Guilt and shame: an axiomatic analysis

Using the machinery of Game Theory, this article analyzes how shame and guilt affect preferences. Based on abundant psychological literature, we posit that the preference ordering of someone who can feel shame (or guilt) must satisfy a number of axioms and prove that it can be represented by a particular utility function. Understanding how shame and guilt work is important to explain why people respect social norms and exhibit prosocial behavior, many times contrary to their material interest.     

An axiomatic system for multidimensional preferences

An axiomatic system TP is developed which allows the amalgamation of linear preferences (preferences in respect to different criteria) according to the weights of those criteria. Section 1 deals with linear preferences. In Section 2 an axiomatic system for the ordering of classes of criteria is formulated. Section 3 explains the development of system TP. Two TP-systems are distinguished, based on two different linear preference systems. The preference relation of TP is shown to be nontransitive, while the linear preference relation is transitive. In 3.7 an alternative-system TP′ is given. Section 3.8 deals with formulas concerning the disjunction of alternatives, which are not valid in TP, even though they are valid in a linear preference system. In Section 4 types of preference relations and types of alternatives are distinguished to get the opportunity to express preferences between preferences.     

A new axiomatic foundation of partial comparability

The paper presents some results obtained in searching for a new axiomatic foundation for partial comparability (PC) in the frame of non-conventional preference modeling. The basic idea is to define an extended preference structure able to represent lack of information, uncertainty, ambiguity, multidimensional and conflicting preferences, using formal logic as the basic formalism.A four-valued paraconsistent logic is therefore described in the paper as a more suitable language for the purposes of the research. The concepts of partition, general binary relations properties, fundamental relational system of preferences (f.r.s.p.), maximal f.r.s.p. and well founded f.r.s.p. are then introduced and some theorems are demonstrated in order to provide the axiomatic foundation of PC. The main result obtained is a preference structure that is a maximal well founded f.r.s.p. This preference structure facilitates a more flexible, reliable and robust preference modeling. Moreover it can be viewed as a generalization of the conventional approach, so that all the results obtained until now can be used under it.Two examples are provided at the end of the paper in order to give an account of the operational potentialities of the new theory, mainly in the area of multicriteria decision aid and social choice theory. Further research directions conclude the paper.This research has been done while the first author was in the Université Libre de Bruxelles under the Research in Brussels actions.     

A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion

This paper takes the Anscombe–Aumann framework with horse and roulette lotteries, and applies the Savage axioms to the horse lotteries and the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms to the roulette lotteries. The resulting representation of preferences yields a subjective probability measure over states and two utility functions, one governing risk attitudes and one governing ambiguity attitudes. The model is able to accommodate the Ellsberg paradox and preferences for reductions in ambiguity.     

Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.     

An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept

The purpose of this paper is to analyze axiomatically the Nash equilibrium concept. The class of games under study is a (relatively large) subclass of n-person normal form games. Solutions are correspondences which associate to each game a non empty set of strategy vectors of this game. It is shown that if a solution satisfies the axioms Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Individual rationality (IR), then all the strategy vectors in this solution are Nash equilibria. This result holds good also if IR is replaced by Strong individual monotonicity (SIM) or Weak principle of fair compromise (WPFC).     

On the gearing adjustment. An axiomatic approach

The gearing adjustment is approached axiomatically. The gearing adjustment defines a capital maintenance concept; the revaluation criteria compatible with it are investigated. It is proved that one and only one kind of revaluation criterion is compatible with the gearing adjustment.     

Financial inclusion in India: An axiomatic approach

In this paper we first develop an axiomatic measure of financial inclusion. This measure is readily implementable and useful to determine policy priorities to promote financial inclusion. Next, we demonstrate that supply side data on banking services can be usefully employed to measure financial inclusion. Third, we examine the effects of major banking policies on financial inclusion across states in India during 1972–2009, using panel data econometrics techniques. We find that the social-banking policy has played crucial role to foster financial inclusion across states in India during 1977–1990. Thereafter, the move toward pro-market financial sector reform has adversely affected the pace of financial inclusion. This paper identifies geographic penetration of banks and credit availability as two policy targets to foster financial inclusion in India.     

Choice under risk and the security factor: An axiomatic model

The particular attention paid by decision makers to the security level ensured by each decision under risk, which is responsible for the certainty effect, can be taken into account by weakening the independence and continuity axioms of expected utility theory. In the resulting model, preferences depend on: (i) the security level, (ii) the expected utility, offered by each decision. Choices are partially determined by security level comparison and completed by the maximization of a function, which express the existing tradeoffs between expected utility and security level, and is, at a given security level, an affine function of the expected utility. In the model, risk neutrality at a given security level implies risk aversion.     

An axiomatic basis of accounting: A structuralist reconstruction

Set-theoretic axiomatizations are given for a model of accounting with double classification, and a general core-model for accounting. The empirical status, and representational role of systems of accounts, as well as the problem of how to assign correct values to the goods accounted, are analyzed in precise terms. A net of special laws based on the core-model is described.     

Ranking sets additively in decisional contexts: an axiomatic characterization

Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this article. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations in the literature. The focus of the article is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn (1996), Journal of Mathematical Psychology 40, 64–77 showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to characterize such a family has no upper bound as the cardinality of X increases. In turn, this article proposes a way to overcome these difficulties and allows for the characterization of a meaningful (sub)family of additively representable rankings of sets by means of a few simple axioms. Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990), Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56, 383–390) characterization of the cardinality-based rule will be derived from our main result, and other new rules that stem from our general proposal are discussed and characterized in even simpler terms. In particular, we analyze restricted-cardinality based rules, where the set of “focal” elements is not given ex-ante; but brought out by the axioms.      

An axiomatic derivation of subjective probability,utility, and evaluation functions

Subjective expected utility maximization is derived from four axioms, using an argument based on the separating hyperplane theorem. It is also shown that the first three of these axioms imply a more general maximization formula, involving an evaluation function, which can still serve as a basis for decision analysis.     

An integrated axiomatic approach to the existence of ordinal and cardinal utility functions

Summary This paper presents a unified axiomatic treatment of the existence of ordinal and cardinal utility functions. The contribution of the paper is mainly pedagogical.     

道德原则与道德重构

社会主义市场经济条件下的道德原则应包括三方面内容 :尊重和发展个性的原则 ,公利的原则和和谐的原则。在此基础上 ,建构出具有现代意义的高度发达高度文明的新的经济和价值观念模式 ,正是当代哲学伦理学存在之意义所在     

An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting

This article is an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking game forms in terms of the predictability they offer to individuals. Two criteria are proposed and characterized, the CardMin and the CardMax. Both compare game forms on the basis of the number of distinct outcomes that can result from the choice of a CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy. The CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy is defined as a strategy leading to the smallest (resp. highest) number of different outcomes. In both cases, the lower these numbers the better the game form.     

道德个体的孤独与道德权威的尴尬

面对当前的社会道德生活,无论是鼓噪道德正在复苏,还是惊呼道德已滑入万劫不复的深渊,无不表明我们的社会道德已陷入异常的困境,集中表现为道德个体的孤独与道德权威的尴尬.道德个体的孤独反映的是一种内指型道德困境,而道德权威的尴尬意在表达一种外指型道德环境资源困境.积极向外寻求依托制度伦理的力量以加强外指型道德环境资源的权威性,从而解决内指型道德个体的孤独,最终实现道德个体与社会道德博弈中的互惠共享,增强道德的力量.     

Rawls versus Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem

The decision rules yielded respectively by the Rawlsian maximin conception of justice and by classical utilitarianism are compared and contrasted. The discussion is based on the assumption of a pure distribution problem and sharp differences are brought out. An axiomatic analysis of the two conceptions is undertaken, the result of which is that Rawls and utilitarianism both omit essential aspects of distributional welfare judgments: Rawls leaves out questions of welfare differences, utilitarianism leaves out questions of welfare levels. It is possible to pay attention to the ranking of welfare levels without concentrating exclusively on the welfare levels of worst off persons only, thereby departing from both Bentham and Rawls.I have benefited from the comments of Partha Dasgupta.     

道德信仰：道德建设的本质与方法

信仰是道德的基本特性。把道德提升到信仰高度来建设,使之具有相对独立的信仰价值,有利于扩大群众基础,增进社会的稳定与和谐,有利于巩固我们党的执政地位,并与社会的政治信仰形成遥相呼应的互动格局。道德信仰包含了对道德的信仰与对善的终极追求两方面内容。解决信仰什么和为什么信仰的问题,可使道德成为一种终极的价值追求。道德信仰的养成需要全社会的关注,既需要从道德体系上完善道德信仰理论,又需要政府政策性的公共引导,同时还需要创设仪式化的社会生活氛围使之加以巩固与强化。