Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

A model of voluntary childlessness

Demographers and sociologists have studied why women remain childless for more than two decades; however, this specific choice of zero fertility has not interested economists. Permanent childlessness, in developed countries, can concern up to 30 % of the women in a cohort. Childlessness rates can be positively related to average fertility for some cohorts of women. This paper provides an explanation for this using an endogenous fertility model where individuals have different preferences for children. The main mechanism considered goes through the intergenerational evolution of preferences: I show that a reduction in the gender wage gap, or an increase in the fixed cost of becoming a parent, has a negative effect on both fertility and childlessness. The reduction of childlessness is due to a composition effect: small families shrink more than larger families, and this reduces childlessness.     

What is natural fertility? The modelling of a concept

The value and importance of the concept of natural fertility have been widely debated since Henry's work in the late 1950s. Whereas Henry regarded natural fertility largely as a useful concept for model building, Coale-Trussell demonstrated that this concept could also be used to analyze patterns of age-specific fertility. The set of age-specific marital fertility schedules assembled by Henry and then used by Coale and Trussell involved largely small populations drawn from disparate sources. Nonetheless, from this diverse and fragmentary data, Henry was able to construct a standard of natural fertility which, in the operational form developed by Coale-Trussell, has proved remarkably general in its application and utility. This in turn suggests that the physiological forces shaping fertility are exceedingly strong, especially the incidence of physiological sterility. There appears to be no single universal pattern of natural fertility. Rather, there is a set of closely related age profiles, the exact shape of which is determined by specific behavioral and social factors that influence childbearing. The increase in physiological sterility with age serves to give an upper limit to fertility at each age, while other factors determine how close a given population comes to that maximum. Although no society has ever demonstrated Henry's ideal notion of a purely physiological fertility pattern, the effect of the intervening factors is often weak. In terms of the Coale-Trussell model, maximum likelihood estimation offers the most informative method of implementation and a time series for 1 population is more readily interpretable than a cross-section comparing several populations.     

Fertility adaptation by rural-urban migrants in developing countries: The case of Korea

Summary The purpose of this study is to develop and test a model to assess the influence of rural-urban migration on fertility in less developed countries. Two major reasons may account for lower fertility levels observed among such migrants than among women who remained in rural areas: a selection effect, and adaptation to constraints in the area of destination. Results of previous studies have only rarely suggested that the effect of adaptation was significant. We use the detailed personal migration and pregnancy histories recorded in the Korean World Fertility Survey of 1974 and an autoregressive model to control for unobservable variations in personal preferences for different family sizes between migrants and non-migrants. Our study provides evidence that adaptation following rural-urban migration is a significant factor which explains the lower fertility of rural-urban migrants compared with that of rural stayers.     

The Relevance of the 'Easterlin hypothesis' and the 'new home economics' to fertility movements in Great Britain

Summary The hypothesis that a family's economic status relative to its aspirations (relative economic status) is an important determinant of its fertility behaviour has been developed and applied to the explanation of swings in American fertility by R. A. Easterlin. However, a recent application by Butz and Ward of a model derived from the 'new home economics' (pioneered by Becker and Mincer) strongly suggests that relative economic status is not the dominant factor in explaining fertility movements in the U.S.A. Rather, both current men's and women's wages operate independently in explaining the movement in fertility, and in particular the decline in fertility is attributed to rising women's wages. In this paper we explore the relevance of both the Easterlin hypothesis and the hypotheses derived from the 'new home economics' to the 1955-75 fertility swing in Great Britain. We find that we must reject the Easterlin hypothesis on the basis of the measures of relative economic status suggested by Easterlin and Wachter. A variant of the Easterlin hypothesis suggested by Oppenheimer does receive some support from the available evidence, and the evidence provides strong support for the model of fertility behaviour derived from the 'new home economics', which emphasizes the distinction between the effects of changes in men's and women's real wages on fertility decisions. The cause of the fertility decline is attributed to rising women's wages and employment opportunities through their direct effect on the opportunity cost of time and children among working wives and through their effect on the labour force participation of married women of childbearing age. The test of this model and the estimates of its parameters are not definitive, however, because of deficiencies in the data and problems of statistical estimation. We nevertheless conclude that both this model and the Oppenheimer variant of the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as other elements of a more comprehensive economic theory of fertility, point to a continuation of low fertility and the possibility of a secular decline with fertility approaching some lower asymptote.     

The Effects of Children's Schooling on Fertility Limitation

Many theories of fertility predict that mass education reduces fertility, but this effect may be produced in a variety of ways. In this paper, microdemographic data from a rural community in Nepal, in which the spread of mass education and fertility limitation is just beginning, are used to examine these links. The analyses contrast the influence of parents' and children's educational experiences of parents' fertility preferences and behaviour. The results indicate that children's schooling has a strong influence on both fertility preferences and behaviour. The effects of parental schooling are weaker, and also inconsistent in different models. These findings provide support for theories that link mass education to the onset of fertility limitation through children's schooling experience.     

An Explanatory Model for Projecting Regional Fertility Differences in the Netherlands

Current differences in the level of the total fertility rate (TFR) between Dutch municipalities are smaller than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, there are still considerable differences. Small municipalities have higher TFRs than large cities. This article aims to answer the question whether these differences will decline further until differences between large and small cities disappear. For that purpose we develop a regression model of regional differences in the TFR including demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural variables. Using the estimation results we decompose differences in fertility between large and small cities into the contribution of differences in levels of the determinants versus differences in the relationships between the determinants and fertility. The results show that differences in cultural variables have a larger effect on differences in the TFR than the demographic and socioeconomic variables. As cultural differences do not tend to change quickly, they will not lead to quick changes in regional differences in the TFR. Demographic differences are not expected to lead to strong changes either, as the two demographic variables (household structure and ethnic structure) have opposite effects. As the effect of the socioeconomic variable is caused by differences in the magnitude of the regression coefficient rather than by differences in the value of this variable, even if differences in this variable disappeared, this would still not lead to convergence of the TFR. Thus the article concludes that differences in the TFR between large and small cities are not likely to diminish quickly.     

Measuring the effect of sex preference on fertility: The case of Korea

Preferences for male or female children or a balanced number of sons and daughters are common throughout the world. The dominant preference is for male offspring, particularly in less developed countries. Strong son preference is often tempered, however, by a desire to have at least one child of each sex. In more developed countries a balance preference is more common, often together with a strong preference for the first child to be a son. Although it is usually assumed that sex preference can substantially influence fertility, some analysts argue that the effect is negligible. An intermediate position is taken by those who say that sex preference may not have much impact at high fertility levels, but that as average family sizes begin to fall, sex preference will become a more important factor in fertility decisions. Despite the keen interest that has been shown in sex preference, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence of its effects on fertility. Moreover, much of the research in this area is methodologically weak. The measures that have been used in the past have been subject to a number of criticisms that call their results into question. This paper proposes a new measure of the effect of sex preference on fertility that avoids many of the problems inherent in other methods. The measure is based on widely available survey data on the sex composition of children and can be used with any measure of fertility or family planning. It can handle any type of sex preference and does not assume a linear relationship between sex preference and fertility.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

The influence of rural-urban migration on migrants' fertility in Korea,Mexico and Cameroon

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between rural-urban migration and fertility in Korea, Mexico, and Cameroon. Using an autoregressive model, the results show a significant rural-urban migration adaptation effect in Korea and Mexico, a reduction of 2.57 and 1.45 children during the entire childbearing period, respectively, when compared to a rural stayer, even after the effect of selection has been controlled. Rural-urban migration has a very small impact on fertility in Cameroon. The unexpected result for Cameroon is due to the fact that the fertility-increasing effect of urban residency on the improved supply conditions of births, such as reduced infertility, offsets the fertility-depressing effect of urban residency on the demand for births. As a result of the adaptation to urban fertility norms, the number of country-wide births was reduced significantly in Mexico and Korea over the time periods studied.     

Economic determinants of fertility: Results from cross sectional aggregate data

Census data for areal units, SMSA’s in 1960 and cities in 1940, are used to test hypotheses and estimate parameters concerning the influence of a variety of socioeconomic variables on fertility rates of ever married white and nonwhite women aged 25–29, 30–34, 35–44, and 45–49. An economic model of the demand for children is adopted as the theoretical framework. The principal findings are that the market earnings opportunities for wives have an important negative effect on the fertility rate and that male income, representing the income of husbands, has a small but positive effect on fertility. The implication of these results is that changes in economic variables, for example, improvements in the employment opportunities and wages for wives or the establishment of a children’s allowance program, may be expected to affect fertility.     

The construction of the fertility model of variable parity from family planning practice]

Understanding the changing patterns of age specific fertility under the planning system is essential for building a fertility model which reflects birth control policy implementation in China. In building a Parity Variable Fertility Model, 4 basic elements are to be considered: 1) psychosocial, and physiological variables, 2) patterns of the total fertility rate and age-specific fertility rate, 3) socioeconomic development, and 4) distribution of parity-specific fertility. THe natural fertility of women is 17, calculated from a 309-years childbearing period, with 17% of non-susceptible time. In China, about 86% of natural fertility is suppressed by various factors. In this model, the following variables are included: 1) The first marriage ratio, which is the proportion of women in each age group which enters into a first marriage. The range and spread of this ratio is closely associated with the first birth. 2) The first birth ratio, which is the proportion of a marriage cohort to have a first birth each year. 3) the birth interval, which determines the distribution of second births. 4) Regulation coefficient B, which represents birth control regulations which approximately determine the number of second-parity or higher order births. The difference between the fertility level generated from the Parity Variable Fertility Model and reality depends on the implementation of birth control program, the assumptions on regulation coefficients, and changes in social and cultural factors. The model is easy to use, especially for areas where the marriage and fertility records of women of child-bearing are well kept.     

Demographic change and the labour share of income

Despite similar levels of per capita income, education and technology, the development of labour income shares in OECD countries has displayed different patterns since 1960. The paper examines the role of demography in this regard. We first use a standard overlapping generations model to derive the mechanisms by which demographic change can affect the labour share. It turns out that demographic change can affect the labour share either by altering the domestic capital intensity, by causing factor-biased technological change or in a small open economy framework by creating a gap between domestic savings and investments. The latter affects the country’s investments abroad and in return its net foreign asset income which directly leads to changes in the labour share. Empirical estimations based on these insights, provide evidence that an increases in the expected retirement durations and old-age dependency ratios as well as declines in labour force growth rates have indeed been major forces behind the decline in labour shares that took place in many countries. These effects tend to be larger in open economies and pension reforms towards a funded pension system seem to have accelerated the effects.     

An Empirical Assessment of Households Livelihood Vulnerability: The Case of Rural Ghana

The recent years witnessed a sharp drop in China’s demographic dividend; therefore, some reform measures about China’s fertility policy have been adopted to optimize population structures and to maintain demographic dividend. However, our simulation results reveal that the new two-child fertility policy cannot effectively deal with population ageing, and that China’s fertility policy needs further adjustment. Specifically, we find that the new two-child fertility policy will deteriorate demographic dividend before 2050, through combination of simulation results and formula derivation. Aiming to stabilize demographic dividend at ideal range all the time, we build nonlinear integer programming model to propose an appropriate reforming path for China’s fertility policy. Then, we simulate and compare demographic developments under the proposed reforming path with those under three possible fertility policies: one-child, two-child and no fertility restriction, verifying that the proposed reforming path has better performance on stabilizing demographic dividend than these three fertility policies have. Finally, sensitivity analysis of upper bound of research interval is conducted to evaluate the effect of the upper bound on proposed reforming path. Based on these results, we suggest that China should continue to execute current strict fertility policy before 2032, then begin to relax it gradually especially during 2036–2041, and completely cancel fertility policy after 2065.     

The empowerment of women,fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis

This paper examines one avenue through which female autonomy impinges on fertility and child mortality in developing countries. A simple model is set out in which couples are motivated to have children for old age security purposes. The decisions of a couple regarding fertility and allocation of resources for the healthcare of their children are made within a bargaining framework. An increase in female autonomy translating into an increase in the relative bargaining power or the threat point utility of mothers is shown to reduce fertility and also to reduce child mortality rates. Paradoxically, the increase in female autonomy within a household may increase the disadvantage suffered by female children in that household with respect to survival. Received: 4 August 1999/Accepted: 7 September 2000     

Cheaper by the dozen? The marginal time costs of children in the Philippines

The important relationship between fertility rates and economic development has prompted many researchers to try and better understand the determinants of family size. It has repeatedly been shown that the costs of children, both direct and indirect, are one of the most important determinants of fertility, exerting a significantly negative effect on birth rates in both developed and developing countries. Many studies which investigate the relationship between the costs of children and family size have assumed that these costs do not vary with parity. However, there is substantial evidence that the marginal costs of children are not constant but decrease with birth order in developed countries. In this paper, the hypothesis that there are diminishing marginal time costs of children is tested using household data from the developing country setting of the Philippines. By examining the determinants of additional time spent in childcare before and after the birth of a child, it is found that the marginal time costs are not the same across households of various sizes. Firstborn children cost significantly more in terms of additional mother's time than children of higher birth orders. In addition, the time costs of the second child are found to be significantly greater than those of the third child. However, these economies of scale in childcare are limited and do not extend beyond three children. The effect of birth spacing on the marginal time costs of children is also found to be significant.     

The Long-Term Effect of the Timing of Fertility Decline on Population Size

Existing long-range population projections imply that the timing of the fertility transition has a relatively unimportant effect on long-term population size when compared with the impact of the level at which fertility is assumed eventually to stabilize. However, this note shows that the effect of the timing of fertility decline is a function of the eventual fertility rate: the lower the eventual fertility rate, the greater the effect of the timing of the transition becomes. This finding has important implications for projection methodology, as well as for policies related to the consequences of long-term levels of population size.     

How development programs can affect fertility: the case of Bangladesh

Improving living standards and increasing productivity in developing countries may result in fertility reduction. In Bangladesh, government policy stresses rural development and fertility reduction. Programs that raise women's status reduce fertility. Educational level is inversely correlated to childbearing. Women aged 25-29 with a Secondary School Certificate have 2.4 children, versus 4.0 for those with no education. Employment also decreases fertility. Thus, improving the educational and employment status of women could have major effects on fertility. Studying the Bangladesh Rural Social Services program revealed that community organization efforts and self-help programs for economic and social improvement also decrease fertility. Rural electrification programs, which have been emphasized in development planning, contribute to changing attitudes and behavior of residents of these regions. In addition to electrification, improved transportation and communications should enhance the spread of information to rural areas. Agricultural development programs, such as the Comilla development program, have not affected fertility. This is attributed to the concentration of benefits to a few farms, with the majority becoming poorer. Unless agricultural development benefits are widely distributed, there will probably be little effect on fertility. Thus, the development programs most likely to affect fertility are those which emphasize female education and employment, open rural areas to information and ideas, and are open to a whole community.     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

The dependent tax exemption,abortion availability,and US fertility rates

The impact of the personal income tax dependent exemption, abortion availability, and other factors on fertility rates is analyzed. US time series data for 1915–88 are used in the empirical model. The results indicate that greater abortion availability in the USA is associated with lower fertility. A higher value of the dependent exemption generally is associated with higher fertility, but the magnitude and significance of the effect is sensitive to specification choice. The results suggest that restricting abortion availability in the USA will increase the fertility rate, but a change in the tax value of the dependent exemption will have a less predictable impact on fertility.     

The fertility of two-generation urbanites

In this paper it is argued that in studies of urban fertility, the relationship between socio-economic variables and fertility has been obscured by the presence of rural migrants in the populations under investigation. Accordingly, data obtained from families of completed fertility in six probability samples of metropolitan Detroit are divided into two groups, farm migrants and two-generation urbanites.

In general, the socio-economic differences in fertility observed among the “pure” urban types in Detroit are found to be small and inconsistent, most of them being statistically insignificant. The inverse fertility pattern found in the total Detroit population is attributed to : (a) the overrepresentation of farm migrants (who have high fertility) in the lowest social and economic positions in the city, and (b) the pronounced inverse pattern of fertility among the farm migrants.

It is suggested that the absence of an inverse fertility pattern among twogeneration urbanites and its presence among the farm migrants can be attributed to differences in family organization.