POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

THE PROTESTANT FISCAL ETHIC: RELIGIOUS CONFESSION AND EURO SKEPTICISM IN GERMANY

During the European sovereign debt crisis, most countries that ran into fiscal trouble had Catholic majorities, whereas countries with Protestant majorities were able to avoid fiscal problems. We find that Christian‐conservative members of the German parliament from constituencies with higher shares of Protestants were more likely to vote against a third bailout for Greece. Survey data show that views on the euro differ between German Protestants and non‐Protestants at the individual level, too. Among Protestants, concerns about the euro have, compared to non‐Protestants, increased during the crisis. We show that this increase in concern is linked to a reduction of Protestants' subjective well‐being. We use the timing of survey interviews and news events in 2011 to account for the endogeneity of euro concerns. Emphasis on moral hazard concerns in Protestant theology may, thus, still shape economic preferences. (JEL D72, E00, I31, Z12)     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: INCOME DISTRIBUTION,CONSUMER CREDIT,AND BUSINESS CYCLES

We introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios. Growing inequality produces debt‐led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend. Instead, when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated, aggregate demand and output fall. Our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy: acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy. (JEL C63, D31, E62, G01)     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

How do exchange rate regimes influence fiscal discipline? This important question has typically been addressed exploiting the classic dichotomy of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes assuming perfect capital mobility. However, the role of capital controls cannot be neglected, particularly in developing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which the fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The model also shows this effect increases as fiscal authorities become more impatient. Dynamic panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Using a dummy for pre‐electoral year as an indicator of fiscal authorities' shortsightedness, we also confirm that dual exchange rate has a more adverse effect on fiscal deficits as the authorities become more impatient. (JEL E50, E60, F31, F41)     

THE ROLE OF THE GOLD STANDARD IN KEYNESIAN MONETARY THEORY

This paper shows that many of the most distinctive features of Keynesian economics are best understood if one views the General Theory as essentially a gold standard model. A close examination of Keynes's statements on contemporaneous policy issues suggests that the gold standard had a profound impact on his views on monetary policy effectiveness. In particular, I show that the liquidity trap has been widely misunderstood. Finally, I argue that post–General Theory developments in Keynesian economics are best understood as a response to the inapplicability of Keynes's original message to a world of fiat money regimes. ( JEL B22, E12, N1)     

FISCAL RULES AND GOVERNMENT BORROWING COSTS: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985–2010. We apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self‐selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the “risk premium” on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility. (JEL E43, G12, H60)     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON PROFITS

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 18 high‐income OECD countries during the period 1975–1999. We estimate a profit equation allowing a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while expenditures on goods and services and in particular on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. In general, “productive” expenditures seem to increase profits while the effect of “unproductive” expenditures is insignificant. Transport and communication expenditures seem to have a positive impact on profits. On the revenue side, we find that both direct and indirect taxation has a negative impact on profits. (JEL E62, H32, H54)     

RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A NONLINEAR FISCAL POLICY RULE

In the aftermath of the recent debt crisis, many countries are implementing nonlinear fiscal policy rules, whereby the government's responsiveness to debt strengthens at higher levels of debt. This paper examines how a nonlinear fiscal policy rule affects the possibility of future insolvency in a small open economy. We find that (1) the criteria for a nonlinear fiscal rule to eliminate explosive behavior should be tighter than the ones proposed by Bohn (1998); (2) a country that adopts a nonlinear fiscal rule could substantially reduce the probability of a solvency crisis; and (3) a nonlinear fiscal rule allows a country to reduce the possibility of insolvency without large initial responsiveness. (JEL C63, E62, E63, F34, H63)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

ASSET DYNAMICS,LIQUIDITY, AND INEQUALITY IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

The Kiyotaki and Wright model has exerted a considerable influence on the monetary search literature. We argue that the model also delivers important insights into a broader range of macroeconomic and development issues. The analysis studies how market frictions and the liquidity of assets affect the distribution of income. Experiments illustrate how the economy adjusts to shocks to asset returns and to the matching technology. They also deal with long‐run transition. An experiment interprets the reversal of fortune hypothesis as a situation in which an economy with a low‐return asset takes over a similar economy with a high‐return asset. (JEL C61, C63, E41, E27, D63)     

FISCAL POLICY AND LENDING RELATIONSHIPS

This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the United States. First, it conducts a structural vector‐autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending increases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relationships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock. (JEL E44, E62)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BITCOIN

The recent proliferation of bitcoin has been a boon for users but might pose problems for governments. Indeed, some governments have already taken steps to ban or discourage the use of bitcoin. In a model with endogenous matching and random consumption preferences, we find multiple monetary equilibria including one in which bitcoin coexists with official currency. We then identify the conditions under which government transactions policy might deter the use of bitcoin. We show that such a policy becomes more difficult if some users strictly prefer bitcoin because they can avoid other users holding the official currency in the matching process. (JEL C78, E41, E42, E50)     

DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES: GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS IN HARD TIMES

We investigate state-dependent effects of fiscal multipliers and allow for endogenous sample splitting to determine whether the U.S. economy is in a slack state. When the endogenized slack state is estimated as the period of the unemployment rate higher than about 12%, the estimated cumulative multipliers are significantly larger during slack periods than nonslack periods and are above unity. We also examine the possibility of time-varying regimes of slackness and find that our empirical results are robust under a more flexible framework. Our estimation results point out the importance of the heterogenous effects of fiscal policy and shed light on the prospect of fiscal policy in response to economic shocks from the current COVID-19 pandemic. (JEL C32, E62, H20, H62)     

ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

We introduce borrowing constraints into a two‐sector Schumpeterian growth model and examine the impact of asset price bubbles on innovation. In this environment, rational bubbles arise when the intermediate good producing R&D sector is faced with adverse productivity shocks. Importantly, these bubbles help alleviate credit constraints and facilitate innovation in the stagnant economy. On the policy front, we make a case for debt financed credit to the R&D sector. Further, we establish that a constant credit growth rule (akin to the Friedman rule) outperforms the often prescribed counter‐cyclical “lean against the wind” credit policy. (JEL E32, E44, O40)     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT LEVEL AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

In this article we unify the traditional approaches to testing for fiscal sustainability considering the stock‐flow system that fiscal variables configure. Our approach encompasses previous ways of testing for sustainability. The results obtained for a group of 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries point to weak fiscal sustainability, as well as to the existence of cointegration between deficit and debt, confirming the relevance of the stock‐flow approach. Allowing for structural breaks and multicointegration turns out to be of critical importance to assess whether the fiscal authorities apply their policies looking for sustainability and whether, simultaneously, they try to stabilize real debt target levels. (JEL H62, E62, C22)     

RELEASING THE TRAP: A METHOD TO REDUCE INATTENTION BIAS IN SURVEY DATA WITH APPLICATION TO U.S. BEER TAXES

This study uses discrete choice experiments to explore the efficacy of prompts targeted at reducing inattention bias. Upon receiving feedback, inattentive respondents are given the opportunity to reanswer a so‐called “trap question” that checks for attentiveness. We find that individuals who miss trap questions and do not correctly revise their responses have significantly different choice patterns as compared to individuals who correctly answer the trap question. Adjusting for these inattentive responses has a substantive impact on policy impacts. Results, based on attentive participant responses, indicate that a minimum beer price would have to be substantial to substantially reduce beer demand. (JEL C83, Q18, Q51)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)