Singular causal explanations

Singular causal explanations cite explicitly, or may be paraphrased to cite explicitly, a particular factor as the cause of another particular factor. During recent years there has emerged a consensus account of the nature of an important feature of such explanations, the distinction between a factor regarded correctly in a given context of inquiry as the cause of a given result and those other causally relevant factors, sometimes called mere conditions, which are not regarded correctly in that context of inquiry as the cause of that result. In this paper that consensus account is characterized and developed. The developed version is then used to illuminate some recent discussions of singular causal explanations.Work on this paper was supported by a University of Maryland Faculty Research Award. Earlier versions were read at the University of Minnesota and at the 1971 Western Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association. I have profited from criticisms raised on these occasions. I am especially grateful for the comments of James Lesher, Peter Machamer, John Vollrath, and the students in my Macalester College seminar.     

On a concept of representative democracy

Political theory distinguishes between two concepts of representative democratic decisions. Under the first concept, representatives do not decide issues as independent individuals but merely reflect the will of their constituencies; under the second, the decisions are made by the elected representatives themselves on the basis of their independent judgments on political issues. In the literature of democratic choice, the first concept has been formalized by Murakami, Fishburn, Pattanaik among others, in terms of decision procedures where the representative is identified with the preference-pattern emerging from the aggregation of the preferences of individual voters in a given constituency. Here we formalize the second type of representative democracy and show that it comes into conflict with certain essential features of a democratic group decision rule. In particular decisiveness and monotonicity are violated. The violation of monotonicity is of particular significance because it has come to be regarded as one of the fundamental principles for the ethical acceptability of democratic decision procedures.I am also grateful to the University Grants Commission of India for the financial assistance in carrying out this study.I wish to acknowledge my great debt to Professor Prasanta K. Pattanaik, my supervisor, both for initiating me to this problem and for his invaluable comments, criticisms and guidance. The paper acquired much of its present status through the discussions I had with him. Responsibility for any error, of course, rests with me.     

Multivariate risk premiums

This paper develops characterizations of a risk premium and of the relation more risk averse, for multi-dimensional problems where the agent is exposed to an insurable and an uninsurable risk. We generalize and inter-relate results of Duncan (1977), Karni (1979), Kihlstrom et al. (1981), Malinvaud (1971), and Ross (1981) in deriving a local ordering of the risk aversion of agents with differing ordinal preferences.Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at seminars at New York University, the University of Alberta, and the University of British Columbia. We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of participants at these presentations, in particular, Yakov Amihud, David Nachman, Joel Owen, Siegfried Schaible, Gordon Sick, and William Ziemba. All responsibility for errors and omissions resides with the authors.     

Limited role of entropy in information economics

Information transmitted is defined as the amount by which added evidence (or message received) diminishes uncertainty. The latter is characterized by some properties intuitively suggested by this word and possessed by conditional entropy, a parameter of the posterior probability distribution. However, conditional entropy shares these properties with some other concave symmetric functions on the probability space.Moreover, a given transmission channel (or, in the context of statistical inference, a given experiment) yields a higher maximum expected benefit than anotherto any user if and only ifall concave functions of the posterior probability vector have higher values for the former channel (or experiment). Hence one information system (channel, experiment) may be preferable to another for a given user although its transmission rate, in entropy terms, is lower.But only entropy has the economically relevant property of measuring, in the limit, the expected length of efficiently coded messages sent in long sequences. Thus, while irrelevant to the value (maximum expected benefit) of an information system and to the costs of observing, estimating, and deciding, entropy formulas are indeed relevant to the cost of communicating, i.e., of storing, coding and transmitting messages.Revised version of a paper presented at the 5th Colloquium on Optimization Techniques (International Federation for Information Processing, Rome, May 1973), Lecture Notes series of the Springer Verlag, Heidelberg and New York. The author wishes to thank Springer Verlag for reprint permission. Acknowledgements of support are due to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Special Program for the Cooperation of Research Institutes of F.R.G. and U.S.A.), the U.S. Office of Naval Research and the Institute for Economic Theory, University of Bonn.     

Cultural evolution

In this paper I consider the problem of man's evolution - in particular the evolutionary problems raised when we consider man as a cultural animal as well as a biological one. I argue that any adequate cultural evolutionary theory must have the notion of adaptation as a central concept, where this must be construed in a fairly literal (biological) sense, that is as something which aids its possessors (i.e. men) to survive and reproduce. I argue against theories which treat adaptation in a metaphorical sense, particularly those speaking of the adaptation of cultures without reference to men. Iron tools per se are not better adapted than bronze tools - it is the men with iron tools who are better adapted than men with bronze tools. I show that by taking the approach that I do, one can apply at once in a fruitful manner some conclusions of biological evolutionary theory directly to men and their cultures. I conclude with a brief discussion of methodological issues raised by cultural evolutionary theories, particularly those of confirmation and falsification.     

The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games

Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.     

Utilities for distributive justice

This paper falls within the field of Distributive Justice and (as the title indicates) addresses itself specifically to the meshing problem. Briefly stated, the meshing problem is the difficulty encountered when one tries to aggregate the two parameters of beneficence and equity in a way that results in determining which of two or more alternative utility distributions is most just. A solution to this problem, in the form of a formal welfare measure, is presented in the paper. This formula incorporates the notions of equity and beneficence (which are defined earlier by the author) and weighs them against each other to compute a numerical value which represents the degree of justice a given distribution possesses. This value can in turn be used comparatively to select which utility scheme, of those being considered, is best.Three fundamental adequacy requirements, which any acceptable welfare measuring method must satisfy, are presented and subsequently demonstrated to be formally deducible as theorems of the author's system. A practical application of the method is then considered as well as a comparison of it with Nicholas Rescher's method (found in his book, Distributive Justice). The conclusion reached is that Rescher's system is unacceptable, since it computes counter-intuitive results. Objections to the author's welfare measure are considered and answered. Finally, a suggestion for expanding the system to cover cases it was not originally designed to handle (i.e. situations where two alternative utility distributions vary with regard to the number of individuals they contain) is made. The conclusion reached at the close of the paper is that an acceptable solution to the meshing problem has been established.I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Michael Tooley whose positive suggestions and critical comments were invaluable in the writting of this paper.     

Rawls versus Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem

The decision rules yielded respectively by the Rawlsian maximin conception of justice and by classical utilitarianism are compared and contrasted. The discussion is based on the assumption of a pure distribution problem and sharp differences are brought out. An axiomatic analysis of the two conceptions is undertaken, the result of which is that Rawls and utilitarianism both omit essential aspects of distributional welfare judgments: Rawls leaves out questions of welfare differences, utilitarianism leaves out questions of welfare levels. It is possible to pay attention to the ranking of welfare levels without concentrating exclusively on the welfare levels of worst off persons only, thereby departing from both Bentham and Rawls.I have benefited from the comments of Partha Dasgupta.     

Some quantitative concepts of value and utility from a utilitarian point of view

This paper clarifies and interprets some basic quantitative concepts of value, utility and utility function from a utilitarian point of view. First, I discuss the question as to whether value is objective or subjective. I hold that value is subjective and statistical in nature (although from the various subjective values of a certain object a norm can usually be obtained). Second, I emphasize the distinction between use value and exchange value in relation to utility. Third, I propose a law of diminishing incremental interest, which refers to the incremental (marginal) utility of money. Fourth, I identify the utility of money with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Fifth, I question the necessity of the usual normalization of utility functions and the restricted linear transformation (and the consequent concept of strategic equivalence). Sixth, I discuss in detail the terminal values and utilities of a utility function from a philosophical rather than mathematical point of view, particularly the boundedness of a utility function and the magnitudes of V ₀ and U ₀. Finally, I conclude that, in order to be able to have interpersonal comparisons of utility, utility should have the same dimension as value rather than no dimension, and the normalization problem should be reconsidered in the light of terminal values and utilities.     

Similarity and preferences in the space of simple lotteries

A. Rubinstein's similarity-relation approach to decision making under uncertainty is extended by introducing a new concept of correlated similarity relations. It is shown that every expected utility preference is consistent with the -difference similarity relation on the prize space and some correlated similarity relations on the probability space, and that a similarity relation on the prize space and correlated similarity relations on the probability space overdetermine the preference (in A. Rubinstein's sense).Earlier versions were presented at the Edwin Smart Symposium on Games and Economic Behavior, Ohio State University, 1989, the ESEM 1989 Meeting, the EEA 1989 Meeting, the Workshop on Rational and Boundedly Rational Principles of Strategic Behavior, Universität Bielefeld, 1989, and the ASSET 1991 Meeting. We wish to thank the comments received from the participants in those meetings and the stimulating suggestions of S. Ch. Kolm, R. D. Luce, and an anonymous referee. Financial support from the Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, DGCYT (PS 87-0039) and Gobierno de Navarra are gratefully acknowledged.     

Punishment as retribution

The article is concerned with punishment as retribution. A number of reasonable assumptions concerning the punishment of criminals as well as the punishment of innocent individuals are made. These assumptions are consistent and from them a comprehensive justice map is drawn. Several implications concerning justice are derived and there is an analysis as to where slack in the pursuit of justice is most likely to occur. It is then shown that all of the assumptions and consequently all the results can be derived from a simple utility maximization model. Throughout the paper, behavior consistent with the concept of retribution is presented and there is some comparison to other theories of punishment. More generally, the article can be seen as a building of a social welfare function. In contrast to other work on social welfare functions which begin with just methods of aggregating preferences, this article begins with just preferences.I would like to thank David Kaun and Richard Posner for their comments.     

Insurance with undiversifiable risk: Contract structure and organizational form of insurance firms

Previous explanations of the contract choice and organizational form of insurance firms do not explain, by themselves, the recent proliferation of mutuals and new contract designs. We first present risk-bearing arguments to address these phenomena. We present two forms of insurance. The first is a conventional transfer of risk whereas the second decomposes risk between idiosyncratic and nonidiosyncratic. We show that the latter form leads to more active trade in insurance markets with correlated exposures. Moreover, the decomposed form dominates the simple transfer. These results qualify and extend the work of Borch (1962) and Marshall (1974). Market responses to the recent liability insurance crisis are compatible with these predictions.This research was conducted while G. Dionne was visiting the University of Pennsylvania under grants from Huebner Foundation and CRSH Canada. N. Doherty wishes to acknowledge with thanks support from the National Science Foundation under grant #88-09299. We wish to thank Patricia Danzon, Beverly Dahlby, Claude Fluet, James Garven, Scott Harrington, Howard Kunreuther, Clifford Smith Jr., George Theall, Kip Viscusi, and a referee for helpful comments.     

Skinner on the prediction and control of behavior

While prediction is a necesary requirement for the acceptance of a scientific theory, the prediction and control of behavior is not a neutral criterion for evaluating psychological theories. Appeal to prediction and control of behavior as a criterion, or objective of psychological theory is intelligible only if Skinner's conception of man is accepted. Emphasis upon control as criterion, as elaborated by Skinner, is not only inadequate but also dangerous. Finally some questions are raised about the relationship between psychological theories and methodology, and background conceptions of man.Preparation of this paper was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SOC75-08464), and it was written while the author was a visiting scholar at Standford University. I am grateful to D. Bullock, Maria I. Lacey, Howard Rachlin and E. E. Smith for helpful comments.     

On instructional science and instructional technology

Against the background of contemporary new views, approaches and methods of teaching and training, it is assumed that we are faced with the emergence of a new branch of science, a science of instruction, located somewhere between the psychology of learning and educational work. This science of instruction is carefully distinguished from the much discussed technology of education, a term which is reserved for the field of application (praxis) alone.The most characteristic requirement of a science of instruction is that it must provide operational rules, so-called operative precepts with reference to well-defined forms of learning. Another fundamental distinction in the paper is made between operative and normative precepts.Examples of certain types of operative precepts are discussed, which in the main have bearing upon the technology of education called programmed instruction; they belong to a body of operative, instructional precepts, which could be traced to a developing science of instruction.Finally some concepts and functions of instruction are dealt with and it is stressed that this field of application, in order to secure the necessary basis of decision, must be rooted on the one hand in a science of instruction capable of developing operative rules, and on the other hand in a philosophy of education whence it can derive its normative precepts.     

Staying power in sequential games

Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself (rational termination). These rules of sequential play induce a determinate, Paretosuperior outcome in all two-person, finite, sequential games in which the preferences of the players are strict.In 57 of the 78 distinct 2 × 2 ordinal games (73 percent), it makes no difference who the (second-moving) player with staying power is, but in the other 21 games the outcome is power-dependent. In all but one of these games, staying power benefits the player who possesses it.If no player has staying power, the outcomes that result from sequential play and rational termination are called terminal; they coincide with staying power outcomes if they are Pareto-superior. Normative implications of the analysis for rationally justifying cooperation in such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, and implementing Pareto-superior outcomes generally, are also discussed.We are grateful to D. Marc Kilgour for very valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, causing us to rethink and redefine staying power. The earlier version was presented at the Seventeenth North American Conference, Peace Science Society (International), University of Pennsylvania, November 9–11, 1981.     

Relationship Between Pain and Chronic Illness Among Seriously Ill Older Adults: Expanding Role for Palliative Social Work

Confronting the issue of pain among chronically ill older adults merits serious attention in light of mounting evidence that pain in this population is often undertreated or not treated at all (Institute of Medicine, 2011 Institute of Medicine . ( 2011 ). Relieving pain in America: A blueprint for transforming prevention, care, education and research . Washington, DC : National Academies Press . [Google Scholar]). The relationship between pain and chronic illness among adults age 50 and over was examined in this study through the use of longitudinal data from the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study, sponsored by the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. Findings suggested positive associations between pain and chronic disease, pain and multimorbidity, as well as an inverse association between pain and education. Policy implications for workforce development and public health are many, and amplification of palliative social work roles to relieve pain and suffering among seriously ill older adults at all stages of the chronic illness trajectory is needed.     

How a certain internal consistency entails the expected utility dogma

If I am coherent, in the sense that I can always replace any subset of outcomes by their certainty equivalent (occurring with the sum of their probabilities), then I must act according to the dogma of maximizing an Exp {U}, ruling out Machina [1982], Allais [1952], and Ysidro [1950] functionals.     

Kuhn's impossibility proof and the moral element in scientific explanations

Thomas S. Kuhn and others have arrived at the conclusion that at certain stages of investigation scientists cannot have recourse to criteria by which to justify their choices and actions. From this they have inferred that the choices made at these stages cannot be justified, leaving the impression that scientists may not be responsible for acting in some (sound, right, correct) as opposed to other (wrong, unsound, incorrect) ways in those circumstances. Kuhn's judgment is that in the last analysis it is so called subjective aesthetic considerations that will determine the actions taken.In this paper I argue that Kuhn fails to consider criteria of justification not provided by some field of science itself. He appears even to reject the possibility of invoking such field-invariant (S. Toulmin's term) criteria. He also seems to reject recourse to metaphysical first principles, without even giving these a polite perusal. Finally he does not allow for any possible moral element within these types of human activities - i.e., people faced with dilemmas in or out of science.I end by indicating how we might approach the Kuhnean type of choices and actions from within a moral perspective. The notion of acting as guided by moral rules is rejected since in stress cases the same problems occur here as do with paradigm selections namely we are left without rules. I suggest that the moral element consists, broadly, in exerting the effort needed to find solutions, in moral integrity, conscientiousness or the like. Mainly, however, I argue that how this moral element is to be characterized (identified) will in such cases have to await the occurrence of the dilemma and its solution. That is its uniqueness. But it does not exclude the possibility that once these cases have emerged, they should be discovered to require a given approach, not another. This, in turn, allows that the actions to be taken be justifiable and even that those who face the situation are responsible to discover how to act under the circumstances.     

Endogenous risk and protection premiums

Endogenous risk implies an individual perceives he can influence the likelihood that a state of nature will occur. To add structure to endogenous risk models, I define a protection premium for reduced uncertainty about protection efficiency when a stochastic variable enters the probability functionp(x) rather than the utility function. For a binary lottery, a measure of aversion of uncertain protection efficiency(x) =-p(x)/p(x) is defined to unambiguously determine the effects of increased risk on an individual's voluntary contribution to public good supply earmarked to reduce the probability of an undesirable state. Finally, I examine the protection premium in ann-state discrete lottery and when uncertainty exists in both the probability and utility function.     

Testing for juxtaposition and event-splitting effects

Regret theory predicts that choices over prospects will be systematically influenced by the juxtaposition of outcomes in the payoff matrix. Experiments have found apparent juxtaposition effects of this kind. However, these experiments have not controlled for event-splitting effects (ESEs), by which the subjective weight given to an outcome depends on the number of states of the world in which it occurs, as well as on their combined probability. An experiment is reported that tests independently for juxtaposition effects and ESEs. The results suggest that the apparent juxtaposition effects found in previous experiments are largely due to ESEs.The research reported in this article was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (award numbers R 00 23 2236 and R 000 23 2269) and by the Economics Research Centre of the University of East Anglia. We are grateful to Judith Mehta for help in carrying out the experiments, and to the editor and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. The idea that our previous experiments might have revealed event-splitting effects rather than juxtaposition effects was first suggested to us by Stephen Davies.