Do Rainfall Deficits Predict U.S.-Bound Migration from Rural Mexico? Evidence from the Mexican Census

Environmental and climatic changes have shaped human mobility for thousands of years and research on the migration-environment connection has proliferated in the past several years. Even so, little work has focused on Latin America or on international movement. Given rural Mexico’s dependency on primary sector activities involving various natural resources, and the existence of well-established transnational migrant networks, we investigate the association between rainfall patterns and U.S.-bound migration from rural locales, a topic of increasing policy relevance. The new economics of labor migration theory provides background, positing that migration represents a household-level risk management strategy. We use data from the year 2000 Mexican census for rural localities and socioeconomic and state-level precipitation data provided by the Mexican National Institute for Statistics and Geography. Multilevel models assess the impact of rainfall change on household-level international out-migration while controlling for relevant sociodemographic and economic factors. A decrease in precipitation is significantly associated with U.S.-bound migration, but only for dry Mexican states. This finding suggests that programs and policies aimed at reducing Mexico-U.S. migration should seek to diminish the climate/weather vulnerability of rural Mexican households, for example by supporting sustainable irrigation systems and subsidizing drought-resistant crops.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Returning to a New Mexican Labor Market? Regional Variation in the Economic Incorporation of Return Migrants from the U.S. to Mexico

Population Research and Policy Review - In recent years, a historically unprecedented number of Mexican migrants to the U.S. returned to Mexico. Compared to previous cohorts, recent return migrants...     

Do People Move When They Say They Will? Inconsistencies in Individual Migration Behavior

Conventional theories of migration decision–making posit that there exists a simple, sequential link between residential satisfaction, mobility intentions and actual moving behavior. Past empirical work, however, has indicated substantial discrepancies between mobility intentions and behavior. This study investigates behavioral inconsistencies in migration using data drawn from the 1985, 1987 and 1989 rounds of the American Housing Survey (AHS). Mobility is inferred by comparing occupants of the same housing units in two consecutive surveys. The results show that a substantial number of people do not realize their intention to move and many move unexpectedly; with or without prior intentions to move, movers and stayers appear to differ significantly in terms of their sociodemographic characteristics. The extent to which individuals act consistently with their intentions also differs along with their attributes (e.g., tenure, age, education and gender). The paper discusses possible reasons for behavioral inconsistencies in migration based on recent developments in social psychological theories of human behavior.     

The 1990 U.S. census: how good is good enough?

The 1990 US census is likely to be the most accurate in the nation's history, but it may miss 2 or 3 million people, most of them poor and many of them black or Hispanic. Because the population census is the basis for political apportionment and determines the allocation of a growing share of federal funds to localities and public programs, undercoverage is of great concern to cities, states, and the groups most affected. The statistical methods developed to measure the extent of undercounting in the census have become increasingly reliable, but the official census count has never before been adjusted on the basis of these methods. This article describes plans for the 1990 census and examines a growing controversy over adjustment for an undercount.     

Does the Hispanic Paradox in U.S. Adult Mortality Extend to Disability?

Studies consistently document a Hispanic paradox in U.S. adult mortality, whereby Hispanics have similar or lower mortality rates than non-Hispanic whites despite lower socioeconomic status. This study extends this line of inquiry to disability, especially among foreign-born Hispanics, since their advantaged mortality seemingly should be paired with health advantages more generally. We also assess whether the paradox extends to U.S.-born Hispanics to evaluate the effect of nativity. We calculate multistate life tables of life expectancy with disability to assess whether racial/ethnic and nativity differences in the length of disability-free life parallel differences in overall life expectancy. Our results document a Hispanic paradox in mortality for foreign-born and U.S.-born Hispanics. However, Hispanics’ low mortality rates are not matched by low disability rates. Their disability rates are substantially higher than those of non-Hispanic whites and generally similar to those of non-Hispanic blacks. The result is a protracted period of disabled life expectancy for Hispanics, both foreign- and U.S.-born.     

How responsive is U.S. population growth to immigration? A situational sensitivity analysis

There has been public concern about the effect of immigration on population growth in the U.S. But how responsive is population growth to immigration? This paper examines the sensitivity of intrinsic population growth to immigration and situates such sensitivity in fertility and survival changes. The application of second derivatives on a modified Leslie matrix facilitates the analysis of situational sensitivity of U.S. population growth to immigration. The results show that the sensitivity to immigration is not as influential as the sensitivity to fertility, and that the sensitivity to immigration further depends on changes in fertility and survival.     

Left Out? Lesbian,Gay, and Bisexual Poverty in the U.S.

This paper analyzes the risk of poverty for self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people from mid-2013 through 2016 in the National Health Interview Survey, a nationally representative survey of households that includes a sexual orientation question based on identity (n = 112,143). The study tests the role of family structure—living with a spouse or partner and having children—on the risk of poverty for LGB and heterosexual respondents. After controlling for education, demographic, and health measures in a probit model, lesbians and gay men are as likely to be poor as similar heterosexuals, but bisexual women and men are significantly more likely to be poor, regardless of relationship status. Single and childless gay men are also more likely to be poor than single heterosexual men. Being in a relationship reduces the likelihood of poverty for people of all sexual orientations, but the data show evidence of a gender composition effect: married male same-sex couples are less likely and unmarried female same-sex couples more likely to be poor than their married counterparts. Marriage reduces gay men’s poverty risk more and children increase their poverty risk less than for heterosexual men.     

U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

User Beware: Concerning Findings from the Post 2011–2012 U.S. Internal Revenue Service Migration Data

Population Research and Policy Review - The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) makes publicly and freely available period migration data at the state and county levels. Among their uses, these...     

Is the fertility of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans converging to the U.S. norm?

This paper examines the process of assimilation in fertility behavior for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the US, using census-based estimates of recent fertility trends for the period 1965-1980. The authors examine fertility trends for all Asians and all Pacific Islanders, and separately for Asian Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Guamanians, Hawaiians, and Samoans. The authors also examine, for each of these groups, differential fertility by urban-rural residence, educational attainment, nativity, and year of immigration if foreign-born. The fertility of most Asian and Pacific Islander groups in the US fell substantially between 1965 and 1980, as did the fertility of the US population as a whole. The fertility of most Asian groups was initially lower than that of most Pacific Islander groups. Most Asian groups experienced fertility trends not much different from those of the US as a whole. In contrast, most Pacific Islander groups experienced faster than average fertility decline, thereby showing some evidence of assimilation toward the US fertility norm. Differential fertility conformed to familiar patterns; urban fertility tended to be lower than rural fertility. The fertility of the more-educated tended to be lower than the fertility of the less-educated. The fertility of the native-born tended to be lower than the fertility of the foreign-born. The fertility of established migrants tended to be lower than the fertility of recent migrants. Fertility tended to fall not only for each racial group as a whole, but also for each socioeconomic category.     

Educational selectivity in U.S. Immigration: How do immigrants compare to those left behind?

Current immigration research has revealed little about how immigrants compare to those who do not migrate. Although most scholars agree that migrants are not random samples of their home countries' populations, the direction and degree of educational selectivity is not fully understood. This study of 32 U.S. immigrant groups found that although nearly all immigrants are more educated than those who remain in their home countries, immigrants vary substantially in their degree of selectivity, depending upon the origin country and the timing of migration. Uncovering patterns of immigrant selectivity reveals the fallacy in attributing immigrants' characteristics to national groups as a whole and may help explain socioeconomic differences among immigrant groups in the United States.     

“It’s a Horrible Sin. If They Find Out,I Will Not be Able to Stay”: Orthodox Jewish Gay Men’s Experiences Living in Secrecy

This qualitative study examined the intersection of sexual orientation and religion in the Jewish Orthodox community by exploring 22 Orthodox Jewish gay men’s experiences living in secrecy. Analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with these men revealed four primary themes: emotional turmoil, ways of coping, impact on family relationships, and importance of the context. Findings from this study describe the daily struggles these men experienced keeping their homosexuality a secret. The findings suggest that in order to design effective interventions with this population, it is crucial to consider the larger community and religious context.     

More Than One Million New American Indians in 2000: Who Are They?

More than one million people reported their race as American Indian/Alaska Native (AIAN) in the 2000 U.S. census but did not do so in the 1990 census. We ask three questions. First, which subgroups had the greatest numerical growth? Second, which subgroups had the greatest proportional increase? And third, are the 2000 single-race AIANs and the 1990 AIANs the same set of people? We use full-count and high-density decennial census data; adjust for birth, death, and immigration; decompose on age, gender, Latino origin, education, and birth state; and compare the observed subgroup sizes in 2000 with the sizes expected based on 1990 counts. The largest numerical increases were among adolescent and middle-aged non-Latinos, non-Latino women, and adults with no college degree. Latinos, women, highly educated adults, and people born in Eastern states had the largest proportionate gains. The ability to report multiple races in 2000 and the new federal definition of “American Indian” may have especially affected these groups, although personal-identity changes are probably also involved. We find that thousands of new Latino AIANs reported only one race in 2000, but many 1990 AIANs reported multiple races in 2000. Thus, the 1990 AIANs and 2000 single-race AIANs are not always the same individuals.     

Immigrant residential segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1990–2000

This paper examines the extent of spatial assimilation among immigrants of different racial and ethnic origins. We use restricted data from the 1990 and 2000 censuses to calculate the levels of dissimilarity by race and Hispanic origin, nativity, and year of entry, and then run multivariate models to examine these relationships. The findings provide broad support for spatial assimilation theory. Foreign-born Hispanics, Asians, and blacks are more segregated from native-born non-Hispanic whites than are the U.S.-born of these groups. The patterns for Hispanics and Asians can be explained by the average characteristics of the foreign-born that are generally associated with higher levels of segregation, such as lower levels of income, English language ability, and home ownership. We also find that immigrants who have been in the United States for longer periods are generally less segregated than new arrivals, and once again, much of this difference can be attributed to the characteristics of immigrants. However, patterns also vary across groups. Levels of segregation are much higher for black immigrants than for Asian, Hispanic, and white immigrants. In addition, because black immigrants are, on average, of higher socioeconomic status than native-born blacks, such characteristics do not help explain their very high levels of segregation.     

The Benefits of Educational Attainment for U.S. Adult Mortality: Are they Contingent on the Broader Environment?

The growing recognition that educational attainment is one of the strongest preventive factors for adult health and longevity has fueled an interest in educational attainment as a population health strategy. However, less attention has been given to identifying social, economic, and behavioral resources that may moderate the health and longevity benefits of education. We draw on theories of resource substitution and multiplication to examine the extent to which the education–mortality association is contingent on other resources (marriage, employment, income, healthy lifestyles). We use data on adults aged 30–84 in the 1997–2006 National Health Interview Survey Linked Mortality File and estimate discrete-time event history models stratified by gender (N = 146,558; deaths = 10,399). We find that the mortality benefits of education are generally largest for adults—especially women—who have other resources such as employment and marriage, supporting the theory of resource multiplication. Nonetheless, our results also imply that other resources can potentially attenuate the mortality disadvantages (advantages) associated with low (high) levels of education. The findings suggest that efforts to improve population health and longevity by raising education levels should be augmented with strategies that assure widespread access to social, economic, and behavioral resources.     

Social indicators of marital instability,U.S.A., 1920–1969

A social indicators model which included demographic variables (birth rate and aged child ratio), economic variable (unemployment) and marriage rates (control variable) was utilized in explaining changes in divorce rates over time. Analysis of time series data for two distinctive periods in the U.S.A. (1920–1940 and 1946–1969) revealed the following significant results:

1. Demographic changes in the age structure of the population while controlling for marriage rates explains significantly larger amounts of the variance in marital instability than economic changes alone (unemployment).
2. In the post-World War II era unemployment was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of marital instability when control for demographic changes were established.
3. In the post-World War II era marriage rates appear to be a significant predictor of divorce rates when control for demographic changes were maintained.
4. In the post-World War II era marriage rates were found to be more sensitive to changes in economic conditions than marital instability (divorce rate).