHARITABLE PUMP: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF TWO‐STAGE RAFFLES

We experimentally study two‐stage self‐financing raffles in which participants can buy tickets in two stages. In all raffles, one half of the proceeds are donated to a local charity and the raffle winner wins the other half. The mechanisms differ by what happens to the tickets purchased in the first stage. In the complete draw down two‐stage raffle, the first stage tickets are eliminated from the active pool of tickets, while in the no draw down raffle they remain in the active pool. We find that both two‐stage raffles initially perform better than the standard one‐stage 50–50 raffle. Over time, the aggregate contribution level in the complete draw down raffle declines and approaches that of the one‐stage raffle, while in the no draw down raffle contributions are stable and remain higher than those in the other two mechanisms. In both two‐stage raffles, we observe a positive correlation between the proceeds of the first stage and the number of tickets bought in the second stage. Our results are at odds with a standard warm glow model of giving, and also cannot be explained by the joy of winning or learning about bidders' types. (JEL C72, C92, D64)     

HISTORY DEPENDENCE AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study the minimal contributing set (MCS) game, a three‐person sequential step‐level public goods game. The behavior of critical third players changes with experience in this game even though they face no strategic or payoff uncertainty. We explore why these changes occur by manipulating subjects' experience in the first half of the experiment. The treatments give subjects very different initial experiences, but all treatments move subjects' choices toward experienced subjects' play in the control sessions. Long‐run play is indistinguishable across treatments. Our results are more consistent with the “discovered preferences” hypothesis ( Plott 1996 ) than either the “constructed preference” or “reference point” hypotheses. (JEL H41, C72, C92)     

ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF TIME AND RISK PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

When explaining risk taking, intertemporal allocation, and distributing behavior, economists rely on risk, time, and other-regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial aspects are interrelated. We report on an experiment exploring such interrelation. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, each of which allocates certain or risky and immediate or delayed payoffs to the actor and to another participant. We find that individuals are self-oriented as to social allocation of risk and delay and other-regarding with respect to expected payoffs . ( JEL C91, D63, D81)     

ECONOMIC SEARCH: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

This paper presents results of experiments designed to test several of the hypotheses present in the theoretical literature on "optimal" economic search. First we test whether the subjects (searchers) actually search for wages in ways that are consistent with setting an optimal reservation wage. We then proceed to determine experimentally the effects of risk aversion, increased search costs, changes in risk (brought about by a mean-preserving transformation of the distribution of wage offers), the presence or absence of recall, the existence of a finite horizon, and the searcher's state of knowledge about the underlying distribution of wages. In general, we find that the searchers exhibit behavior that is consistent with that predicted by theory. Differences between risk neutral and risk averse searchers are found, and the responses of both groups to changes in search costs, in the degree of risk, or in the state of knowledge are consistent with theoretical predictions.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF KIN AND ETHNIC FAVORITISM

Ethnic and kinship ties have long been viewed as potential catalysts for favoritism, and hence corruption. In experiments conducted in three countries, we recruit siblings, coethnics and strangers and vary the relationship(s) between the players of a game to observe how kin and ethnic ties influence the willingness of two players to benefit one another at the expense of a third party. We see universal sibling favoritism, but ethnic favoritism, and favoritism toward other in-group members (friends) varies. We argue this may be driven in part by kinship institutions, since favoritism is more common in societies with denser kin networks. ( JEL D9, C9, D73, J12)     

LABOR MARKET SEARCH: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

The theoretical results derived from models of economic search have implications which relate to the structure and performance of labor markets. Utilizing a series of laboratory experiments, we attempt to capture many of the features of workers' search and also the conditions under which labor markets operate. By varying certain of the experimental conditions, we are able to determine the searchers' responses to changes in the terms of unemployment insurance, to the existence of a minimum wage, and to different states of information about the underlying distribution of wages. In most cases the behavior of the searchers is consistent with that predicted by theory.     

THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long‐term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long‐term employment can result either from offering long‐term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments differ in how regulations restrict the employer's flexibility in adapting the employment contract. All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting to be rematched. Effort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments vary from no contract flexibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) flexibility be used in ongoing employment but reduce labor market efficiency? And will regulation crowd out long‐term employment, in the form of long‐term contracts or voluntary rematching? (JEL C72, C90, F16, J21, J24, L10)     

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE RELEVANCE AND SCOPE OF NATIONALITY AS A COORDINATION DEVICE

In a period marked by extensive cross‐national interactions, nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on. This study uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that nationality serves as a coordination device if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects. The strength of this device is nationality‐dependent and diminishes when participants are provided with additional information about their partner. We also find that subjects are likely to coordinate on the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown. (JEL C91, C92, Z1, Z13)     

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE IN AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY GAME

This article develops a two-country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector. We prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors, the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the Friedman rule. When governments lack such ability to commit, we find that the Friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open-economy model than in the closed-economy model of Ireland. ( JEL E31, E52, E61)     

DIFFERENTIATED ASSETS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON BUBBLES

In this paper, we study if and how having two differentiated assets affects bubble formation. We consider differences in assets' intrinsic characteristics as well as trading regulations that help differentiate two otherwise identical assets. We find that, compared to trading regulations, differences in assets' intrinsic characteristics encourage more arbitrage across assets and thus help reduce mispricing significantly. We also find that short‐term speculation does not depend on how assets or markets are being differentiated. As a result, short‐term speculation cannot be used to explain why bubbles are smaller when two assets are intrinsically different than when they are not. (JEL C91, F34)     

AUCTIONS WITH RESALE OPPORTUNITIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue‐efficiency trade‐off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer‐advantaged resale case. (JEL D44, C92)     

THE EFFECTS OF MARKET PRACTICES IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ETHYL CASE

This study reports on the performance of experimental markets characterized by industrial structure and practices similar to those at issue in the Ethyl case. The central question is whether price competition is affected by the practices of advanced notification of price changes and "most-favored nation" contracts or is determined by industrial organization and concentration alone.     

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A HYBRID LIABILITY RULE

This article considers a legal setting with a tort liability rule that includes both a care-based component (such as negligence) and a non–care-based component (such as no liability). Children trespassers are sometimes protected by a doctrine known as attractive nuisance. Attractive nuisance acts as a hybrid liability rule in its application—it applies the negligence rule to accidents involving some types of children, and the no-liability rule to accidents involving other types of children. A standard economic model of torts is applied to a trespass setting, and the potential efficiency of a hybrid liability rule is examined.     

INCENTIVES FOR DISHONESTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY WITH INTERNAL AUDITORS

We conduct an experiment with professional internal auditors and evaluate their performance and objectivity, measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real-effort task. In line with our hypotheses, we find that incentive-based compensation increases dishonest behavior: competitive incentives lead to under-reporting of other participants' performance, while collective incentives lead to over-reporting of performance. We replicate these results with a student sample. In addition, we find that moving from an environment with objective performance evaluation toward a peer evaluation scheme reduces performance among internal auditors, but not among students.(JEL C93, M42, M52)     

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COMPLIANCE AND LEVERAGE IN AUDITING AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Evidence suggests that individuals often comply with regulations even though the frequency of inspections and audits is low. We report a laboratory experiment based on the dynamic model suggested by Harrington (1988) to explain this puzzle in which participants move between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity of fine. Enforcement leverage arises in the Harrington model from movement between the groups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance. We find that compliance behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts. A simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimal behavior. (JEL C91, Q20, Q28 )