COLLUSION AND OVERLENDING

This study provides a theoretical background for collusion-induced overlending being the main cause of the 1997 Korean financial crisis. Our model consists of a lending institution, a borrowing chaebol of an unknown type, and an informed politician who can influence lending decision. We show that collusion can be formed between a low-type chaebol and the politician, and it may not be the lending institution's best interest to deter such collusion. This equilibrium, however, is possible only when the economic environment is favorable. When the economy deteriorates, the expectations of the fall of the collusion equilibrium can trigger financial crisis. (JEL G30, D82, O16)     

THE IMPACT OF ENTITLEMENTS AND EQUITY ON COOPERATIVE BARGAINING: AN EXPERIMENT

In some bargaining situations—for example, collaborative policy making and compulsory arbitration—a third party imposes a backstop position that differs from the status quo. Axiomatic models of cooperative bargaining presume that the status quo in such cases will have no effect on the negotiated outcome, especially if it is Pareto inferior to the backstop. Recent literatures on equity and entitlement, however, suggest that the status quo may establish a focal point that acts as an “anchor” in current negotiations, affecting any ultimate agreement. In a two‐party, two‐attribute experiment, in which subjects jointly select from up to 200 options, we find evidence (1) that the status quo matters, perhaps because of “entitlement effects” and (2) that parties prefer egalitarian outcomes to the Nash bargain. (JEL C92, D74, H44, Q58)     

SERVICES OUTSOURCING AND INNOVATION: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the links between international services outsourcing, domestic outsourcing, profits, and innovation using plant‐level data. We find a positive effect of international outsourcing of services on innovative activity at the plant level. Such a positive effect can also be observed for domestic outsourcing, but the magnitude is smaller. We also find that international services outsourcing has a positive effect on profitability, as predicted by theory, whereas this is not true for domestic sourcing. The results are robust to various specifications and an instrumental variables analysis. (JEL F19, O31)     

COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. ( JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)     

COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.     

PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND RISK ATTITUDES: AN EXPERIMENT

Using financial incentives, we study how portfolio choice (how much to invest in a risky asset) depends on three well-known behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the illusion of control, and myopic loss aversion. We find evidence that these phenomena are present and test how the level of investment is affected by these motivations; at the same time, we investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge preferences for less ambiguity, more control, or more frequent feedback/opportunities to choose the investment level. First, the observed preference for "control" did not affect investment behavior and in fact disappeared when participants were asked to actually pay to gain more control. Second, while people were indeed willing to pay for less ambiguity, the level of ambiguity did not influence investment levels. Finally, participants were willing to pay to have more frequent feedback opportunities to change their portfolio, even though prior research has shown that people invest less in risky assets (and earn less) in this case . ( JEL B49, C91, D81, G11, G19)     

PERCEIVED IMPACT OF DEFAMATION: AN EXPERIMENT ON THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS

This paper explores the intersection of libel law and communicationtheory that occurs when libel juries assess the effect of adefamatory communication on others. The third-person hypothesissuggests that people often assume others will be more affectedby potentially persuasive communications than they are themselves.An experiment was conducted in which students were exposed toa variety of defamatory newspaper articles. The results confirmedseveral predictions. First, readers estimated that others wouldbe more affected by defamatory messages than the readers themselveswould be. Second, this effect was magnified as the "others"became progressively more distant from these readers. Third,when the defamation was attributed to a negatively biased sourcethe effect was also accentuated: readers themselves discountedthe message, while assuming others would be even more influenced.It is suggested that courtroom assessments of the effects ofdefamatory communications on others may be influenced by suchthird-person perceptions.     

INTEGRATED HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. METHODS AND AN INNOVATION

We present a vision for improving household financial surveys by integrating responses from questionnaires more completely with financial statements and combining them with payments data from diaries. Integrated household financial accounts—balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows—are used to assess the degree of integration in leading U.S. household surveys, focusing on inconsistencies in measures of the change in cash. Diaries of consumer payment choice can improve dynamic integration. Using payments data, we construct a statement of liquidity flows: a detailed analysis of currency, checking accounts, prepaid cards, credit cards, and other payment instruments, consistent with conventional cash flow measures and the other financial accounts. (JEL D12, D14, E41, E42)     

TRANSACTION COST, TWO-PART TARIFFS, AND COLLUSION

When two goods exhibit demand complementarity, the sellers would generally charge lower prices under collusion than under rivalry–a cartel internalizes cross effects that independent firms ignore. For the particular case of "two-part" tariffs consisting of entrance fees and per-unit prices, this paper shows that entrance fees are indeed lower under collusion than under rivalry, but that per-unit prices are unaffected. The demand complementarity arises from transaction costs borne by consumers who enter the market. The policy implication is that collusion can be socially preferable to competition in the presence of such transaction costs.     

INFORMATION SHARING AND TACIT COLLUSION IN LABORATORY DUOPOLY MARKETS

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion. ( JEL C92, D80, L13)     

POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS

Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed-bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning-bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices.     

"SECRET BALLOTS" AND SELF-REPORTS IN AN EXIT-POLL EXPERIMENT

A controlled exit-poll experiment on Election Day (November3, 1992) shows that refusals to answer questions and other evasiveforms of responding were significantly lower when respondentswere given a self-administered "secret-ballot" questionnairethan when they were interviewed face-to-face. While there weresome suggestive interactions of this mode-of-data collectioneffect with age and sex, and with the partisan atmosphere ofthe precinct in which the interviews were conducted, they wereborderline in significance, inconsistent in pattern, or difficuitto interpret. More important, comparisons with official electionreturns (the truth) indicated that the secret-ballot techniquewas more accurate than were face-to-face interviews in estimatingthe final outcome on the most socially sensitive of three self-reportedvotes: a vote for or against a tax levy for elderly services.Using a genuine secret ballot in the tradition of the olderGallup preelection polls can thus increase the validity of self-reportsin exit polls today.     

SCHOOLS OF ACTIVITY AND INNOVATION

Explanations of artistic innovation have generally focused on political or psychological factors influencing individual socialization. This article suggests an alternative approach focusing on the organizational processes in an art world, specifically the production of concert music. Concerts are produced through the collective activity of musical specialists. Compatible collaborators identify each other by constructing "schools of activity" that group conventional concert practices and practitioners. Different schools, however, do not simply represent alternative conventions, rather they represent degrees of convention that correspond to varying aesthetic interests in innovation and virtuosity. The first part of this article examines the organization of artistic activity and the formation of schools. The second part presents data from the concert world illustrating the organization of alternative types of artistic practice.     

COLLUSION, EFFICIENCY AND PRICING BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM THE BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper examines the validity of competing hypotheses used to explain the observed positive relationship between concentration and profits. Using price proxies from the banking industry, we find that leading (secondary) firms in a market act as price-setters (price-takers). This is true regardless of market concentration. We interpret this as evidence of the superior efficiency of leading firms and conclude that the higher profits earned by these firms is due to their superior efficiency and not collusive behavior.     

PERSISTENCE OF POLITICIANS AND FIRMS' INNOVATION

We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms. We use 12,000 firm‐level observations from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation. This finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms' incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can extract rents from long‐term connections with politicians. (JEL D22, D72, O31)     

ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

We introduce borrowing constraints into a two‐sector Schumpeterian growth model and examine the impact of asset price bubbles on innovation. In this environment, rational bubbles arise when the intermediate good producing R&D sector is faced with adverse productivity shocks. Importantly, these bubbles help alleviate credit constraints and facilitate innovation in the stagnant economy. On the policy front, we make a case for debt financed credit to the R&D sector. Further, we establish that a constant credit growth rule (akin to the Friedman rule) outperforms the often prescribed counter‐cyclical “lean against the wind” credit policy. (JEL E32, E44, O40)