Gender Inequality and Economic Growth in Rural China

This article joins the debate over the effect of market-driven economic development on women's work opportunities and household gender inequalities. It assesses women's opportunities for off-farm employment, the relative contributions of female off-farm workers to household income, and the distribution of power in families whose male members have left for off-farm jobs, leaving women behind in agricultural work. We find that women are not uniformly excluded from opportunities for off-farm employment and that economic development does not uniformly increase gender inequalities within Chinese households. Although men are more likely than women to obtain off-farm employment in China, women's opportunities for off-farm work improve significantly when the coexistence of local and regional marketization creates a shortage of male workers and compels employers to hire women. The relative size of contributions to household income for male and female nonfarm workers also narrows incrementally with increased marketization. In addition, women who are left in agricultural work are more likely to become heads of household, a position which brings greater household decision-making power to female family members.     

蒙古族题材影视艺术的美学力量——从蒙古族导演麦丽丝的影片《圣地额济纳》谈起

凡是"好看"的民族题材影视作品,都是因其传递了对"每一个人"切身体验的关怀而显现其美学力量的。譬如,面对利益如何取舍,是每一个人都会时常遇到的问题;面对关乎生存的大利大益如何取舍,也是每个人一生中难免遇到的问题。蒙古族题材影视艺术正是通过"利益取舍"这个事关人性的问题,来揭示不同民族的不同性格,不同性格支配的不同行为,以及不同行为折射出来的不同境界,以激发观众审美兴趣的。     

我国地方政府决策程序中实然与应然的矛盾及现实进路

改革开放以来,地方决策权的扩大调动了地方政府处理公共事务的主动性、积极性。但与此同时,地方政府在决策时出现的程序问题也不容忽视,其中,决策程序的实然与应然的矛盾十分突出。这是由于我国重结果轻程序的传统所导致的,在这种情况下,决策问题的提出、方案的设计、专家咨询论证制度、决策利益主体参与的听证会制度等都被忽略或者流于形式。探究地方政府决策程序中实然与应然的矛盾。可以为地方政府更好地进行决策、维护公众利益寻找现实进路。     

2000年以来我国外国游客的人口社会特征及其消费情况分析

外国旅游人口是我国旅游人群的一个重要群体,在我国旅游外汇收入中发挥着重要作用。文章利用我国旅游统计数据,对我国外国旅游人口社会特征和经济行为进行分析。2000年以来,到我国旅游的外国游客规模不断上升,他们多以男性、中青年为主,其旅游目的主要是观光休闲和会议商务。这些游客的交通方式主要为飞机、徒步和汽车,入境的时间比较均衡,游客的客源地和在我国的分布都非常集中,并且在消费上存在性别、年龄、职业和地区之间的明显差异。     

Cumulative advantage in collective action groups: How competition for group members alters the provision of public goods

Research on collective action problems and the provision of public goods has yielded an array of important insights into why people sacrifice for their groups, but ignores the processes that bring people into those groups in the first place. The literature is also silent on the fact that groups providing similar public goods often compete with one another to attract new members. We extend the reach of theories of collective action problems to bring them to bear on these interrelated issues. Results from four experiments support our predictions about when group members compete to attract new adherents by sacrificing more for group goals. Further, we find that prospective members join more productive groups at much higher rates and then contribute to them at high levels. These processes give way to cumulative advantage, whereby initially productive groups continually attract new members. Thus competition for members can yield large inequalities in the size and success of collective action groups.     

A comparison of network sampling designs for a hidden population of drug users: Random walk vs. respondent-driven sampling

Both random walk and respondent-driven sampling (RDS) exploit social networks and may reduce biases introduced by earlier methods for sampling from hidden populations. Although RDS has become much more widely used by social researchers than random walk (RW), there has been little discussion of the tradeoffs in choosing RDS over RW. This paper compares experiences of implementing RW and RDS to recruit drug users to a network-based study in Houston, Texas. Both recruitment methods were implemented over comparable periods of time, with the same population, by the same research staff. RDS methods recruited more participants with less strain on staff. However, participants recruited through RW were more forthcoming than RDS participants in helping to recruit members of their social networks. Findings indicate that, dependent upon study goals, researchers' choice of design may influence participant recruitment, participant commitment, and impact on staff, factors that may in turn affect overall study success.     

An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem

An experiment was conducted to test propositions drawn from a theory of rational decision-making propounded by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action. From Olson's theory it was hypothesized that: (1) Given only a public good to be achieved, the contributions from individuals in an operational equivalent of a large group will be smaller than the contributions from individuals in a small group. (2) Given that certain individuals' actions are not effective toward obtaining a public good, the contributions from those individuals in a condition in which a private good is also provided-but made contingent upon the individuals making a contribution to the public good-will be larger than the contribution from those individuals in a condition in which no private good is provided. Because Olson's theory presumes an informational input from a group context, two propositions regarding reference groups and individuals were also tested: (3) Individuals will contribute less toward a group goal when their actions are anonymous than when their performances are reviewed by a reference person. (4) Individuals who perceive that many of the members of their reference group are making large contributions toward a group goal will themselves make larger contributions than individuals who perceive that many of their reference group are making small contributions, ceteris paribus. (This last proposition is potentially inconsistent with Olson's theory.) The results of the experiment support propositions (1) and (2) and partially support proposition (3) but the results do not support proposition (4).The experiment demonstrates that the so-called free-rider phenomenon may be produced in the laboratory under controlled conditions and also that the extent of the phenomenon may be varied under laboratory conditions. Further the experiment suggests that the amount of contributions which group members are willing to make may be only indirectly affected by the size of the group through the medium of “perceived effectiveness” of an individual's contributory efforts.     

中国古代制度保廉论

制度文明是中国传统政治文化的重要组成部分。文章从匡正君王失误的朝议谏诤制度、择优防腐的选官制度、抑制官吏勾结营私的回避制度、纠弹官吏紊失的监察制度、奖勤罚懒的考绩制度、厚俸养廉制度等六个方面分析了中国古代这些制度对当时廉政建设的作用。     

The compliance you need for a cost you can afford: How to use individual and collective sanctions?

In many naturally occurring situations, actors (agents) use individual sanctions or collective sanctions or both to obtain compliance from members of a group. Individual sanctions are sanctions applied to each individual based on that individual’s perceived behavior; collective sanctions are sanctions to all group members based on perceived behavior by some group members. Often, there are constraints on the amount of sanctions an agent may use. I use Heckathorn’s (1990) sequential decision model of group-mediated social control to analyze the power of an agent concerning compliance by group members under such constraints. Results show that whether positive or negative sanctions are considered, the amount of group compliance is an increasing but non-linear step function of the looseness of the constraints. Moreover, it appears that the most cost-effective use of power entails using only collective sanctions when lower levels of compliance are sought, only individual sanctions when higher levels of compliance are sought, and never mixing the two.     

商会的产生机理:一个利他主义的解释

对于只提供集体公共产品的商会来说,如果行业内的企业都是利己主义者,且加入商会完全自愿,则"搭便车"的行为会使得集体行动无法实现,商会的发生机制亦将成为难解之迷。假如行业中存在利他主义的企业,其利他行为将使其他企业意识到行业的共同利益,从而抑制各自的机会主义倾向。利他主义者的存在起到了一种"凝结核"的作用,他们除了付出物质上的代价去增进行业的共同利益外,还会付出时间和精力去游说其他企业,推动行业的集体行动。多数行业的市场结构是不完全竞争的,企业规模参差不齐,一些规模较大的企业对于通过集体行动来获得合作剩余有着更强烈的需求,为了增进自身利益和整个集团的利益,这些规模较大的企业会成为商会的发起人。     

价值一元论下的经济社会基本矛盾分析

从价值一元论出发,我们能够相对较严密地解释和剖析人类社会中围绕利益而演化出来的矛盾运动规律。这种剖析是利己和利他并存的价值二元论无法做到的。价值二元论存在内在矛盾,价值一元论是经济逻辑的必然要求。利益可分成生理利益和心理利益,价值一元论可以把利他和利己整合到一起。社会秩序是人类和平而稳定地生活的保障,社会秩序所界定的人与物之间的利益关系就是权利。权力系统界定、维持及改变社会秩序,权力系统运行的效果直接影响社会经济发展的效率。     

转型期城市空间博弈中的媒介角色思考

实践空间层面上的城市空间生产是对特定时期社会关系的客观反映,是社会上多个利益主体博弈的过程和结果。空间的如何建构不仅能动而又全面的反映着财富、资本、利益、社会地位、生活质量的阶层偏移,而且还反映在话语权上的转移。当今中国正处在前所未有的巨大社会转型浪潮之中,在经济持续高速增长的表层繁荣下,内部阶层间的收入差距愈发加剧,两极分化日趋严重,这直接导致各利益主体参与博弈的资本愈发悬殊。而失败的一方又会因资本的缺乏而进一步失去天然上应属于自己的话语权。如何在转型期把握好自己的角色定位,正确履行好自己的与生俱来的使命是媒体应当考虑的重大问题。     

浅析人才为本和以人为本

科学发展要以人才为本,人才工作要以人为本。以人为本是指对人的尊重,把人作为价值标准,尊重人的权利和需要,实现人的发展。尊重人的权利,就是在程序中贯彻民主原则。尊重人的需要,就是维护人们的合法权益,实现机会公平和程序正义。促进人的发展,要增加体制的开放性,让人们在自由竞争中成材,在自由流动中提高自身价值。当代应当提倡个性解放,支持人们发展兴趣,实现人的全面自由发展。     

“以人为本”的理论与实践

国家具有阶级性和社会性,在实践上体现为国家的政治统治和社会管理两种职能。执政党除了自己阶级和阶层的＂狭隘利益＂外,还必须履行一定的公共职能。＂以人为本＂在政党层面和国家层面具有一定区别。＂以人为本＂,就是要做到：维护最广大劳动人民的权益;严格党员标准,永远保持党的先进性;科学执政、民主执政,推进社会主义民主法制;高度重视、充分尊重和保障新社会阶层的合法权益。     

关于哈贝马斯公共领域理论的阐释与探析

公共领域处在公共权力领域和私人领域的中间地带,主要是对涉及公众普遍利益的事务向公共权力机关提出批判,形成公众舆论。哈贝马斯提出的公共领域理论在大力发展社会主义民主和法制的中国具有研究和借鉴的意义。     

权力实践与政治象征

政治生活中权力的争夺不局限于取得物质利益的支配权,在更深的层面是追求精神领域的支配权。精神上的联系使大家形成一个新的社会共同体,成员间共享相同的信念和价值观。广泛存在于大众生活中的政治象征满足了人们的这种社会和精神需要。从权力的角度,透过其多样的表现形式揭示出政治象征的实质是政治在精神领域的权力实践,其研究向度是政治权力本身。权力精英们通过政治象征的运用塑造了政治领袖、掌握着政治话语的解释权、操纵着各类政治仪式。通过意义的阐述和价值的构建,实现了为权力提供合法性论证和辩护的核心目的。     

试论公司瑕疵决议制度

公司股东(大)会决议、董事会决议存在各种情形的瑕疵,这种情况在大多数公司的运营中较为普遍。当公司机关在作出决议的内容和程序上有瑕疵时,就有可能侵害到股东或公司的权益。为了维护股东或公司的合法权益,就有必要对相关决议的效力作出法律评价并给予权利主体一定的权利救济。全面阐述公司瑕疵决议的常见类型、救济方式及其对公司内外部的法律影响等问题,对司法实践将有所助益。     

论我国公安机关侦查职权的合理配置

基于侦查价值多元化的考量,现代刑事诉讼中的侦查程序并非仅是行使侦查权的载体,而是与侦查活动有关的多种职权相互协调的过程。因此,只有对侦查程序中的各种职权予以合理配置,才能达到既保障侦查权的充分行使,又能够对侦查权进行必要制约的目的。     

哈耶克论市场服务的动力与调适

在市场服务中,服务者的主观目标和动因是个人目的和个人利益,企业所考虑的也是自身的收益和利润。追求个人目的和利润之行为不仅是应当的,而且具有正当价值;允许个人按自己的愿望和利益行动,允许人们追求自身目的,也不是自私自利。只承认客观结果意义上的利他人或小团体中的利他主义是不够的,市场服务中也存在目的意义上的利他精神。市场系统和一般抽象规则是调节个人服务行为的两类方式,对规则的遵从是调适之核心。     

建立公共权力监督与制约机制的思考和建议

从决策和执行等环节加强对行政权力的监督,保证把人民赋予的权力真正用来为人民谋利益。这既是当前我国政治体制改革的重要内容,也是防止腐败,做到标本兼治,正确运用行政权力的一个重要举措。当前在行政运行中存在的问题,必须加快政府职能转变,优化权力运行配置,健全权力运行规则,完善权力运行制度和加强权力运行监督。